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History of Ukraine

Monograph



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NOTICE TO THE READER
BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
S. V. LAVROV

Dear reader,

This is a monograph on the History of Ukraine by a team of Russian historians and publicists. The authors touch upon a topic that is relevant in today's context, the comprehension of the stages of historical development of the lands that make up modern Ukraine.

It is no secret that the longstanding efforts of Ukrainian national radicals and their Western mentors have created and continue to create a huge number of historical myths and falsifications. False interpretations of history lead to the misconception in the public mind that Ukraine developed separately from Russia. The aim is clear: by denying the unity of Ukrainians and Russians to set the two brotherly peoples against each other, to demonise modern Russia as a successor state to the USSR. The sad consequence of such a policy is only the repudiation of the common past, the traditions of good neighbourliness and even — for many Russians born and raised in Ukraine — of their mother tongue.

It is for this reason that the preservation, and if necessary, the restoration, of historical truth is particularly in demand today. This monograph is intended to contribute to this noble effort. It is based on a comprehensive, serious analysis of the emergence of modern Ukraine. This research work provides a better understanding of the origins of many current events and processes.

I am sure that the publication will be of great interest not only to historians, but also to a wide range of readers.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

S. V. Lavrov

FOREWORD

The history of Ukraine, despite the great scientific interest of both domestic and foreign historians, is still a complex and understudied subject of research. Political interests and ideological doctrines have had an impact on the work of researchers. A significant number of works, especially those produced recently in the West and Ukraine, are politicised, unscientific and based on deliberate distortion of historical facts, anti-Russian speculation and falsification. For example, ideas about the ancient Ukrainian nation, the state of “Rus-Ukraine”, the “Ukrainian” Princess Anna Yaroslavna and the centuries-long struggle of the Ukrainian people against “Russian colonial aggression” become the focus of attention. There is a blatant falsification of history, substitution of facts or their arbitrary interpretation in such historical subjects as, for example, the Baturyn massacre or the Holodomor. Any connection with Russian culture, the Russian language and the Russian people is denied.

Unfortunately, the historical truth about the unity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples has been sacrificed to the ambitions of Kiev’s politicians and the geopolitical interests of Western states aimed at separating Ukraine from Russia and turning Ukraine into an outpost of the West against Russia. In this respect, one cannot but agree with the views of Russian President Vladimir Putin: “Step by step, Ukraine was dragged into a dangerous geopolitical game aimed at turning Ukraine into a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia. Inevitably, there came a time when the concept of ‘Ukraine is not Russia’ was no longer an option.

There was a need for the ‘anti-Russia’ concept which we will never accept”¹.

The commonality of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples is not in doubt and is a scientific fact. The collective monograph “History of Ukraine” is based precisely on this objective scientific foundation. The merit of the work is the accurate adherence to historical facts, a comprehensive and detailed research of historical events, the desire for an objective and unbiased analysis of all, including the most dramatic and acute pages of Ukrainian history. The book covers political as well as economic, social and cultural aspects of history.

The monograph allows to form a holistic understanding of the history of Ukraine from the pre-state period to the present day, based on the most significant historical events that played a major role in Ukrainian history.

An important and undoubtedly positive aspect of the work seems to be the consideration of Ukrainian history in its inseparable and close connection to Russian history, as part of Russian history. The territories that formed part of the Ukrainian SSR in 1922–1954 and then the Ukrainian state in 1991 have different ethnic composition and history. However, most of these territories were, for more than a thousand years of history, the southwestern part of the Russian lands, linked culturally, linguistically and religiously to Russia. The period of foreign domination and occupation of these lands by Lithuania, Poland, and Austria-Hungary, forced attempts to change the cultural and religious identity expressed in Polonisation and Catholicisation, and development of Uniatism, nevertheless, did not lead to separation of ties between Russian lands which provided grounds for reunification later, in the 17th–18th centuries, within the common state, the Russian Empire.

The history of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people during the Soviet period is also remarkable. As part of the USSR, this union republic, despite the destruction and suffering of the people during the Great Patriotic War, acquired a strong economic base, the impressive development of cities and villages, science and culture, the true flowering of ethno-national self-consciousness, while maintaining the historical

¹ *Putin V. V.* On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> (accessed: 29/09/2022).

and cultural distinctiveness of its regions. The publication in the 1970s of the 26-volume *History of Cities and Villages of the Ukrainian SSR*, which won the USSR State Prize for Science, is one example of this. In 1982 there was a major national celebration of the 1,500th anniversary of the city of Kiev, the “mother of all Russian cities”.

Unfortunately, the post-Soviet development of Ukrainian statehood was based not on the principles of federalism and official Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism — the only acceptable option for nation-building in a country with such a complex ethnic composition and regional identity — but on the ideology of exclusive Ukrainian ethno-nationalism with all its extremes of neo-Nazism, Russophobia and anti-Semitism. It was this policy and the accompanying humiliation and violence that led the Russian-speaking population of Crimea and the southeastern regions of Ukraine to choose their living arrangements and security in favour of the Russian Federation. In a tragic situation of already open conflict, crucially instigated by the “collective West”, relations between the two peoples have been put to new tests, and attempts to break the unity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples have now acquired a new dynamic. These attempts urge us to restore and defend the historical truth. This is what this book aims to do.

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences

V.A. Tishkov

The History of Ukraine monograph, prepared by a team of authors led by M. S. Grigoriev, deals with a very topical issue of the common historical past of our nations. This commonality is being denied in modern Ukraine to the benefit of the policy of rejection and opposition of the Ukrainian people to Russia. Attempts to depict the history of Ukraine outside Russia, moreover, to present the mythical “Ukraine-Rus” as the antipode of Ancient Rus’ and Russia have unfortunately entered the school curriculum in modern Ukraine and have seriously distorted the historical memory of modern Ukrainians.

Therefore, the work offered to the reader, in which the need to study the historical past of Russia and Ukraine and the cultural and historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians is brought up to date on a purely scientific level, is extremely relevant. It is about, as Russian President Vladimir Putin noted, “our spiritual, human and civilizational ties formed for centuries... hardened by common trials, achievements and victories”.

The central theme of the monograph is the unity of Russians and Ukrainians at all stages of our shared history, striving to overcome the political division that emerged in the 13th-14th centuries, the role of representatives of the Ukrainian people in the all-Russian history, culture and science, the defence of the common Homeland.

The monograph fills the gap in research on the history of Ukraine that is obvious for contemporary Russian historical science. It is especially worth mentioning the participation of representatives of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics in the authoring team, which made it possible to form common approaches to the study of

the regions of southern Russia and to identify features of the historical development of the lands of Novorossiia and Donbas. The book's undoubted merits include a critical analysis of anti-scientific concepts prevalent in contemporary Ukrainian and Western historiography.

The collective work "History of Ukraine" is an important step in understanding the common historical heritage of our peoples and will serve as a good basis for further scientific research.

Director of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, Doctor of History, Professor

Yu. A. Petrov

Contemporary historical science is systematically confronted with the fundamental challenge of actively intervening in the field of knowledge about the past in what is called politics of memory. These politics today are not solely about the control of national elites over the institutions of historical knowledge production, the education system, the media and the social mechanisms for preserving and disseminating cultural memory. The structure of contemporary historical knowledge and education is largely disoriented by the fact that there are many different players involved in its acquisition and transmission, such as international foundations, public organisations and private individuals. Information exchange has become global and super-fast, but also poorly verifiable and virtually uncontrollable. This global information infrastructure has made it possible to use politics of memory in the geopolitical interests of major powers, particularly those in the West, who use so-called “soft power” technologies to control the mass consciousness of not just individual social groups or even the population of their countries, but of the world’s information consumers. The consequences of this global politicisation of world history and the history of particular regions and states are likely to be dealt with objectively by future generations of historians. And now, the historical community, particularly in Russia, has to respond to the massive invasion of historical mythology, “strong” historical concepts, ideological interpretations and “grand narratives”, sometimes reacting vigorously to this or that distortion of history.

It is in this vein — combating attempts to rewrite the history of Russia and Ukraine, to falsify major historical events, to replace the true

history of shared feats of arms and glory, tragedies and sacrifices, scientific discoveries and cultural achievements — that the new History of Ukraine, created by the authoring team led by the Director of the Foundation for Democracy Studies, Member of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Political Science, Professor at the Russian State University for the Humanities M. S. Grigoriev, was written.

The monograph is a classic study of the political history of territories which at different times were not only, or rather not so much, part of the Ukrainian state, but of other states. The object of the research is formulated in a complex way, but quite in line with the real, historically established state of affairs. The authors seek from the outset to move their research away from ready-made, set ideological — national or transnational — templates.

The work includes a detailed critical analysis of the historiography. This is followed by a description of the history of the named territories, which were part of Ukraine from 1991 to 2014, followed by a detailed analysis of the sources for the history of the region from the 9th century to the present day. “The merit of the work is the accurate adherence to historical facts, a comprehensive and detailed research of historical events, the desire for an objective and unbiased analysis of all, including the most dramatic and acute pages of Ukrainian history,” notes in the preface to the monograph the Director of the Centre for Social Anthropology of the Russian State University for the Humanities, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. A. Tishkov. Despite the objective complexity of the material and the truly enormous source base of the research, the authors manage to present the material in a fairly compact way: the book is over 650 pages long, although such studies are usually published in several volumes!

The historiographical analysis presented in the monograph includes not only Ukrainian literature, but also the works of Russian, European, American and other scholars. The review of studies is arranged in chronological order beginning with the works of the late 19th century, in particular the famous ten-volume “History of Ukraine” by M. S. Hrushevsky. Each of the most important publications is subjected to comprehensive critical scrutiny, including the identification

of ideological influences as well as biased interpretations of events and facts.

The authors' scientifically balanced assessment of the phenomenon of political Ukrainism, aimed mainly against Russian history, culture and politics, runs through the entire book. Ukrainian nationalism today is a subject of particular concern and support from the US ruling circles.

A wide range of written sources, from Russian and European chronicles (on medieval history) to internet resources and social media (on the history of modern Ukraine) are used as a source base for constructing such an extensive historical panorama. Working with the sources implies the use of the most modern critical methods and theoretical approaches.

Thus, the monograph's authors' accounts of the years-long humanitarian catastrophe in Donbas are rigorously documented.

The timeliness, scientific and societal relevance of the book cannot be overemphasised. In fact, it now acts as a kind of critical filter and simultaneously as a navigator for orientating in the vast sea of unreliable data and "narratives" that surrounds both ordinary readers and professional scholars on all sides. Perhaps the authors can be challenged on some issues and there is some repetition in the work, but overall, the work offered to the general public is noteworthy for its scale and the pressing relevance of its research approach. The principle of historicism is particularly difficult to uphold in an information war. But this work will help the reader to acquire a clear historical lens for dealing with subjects that concern us all, while encouraging them to form their own opinions. I believe that the monograph will be useful in the teaching process, not only in the humanities departments of universities, but also in school history courses.

Doctor of History, Professor, Rector of the Russian State
University for the Humanities (RSUH)

A. B. Bezborodov

PREFACE

The subject matter studied in the monograph is scientifically extremely complex — for at least the last hundred years it has been the subject of both purposeful interference by various states and outright falsification and anti-scientific myth-making.

The very title of the monograph “History of Ukraine” has more to do with the need for a brief indication of the subject of research than with the precision of its wording. In this case, the term “Ukraine” does not refer to a state, but to territories which at different times were not only, or rather not so much, part of the Ukrainian state, but of other states. In line with this logic, the book examines the history of these territories from the pre-state period to the modern period. Moreover, the pre-state period should not be understood as the pre-state period of “Ukraine” itself, but rather the states that comprised these lands, beginning with Ancient Rus’.

Historically, Ukraine has existed for a very short period of its history as a sovereign, autonomous state. The period of “Cossack Hetmanate” (“Hetmanshchyna”) certainly cannot be regarded as such. Neither in the 18th century, nor in the preceding period, was there a single territory with a single Ukrainian statehood. Moreover, “Hetmanshchyna”, occupying less than a third of the territory of modern Ukraine, never was a state, nor did it aspire to be one. The vast majority of the Malorussian elite opted for Russia. But the territory of modern Ukraine, which by the beginning of the 18th century was part of Russia, was not united and belonged to different administrative units. Part of the Malorussian elite sought subjection to Poland, while another part sought to recognise subjection to the Ottoman Empire. For each of them the main aim was not to create a state formation

but to join the political elite of those countries and gain rights to appropriate material goods and property.

From a formal point of view, the brief period of existence of the state of Ukraine can be considered two weeks in 1918 — from 9 (22) January, when the Central Rada declared its independence from Russia with the Fourth Universal, to 25 January (7 February), when the representatives of the Central Rada fled from Kiev.

However, at the time of independence, the Central Rada was not the only authority in Ukraine — there was de facto dual power from 1917 onwards. On 11–12 (24–25) December 1917 the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets was held in Kharkov, which proclaimed Ukraine a Republic of Soviets and established federal ties between Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia. The Congress was attended by delegates from 46 councils of the Yekaterinoslav and Kharkov Governorates, 32 councils of the Poltava, Chernigov, Kiev and Podolsk Governorates and four councils of the Kherson Governorate. The Congress thus represented most of the territory of Ukraine, with the exception of the Volyn Governorate.

It is also worth mentioning the dubious legitimacy of the Central Rada, which declared independence. Not only was it not elected by the population, but it consisted exclusively of representatives of Ukrainian nationalist civic or political organisations of various levels, as well as random people who came to meetings on the basis of absurd documents (such as a travel warrant to obtain boots) — soldiers from various military units and members of cooperatives. Moreover, the leaders of the Rada itself voted on their own for a large number of “MPs” at once.

It is interesting to note that on 27 January (9 February) 1918, during the signing of a separate treaty (recognising Ukraine’s independence) between the governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey and a delegation from the Central Rada, the latter fled from Kiev and no longer represented anyone.

Nor can the period of Ukrainian independence be considered a period of its occupation in 1918 by the 200,000-strong German and Austro-Hungarian armies. The Central Rada, which soon was returned on German bayonets, was replaced by Hetman Skoropadsky. Curiously enough, even he declared on 1 (14) November that Ukraine “should be the first to act in the formation of an All-Russian Federation, its ultimate goal being the restoration of Great Russia”.

Following the Hetman's flight, the Directorate government, led by Ukrainian nationalists, formally came to power, first proclaiming nominal unification with the West Ukrainian People's Republic and then concluding a separatist agreement to hand the territory over to Poland, which seized it some time later. At that time, the government in Kiev had no control over the territory, part of it was occupied by Entente troops, and the de facto power belonged to various "field commanders". On 6 February 1919, Bolshevik troops took over Kiev.

Obviously, the subsequent successes and capture of Kiev by the White Guards under the command of Anton Denikin and his policy of "single and indivisible Russia" can in no way be qualified as the existence of an independent Ukraine. In the first half of December 1919, Soviet power was restored in Kiev, Kharkov and Poltava, establishing a common federation with Soviet Russia.

Despite the ideology proclaimed under Presidents P. Poroshenko and V. Zelensky, the period of Ukraine's occupation by Nazi German troops cannot be attributed to its independent existence. It should be recalled that on 30 June 1941 in occupied Lviv Ukrainian nationalists proclaimed the creation of a Ukrainian Sovereign United State. Their "Act of Restoration of the Ukrainian State" said: "The newly formed Ukrainian state will work closely with the National-Socialist Greater Germany, under the leadership of its leader Adolf Hitler which is forming a new order in Europe and the world and is helping the Ukrainian People to free itself from Muscovite occupation. The Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army which has been formed on the Ukrainian lands, will continue to fight with the Allied German Army against Muscovite occupation for a sovereign and united State and a new order in the whole world. Long live the Ukrainian Sovereign United State! Long live the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists! Long live the leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian people — Stepan Bandera!"

In 1991, as a result of the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine re-declared its independence. It was during this period that Ukraine had the largest territory within its borders. This period should include the years from 1991 to 2014, which ended with an anti-constitutional coup perpetrated with the direct and overt support of the US and European countries.

Returning to the title of this monograph, a more accurate but significantly less succinct title would be “History (from antiquity to the present) of the various territories that were temporarily part of Ukraine after the dissolution of the USSR”. The need for a more precise description of the subject matter is precisely why the monograph contains such wordings as, for example, the title of the second chapter — “Pre-state period in the history of the territories which were temporarily part of Ukraine in 1991–2014”.

The 2014 coup d'état was followed by a Ukrainian civil war. A significant part of the country's population did not recognise the power that emerged from the coup d'état. Kiev's response to this has been genocide against the inhabitants of these territories, torture and killing of civilians, terrorist acts, artillery and rocket attacks on cities.

Since the coup, the Kiev regime has become a puppet in nature and has been completely subservient to the will of Western countries, above all the United States. History will remember the words of US President J. Biden, who publicly bragged about firing and appointing Ukrainian prosecutors-general: “I said, ‘you're not getting the billion... I'm leaving in six hours. If the prosecutor is not fired, you're not getting the money.’ Well, son of a bitch! He got fired. And they put in place someone who was solid at the time.”

Kiev-controlled territory has seen murders of political opponents, including the burning of dozens of opposition figures in Odessa, censorship and the banning of political parties and media outlets, persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian language.

This policy of the Kiev regime eventually led to referendums in 2022 in the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics and in the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, in line with the right to equality and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the UN Charter, which resulted in their admission into the Russian Federation.

Member of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation,
Director of the Foundation for Democracy Studies,
Professor at the Russian State University for the Humanities

M. S. Grigoriev

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades there have been active attempts to rewrite the history of Russia and Ukraine, to falsify major historical events, to replace the true history of shared feats of arms and glory, tragedies and sacrifices, scientific discoveries and cultural achievements.

The origins of the historical policy aimed at separating Ukraine from Russia and turning Ukraine into “anti-Russia” date back to the activities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austria-Hungary and Nazi Germany. They were always based on the desire of Russia’s western neighbours to control and seize these lands, to separate and oppose these territories to Russia. In recent decades, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this policy has become systemic and complex. In historical studies and journalism, this can be seen in the coordinated actions of American, European and Ukrainian historians, politicians and journalists. Their aim is to insistently inculcate in the public consciousness of the population of Ukraine and Western countries the anti-historical idea of the separateness of Ukrainians and Russians throughout the entire millennia of history, starting from the pre-state period. The desire to construct the notion that Ukraine’s history has nothing to do with Russian history has also found expression in public statements by the Ukrainian authorities. For example, Volodymyr Zelensky, seeking to demonstrate this idea, stated the following: “First cousins once removed and very distant relatives should not encroach on its heritage and try to prove their involvement in the history of thousands of years and thousands of events, being thousands of kilometres away from the places where they took place”.

Many historical myths have been created and actively used that have nothing to do with historical truth. These include myths about the existence of the Ukrainian people in ancient times, the separate Ukrainian state “Rus-Ukraine”, which modern Russia has nothing to do with, the Holodomor as a famine specifically organised and directed exclusively against Ukrainians. A pantheon of “heroes”, led by Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevich, has been formed from paid agents of Nazi Germany. At the same time, everything connected to Russia, to our common history, is being denied and censored.

The trampling of historical memory and aggressive policies aimed at distorting the shared historical past of Russia and Ukraine require a response from Russian historical science and the restoration of the historical truth. This monograph is a response to attempts to distort Ukraine’s history.

The book consists of 14 chapters devoted to the history of the formation and development of Ukraine from the pre-state period to the present. The monograph is based on the study of a significant number of archival materials, published documents, memoirs and eyewitness accounts, analysis of historical works of Russian, Ukrainian and foreign historians. A number of archival sources, accounts of participants and eyewitnesses of the events have been introduced into the scientific discourse for the first time.

The monograph also provides a critical analysis of common anti-Russian myths, presenting evidence of their failure in terms of historical science.

This research into the history of Ukraine is based on the notion of the historical unity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. The authors of the monograph agree with the assessment of Russian-Ukrainian history presented in the article by Russian President Vladimir Putin: “Our spiritual, human and civilizational ties formed for centuries and have their origins in the same sources, they have been hardened by common trials, achievements and victories. Our kinship has been transmitted from generation to generation. It is in the hearts and the memory of people living in modern Russia and Ukraine, in the blood ties that unite millions of our families. Together we have always been

and will be many times stronger and more successful. For we are one people”¹.

Most of the territories that became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (as part of the USSR) historically represent the southwestern part of Russia. These lands were part of the Ancient Russian state in the 9th-13th centuries. After the defeat of the Russian principalities against the Mongol Tatars in the second half of the 13th century, the territory of southwestern Russia was conquered by neighbouring states, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland. Nevertheless, the Russian population of these lands retained the idea of a united Russian nation, underpinned by one language, culture and religion. Throughout the period of occupation, the Russian population’s struggle for freedom from foreign domination continued unabated. In this struggle they received active support from Russia.

The process of reunification of the Russian lands stretched over many centuries. It began with the results of the Russo-Lithuanian war of 1500–1503 and the incorporation of the Severian lands into the Russian state. The completion of the reunification process was the incorporation of Subcarpathian Rus’ (Transcarpathian Ukraine) into the Soviet Union in 1945.

Up until 1917 the territories that became part of the Ukrainian SSR were divided into several historically established regions, including Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Malorossiya and Novorossiya. Each of these territories, as part of the Russian lands, had certain regional specificities stemming from the peculiarities of historical development, the time these territories were under external, Polish, Lithuanian and later Austro-Hungarian occupation, the peculiarities of the occupation policy aimed at political, linguistic, cultural and religious assimilation of the population of southwestern Russia. The territories of Novorossiya, recaptured by Russia from the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century and inhabited by natives of different regions of the Russian Empire and migrants from other states, as well as Donbas, representing the territories of the Novorossiya Governorate and the Province of the Don Cossack Host, on which the largest industrial centre in the

¹ *Putin V. V.* On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> (accessed: 06/09/2022).

Russian Empire was created at the end of the 19th century, should be mentioned separately.

The monograph is structured according to the historical-chronological principle, highlighting the pre-state period as well as subsequent periods of Ukrainian history. The division into periods corresponds to the peculiarities of Ukraine's historical development. In particular, the authors consider it appropriate to divide the post-Soviet stage of Ukraine's development into two periods, 1991–2014 and 2014–2022, each of which has certain characteristic features.

The monograph allows to form a holistic and systematic approach to the study of Ukrainian history, based on the principles of historicism and objectivity.

Chapter 1

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF UKRAINE

The study of domestic and foreign historiography of Ukrainian history reveals several characteristic features.

First, it should be noted that the foundation of this historiographical tradition was not established until the 20th century. Prior to this there had been no attempt to write special works on the history of the Ukrainian people, let alone claim to be a study of the nation-state model. The material on southwestern Russia was included in more extensive studies of the Ancient Russian or Muscovite periods. Malorussian and later Novorussian regional historical characteristics constituted certain aspects of the general history of the Tsardom of Russia and of the Russian Empire.

Second, scholarly publications on the history of Ukraine have not gained significant traction. Many of them gravitated towards descriptiveness, not claiming to be scholarly, research or generalising in nature.

Third, despite the limited number of studies, the works on the history of Ukraine were characterised by a sharp inconsistency of approaches and assessments. Alongside the works based on objective approaches to the study of Ukrainian history, a significant part of the studies has an openly speculative nature based on distortion of history and interpretation of historical facts in accordance with the ideological views of the authors.

The turn of the 19th and 20th centuries saw the culmination of a clash between Ukrainophile and Russophile views. Given the massive ideological influence of Western states through Galicia and Volhynia, which were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, this conflict increasingly took on a geopolitical and cultural-civilizational nature in the context of the confrontation between Europe and Russia. The peculiarity of this confrontation is an implicit or explicit Russophobia of historical literature created by representatives of the Ukrainophile strand of intellectual thought.

It is natural that at that time M. S. Hrushevsky started to publish his 10-volume monograph “History of Ukraine”, covering the country’s history from ancient times to the mid-17th century. The first volume of this work was published in Lviv, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in 1896, and the last volume was published in Kiev in 1936, after the author’s death¹. In 1906, excerpts from this monograph, translated by the author himself, were published in Russian, in St Petersburg². In 1913 M. Hrushevsky’s “Illustrated History of Ukraine” was published in Ukrainian in Kiev and Lviv, and later in St. Petersburg³.

The author, as a prominent liberal-nationalist public figure who headed the Central Rada of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1917–1918, was far removed from the real facts and characteristics in his views. He artificially bred the nation of ancient Ukrainians from the tribe of Antes. The ethno-cultural development of this nationality, in his opinion, eventually led to the formation of a distinct ethnos, different from the other East Slavs. According to M. Hrushevsky’s concept, Kievan Rus was seen as a form of exclusively ancient Ukrainian statehood, the so-called “Ukraine-Rus”, which had nothing to do with later Russia. Based on this historiographic notion, Hrushevsky, on the one hand, proclaimed an ethnogenetic difference between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples and a fundamental divergence of vectors of their development, and on the other hand, proved the state succession of Ukrainians as the hegemon in relation to Kievan Rus, accordingly

¹ *Hrushevsky M.* History of Ukraine-Rus.

² *Hrushevsky Mykhailo.* Outline of the History of the Ukrainian People. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg., 1906.

³ *Hrushevsky M.* Illustrated History of Ukraine.

attributing to the fictitious early Ukrainian nationhood all the historical merit in the development of ancient Russian culture, language, religion, social structure and economy.

Hrushevsky's ideas had a dangerous continuation in 1924, when he was unjustifiably invited from emigration to Soviet Ukraine to head the historical section of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, which spread the ideas of "cultural nationalism" at a time of erroneous policies of "Ukrainisation". Then members of the historical section, such as D. Bahaliy, M. Slabchenko, A. Ogloblin and O. Germayze, published articles in Ukraine magazine. Among them it is worth highlighting Dmytro Bahaliy, who, as a prominent researcher of the history of Sloboda Ukraine, published the first study on the historiography of national history¹. This intense national-liberal activity continued until 1931, when Hrushevsky's historical section was closed and the historian himself was accused of collaborating with a Ukrainian nationalist organisation.

Even in post-Soviet Ukraine, Hrushevsky's works have been published in summary form as a reading book². Since then, they have become the programmatic framework for all modern school textbooks on Ukrainian history published over the past 30 years in that country. Among these textbooks, the works of O. V. Burlaka, V. S. Vlasov, A. V. Gisem, N. M. Gupan, V. O. Dribnitsa, S. I. Drovoziuk, I. A. Kostyuk, S. V. Kulchytsky, T. V. Ladichenko, Yu. B. Malienko, A. A. Martynyuk, P. P. Panchenko, T. P. Pirus, I. O. Piskaryova, O. I. Pometun, N. Yu. Romanishin, I. M. Romanyuk, Yu. Yu. Svidersky, V. L. Smoliy, N. M. Sorochinskaya, V. S. Stepankov, A. K. Strukevich, S. M. Timchenko, F. G. Turchenko, G. O. Freyman and I. Ya. Schupak were particularly biased and tendentious in the spirit of M. Hrushevsky³.

¹ *Bahaliy D.* Outline of Ukrainian Historiography. Vol. 1. Pub. 1–2 (1923–1925).

² *Hrushevsky Mykhailo.* History of Ukraine. K.: Lybid', 1992.

³ *Pometun O. I., Kostyuk I. A., Matenko Yu. B.* History of Ukraine (Introduction to history). Textbook for the 5th grade of secondary schools. K.: Osvita, 2013; *Vlasov V. S.* History of Ukraine. Textbook for the 7th grade of secondary schools. K.: Geneza, 2007; *Smoliy V. L., Stepankov V. S.* History of Ukraine. Textbook for the 7th grade of secondary schools. K.: Geneza, 2007; *Svidersky Yu. Yu., Ladichenko T. V., Romanishin N. Yu.* History of Ukraine. Textbook for the 7th

The low scientific level of modern Ukrainian history textbooks was openly identified by the leading contemporary Ukrainian medievalist academician P. P. Tolochko: "...I have been analysing textbooks for secondary and higher education. A very disappointing picture. They are immensely ideologised. In the early historical periods, everything is declared Ukrainian — from Tripolye to Kievan Rus. And this nonsense is introduced into textbooks, and children, of course, already absorb this mythology. For example, that Kievan Rus was created by Ukrainians... There is nothing offensive about the fact that there was no Ukraine during Kievan Rus. There was no Russia either, if that makes anyone feel any better! As I say, the Ruthenians would never imagine that some of them would be Ukrainian, some Belarusian and some Russian. They were simply Ruthenians. Old Ruthenians..."¹

grade of secondary schools. K.: Gramota, 2007; *Gisem A. V., Martynyuk A. A.* History of Ukraine: Textbook for the 7th grade of secondary schools teaching in Russian. Kharkov: Ranok, 2015; *Dribnitsa V. O., Schupak I. Ya., Burlaka O. V., Piskaryova I. O.* History of Ukraine. Textbook for the 7th grade of secondary schools. K.: Orion, 2020; *Strukevich A. K., Romanyuk I. M., Pirus T. P.* History of Ukraine. Textbook for the 8th grade of secondary schools. K.: Gramota, 2008; *Strukevich O. K.* History of Ukraine. Textbook for the 9th grade. K.: Gramota, 2009; *Gupan N. M., Pometun O. I., Freyman G. O.* History of Ukraine. 10th grade. Textbook (standard, academic level). K.: Svit znan', 2011; *Gisem O. V., Martynyuk O. O.* History of Ukraine (standard level): textbook for the 10th grade of secondary schools. Kharkov: Ranok, 2018; *Gisem O. V.,* History: Ukraine and the world (integrated course, standard level): textbook for the 10th grade of secondary schools. Kharkov: Ranok, 2018; *Vlasov V. S., Kulchytsky S. V.* History of Ukraine (standard level): textbook for the 10th grade of secondary schools. K.: Litera, 2018; *Strukevich O. K.* History of Ukraine (standard level): textbook for the 10th grade of secondary schools. K.: Gramota, 2018; *Strukevich A. I., Romanyuk I. M., Drovoziuk S. I.* History of Ukraine. Textbook for the 11th grade. K.: Gramota, 2011; *Turchenko F. G., Panchenko P. P., Timchenko S. M.* Contemporary history of Ukraine, 11th grade, Part Two, 1939–2001. K.: Geneza, 2001; *Turchenko F. G.* History of Ukraine. Textbook for the 11th grade of secondary schools. Advanced level. K.: Geneza, 2011; *Pometun Ye. I., Gupan N. P.* History of Ukraine. Textbook for the 11th grade of secondary schools (standard, academic level). K.: Osvita, 2011; *Sorochinskaya N. M., Gisem O. O.* History of Ukraine [standard level]: textbook for the 11th grade of secondary schools. Ternopil: Study book — Bogdan, 2019.

¹ *Tolochko P.* Our Common History Cannot be Left at Yushchenko's Mercy // *Izvestia.ru*.12/11/2008. URL: <https://iz.ru/news/342642>

The nationalist line of Ukrainian historiography in the second half of the 20th century was continued by O. Subtelny, a Canadian historian of Ukrainian origin and Professor of History and Political Science at York University in Toronto. His main monograph was rich in historical facts, but in content it was superficial, lacking a thorough grounding in sources, journalistic in its presentation and a clear mix of Russophobia and anti-Sovietism¹.

Opposing the radical Ukrainism of M. Hrushevsky, his contemporary A. Ya. Yefimenko, a Russian historian who lived most of her life in Ukraine and was killed by Petlyura soldiers during the Civil War, substantiated the common historical genesis of the Eastern Slavs (Old Ruthenians) and then the natural affinity of the Great Russians and Malorussians².

A. I. Dikiy, a historian and publicist of Ukrainian origin who emigrated to the US, wrote a work in line with traditional Russian historiography. The very title of his work can be considered a direct polemic with the position of M. Hrushevsky³.

The main works of the opponents of Hrushevsky's ideological legacy have now been republished. It is typical that these monographs were published by a joint Russian-German publishing house⁴.

A counterbalance to Hrushevsky's concept was a collective monograph by Soviet Ukrainian historians led by A. K. Kasimenko, which was published after the Great Patriotic War⁵. This was a fundamental work, in the creation of which 16 Ukrainian authors received valuable advice from renowned Soviet academics: B. D. Grekov, I. I. Mints,

¹ *Subtelny Orest*. Ukraine: A History. University of Toronto Press, 1988; *Subtelny Orest*. History of Ukraine. K.: Lybid', 1994.

² *Yefimenko A. Ya*. History of Ukraine and Its People. St. Petersburg, 1907.

³ *Dikiy A. I.* Undistorted History of Ukraine-Rus: in 2 vol. New York: Truth about Russia, 1960.

⁴ *Dikiy A. I.* Undistorted History of Ukraine-Rus: monograph. Volume I. From the formation of the Kiev state to the formation of the Nova Sich. 18th century. M.; Berlin: Direct-Media, 2015; *Yefimenko A. Ya*. History of the Ukrainian People: monograph. M.; Berlin: Direct-Media, 2019.

⁵ History of Ukraine. Brief course. Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. 1948 [website]. URL: <https://sheba.spb.ru/shkola/istoria-ukrainy-1948.htm>

A. M. Pankratova and others. This publication made considerable progress towards objectification of the historical process, while showing such shortcomings of the historiography of its time as class schematism, underestimation of the spiritual development of society, etc.

In an even more decisive form, the criticism of Hrushevsky's unscientific conclusions was offered by N. I. Ulyanov, a representative of the Russian emigration¹. As a student of the famous Russian historian S. F. Platonov, who lived in the US, he devoted his main work to exposing the fabrications of Ukrainian radical nationalism, the quintessence of which were the writings of M. Hrushevsky. Nikolai Ulyanov proceeded from the idea of the unity of the Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups and their objective interest in the existence and development of a common state. It is clear that in this way he was expressing Russian patriotic-powerful views of a conservative nature. N. I. Ulyanov's work was subsequently republished in modern Russia².

A further development of the Soviet school of Ukrainian history was the publication in 1981–1985 of the 10-volume “History of Ukraine”. The monograph was prepared by a team of leading Ukrainian historians under the leadership of Yury Yuryevich Kondufor, academician of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR and editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian Historical Journal. The edition covered the period from primitive times to the early 1980s. The merit of the work is its fundamental character, a thorough analysis of certain pages of Ukrainian history, primarily the history of the 20th century, the desire for an objective presentation of the history of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, their interaction during different periods of history³.

¹ *Ulyanov N. I.* Origins of Ukrainian Separatism. New York, 1966.

² *Ibid.*

³ History of the Ukrainian SSR: in 10 volumes / chief editorial board: Yu. Yu. Kondufor (editor-in-chief) and others. K.: Naukova dumka, 1981–1985. Vol. 1. Primitive Communism and the Emergence of a Class Society. Kievan Rus (until the second half of the 13th century) / [I. I. Artemenko, S. N. Bibikov, V. I. Bidzili and others]; editorial board: I. I. Artemenko (responsible editor) and others. 1981. 495 p.; Vol. 2. Development of Feudalism. Increase in Anti-Feudal and Liberation Struggle (from the second half of the 13th century to the first half of the 17th century) / [V. A. Golubitsky, V. V. Grabovetsky, A. I. Dey and others]; editorial board: I. S. Slabeyev (re-

However, the monograph has a number of significant shortcomings. The work is based on the traditional for Soviet historiography notions of the formational approach, the successive change of social and economic formations, and the apologetics of the proletariat, revolutionary movements and the Bolshevik party. The class approach, the desire to analyse historical events through the prism of the struggle between the exploiters and the exploited masses, leads to a significant distortion of historical events.

Among contemporary authors, the leading Ukrainian historian and archaeologist Petro Petrovych Tolochko and his students have the most objective and balanced viewpoint. In his scholarly work, Petro Tolochko, leaning towards civic Ukrainian patriotism, relies on real facts, logical arguments and convincing evidence. In historiographical polemics Petro

sponsible editor) and others. 1982. 591 p.; Vol. 3. Liberation War and Reunification of Ukraine with Russia. Beginning of Decomposition of Feudalism and the Emergence of Capitalist Relations (from the second half of the 17th century to the 18th century) / [V. I. Borisenko, T. P. Bryantseva, Ye. V. Gorbenko and others]; editorial board: G. Ya. Sergiyenko (responsible editor) and others. 1983. 719 p.; Vol. 4. Ukraine During the Decay and Crisis of the Feudal Serfdom System. Abolition of Serfdom and the Development of Capitalism (19th century) / [B. S. Abalikhin, A. K. Voloshchenko, V. F. Gorlenko and others]; editorial board: N. N. Leshchenko (responsible editor) and others. 1983. 694 p.; Vol. 5. Ukraine During Imperialism (early 20th century) / [P. V. Zamkovy, V. I. Kizchenko, I. I. Kompaniyets and others]; editorial board: V. G. Sarbey (responsible editor) and others. 1983. 558 p.; Vol. 6. The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War in Ukraine (1917–1920) / [N. I. Suprunenko, Ye. D. Boyko, Yu. M. Gamretsky and others]; editorial board: N. I. Suprunenko (responsible editor) and others. 1984. 655 p.; Vol. 7. Ukrainian SSR During the Building and Strengthening of Socialist Society (1921–1941) / [P. P. Gudzenko, A. A. Makarenko, F. K. Stoyan and others]; editorial board: S. V. Kulchitsky (responsible editor) and others. 1984. 719 p.; Vol. 8. Ukrainian SSR in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (1941–1945) / [M. Z. Danilyuk, P. I. Denisenko, N. D. Dyatlenko and others]; editorial board: V. I. Klovov (responsible editor) and others. 1984. 639 p.; Vol. 9. Ukrainian SSR During the Building of a Developed Socialist Society (1945 — early 1960s) / [N. P. Baranovskaya, L. D. Vitruk, A. N. Zenina and others]; editorial board: A. V. Likholat (responsible editor) and others. 1985. 582 p.; Vol. 10. Ukrainian SSR Under Developed Socialism (1960s — early 1980s) / [N. P. Baranovskaya, A. M. Veselova, L. D. Vitruk and others]; editorial board: A. V. Likholat (responsible editor) and others. 1985. 775 p.

Tolochko fundamentally rejects unsubstantiated fantasies of Mykhailo Hrushevsky and his supporters, chimeras of authors of modern Ukrainian textbooks, opportunistic political speculations on historical themes of the leaders of modern Ukraine: V. Yushchenko, P. Poroshenko, V. Zelensky¹. Starting with a series of problematic works², Petro Tolochko and his colleagues came up with a systematic collective monograph³. Such an independent and honest position of a historian could not but arouse the ire of those in power and the closest scholars serving them. In 2016, Petro Tolochko was forced to resign as director of the Institute of Archaeology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and in 2017 he resigned as editor-in-chief of the Archaeology magazine.

While P. P. Tolochko's works have undoubted merits, it should be noted that they are characterised by a certain Ukrainocentricity of Russian history, the desire to strengthen the role and importance of the Ukrainian lands in Russian history.

Of the foreign authors, the closest to a balanced assessment of Ukrainian history was the British researcher, diplomat and politician William Allen, who tried to look at Ukraine not as a proto-state but as a southern Russian region in its complex geopolitical environment⁴.

The Ukrainian nationalist and anti-Russian interpretation of Ukrainian history has now been continued in the works of the Canadian historian of Ukrainian origin, Serhii Plokyh. His most recent and most complete work, "The Gates of Europe. A History of Ukraine" was published in New York in 2015 and reprinted in Russian in 2018⁵.

¹ *Tolochko P.* Our Common History Cannot be Left at Yushchenko's Mercy // *Izvestia.ru*. 12/11/2008 [website]. URL: <https://iz.ru/news/342642>

² *Tolochko P. P.* Old Russian Nationality: Imaginary or Real. M.: Aletheia, 2005; *Tolochko P.* Where does the Russian land originate from? Strelbytsky's Multimedia Publishing House, 2016; *Tolochko P. P.* Ukraine between Russia and the West: historical and journalistic essays. St. Petersburg, 2018.

³ History of Ukraine. From the 6th to the 21st century. / P. P. Tolochko, A. A. Oleynikov [and others]; led by P. P. Tolochko. 2nd ed., updated and revised. K.; M.: Kievan Rus: Kuchkovo Pole, 2018.

⁴ *Allen William.* History of Ukraine. South Russian lands from the first Kievan princes to Joseph Stalin. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2022.

⁵ *Plokyh S. M.* The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine. New York: Basic Books, 2015; *Plokyh S. M.* The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine / translated from English by Sergei Lunin. M.: Corpus, 2018.

S. Ploky reproduces all the basic concepts of his predecessors, considering as Rus' in the "narrow sense" only the territory of modern Ukraine: the Principalities of Kiev, Chernigov and Pereyaslav. In doing so, the author draws a distinction between the population of Kievan Rus and contemporary Russians¹. S. Ploky assesses the modern stage of Ukrainian history in the same way as the representatives of Euromaidan — through the prism of the struggle of the freedom-loving Ukrainian people, who made their European choice, against the "aggression" of Russia and pro-Russian "militants" from Donbas: "They [Ukrainians] were in favour of rapprochement with the European Union. While attitudes were growing cooler in the nations already part of the union, the stubbornness of the Kiev protesters, their willingness to freeze in the open air for months at a time, aroused surprise and delight in Central and Western Europe... Russia annexed Crimea in March, then provoked a "hybrid war" in eastern Ukraine. In July of the same year, militants from non-government-controlled Ukrainian territory shot down a Malaysian airliner over Donbas"².

In contemporary Russian historiography, the publication of a collective monograph by Russian scholars I. N. Danilevsky, T. G. Tairova-Yakovleva, A. V. Shubin, and V. I. Mironenko should be noted³. The authors of the work followed the path of finding a compromise between the established approaches to the history of Southern Russia and Malorossiya within or in the context of Velikorossiya, and the self-sufficient history of Ukrainian society and state. The result is a work based on a significant source and historiographical base, but which gravitates towards liberal Ukrainophilia (especially in its characterisation of the recent historical period).

In particular, the work contains an apologetics of the T. Shevchenko scientific partnership led by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, which is described as "an outstanding school of Ukrainism"⁴. The authors of the monograph attempt to avoid unequivocal condemnation of Stepan

¹ *Ploky S. N.* The Gates of Europe. A History of Ukraine. P. 30.

² *Ibid.* P. 24.

³ *Danilevsky I., Tairova T., Shubin A., Mironenko V.* History of Ukraine. 2nd ed., updated and revised. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020.

⁴ *Ibid.* P. 280.

Bandera and his supporters by presenting not only them but also the Soviet authorities as the perpetrators of the Ukrainian nationalists' crimes. The authors conclude: "Responsibility for the bloody agony of the nationalist movement in western Ukraine, which dragged on for almost a decade, lies, in our view, with both forces that fought amongst themselves. It lies with the Communist Party of Ukraine and its government for their mad rush to 'sovietisation' and their unjustified brutality, including against those who dared to stop the struggle. It lies with the leadership of the OUN, S. Bandera and the UPA command for their unwillingness to admit their political and military defeat and their unscrupulousness in the means of struggle"¹. This conclusion of the authors appears to be highly biased. The desire to apportion responsibility for crimes to two sides in the conflict seems a wholly untenable attempt to rewrite history.

At the present stage, with the patriotic forces of the DPR and LPR struggling for their spiritual and political liberation, editions of contemporary works written by authors from universities and educational centres in the Donbas have appeared in a timely manner².

These works have a number of undeniable merits. First, they are based on detailed facts, credible sources and a diverse scientific literature. Second, they directly oppose the modern Western and official Kiev falsification of Ukrainian history. And third, they reveal and analyse their regional material in depth. At the same time, the clear achievements of such publications in the cross-cutting or periodical sections simultaneously create natural regional limitations for them.

Therefore, a critical analysis of the existing scientific literature leads to the idea that there is a demand for new research based on reliable facts, scientific approaches, principles of historicism and objectivity, new documents and eyewitness accounts of events that allow the interpretation of historical events of Ukrainian history in all their diversity.

¹ *Danilevsky I., Tairova T., Shubin A., Mironenko V.* History of Ukraine. 2nd ed., updated and revised. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 462–463.

² History of the Donbas from Antiquity to the Present /led by L. G. Shchepko, V.N. Nikolsky. Donetsk: DonNU, 2018; *Buntovsky S. Yu.* History of the Donbas. Donetsk: Donbasskaya Rus, 2017; *Bespalova S. V., Bobrovsky A. S., Kolesnik A. V., and others.* russian Donbass: historical, spiritual-intellectual and economic foundations. Donetsk: DonNU, 2021.

Chapter 2

PRE-STATE PERIOD IN THE HISTORY OF THE TERRITORIES WHICH WERE TEMPORARILY PART OF UKRAINE IN 1991–2014

The early development by primitive people of the lands located on the territory of modern Ukraine dates back to the Lower Palaeolithic. During the transition from Palaeolithic to Mesolithic, there was a division of labour with the separation of farming and cattle breeding, and later crafts were separated from agriculture collectively.

Progress in the development of production led to the formation of successive cultures: in the Bronze Age — the Belogradov culture, at the turn of the Bronze and Iron Ages — the Zarubinet culture, and in the Iron Age — the Chernyakhov culture.

The Belogradov archaeological culture was characteristic of the sedentary population living in the area between the Dniester and Dnieper in the 11th-9th centuries BC. The Zarubinet archaeological culture was distributed in the Upper and Middle Podnieprovie, as well as in the Middle Poseymie and Pripjat Polesie in the 3rd century BC — 2nd century AD. The Chernyakhov archaeological culture, polyethnic in essence, covered wide areas of the Black Sea coast in the 2nd-4th centuries AD. None of these archaeological cultures belong exclusively to the territory that makes up modern Ukraine, they were common to the inhabitants of lands that are now part of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Romania, Moldavia and others.

The ethnic affiliation of these cultures cannot be ascertained, but excavations confirm the possible connection of these cradles of ancient civilisations with various tribal migrations, such as the Cimmerians or the Scythians. In particular, nomadic Cimmerian tribes appeared in the territory of modern Ukraine around 1,500 BC, and in the 7th century BC they were displaced by the Scythians. During the ancient period, the first Greek colonies were founded in the Northern Black Sea coast, which turned into city-states, i. e., centres of polis civilisation.

In the Early Middle Ages, during the Migration Period, the area was occupied by Germanic Goth and Turkic Hun tribes. In the second half of the 1st millennium AD a part of the territory of modern Ukraine belonged to the Avar Khaganate and another part to the Khazar Khaganate.

The processes of ethno-cultural development in southeastern Europe at the end of the 1st millennium BC and the first half of the 1st millennium AD were characterised by a high degree of complexity. Almost all the cultures of this region, especially the Chernyakhov, included non-Slavic elements, testifying to the presence of various groups of Germanic, Baltic, Iranian and Thracian-speaking population there. A particularly prominent role in these processes was played by the Goths. Their arrival changed the political situation in southeastern Europe. At the beginning of the 4th century, the Goths become the main military and political force, leading the tribal alliances consisting of the later Scythians, Sarmatians, Dacian-Gets and Slavs and waging war against the Roman frontier garrisons. At present, there are identified monuments within the Chernyakhov culture, whose belonging to the various ethnic groups mentioned above is not in doubt. By mapping the monuments with relatively well-defined local Slavic features, dating back to the Zarubinet culture, it was possible to establish a certain stability in their distribution in the forest-steppe border zone from the 2nd century AD to the 5th century AD.

There are several versions of the original settlement of the Slavic tribes. Some of them adhere to the point of view about the formation of the Slavic Early Medieval cultures in a small region of Upper Podnieprovie (V. N. Danilenko, I. Verner, K. Goldovsky) or Southern and Middle Poland (I. P. Rusanova), others — in a wider area in sev-

eral regions (B. A. Rybakov, P. N. Tretyakov, J. Herrmann, I. Zeman, W. Hensel, V. V. Sedov, Z. Vania, etc.)¹.

Slavic tribes spread over a large area from the Dnieper to the Oder. At that time, Slavic material culture retained its inner unity, as shown by the funerary equipment, specific moulded pottery and sunken dwellings. It is also traceable in funeral rites².

Discussions about the origins and ancestral homeland of the Slavs have not yet led to any definite conclusion. It is not disputed, however, that during the Migration Period, approximately in the 4th-5th centuries AD, the Proto-Slavs split into three branches: the West Slavic tribes as the ancestors of the modern Poles, Czechs and Slovaks; the South Slavic tribes as the ancestors of the modern Danube Bulgarians and former Yugoslavia peoples; the East Slavic tribes as the ancestors of the modern Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians.

After their migration, the East Slavs occupied the most extensive areas of the East European Plain: from the Neva and Ladoga in the north to the middle course of the Dnieper in the south, from the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains in the west to the flow of the Oka into the Volga in the east.

In the new lands, the process of forming a single Old Russian ethnos out of various tribal associations, both Eastern Slavic and representing other ethnic groups, took place. By the moment of Christianisation of Rus, the formation of a single Old Russian nation was complete.

According to Byzantine historical sources, there could be a tribe of the Antes in the territory of modern Ukraine. The Antes, judging by the etymology of their name, could be of early Slavic, Baltic, Iranian or Turkic origin. The Lombard Annals mention a country called Anthaib, located between the Danube and the Baltic Sea coast and inhabited by the Antes³. Thus, the settlement area of the Antes referred to both eastern, western and southern Slavs collectively.

According to numerous sources, the Antes came to these lands as a result of a large migration (probably during the Migration Period), were bellicose and savage, and led destructive and predatory raids on

¹ Ukrainians. M.: Nauka, 2000. P. 11.

² Ibid. P. 13.

³ *Scriptores Rerum Langobardorum*. MGH (1878). P. 3, 54.

the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire; they fought a bitter conflict for living space with the Huns, with varying success, and eventually lost. As a result of the invasion of the Avars, the line of the Antes was interrupted and they finally fell off the historical scene. The last time the Antes were mentioned was in 602, when Theophylact Simocatta wrote: "...In the meantime the Khagan, having received news of Roman raids, sent Apsychus here with an army and ordered to exterminate the tribe of the Antes, who were allies of the Romans..."¹

With this in mind, the theory disseminated in modern Ukraine, which equates the tribe of the Antes with artificially invented mythical "ancient Ukes" who allegedly are the ancestors of modern Ukrainians, has an anti-scientific nature. The thesis was particularly actively promoted by Ukrainian historian and politician Mykhailo Hrushevsky (chairman of the Central Rada of the Ukrainian People's Republic in 1917–1918) in his *History of Ukraine* (the first volume was published in 1896 on Austro-Hungarian territory), who wrote: "...The southeastern tribes, from which our Ukrainian nation emerged, moved from their old settlements mainly to the south, to the steppe region devastated by the invasion of the Huns. Then for the first time there is a notice about our tribes separately, and not about the whole Slavic nation, as before. They were called Antes in the writings of that time... Probably then the Antes confronted the Goths in the Black Sea coast, and that war was a sign of Ukrainian settlement in the steppes..."² Note how Hrushevsky substitutes eastern Slavs for southeastern ones, operates with the term "Ukrainian people" in reference to an era when it simply did not exist, not to mention that he completely ignores recognised historical sources. Seeking to present the Antes as the origin of the Ukrainians, he artificially lengthens their history, allowing him to draw the absurd but politically expedient conclusion that the Ukrainian people existed back in the times of the Roman and Byzantine empires.

It is interesting to note that in 1906 he, in accordance with the generally accepted scientific point of view, said that not only at the time

¹ *Simocatta Theophylact. History* / translated by S. S. Kondratyev. M., 1996.

² *Hrushevsky Mykhailo. History of Ukraine*. K.: Lybid', 1992. P. 29–30.

of the Antes, but much later there were no Ukrainians: “Of course, in the 9th-10th centuries there was no Ukrainian nationality in its fully developed form”¹. But later he uses the term “Ukrainian” without any limitations for the most ancient times, including the period with which the tribe of the Antes is associated.

Back in 1966 historian N. I. Ulyanov wrote about M. Hrushevs-ky: “Neither cyclopean shifts in the fortunes of peoples under the influence of invasions like the Hun or Tatar, nor changes in names, nor mixtures of blood and cultures, nor natural and forced migra-tions, nor cultural evolution, nor new ethnic formations exist for him. The Ukrainian nation has passed through all the storms and floods undamaged, preserving its racial virginity, almost from the Stone Age”.

Indeed, regarding the Mongol-Tatar invasion M. Hrushevsky writes literally as follows: “...Turkic colonisation returned to the steppes without having had time to assimilate with the Ukrainian population and without leaving any significant traces in the Ukrai-nian ethnic type”². N. I. Ulyanov also notes: “As is well known, the Tatar invasion was particularly devastating for the Russian south... M. Hrushevsky devoted an extensive volume, about 600 pages, to proving the incorrectness of the version about the desolation of Ukraine during the Batu period. Historical scholarship does not rate this study highly”³.

The anti-scientific theory calling the Antes Ukrainians is still spreading today, supplemented by absurd claims about the ancient origins of a separate Ukrainian language, distinct from Old Russian. In particular, the author of a contemporary Ukrainian school text-book states: “...The tribal unions of the Dulebs (Volhynians), the Drevlians, the Polians, the Severians, the Croats, the Uliches and the Tivertsi have long had close relations, since they had a common language, customs and similar Slaveni-Antian origin and were thus

¹ *Hrushevsky Mykhailo*. Outline of the History of the Ukrainian People. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg., 1906.

² *Ibid.* P. 31.

³ *Ulyanov Nikolai*. Origins of Ukrainian Separatism. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2017. P. 293.

different from the neighbouring north-western and north-eastern tribes of the East Slavs. Therefore, these tribal associations can be called the direct ancestors of Ukrainians, and their language can be called proto-Ukrainian...”¹

It is interesting to note that, reflecting the accepted view in historical science and discussing the unity of the Slavic tribes, the British historian and diplomat William Allen writes: “...Cities were built: Kiev on the Dnieper, Novgorod on Lake Ilmen, and later others. These were the cities of ‘Rus’. No one used to call Kiev a city of the Polians, Novgorod a city of the Slovenes and Smolensk a city of the Kriviches...”² Meanwhile, that is exactly what the politically engaged authors of the anti-scientific constructs described above are doing.

Equally anti-scientific are the claims in contemporary Ukrainian literature that the primitive Tripolye archaeological culture is the beginning of the “Ukrainian civilisation”. In fact, the Tripolye archaeological culture of the Neolithic and Early Bronze Age from the middle of the 5th millennium was spread not only on the territory that now belongs to modern Ukraine, but also to a similar extent on the territory of Romania and Moldova. Thus, if one accepts the claims of its proto-Ukrainian nature, it should simultaneously be considered proto-Romanian and proto-Moldavian or lead to the similarly absurd conclusion of a common ancient “Romanian-Ukrainian civilisation”.

Making a comprehensive analysis of the primitive Tripolye archaeological culture, Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine P. P. Tolochko writes: “...There is no reason to consider this culture proto-Ukrainian, as presented in the new historical literature...”³

And yet modern Ukrainian school textbooks state that “...the first humans appeared on the expanses of Ukraine maybe a million years ago. An example of the oldest social formations can be seen in the ag-

¹ *Vlasov V. S.* History of Ukraine. Textbook for the 7th grade. K.: Geneza, 2007. P. 7.

² *Allen William.* History of Ukraine. South Russian lands from the first Kievan princes to Joseph Stalin. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2017. P. 18–19.

³ History of Ukraine. The 6th-21st centuries. / P. P. Tolochko. P. 9.

ricultural-pastoral tribes of the Tripolye culture, which was one of the most developed ancient agrarian civilisations...”¹

Following this anti-scientific theory, the absurd conclusion is drawn in modern Ukraine that the “Ukrainian civilisation” is one of the oldest on the Earth and existed long before Ancient Egypt or, for example, the Maya or Ancient Mesopotamia civilisations.

The traditional written sources of the medieval period are the old Russian chronicles, especially the oldest surviving one, the Tale of Bygone Years. There is no original of this historical document, and the surviving folios contain many contradictions, inaccuracies and later insertions. According to a number of scholars, including D. S. Likhachev, A. A. Shakhmatov, M. D. Prisyolkov, A. N. Nasonov, M. N. Tikhomirov and others, the Tale of the Bygone Years is not a single work, but is based on the preceding chronicles. According to A. A. Shakhmatov, the first Russian chronicle, the Oldest Compilation, was compiled in 1039. The text, titled The Tale of the Bygone Years, was then revised and continued by the monk Nikon around 1110 in the Kiev Pechersk Lavra, and later by the hegumen of the Kiev Pechersk Lavra monastery, Ioann. The first edition of this work (provisionally called the Primary Compilation) has not survived. From the translations of the Byzantine chronicle information was added about various tribes, texts of Rus’ treaties with Byzantium, elements of oral tradition, etc. Some of the folios have subsequently been reworked by other chroniclers, such as the hegumen Sylvester. The versions preserved in various places, such as the Novgorod and Kiev compilations, differ considerably. Other scholars argue that the chronicle originated as short annals, which were gradually amended and improved, and the Tale of Bygone Years was based on them.

D. S. Likhachev noted that the Tale of Bygone Years reveals obvious insertions that destroy the logic of the narrative². Ye. Ye. Golubinsky wrote that some of the events described in the Tale of By-

¹ *Svidersky Yu. Yu., Ladichenko T. V., Romanishin N. Yu.* History of Ukraine. Textbook for the 7th grade. K.: Gramota, 2007. P. 7.

² *Likhachev D. S.* The Tale of Bygone Years // D. S. Likhachev. [Great Legacy: Classic Works of Literature of Ancient Rus]. L.: Khudozhestvennaya Literatura, 1987. Vol. 2.

gone Years were a consequence of “the ambition and vanity of our ancestors”¹. M. D. Prisyolkov considered that The Tale of Bygone Years is “an artificial and unreliable historical source”². I. N. Danilevsky considered The Tale of Bygone Years as a work of apocalyptic literature, and that when describing events, the author was more interested in the religious assessment of events than in their exact description³.

The history of the Slavs is described in the work as follows: “... Upon the division of the nations, the sons of Shem took the eastern countries and the sons of Ham took the southern countries. And the sons of Japheth took the western and the northern countries. From the same seventy and two nations came the Slavic people, from the tribe of Japheth — the so-called Noricians, who are actually Slavs...

After a long time, the Slavs settled along the Danube, where the land of Hungary and Bulgaria is now. And those Slavs dispersed over the land and called themselves by their names from the places where they settled. As they came and settled on the river named Morava, so they called themselves Morava, and others called themselves Czechs. And there are those same Slavs: the White Croats, and the Serbs, and the Chorutans. When the Vlachs attacked the Danubian Slavs, they settled among them and began to oppress them.

And other Slavs came and settled on the Vistula and were called Poles, and from those Poles proceeded Polians, other Poles — Lutici, others — Masovians, and others — Pomeranians...

Also, these same Slavs, having come, settled along Dnieper and were called Polians, and others — Drevlians, because they settled in woods, and others settled between Pripyat and Dvina and were called Dregoviches, others settled along Dvina and were called Polochans,

¹ *Golubinsky Ye. Ye.* History of the Russian Church. 2nd ed. M.: Prosveshcheniye, 1901. Vol. 1. P. 21.

² *Prisyolkov M. D.* The Kievan state in the second half of the 10th century according to Byzantine sources. L.: Bulletin of the LSU, 1941. (Historical Science Series. Pub. 8).

³ *Danilevsky I. N.* The Tale of Bygone Years: Hermeneutic bases for the study of annalistic texts. M.: Aspect-Press, 2004. P. 133.

by the river flowing into Dvina, named Polota, that gave the name to Polochans. The same Slavs who settled near Lake Ilmen were called by its name and built a city, and called it Novgorod. The same Slavs who settled near Lake Ilmen were called by its name and built a city, and called it Novgorod. And others settled along the Desna, and the Seim, and the Sula, and called themselves the Severians. And so the Slavic people spread, and by its name the writing was called Slavic...”

It is clear that the chronicle refers to certain parts of a single East Slavic ethnos, which had a single language and written language. However, according to A. A. Shakhov, the fragment about the settlement of the Slavs only appeared in the Tale of Bygone Years, but was missing in the original chronicles, on the basis of which the tale itself was written, i. e., the description is given several centuries after the settlement, not using written sources.

It is important to note that, according to the Tale itself, from a certain point onwards there is no mention of them at all: “...The last record of the Polians is dated by 6452 (944), Drevlians — 6485 (979), Severians — 6532 (1024), Uliches — 6393 (885), Croats — 6500 (992), and Volhynians (Buzhans) are not mentioned at all in the dated part...”¹

Moreover, the archaeological excavations do not match the information given in this fragment about the settlement areas of the various East Slavic “tribes”. This leads one to the confident conclusion that both the tribes themselves and the descriptions of their places of residence are of the nature of legend. Thus, the following assessment of the Tale of Bygone Years by Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine P. P. Tolochko is illustrative: “...It is an outstanding piece of literature, but a completely untrue story. There is no reason to continue basing our knowledge of the past on it... We are dealing, in fact, with a chronicle legend told in ‘scientific language’...”²

¹ History of Ukraine. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 12.

² *Tolochko P. P.* Outlines of Early Rus. Fragment of the book [web-site]. URL: https://polit.ru/article/2015/02/22/Kievan_Rus/ (accessed: 19/09/2022).

Given that, the theory based on the above-discussed fragment of the Tale of Bygone Years, first proposed by M. Hrushevsky, that artificially marked the tribes of the Polians, Drevlians, Severians, Dregoviches and others as Old-Ukrainian, is unscientific. At the same time, M. Hrushevsky promotes the invented by him thesis that the Polians imagined by him "...for a number of centuries were also the political cultural centre for the whole of Eastern Europe..."¹The aim of this thinking is once again to try to artificially continue the history of Ukrainians and justify their superiority.

It is interesting to note that even accepting on faith this fragment of the Tale of Bygone Years and taking the speculation about the location of these tribes we come to absurd conclusions, when, When, according to P. P. Tolochko, Academician of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) of Ukraine, Director of the Institute of Archaeology of the NAS of Ukraine "... we would have to speak about 'Ukrainian' and 'Russian' Severians, 'Ukrainian' and 'Belarusian' Dregoviches, Drevlians and Volhynians, 'Belarusian' and 'Russian' Kriviches..."² At the same time, "Ukrainian Severians" would be the origin of the Ukrainian people, and "Russian Severians" the origin of the Russians, "Ukrainian Dregoviches" would belong to the ancient Ukrainians, and "Belarusian Dregoviches" to the ancient Belarusians, etc.

It should be noted that these are the same, possibly imaginary, tribes. The inevitable conclusions in Hrushevsky's approach are absurd and refute his own "theory".

In fact, there was a cultural and social proximity between the various Slavic tribes, confirmed by archaeological excavations. This proximity then developed into unity. For example, I. I. Lyapushkin, comparing the Slavic monuments of Dnieper's Left Bank with the Slavic monuments of the Dnieper's Right Bank, Central Europe and the Balkan Peninsula, substantiated the conclusion about the unity of the common Slavic culture from the Dnieper to Elba and Danube in the 6th-7th centuries and about great proximity of the Dnieper's

¹ *Hrushevsky Mykhailo*. Outline of the History of the Ukrainian People. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg., 1906. P. 25.

² History of Ukraine. The 6th-21st centuries. / P. P. Tolochko. P. 25.

right bank and left bank forest steppe Slavic culture in the 8th-9th centuries¹.

In general, all East Slavs of the pre-state period of the 8th-9th centuries were not only at approximately the same level of development, but also had similar social systems from the cultural, socio-political, military and economic points of view.

¹ *Lyapushkin I. I.* The Slavs of Eastern Europe before the formation of the Old Russian state (from the 8th century to the first half of the 9th century). L.: Nauka, 1968.

Chapter 3

HISTORY OF ANCIENT RUS. THE 9th TO THE FIRST HALF OF THE 13th CENTURY

By the 8th-9th centuries, all East Slavic tribes had together formed the historical conditions for the formation of Old Russian statehood. The first ancestor of the ruling dynasty of the Old Russian state in 862 was Rurik. The dispute between Normanists and anti-Normanists about the origins of the Old Russian state has lost its former sharpness. It is well known that the Normanists argued that the state mechanism, along with economic progress and cultural uplift, was brought to Rus' by the Varangians (Vikings, ancient Germans). The anti-Normanists proved that the process of creating the Old Russian state took place entirely independently, without any external influence.

In modern historical science, an approach has prevailed which assumes that by this point the Old Russian proto-states had matured economically, socially, politically and spiritually. In this sense, V. O. Klyuchevsky's conclusion that the Varangians brought to Russia not a ready-made state, but only the Rurik dynasty ruling there, is convincing¹. With the aid of modern scientific evidence, it can be argued that apart from the dynastic backbone, the Varangians reinforced the already inevitable process of the formation of the state power in Rus' by strengthening its military might through their professional retinue and

¹ Klyuchevsky V. O. Course of Russian History. M.: Prospekt, 2013.

by expanding foreign trade relations through the consolidation of the route “from the Varangians to the Greeks”.

In accordance with the generally accepted historical point of view, as well as numerous historical sources, Rurik is considered to be the ancestor of the ruling dynasty of the Old Russian state.

Before the conquest of Kiev by the Novgorod Prince Oleg (The Tale of Bygone Years calls him Oleg the Wise), two centres of Old Russian statehood developed in parallel: Novgorod for the union of the Ilmen Slovenes together with their subordinated tribes, and Kiev for the union of Polians together with their subordinated tribes, where the legendary Kiy, Shchek and Khoryv ruled.

After the conquest of Smolensk, Lubech and then Kiev by Prince Oleg, the two centres of the East Slavs were united into one Old Russian state, which could be called Novgorod-Kiev Rus. Along with unification, the Prince also moved the capital from Novgorod to Kiev, both for geopolitical and economic reasons.

British historian and diplomat William Allen notes the role of the route “from the Varangians to the Greeks” for the unification of Russia into a single state: “It was the dense river network of the Eastern European Plain that helped the tribes inhabiting it to unite into a common state...”

In the 9th century the famous route ‘from the Varangians to the Greeks’ was created. From the Baltic Sea trade caravans travelled along the Neva to Lake Ladoga, and from there along the Volkhov River to Lake Ilmen, then down the Lovat River to the tributaries of the Western Dvina...

The settlements of the Slavs, which emerged along the banks of rivers, enabled them to penetrate into lands that had not yet been developed by them. And the great waterway along which the Varangians travelled became the link that connected the Slavic tribes dispersed over the Great Russian Plain. Along this route the Russian state emerged...”¹

According to some historical accounts, Oleg was a senior retainer, while others say he was a relative of Rurik. After Rurik’s death in 879

¹ *Allen William*. History of Ukraine. South Russian lands from the first Kievan princes to Joseph Stalin. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2017. P. 7–18.

he began to rule in Novgorod as regent over Rurik's under-aged son Igor. There is a version that he seized the princely throne and decided not to hand it over to Igor even after he came of age.

In 882 Oleg undertook a campaign to Kiev, where Askold and Dir were ruling at the time. The city was captured by the Novgorod retinue. After that Prince Oleg moved the capital of Ancient Rus from Novgorod to Kiev, since the latter was located on the most navigable section of the trade route "from the Varangians to the Greeks" and was closer to the centre of the created united single state, formed in the territory of all East Slavic tribes.

In 907 and 911 Oleg made two military expeditions to Tsargrad (Constantinople). The successful second expedition resulted in a treaty with the Byzantine Empire that was beneficial to Rus. The treaty gave Russian merchants the right to free trade with Byzantium. Moreover, they had the right to live for a month at the expense of the Greeks in Constantinople, but were obliged to walk around the city unarmed. Oleg's treaty with Greeks provided for Rus lucrative trade with Byzantium.

According to the chronicler, Oleg's treaty was written in two languages, which confirms that Old Russian writing appeared long before the mass adoption of Christianity. The treaty with the Greeks mentions the "Russian Law" according to which the inhabitants of Kievan Rus were judged. This leads one to conclude that the legal customs, which would later become the basis for the subsequent "Russkaya Pravda" ("Russian Justice"), were already emerging at this time.

Even under Oleg, Drevlians, Severians and Radimichs became part of Ancient Rus. Then gradually other East Slavic tribal unions joined the single state: the Tivertsi, the Uliches, the Vyatichi, the T'mutarakan land and the Cherven cities, as well as such Finno-Ugric tribes as the Chud, the Merya, the Ves.

It is interesting to note that the first mention of Prince Oleg by M. Hrushevsky in his book "Outline of the History of the Ukrainian People" is as follows: "This historical Oleg, who ruled in Kiev at the end of the 9th century, is the first Kievan Prince with his own distinct physiognomy. His time is the epoch of Kiev's extraordinary success-

es...”¹ Simply put, following his method of historical manipulation, M. Hrushevsky totally forgets to mention the origins of the Prince, the reign in Novgorod, the conquest of Kiev by Novgorod, and the unification of the two centres into a single state.

It should be noted that patrimonial Rurik dynasty, based on the principle of seniority, concentrated princely power not only in Kiev or Novgorod, sometimes with transitions from one centre to another, but also in Murom, Rostov and Galich.

However, in modern Ukraine, in a bid to construct its own, alternative history, other extravagant theories are also proclaimed. For example, former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko proclaimed Kievan Prince Vladimir Sviatoslavich as the founder of the Old Russian state. In a decree on commemorative events on the millennium from the death of Vladimir Krasno Solnyshko (“the Fair Sun”), he described the Prince as the creator of “...the medieval European state of Rus-Ukraine...”²

In reality, Prince Vladimir has gone down in history as a christianiser who deliberately chose Orthodoxy for Russia, in contrast to the Catholicism prevalent in Europe, i. e., no “European state” is out of the question. Having first become Prince of Novgorod in 970 and taken the throne of Kiev in 978, he became Orthodox in 988.

Forgetting that it was Kiev that was conquered by Novgorod and not vice versa, and forgetting the existence of a single Russian state, M. Hrushevsky, in his usual style, suggested that Kievan Rus was a Ukrainian state, and all the great Princes of Kiev be considered the ancient Ukrainian rulers. Adhering to this absurd “theory”, one must assume that at the moment of taking the title of Grand Prince of Kiev, Prince Vladimir of Novgorod, from being Russian, becomes Ukrainian (before that a similar instantaneous procedure takes place with Prince Oleg), that Vladimir Monomakh was Ukrainian, but

¹ *Hrushevsky Mykhailo*. Outline of the History of the Ukrainian People. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg., 1906. P. 68.

² Poroshenko as Historian: Prince Vladimir Founded the State of Rus-Ukraine // Vesti.ru [website]. URL: <https://www.vesti.ru/article/1773450> (accessed: 19/09/2022).

his son Yury Dolgoruky and grandson Andrey Bogolyubsky were Russian¹.

Fascinated with constructing alternative histories, M. Hrushevsky did not reject even a direct falsification of historical facts — he claimed that “by the end of the IX century, many lands already depended on Kiev, not only Ukrainian territories, but also others, up to present-day Petersburg and Moscow, paid tribute to the Princes of Kiev...”² Here it should be recalled that the Vyatichi tribal union, on whose territory Moscow would be located at a much later time, joined the common Russian state only in the middle of the 10th century, and the Finno-Ugric tribes, who inhabited Ingria with much later Petersburg, in the late 10th century.

It should be noted that a significant number of these pseudo-historical constructions were taken from the pamphlet “History of the Rus”, which began to circulate in folios between 1810 and 1825, and was openly published in 1846. Despite the large number of proven falsifications and fantasies contained therein, due to the political demand for its Russophobic orientation it gave rise to a number of pseudo-historical theories subsequently developed by M. Hrushevsky and many other Ukrainian nationalists.

N. Kostomarov, a renowned historian and Ukrainophile, said about the “History of the Rus” that it contained “much incorrectness and therefore it, being rewritten many times and changing hands through various copies, had a negative scientific impact, because it spread false beliefs about the past of Malorossiya”³.

Back in 1870 Kharkov Professor G. Karpov in his book “A Critical Review of the Development of the Main Russian Sources Relating to the History of Malorossiya” described its main falsifications and anti-historical fantasy and called it “a political pamphlet written by an extremely spiteful man, which enjoyed undeserved prestige from the

¹ *Tolochko P.* Our Common History Cannot be Left at Yushchenko’s Mercy // *Izvestia.ru*. 12/11/2008 [website]. URL: <https://iz.ru/news/342642> (accessed: 19/09/2022).

² *Hrushevsky Mykhailo.* History of Ukraine. K.: Lybid’, 1992. P. 36.

³ Letter to the editors of the “*Vestnik Evropy*” (“Herald of Europe”). Vol. IV, August 1882.

extreme ignorance of those among whom it was published". Here is his opinion: "A political pamphlet may be written in the form of chronicles, which are written much later than the events they describe, and often based on other chronicles, notes, legends and official documents, which have a completely different purpose than the preservation of the news the author was interested in.

The aim of such an essay is to deliberately provide a special explanation of events; to remain silent about those that the author does not like or tell them not as they happened in reality, and even, finally, to compose unprecedented facts that confirm the pamphleteer's thought... The main feature of such chronicles... [is] the accusation of persons and peoples unpleasant to the author of despotism, uneducation, barbarism, inclination to deceit, cowardice, stupidity. Those whom the author takes under his patronage, however, are ascribed all the pleasant qualities opposite to these.

The second difference is their abundance of anecdotes: simple, ordinary events are embellished with fantasy... for someone with a serious mind they are vulgar because they are too artificial, but for the uneducated masses they are more accessible than serious research. The 'History of the Rus', composed by a man without talent, not liberal at all, but extremely spiteful, belongs to the category of such chronicles. Due to the ignorance of the author, the 'History of the Rus' may take the last place among false writings. It has enjoyed undeserved prestige for so long, probably both from public sympathy for the negative direction and, on the other hand, from the extreme ignorance of those to whom such a pamphlet was issued."

Chapter 4

WESTERN RUSSIAN LANDS IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 13th TO THE 16th CENTURY

In relation to the Mongol-Tatar yoke, two strategic lines were implemented in the Old Russian lands.

One of these was founded by Grand Prince Alexander Yaroslavich Nevsky of Vladimir and continued by his successors, Prince Ivan Kalita of Moscow and his sons. It was intended to temporarily accept dependence in the face of total Mongol-Tatar military superiority, renounce senseless losses, ensure the unification of the country, accumulate strength and, at the appropriate moment, throw off the yoke. In favour of this line was also the fact that the Mongol-Tartars, unlike Western countries and the Catholic Church, did not pretend to affirm their culture, language, power system and, most importantly, the need to renounce the Orthodox faith. Time has shown that Alexander Nevsky's strategy proved to be the only justified one in those circumstances.

The second line was an attempt at immediate liberation from the Horde at any cost, regardless of losses. This position was held by Grand Prince Andrei Yaroslavich of Vladimir, Mikhail Vsevolodovich of Chernigov, and eventually by Daniil of Galicia. Under the established military and political conditions, it proved to be adventurous, led to a senseless waste of human lives and resources, intensified Horde oppression and repression, and then promoted Catholic colonisation by its western neighbours.

After the establishment of the Golden Horde state, dependency in the southern and southwestern lands of Ancient Rus increased. This

was reflected in the murder in 1246 of the Prince Mikhail Vsevolodovich of Chernigov, who had advocated direct and immediate resistance to the Horde yoke. A census was taken and, consequently, tribute in the Chernigov and Kiev lands increased.

Batu Khan's warlords — Kuremsa, Burundai, Nogai and Telebuga — were in charge in southern Rus, conducting regular raids on Russian principalities and pursuing a deliberate policy of weakening them and keeping them in submission. Burunday was especially prominent in this field, forcing the Princes of Galicia-Volhynia to destroy their fortresses as potential points of resistance to their rule.

As a result of the Mongol-Tatar yoke, the land of Kiev finally lost its former significance, and its “capital city” lost its status as the all-Russian capital. After the events of 1240 Kiev and the whole land of Kiev came under the direct rule of the Horde, one of whose hordes (Kuremsa) was based near the town of Kanev (now Cherkasy region, Ukraine).

In 1243 the conquerors handed power over Kiev to the Prince of Vladimir and Suzdal, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, and in 1249 to his son Alexander Yaroslavich (Nevsky), the Prince of Novgorod. But Alexander did not go to Kiev, where Batu Khan's officials dominated, but stayed in Novgorod. There in 1251 he was visited by the new metropolitan of Kiev, Kirill, who had left the utterly ruined Kiev and led, in the words of N. I. Kostomarov, a “wandering life”¹, most often staying in Vladimir. Soon the church centre from Kiev finally moved to north-east Russia: the metropolitan Maxim, “not tolerating Tatar violence”, left for Vladimir.

As the Canadian historian of Ukrainian origin Orest Subtelny noted, “Ancient Kiev remains but a pale shadow of its past glory. Apart from the Orthodox metropolitan, who... left for the prosperous centres of north-eastern Russia and eventually settled in Moscow, the city was left by many boyars and major merchants. For a long time, Kiev did not even have its own prince...”²

Under the influence of foreign expansion between the second half of the 13th and the first half of the 14th century, the old political struc-

¹ *Kostomarov N. I.* The Two Russian Nationalities (Letter to the editor) // *Osnova*. St. Petersburg, 1861. No. 3.

² *Subtelny Orest.* History of Ukraine. K.: Lybid, 1994.

ture ceased to exist, which was characterised by independent principalities — lands ruled by different branches of the Rurik princely family, within which there were smaller vassal principalities.

The Principality of Galicia-Volhynia was particularly active. Prince Daniil of Galicia made great efforts to develop it. According to the Prince's contemporaries, the town of Kholm, which he made his capital, was particularly beautiful. In 1256, Daniil Romanovich founded the city of Lvov in honour of his son Lev. The Prince received artisans and merchants from the Polish and German lands, from the Russian principalities conquered by the Mongols, and especially from Kiev. Peasants and artisans from other Russian principalities fled under his patronage, and Armenian and Jewish traders arrived.

The multi-ethnic character of Galician cities became a feature specific to them for many centuries to come. Historical documents and the names of cities indicate that at least a third of the settlements of Volhynia and Galicia appeared precisely during the period of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, and were inhabited mainly by East Slavs. In terms of cultural and architectural development, the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia was in many ways superior to its neighbours.

Cut off from the rest of Rus by the Golden Horde, and then by Lithuania, the land of Galicia-Volhynia, through trade and economic exchange and western migration, became increasingly close in culture, economy and social life to neighbouring European states, but retained the Orthodox faith and the Old Russian language and writing system.

In his foreign policy, Prince Daniil of Galicia initiated an active formation of the anti-Horde coalition in Europe, concluding alliances with Poland, Hungary, Moravia and the Teutonic Order. He seized the Yotvingian lands and the Black Rus (part of the lands of the Principality of Polotsk) in 1250–1253 to secure his northern borders. In search of allies, Daniil appealed to Pope Innocent IV for help in organising a crusade against the Mongol-Tatars. Documents in the Vatican archives say that negotiations began in April 1246 and lasted for six years. The Pope demanded for his support the spread of Catholicism in the Principality and the union of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches.

Following a difficult compromise, Pope Innocent IV reluctantly called on Christians in Poland, Bohemia, Moravia and elsewhere to

crusade against the Horde in 1253, though he realised that this would de facto never happen. Europe was stunned by the scale and consequences of the Mongol invasion of its territory in 1241–1242. The contradictions between the sovereigns of Eastern Europe remained too acute.

In the autumn of 1253, the papal envoy Opizo presented the Prince Daniil of Galicia-Volhynia in Dorogochina, Volhynia, with the crown and the title of “king of Rus”. However, the Pope pursued a two-faced policy and in 1255 allowed the Lithuanian prince Mindaugas, who had also adopted Catholicism and the crown of king from the Vatican, “to war against the Russian land as against infidels”. For this reason, the Princes of Galicia-Volhynia, instead of driving the Horde out of Kiev, were forced to repel Lithuanian attacks on Rus. Disappointed with the actions of the Vatican and unable to wait for help, Daniil rejected the acceptance of union in his lands and banned the presence of Catholic missionaries, retaining the title of king. He decided on an independent military campaign against Kiev.

The khan’s headquarters sent Kuremsa’s horde, roaming the Galician Lowlands, against him. On the Dniester their cavalry was stopped by detachments led by Daniil’s son Leo. Then the prince himself went on the offensive, defeated the Horde in Pobuzhye, and took the town of Vozyvigel in the land of Kiev. The Prince’s troops thwarted an attempt by the Mongols to take Vladimir and Lutsk. The first stage of Daniel Romanovich’s military operations against Kuremsa in 1254–1257 was successful for him.

In 1259 a huge army headed by the emir Burundai moved against Prince Daniil. Approaching the lands of the Principality, he delivered an ultimatum to the Romanoviches Princes: return their troops from other Russian territories and tear down the fortifications of the cities, or the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia will be destroyed. It was with anguish in his heart that Daniil watched the destruction of the fortress walls of the cities of Vladimir, Lutsk, Kremenets, Kamyanets-Podolsk and Lvov, which he had diligently erected. Only the fortress walls of his beloved Kholm were preserved. In the next two years the Romanoviches were forced to send their troops as part of the Khan’s army on military campaigns in Lithuania and Poland, where they ravaged the Lublin and Sandomierz lands.

As a result, the Prince's adventurist actions took a heavy toll on the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia: Lithuanian raids began, the economy was undermined, and the cities were devastated. A large part of the population took refuge in the Carpathian Mountains. The areas in the middle and lower reaches of the Prut, Dniester and Southern Bug rivers fell out of princely control. The inhabitants of Lowlands chose to submit to the Horde, seeing this as a guarantee of their security.

In 1264 Daniil Romanovich died in his beloved Kholm, not having achieved his main aim, but instead being forced to become an ally of the Mongol-Tatars. With his decease, the most prosperous period in the history of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia ended. By 1265 it had split up into four feudal domains, which were only formally under the jurisdiction of the Princes. After the death of Daniil Romanovich, his sons and grandsons became Princes in the land of Galicia-Volhynia.

The southern Russian lands become an object of expansion from the West. After the release from Horde dependence, the southern Russian lands were occupied by the armies of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Poland and Hungary.

Polish foreign intervention began. In 1340 the boyar opposition organised the poisoning of the last influential and active Prince of Galicia-Volhynia, Yuri II Boleslav. It is interesting that several letters from that era have survived to the present day. In one of them, entitled "Dei dratia natus dux minoris Russiae", the term "Malaya Rus" appears for the first time (in Orthodox correspondence this name was mentioned in Constantinople at the opening of the Metropolitan See of Galicia). Signatures in the documents were also put by Orthodox Church servants and princely nobles: bishop, supporter of prince (boyar Dmytro Dedko), judges and voivodes (Belsky, Peremyshlsky, Lvovsky and Lutsky), called "barons" in the Latin texts.

This fact demonstrates the limited influence of the princely power in the Galicia-Volhynia land. There is an opinion in the historical literature that the death of Yuri II Boleslav was beneficial to the Polish king Casimir III. Nine days after receiving news of the Prince's death, he moved an army into the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, ravaged Lvov, and seized the prince's kleynods and some hefty spoils of war. The death of Yuri Boleslav gave Casimir III, as a close relative of the Mazovian princes, the right to lay claim to the throne of Galicia-Vol-

hynia: “...It was with joy that the Polish king added the monarchical domain of ‘Prince of Russia’ to his title. He was now ‘the lord and heir of the Russian land’...”¹

By 1349 the Polish king Casimir III had conquered Lvov, Belz, Kholm, Berestyie and Vladimir-Volhynsky, and by 1366 the southern territories of Volhynia, from Boremly to Kremenitsa. After his conquest of Galicia in 1350, he entered into an agreement with the Hungarian king Louis I which provided that if Casimir did not have an heir, the Hungarian crown would take pre-emptive rights to the territory. If an heir was born, Louis I received the right to buy the former principality for 100,000 florins. As Casimir did not have a son, the land passed to the Hungarians after his death. King Louis I, who was also the King of Poland, appointed Duke Vladislaus of Opole to be his viceroy in Galicia. The new ruler of Galicia immediately set about minting coins with the image of a lion — the emblem of Galician Rus — and returned to the norms of Russian law and the equality of the Old Russian and Latin languages. He used a seal with his own image as well as with a Galician lion and an eagle. Vladislaus of Opole actively invited colonists from the Polish and German lands, opened a Latin metropolis in Galicia and subordinated the episcopates in Peremyshl, Vladimir and Kholm to it. In 1378, the Hungarian-Polish King Louis I of Anjou deposed Vladislaus and appointed his headmen to Galicia, who came under the protection of Hungarian troops. The Hungarian occupation regime lasted until 1387. Eventually Poland defeated Hungary in this struggle, finally conquered Galicia and legally formalised its takeover. Transcarpathia remained under the rule of the Hungarian kingdom until the 16th century, when it was divided between Austria and Transylvania.

At the same time the expansion of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into south-western Russia was taking place. This state has been Balto-Slavic from the very beginning. Its multi-ethnic composition was reflected in its official name, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Žemaitija and Rus. Actually, at the height of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania’s power, Lithuania represented no more than one tenth of it. The Rus-

¹ *Voitovich L.* Galician-Volhynian etudes (Poland, Mazovia, Lithuania, and Hungary in the Struggle for the Romanoviches Succession). Belaya Tserkov, 2011. P. 379.

sian lands within Lithuania, which were larger than Lithuanian ones and the most economically and politically developed, significantly influenced the nature of social relations and the culture of that state.

In incorporating the Russian lands into their own composition, the Grand Dukes of Lithuania preserved their autonomy and social structure. Many local Rurikovich princes (Drutsky, Vorotynsky, Odoyevsky) retained their boyar fiefdoms, while most nobles retained their estates. There was freedom of religion.

The retention of much authority at the local level meant that there was no centralised administrative apparatus in Lithuania, much like the departmental system in the Muscovite state. The only permanent body was the Chancellery of the Grand Duke, where acts were drawn up and the state archives were kept. In fact, Lithuania was a federation of lands and principalities under the rule of the Grand Dukes of the Gediminid dynasty.

The nobility of the Lithuanian state, with the exception of the princes, consisted mainly of Russians, not Lithuanians. This was due to the fact that Lithuania had for a long time maintained a free peasantry subordinated directly to the Grand Duke, and there were few local nobles. The Russian nobility in the Lithuanian state formed the backbone of the army, participated in solving political problems, and was involved in governing Lithuanian cities. Furthermore, Russian law was incorporated into Lithuanian law: until the second half of the 15th century, “*Russkaya Pravda*” (“Russian Justice”) was the applicable law in Lithuania.

The official language and language of everyday communication in the Duchy of Lithuania was for a long time Russian in its Western version (“*ruska mova*” or “*ruski language*”). As V. O. Klyuchevsky pointed out, “By the end of the 14th century Lithuania was already, both in terms of its population and its way of life, more a Russian than a Lithuanian principality...”¹

In 1362 Kiev was captured by Grand Duke Olgierd. After the Battle of Blue Waters (1363) the Kiev, Podolsk, Pereyaslavl and partially Chernigov-Seversk lands were annexed. A special regime was established for the administration of the western Russian lands under the

¹ *Klyuchevsky V. O. Course of Russian History. M.: Prospekt, 2013.*

authority of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. But the ties between western Rus, Lithuania and the Grand Principality of Moscow were not interrupted. Representatives of the princely and boyar families passed from one prince to another, feuding with each other, but also forming friendships and alliances. On the Kulikovo Field the warlord Bobrok from Volhynia and the sons of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Olgierd — Andrey Polotsky and Dmitry Bryansky — fought beside the Grand Prince Dmitry Ivanovich of Moscow. Meanwhile the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Jogaila, son of a Tver princess, led his troops to join Mamai.

The Polish-Lithuanian conflict, which ended in a peace treaty of 1366, divided the southwestern Russian territories between the conquerors as follows: the Polish king had the lands of Lvov, Peremyshl and Galicia, the Lithuanian king had Volhynia, Kholm and Belz.

Ethnic relations in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania gave rise to the hopes of the Russian population. Often the southwestern Russian lands submitted to Lithuania without much resistance. The incorporation of a large number of Russian lands into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, with a higher level of social relations and culture, created illusions about its transformation into a major Orthodox state. However, this did not happen for a number of reasons.

First, complete equality between Russians and Lithuanians was not established. Large principalities, such as Kiev and Volhynia, still fell to the Lithuanian princes — the descendants of Gedimin. Second, when neighbouring states such as Poland became powerful centralised monarchies, the noble republic which was in fact the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, with its anarchic “Golden Liberty” and lack of an effective central government, financial system and regular army, proved to be unviable.

That is why the Polish-Lithuanian conflict was ended by the Union of Krevo, done at Krevo Castle on 14 August 1385, which established a dynastic alliance between Poland and Lithuania through the marriage of Polish Queen Jadwiga, daughter of Louis the Great, and Lithuanian Duke Jogaila, who was proclaimed king of a common Polish-Lithuanian state. After this geopolitical event for Eastern Europe, the war between the two irreconcilable rivals as a means of dispute resolution was exhausted.

As a result of a series of Unions, the Russian-Lithuanian state began to turn into a Polish-Lithuanian one. Catholicism was gradually adopted, religious persecution of the Russian (Ukrainian) population began, and the colonial rule of Poland and Lithuania over the western Russian lands was consolidated. In 1401 the Union of Vilnius and Radom, in which the Grand Duke of Lithuania Vitovt acknowledged his vassal status to the King of Poland, was signed.

Additional social and political privileges for Catholics in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were introduced by the Union of Horodło (1413), under which the Lithuanian nobility who adopted Catholicism received the rights and privileges of the Polish one. Local administration was also organised along the lines of the neighbouring kingdom, and Catholics were given an advantage in holding administrative positions.

This naturally caused discontent among the Orthodox feudal lords, which erupted during the bloody feuds of Vitovt's relatives. A response from the Polish royal power followed. In 1430 Wladyslaw II Jagiello, King of Poland, issued the Jedlnia Privileges, which stipulated the equality of the Galician-Russian nobles with the Polish nobility, but on the conditions of the latter.

From that time Russian boyars who had come under Polish rule were titled nobles or magnates, depending on their financial means, and "boyarin" was replaced by "pan". All nobles and magnates, including the Russian feudal elite, were exempted from taxes in return for the obligation to perform military service to defend the Kingdom of Poland. The fiefdoms and their owners were declared immune from reprisals without trial. They were allowed to form bodies of local self-government and elected local courts, but only on the basis of Polish law, and even to assemble the General Seimik of Rus in Lvov. The King appointed a voivode (governor) of the largest and most loyal to him feudal lords as a head of the administration of his new Galician lands.

Around 1434 the Russian Voivodeship (Województwo Ruskie) appears on the map of Poland as a legacy of the royal domain from the lands of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, which had been seized in the last quarter of the 14th century. The city of Lvov became its administrative centre. Galician Rus was transformed into a common province of Poland, ruled by the king's viceroy, the "Russian headman" in Lvov.

The last hopes for the formation of an Orthodox state in Lithuania disappeared by the mid-15th century, after Jogaila's son Casimir became both Duke of Lithuania and King of Poland, with the result that the Duchy of Lithuania was finally transformed into a Catholic state.

King Casimir carried out a series of reforms aimed at centralising power in the united state along the lines of the Polish administration and eliminating vestiges of Russian (Ukrainian) autonomy. In 1452 Volhynia was transformed into a common Lithuanian province, and in 1471 the same fate befell the Kiev land. The remnants of local self-government quickly and irrevocably disappeared.

It is accepted that during this period the term "Ukraine" began to appear in Polish documents as a geographical definition instead of "Rus". On the one hand, this was due to the fact that it was the first Russian border periphery annexed to Poland, consisting of the lands of Galicia (Ruś Czerwona/Red Ruthenia), with the Polish elite wishing to erase the term "Rus" from history in the expectation of full assimilation of the territory. Moreover, after the Union of Lublin of 1569, when the provinces of Kiev and Bratslav were included in the crown lands (i. e., Poland), this notion was extended to the new territories of the Rzeczpospolita.

The historian N. Ulyanov was convinced of the active involvement of the Poles in promoting the term "Ukraine", writing: "...The very use of the words 'Ukraine' and 'Ukrainians' was first imposed in literature by them. It can be found as early as in the works of Count Jan Potocki. Another Pole, Count Tadeush Chatsky, then also embarks on a racial interpretation of the term 'Ukrainian'. If old Polish annalists like Samuel Grądzki, back in the 17th century, derived the term from the geographical location of Malorossiya, located on the edge of the Polish possessions ('Margo enim polonice kraj; inde Ukraina quasi provincial ad fines Regni posita'), Chatsky derived it from some unknown horde of 'Ukes', who came out allegedly from across the Volga in the 7th century..."¹ Later the substitution of "Rus" for "Ukraine" takes place with the active participation of the Catholic priest F. Dukhinsky (mid-19th century) and the Jesuit S. Zhebrovsky.

¹ *Ulyanov Nikolai*. Origins of Ukrainian Separatism. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2017. P. 10.

The Polish authorities had set themselves the task of achieving the complete assimilation of Galician Rus. Signs of Russian (Ukrainian) identity were eliminated everywhere, property was taken away from dukes and boyars who were disloyal to the new authorities and given to the Polish aristocracy and nobility, together with entire villages and small towns. Huge latifundia were allocated to the Catholic Church. The Polish feudal lords imposed corvée on the new lands, much earlier than on the original Polish territories... The colonisation process, which began under Jogaila, intensified over time. The authorities were inviting more and more new arrivals from Poland and other European countries, promising them administrative positions after the removal of the autochthonous population, exemption from taxes and corvée, favourable terms of trade, etc.

The introduction of Polish serfdom in the form of the Piotrków-Wiślica Statutes began in the annexed territories of western Rus. These statutes were translated into Russian and distributed to Galician Rus. However, serfdom had been established in the Polish-Lithuanian state 148 years earlier and considerably stricter than in the Russian state, where it was enshrined in the Sudebnik of Ivan III of 1497.

The unbearable conditions of Polish serfdom for Ukrainian peasants were described by the Ukrainian-born Canadian historian O. Subtelny: “At the same time as the star of fortune was shining brightly on the sky of the Rzeczpospolita nobility, the star of the peasantry was setting. For the nobleman, who acquired unimaginable wealth and absolute power, the peasant is above all cheap labour. With its complete control over the political system of Rzeczpospolita, the nobility could tighten its ‘legal’ demands on the peasantry at will...”¹

For example, back in the early 15th century in Galicia, all the obligations of a peasant community (dvorishcha) to a landowner-feudal lord, in fact, were reduced to the requirement to expose two or three members of the community to work for villein service every year for a period not longer than 14 days. By the early 16th century, however, each adult member of the peasant community had to work on a nobleman’s estate two days a week. This was enshrined in the so-called Vo-

¹ *Subtelny Orest*. History of Ukraine. K.: Lybid’, 1994. P. 116.

loki Statute, adopted in 1557 in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, this was not the limit: over time, peasants were forced to work three or four days a week, and sometimes even more. It is clear that in the few days left to cultivate his own land, a peasant could hardly make any profit from higher food prices. In fact, he was barely making ends meet, remembering with longing the old days, which now seemed both fed and free.

With the Voloki Statute, the land on which the peasant lived and worked was no longer legally declared a peasant's land, but a landowner's one. A peasant worked the land, but only a nobleman could own it. An analogy for this mechanism can be found in the Sudebnik of Ivan the Terrible, which was adopted at almost the same time as the Voloki Statute, in 1550. Subsequently, the increase of serfdom resulted in a situation where by the end of the 18th century, the end of the Rzeczpospolita, the amount of villein service in Right-bank Ukraine had risen to 300 days a year.

The personal enslavement of peasants under Polish-Lithuanian conditions developed much more rapidly. To make it easier to exploit the peasants, the nobility tried to get rid of traditional forms of rural self-government in any way they could. At times by force or bribery, the nobility took the headmen, Schultheiß and other holders of traditional peasant "rights" — the "Moldovan" and "German" ones — out of the game. From then on, only one "Polish right", i. e., the direct subordination of the peasant to the feudal lord, was recognised. Back in 1457 a nobleman was granted the right to punish his peasants, from whence his rule in the village became absolute and unquestioning. It is difficult to name an area of the peasant's personal life that was not affected by the landlord.

It should be noted that the punishments of landlords for their serfs were not established in the Russian Tsardom until 93 years later — in accordance with the Sudebnik of 1550. The commercial component of the "redemption" of some personal rights and economic opportunities of serfs in Rzeczpospolita is interesting. In the Russian state too, a serf could not marry without the owner's permission, but only in Poland did some landowners go so far as to demand that their peasants pay for a license to marry, or force their villagers to use the master's mills or inns (both of which Polish nobility often leased to Jews).

The culmination of the establishment of serfdom in Rzeczpospolita was in 1573, 76 years earlier than in Muscovite Rus, where serfdom was legally enshrined in 1649 on the basis of the Sobornoye Ulozheniye of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. Thus, the processes of enslavement of the peasants in Ruś Czerwona proceeded faster than in the main territory of Poland, and were aggravated by the cruellest religious and national oppression.

In 1351–1367 the expansion of the Catholic Church into the western Russian lands began. The Polish magnates drove Russians (Ukrainians) out of the state administration and cultural environment. Latin became the common clerical and official language, and in the earlier period of Lvov's colonisation (second half of the 14th century), German was the main clerical and official language. This policy was carried out by Catholics from European countries, the number of whom increased steadily in the urban patriciate, as well as by the Polonised part of the local Russian (Ukrainian) boyar-feudal estate.

During the reign of the Polish king Casimir III, the Catholic faith in Galician Rus received a privileged status, and Orthodoxy was referred to as a "heresy" or "schism". Administrative positions in all localities of Galicia, previously occupied by members of the Russian Orthodox elite, were given exclusively to Catholics, who received lands in the form of grants from the former princely domain, which had become the property of the king. The Catholic Church did not recognise the Orthodox as Christians. In its official documents of the time one could find the following statement: "He is a Christian, not a Ruthenian". From the mid-14th century, the project of creating a Catholic metropolitan see was actively pursued. Catholic bishoprics appeared in Peremyshl (1351), Vladimir-Volhynsky (1358), Kholm and Lvov (1359), and Halych (1367). The state imposed the activities of the Franciscan and Dominican orders.

From 1356 to 1434 the process of abolition of Russian law took place on the conquered territories, and the laws of the Kingdom of Poland were introduced everywhere. In a number of Galician cities, most notably Lvov, the Magdeburg Law began to be applied in 1356 as a reinforcement of Polish and Catholic influence, which considerably weakened the interests of the Orthodox.

The rights of Russian (Ukrainian) burghers, merchants and artisans were restricted. Discrimination on religious and national grounds began to increase in Galician cities. A peculiar “Russian (Ukrainian) ghetto” was formed in the area of present-day Ruska Street with adjoining areas in Lvov, outside the boundaries of which Russians (Ukrainians) were forbidden to build any buildings or hold Orthodox church processions and funerals. It was forbidden to admit Russians (Ukrainians) to artisan’s workshops. They were not allowed to engage in the production of spirits, beer and wine, or the cutting and sale of cloth.

Since the Russians (Ukrainians) were Orthodox and the Orthodox oath did not serve as a basis for employment with the city’s magistrate, opportunities were therefore “de facto” closed to the native population. Legally, the practice was deemed abusive, sometimes even challenged in the highest courts, but the trials were long and costly. Obviously, not every Russian (Ukrainian) artisan could afford to travel for a long time from Lvov to Warsaw or hire a lawyer to win a lawsuit against the shop’s Catholic organisation.

The Polish King Sigismund I the Old gave the following answer to the complaint of the Orthodox population of Lvov on this matter: “The burghers of Lvov should be content with the territory and streets that have been assigned to them from time immemorial in Lvov, and should not acquire possession of other buildings than those occupied by them or their ancestors”. Thus, the local Russian (Ukrainian) population of the cities became a second-class ethnos in their native land.

Discrimination against Russians (Ukrainians) in Poland’s subordinate Lithuania caused a pull towards the Principality of Moscow. Thus in 1480–1481 there was a so-called “conspiracy of princes”, planning to hand over part of the Russian lands of the Duchy of Lithuania to the power of Moscow. The conspiracy, led by Olgerd’s three great-grandsons: Princes Olshansky, Mikhail Opelkovich and Fiodor Bielski, was uncovered. The first two princes were seized by order of the Polish king, and Bielski “went to Moscow”, where he was received “with real mercy” and given “the town of Demon as his patrimony”. In 1489 two princes Vorotynskys and three princes Bielskis joined the service of Grand Prince Ivan III of Moscow. From that moment the Russian (Ukrainian) nobility fled from Lithuania to the Tsardom of Russia on a mass scale.

A serious danger to the Polish Crown was the uprising in 1508 led by the influential and great magnate Mikhail Glinsky (an uncle of Ivan IV the Terrible's mother Elena Glinskaya), who declared himself a "servant of the sovereign of Moscow". However, as the Russian historian N. M. Karamzin noted, "...the Glinskys tried in vain to agitate the Kiev and Volhynia regions: the people indifferently waited for events; the boyars partly wished Mikhail success, but did not want to subject themselves to execution by revolt; very few joined him, and his army consisted of two or three thousand horsemen; the leaders of cities were loyal to the King. Prince Vasily III of Moscow asked the King not to disturb the Glinskys and to allow them free passage to Russia..."¹

In this situation the struggle to preserve and strengthen Orthodoxy in the Russian lands took on special significance. In 1448 the Russian metropolitan see of Moscow was given autocephaly and in 1458 the Kiev Orthodox metropolitan see of Kiev was established. It is important to note that both Western and Eastern Russian lands spoke the same language, and the faith was Orthodox. The church was united in its administration up to the middle of the 15th century.

The Polish king Casimir III the Great understood the danger that could arise in the case of severe persecution of the Orthodox faith in Galicia due to its great influence on the local population. To defuse the threat of a national explosion among the autochthonous population and the outbreak of a bloody religious war, he became involved in the ancient struggle of the Galician princes to establish an independent Orthodox metropolitan see in the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia. The aim of this political manoeuvre was to separate the newly created Metropolitan See of Galicia from the Metropolitan See of Kiev and All Russia and its subsequent conversion to Catholicism under the control of the Polish monarch.

This would allow the Polish aristocracy to pursue the issue of the ousting of Orthodoxy throughout south-west Rus more actively. The plan of Casimir III, supported by the religious policy of subsequent Polish kings, led to their desired result of effectively splitting the unity of the Orthodox Church.

¹ *Karamzin N. M. History of the Russian State.*

The position of the Grand Duke Olgierd (Algirdas) of Lithuania also had a significant impact on the above-mentioned decision of the patriarch and the Synod of Constantinople to establish a Metropolitan See of Galicia. The ruler of Lithuania pursued similar aims to those of Casimir III in splitting the Orthodox Church, whose unity prevented him from implementing his policy. He refused to allow the Metropolitan of Moscow, under whose tutelage were the bishops of southern Rus, to pass through his territory which separated north-eastern Rus from Galicia-Volhynia. In 1371 Olgierd requested the patriarch of Constantinople for permission to establish a special metropolitan see on the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Later on, the influence of Catholicism on the Orthodox clergy only increased. Thus, on 15 April 1509 the Polish king Sigismund I the Old granted the right to elect the vicar of the Orthodox metropolitan of Kiev in Galicia to the Catholic archbishop of Lvov, despite the absurdity of this step not only in religious, but also in legal terms. At the same time, at the will of the Polish king, the Orthodox metropolitan of western Rus was hypocritically titled “Metropolitan of Kiev, Galicia and all Rus”. At the same time, Orthodox clerics sent to Galicia by the metropolitan of Kiev were arrested on the orders of the Catholic archbishop of Lvov.

After the Metropolitan of Kiev effectively lost control over the Orthodox parishes of Galicia, the Orthodox population rose up in a determined struggle against the expansion of Catholic proselytism. In fact, the resistance, which lasted for thirty years, ended in 1539 with the election of Archimandrite Makarii Tuchapsky as bishop of the Metropolitan See of Galicia, Bishop of Lvov and Kamyanets-Podilsky, i. e., the newly established Diocese of Lvov was the successor of the Galician Orthodox Metropolitan See.

Increased persecution of Orthodoxy, economic and personal enslavement of peasants, restrictions on the rights of the Russian (Ukrainian) population, and the total presence of a foreign element in all spheres of life in the former Russian principality invariably led to growing discontent among the common people. The history of Galicia in the 14th-15th centuries was marked by numerous and constant protests of the Russian (Ukrainian) population against the Polish and Hungarian feudals, which were suppressed with extreme cruelty. There

was a peasant revolt in 1340 and a rebellion in 1370, which lasted for two years. The popular uprisings of 1469 and 1490–1492 heralded the start of a thoroughgoing liberation movement in western Rus against Poland.

Mukha rebellion, one of the largest, covered Moldavia, Galicia and Bukovina, with a total of about 10,000 rebels. The rebellion was suppressed by the joint forces of the Polish nobility and the Teutonic Order. The leader, Mukha (Andrey Borulia), was captured and executed in Khotyn fortress. In 1492 a new leader of the rebellion, also named Mukha, was captured and died of torture in Krakow. The survivors fled to the Zaporozhian Sich. They were let down by the classic vices of all peasant movements: inexperience of the leaders, lack of organisation, poor military training, and an exceptional focus on local problems. The rebellion had the hallmarks of a war of liberation against the Poles. The survivors fled to the Zaporozhian Sich, where, from the 16th century onwards, all those disgruntled by the increasing national and religious oppression by the Polish magnates and nobility began to gather.

At the beginning of the 16th century a series of clashes between the Grand Principality of Moscow and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania over disputed territories took place. Moscow's victory in the Russian-Lithuanian war of 1500–1503 led to the liberation of the Chernigov-Severian lands from Lithuanian colonial rule and the incorporation of these principalities into the Russian state. The Russian-Lithuanian war of 1507–1508 resulted in the signing of an “eternal peace” with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its recognition of integration of the Severian lands into the Muscovite state.

At the new turn of historical development, the points of attraction, the consolidation of the territories of Ancient Rus could become both the Lithuanian Rus and Muscovite Rus. History has it that it was the Princes of Moscow — the descendants of Prince Alexander Nevsky — who threw off the Mongol-Tatar yoke and began to assemble the historic Russian lands.

In the first half of the 16th century the process of Polonisation of the political and economic feudal-boyar elite of western Rus (Daniloviches, Dershnyakis, Lagodovskys, Porokhovitskys, Orekhovskys, Yarmolinskys, Churilis, Chodorovskys) intensified. Most of the Russian (Ukrainian) feudal class either became poor (Volkovskys, Galkis,

Dvorskovichis, Dyadkovichis, Kozlovskys, Karachevskys), unable to withstand the terror of the Polish authorities and mingled with the peasantry, or were forced to flee outside Poland.

In 1569 the Union of Lublin was concluded with the unification of Poland and Lithuania into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita*), which effectively meant that Poland absorbed Lithuania. Most of the southern Russian lands fell under Polish colonial rule. The Union of Lublin was not a voluntary choice of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, much less of the Russians (Ukrainians) and Belarusians living on its territory. As the Belarusian researcher Vitovt Charopko pointed out, "...The union was made by violence. The Lithuanians felt hostility and hatred towards "Lyakhs" (Poles): 'God forbid that there would be a Lyakh! He will massacre Lithuania, and Rus for that matter'..."¹

The Union of Lublin opened up a wide field for the forcible imposition of Catholicism throughout the entire Russian (Ukrainian) space. The Polish King Wladyslaw (Jagiello) gave the Catholic bishop of Lvov the right to supervise "heretics" and the Orthodox on his Catholic territory. The onslaught of Catholicism on the Orthodox clergy began. The Polish Catholic nobility obtained considerable land holdings and privileges on Russian territory. There was a widespread tradition in Poland of referring to the Russian lands under Polish colonial rule as "Ukraine". The Galician Orthodox community, which was deep in the Polish rear, experienced all the hardships.

The unification of Poland and Lithuania changed the position of the Russian (Ukrainian) lands within the new country — the Catholic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Orthodox Church found itself in a subordinate position. The influence of Polish culture and Western European traditions and customs grew stronger. The rights of the Russian (Ukrainian) population were systematically restricted by the *Rzeczpospolita* authorities.

The persecution of the Orthodox Church took particularly sophisticated forms under the Polish and Swedish king Sigismund III (1566–1632), who was actively supported by the Jesuits. The result of this policy was the Union of Brest of 1596, which enabled the Polish

¹ *Charopko Vitovt*. Grand Dukes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. P. 258.

magnates and the Vatican, under the banner of Uniatism invented by Rome, to invade the expanse of Orthodox Rus given over by the Lithuanian dukes.

The Union of Brest of 1596 led to an increase in Catholicisation and Polonisation. This was an agreement under which part of the clergy of the Orthodox Metropolitan See of Kiev joined the Roman Catholic Church by recognising the Pope as head of the church and accepting the tenets of Catholicism. As a result, Orthodox societies were divided into Uniates (Greek Catholics) and Disuniates (opponents of the Union).

The supreme Orthodox leadership in Constantinople realised the danger of their canonical territory in Rus shrinking. In 1686 Ecumenical Patriarch Dionysius IV and the Holy Synod of Constantinople responded by issuing the Tomos, which referred to the transfer of the Metropolitan See of Kiev (western Rus) to the canonical authority of the Moscow Patriarchate. After receiving this decision from Constantinople, Bishop Joseph of Lvov, on behalf of the Orthodox bishops of the region, requested that Patriarch Joachim of Moscow establish a Metropolitan See of Galicia in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. However, this attempt failed due to the opposition of the Polish authorities.

Already from 1676 the prohibition of contacts between Orthodox subjects of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Eastern Orthodox hierarchs, imposed by the Polish Sejm, came into force. The Sejm of 1676 enacted a law which forbade Orthodox Christians of all estates, under pain of death and confiscation of property, to travel abroad or to come from abroad, and strictly charged border headmen with the task of supervising the execution of this law. This measure was intended to prevent the Orthodox from receiving support from outside, and was also intended to force Orthodox priests to accept ordination from Uniate bishops, as there were no Orthodox bishops within Poland, and communion with pastors living in Russia and Moldavia was prevented. such a law was confirmed at the Sejm of 1678 and 1699.

The discussion and conclusion of the Union of Brest led to fierce polemics and a divided society. Ukrainian society split into two unequal halves: on the one side were the Orthodox magnates, the majority of the clergy and the people; on the other were the former hierarchs of the

Orthodox Church and a handful of their adherents. However, a weighty argument, such as royal support, was placed on this other side of the scale. For a while the two sides were in equilibrium — a paradoxical situation in which the hierarchs could do without the church and the church without the hierarchs... The Union of Brest began as an attempt to unite the Christian churches and all Christian believers, but led to their further separation, as there were now three churches in place of the two — Catholic, Orthodox and Uniate.

The church schism caused outrage and backlash from Orthodox patriots. Ivan Vyshensky, for example, took an active part in this dispute. This, perhaps the most prominent Orthodox writer of his time (c. 1550–1620s), a Galician, spent most of his life as a hermit monk in Greece, on Mount Athos. As a staunch defender of Orthodoxy, with a simple and powerful style, he mercilessly criticised the Uniates in works such as the “Epistle to the Apostate Bishops” and the “Brief Reply to Piotr Skarga”. Ivan Vyshensky’s voice is the lonely voice of a man of the people. This hermit monk was the only writer of his time who bemoaned the enslavement of the peasants and dared to condemn the landlords.

Such church reform led to centuries of religious strife in Ukraine and Belarus. Discrimination against the non-Catholic population of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was established. There was a forced conversion of some of the Malorussian nobility to Catholicism, persecution of the Orthodox Church and Russian (Ukrainian) culture, which led to a number of popular uprisings in western Rus.

Thus, the Polish kings succeeded in weakening the influence of the centres of Orthodox Christianity in their traditional canonical territory in Galicia. It was an absolute victory for the Vatican and the Polish aristocracy, allowing the ideological basis for the existence of the Russian (Ruthenian) people of south-western Rus to be destroyed and their value-historical reference points to be blurred. The further course of history showed that the resulting ideological vacuum was being filled by a different, but already palliative influence (Uniatism) on the consciousness of the autochthonous population, isolated from the main Russian body. It was only at the cost of the loss of the Orthodox faith that the autochthonous population of Galicia, who had converted to Uniatism, was allowed to participate in various areas of city life.

The Union of Brest, imposed by the Vatican, according to its (Western) purpose, could not be an ideological foundation for national revival, as it pursued the mirror opposite goal of integrating the Orthodox Russian (Ruthenian) population of the Galician and part of the Volhynian lands into the Catholic world and preventing the emergence of a national liberation movement.

The development of parts of the south Russian lands in the 16th century is closely linked to the phenomenon of the Cossackdom. The word “Cossack” originated in ancient times and meant in the Iranian, Arabic, Turkic and Mongolian languages, where it originally appeared, “a free servant man...”¹ In Rus, the emergence of the concept of the Cossackdom was connected to the emergence of Horde dependence, and then to the process of the collapse of the Golden Horde. According to V. O. Klyuchevsky, “...in those times in Rus the ‘Cossacks’ were the homeless people who filled the Russian principalities... After the collapse of the internal order of the Golden Horde, hundreds of thousands of people in the service of the khans of the Golden Horde left their settled homes and, forced to seek a means of further existence, rushed to the borders of the Russian principalities...”²

Slavic Cossacks first appeared in the 14th century, but it was only with the development of serfdom in the mid-16th century that their number began to grow rapidly. In the second half of the 16th century the Tsar gave the Don Cossacks freedom in exchange for the duty to protect the state borders. The Yaik (Ural), Terek, Daur (Transbaikal), Amur and other Russian Cossacks also enjoyed special treatment and this treatment was extended to the Zaporozhian Cossacks who were relocated to the Kuban in the second half of the 18th century. Eventually, in the social stratification of the Russian Empire, the Cossacks were given a special class status.

During the Late Middle Ages, a similar mechanism for the emergence of Cossacks on the southern borders, and later on the eastern borders, was typical of the Russian lands as a whole and, in particular, of the Muscovite state.

¹ *Gordeyev A. A. History of the Cossacks. Part I. The Golden Horde and the Birth of the Cossackdom. M., 1991. P. 11.*

² *Klyuchevsky V. O. Course of Russian History. M.: Prospekt, 2013.*

A similar mechanism operated in the south-western Russian territories. And it was here that fugitive peasants initially made up the bulk of the Cossacks — although there were also townspeople, renegade priests, and noblemen looking for money or adventure... Moving further south, where no authorities could reach them as yet, the Cossacks settled along the Dnieper and its southern tributaries — downstream of Kanev and Cherkassy (at that time these were small border outposts). On these generous but dangerous lands, they organised so-called caretaking activities — hunting and fishing, herding horses and cattle.

These long seasonal expeditions to the steppe were the prototype of the future Cossack organisation. When travelling to the Wild Fields, the Cossacks chose an ataman who was the most experienced, the bravest and the most resourceful. In order to defend themselves better from the Tatars and to act more amicably in hunting and fishing, they were divided into squads, small, close-knit groups. Over time, the Cossacks began to build permanent, not temporary, fortified camps in the steppes — Siches. Each such Sich was now home to a small military garrison throughout the year. So, for many, “Cossackdom” became a full-time occupation and way of life.

But apart from this benefit, there was another, more significant one. After all, so far it was the headmen who bore the undivided and, it must be said, quite burdensome responsibility for repelling the eternal Tatar raids. So, they found someone to share this responsibility with: the Cossacks turned out to be ideally suited to guarding the border.

Returning to the history of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, it is worth mentioning that as early as 1520, Senko Polozovich, headman of the Cherkassy Cossacks recruited a Cossack detachment to serve on the border. In the following decades other leaders — Yevstafiy Dashkevich, Predslav Lyantskoronsky and Bernard Pretvich — actively used the Cossacks’ services not only for defensive purposes, but also for offensive ones, organising campaigns against the Turks and Tatars. The magnates who initiated the military unification of the Cossacks came from the few remaining non-Polonised Orthodox families of Ukrainian nobility. The magnates who initiated the military unification of the Cossacks came from the few remaining non-Polonised Orthodox families of Ukrainian nobility. Among them the most famous was the headman Dmytro (Baida) Vyshnevetsky of Kanev.

He is credited with the creation of the famous Zaporozhian Sich in 1552; it was Vyshnevetsky who united scattered Cossack squads into Zaporozhian Sich and built a fort on the island of Malaya Khortytsia, strategically located beyond the Dnieper rapids, which was to become a strong barrier against the Tatars... Soon afterwards, Vyshnevetsky led a number of Cossack campaigns to the Crimea and even dared to attack the Ottoman Turks. When the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth refused to support this anti-Muslim “crusade”, Vyshnevetsky moved to the territory of the Russian state, the former Grand Principality of Moscow, from where he continued his attacks on the Crimea. However, he didn’t like it there either, so he returned to Ukraine to focus on Moldova. It was Vyshnevetsky’s fatal mistake: the Moldovans betrayed him, he ended up in the hands of the Turks and was executed in Constantinople in 1563. Folk songs have survived to this day glorifying Baida’s exploits.

The Zaporozhians declared that they obeyed no one and nothing but their own laws, which were handed down from generation to generation. All had equal rights and all participated in general councils — “radas”. These radas met on any occasion and were very heated: usually, of all the debating parties, the one who shouted the loudest would win. In the same way, Cossack leaders — ataman, hetman, yesauls, clerks, oboznys (quartermasters) and judges — were elected or re-elected. The same principle was applied to each kuren (the word meant not only the dwelling, but also the Cossack detachment that occupied it), which also elected a headman.

During military campaigns, a headman had absolute power, the right to execute and pardon. But in peacetime his powers were very limited. There were a total of 5,000 to 6,000 Zaporozhians. Replacing each other, they kept a permanent garrison at the Sich, comprising about a tenth of their numbers. The others went on military campaigns or to peaceful pursuits... Gradually, contrary to the declared equality and brotherhood, social and economic differences and contradictions between the headmen and common Cossacks emerged at the Sich, occasionally breaking out in revolts and coups.

This description reproduces the model of military democracy that was used in the Novgorod and Pskov feudal republics of Russia one to four centuries before the Sich. Over time, this precarious

democracy evolved into a hybrid of patrimonial aristocracy and oligarchy. In terms of its power mechanism, the Zaporozhian Sich lacked the necessary attributes of state sovereignty and its internal organisation was subordinate to Poland, as evidenced by the entries of the Cossacks in the register. The register was a mechanism for employing Cossacks in Polish state service, paying them salaries and, accordingly, controlling their actions. The issue was aggravated by a constant struggle for the volume of the registry, as an excessive number of Cossacks on the registry threatened to leave Polish subordination.

In this regard, the myth of an independent state of the Zaporozhian Cossacks propagated in modern Ukraine is untenable.

The relations between the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Polish authorities were complex and at times conflictual. The Polish government, realising that any attempt to subdue the distant unruly Sich would have been futile, did not abandon the hope to turn at least the city Cossacks into their reliable servants, at least a small part of them first. So, in 1572 King Sigismund Augustus authorised the formation of a detachment of 300 paid Cossacks headed by a Polish nobleman called Badowski. This detachment was taken out of the jurisdiction of local government officials. However, it was soon disbanded, but a precedent was set: for the first time the Polish government officially recognised the existence of the Cossacks, at least 300 of them, as a separate estate with the same self-government rights as all the other estates.

Another, more successful attempt to form a government-sanctioned Cossack army was made in 1578 under King Stephen Báthory. The King paid six hundred Cossacks and allowed them to set up their hospital and arsenal in the town of Trakhtemirov. In return, the Cossacks agreed to obey the noble officers appointed by the King and to refrain from launching unauthorised attacks on the Tatars, which was making foreign policy very difficult for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. According to the established rules, all 600 Cossacks were placed on a special list — a register.

And then these “registered” Cossacks were used not only to guard the borders from the Tatars, but to control the “non-registered” Cossacks. They were called the “Army of His Royal Grace of the

Zaporozhye”. By 1589 the number of registered Cossacks had risen to 3,000. The social stratification was growing in the Sich. The relatively wealthy registered Cossacks differed sharply from their non-registered brethren, whose belongings were more like the belongings of a simple peasant. That is why the relationship between 3,000 registered Cossacks and 40,000–50,000 non-registered Cossacks often reached a boiling point.

Thus, through the efforts of the Polish authorities, there were three (albeit overlapping) categories of Cossacks by the early 17th century. The first were the wealthy registered Cossacks, enlisted to serve the king and the government. The second were Cossacks who lived outside the official boundaries of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The third was the vast majority of the Cossacks, the non-registered Cossacks who lived in the border towns; they lived quite Cossack lives but did not have an officially recognised status.

The attitude of the population of Malorossiia towards the Cossacks gradually improved. In the early phase of their development, the non-registered Cossacks and especially the Sich were in the eyes of the rest of society simply a rabble of brigands. Not only magnates and royal officials, but the majority of Ukrainians also thought so. But by the end of the 16th century, the image of the Cossackdom changed, influenced by their struggle against the Tatars and their powerful patrons, the Turks.

The most extensive Cossack raids against the Turks were carried out between 1600 and 1620. In 1606 the Cossacks devastated Varna, the strongest Turkish fortress on the coast. In 1608 they took Perekop, in 1609 Kiliya, Ismail and Akkerman. In 1624, the Zaporizhians reached the coast of Asia Minor for the first time and attacked Trapezund. But the most stunning action took place in 1615, when under the noses of the Sultan and his capital’s 30,000-strong garrison, some 80 Cossack boats entered Constantinople harbour, set fire to it and escaped with impunity — and all this was repeated five years later! Finally, in 1616, the Cossacks captured the hated Kafa, a slave market in the Crimea, and freed thousands of slaves.

In this context, the Sich leaders began to view the regime established by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s ruling elite differently. Increasing discrimination on ethnic and religious grounds, the

deterioration of the social and economic situation of the Malorussians and the growth of their national consciousness led to frequent and increasingly powerful Cossack rebellions. The first of these erupted in 1591 and proved to be very limited in both cause and participation. It was a feud between two landowners: hetman Krzysztof Kosiński and headman Janusz Ostrogski. Both, judging by their names, were Polish, with the latter having the additional power of the Polish crown's support. Therefore, when Cossacks and peasants were drawn into the conflict on the side of the former, the rebellion took on an anti-Polish nature. The rebellion was predictably suppressed by a small regular Polish army.

A wider and more dangerous rebellion broke out in 1595. Zaporozhian Cossacks participated, joined by peasants and led by Semeriy (Severin) Nalivaiko, Grigory Loboda and Matviy Shaula. This rebellion already had an anti-slavery spirit and a largely national-liberating nature, as calls were made to establish Cossack rule in the recaptured territories. In the face of overwhelming Polish forces, the rebels began to retreat eastwards, expecting to find protection within the Tsardom of Russia under Ivan the Terrible in the event of an unfavourable outcome. Eventually a rift emerged in the weakened rebel units. The main leader of the performance, Cossack Nalivaiko, repeated the fate of Yemelyan Pugachev. He was betrayed to the Poles by the headmen and wealthy Cossacks. Taking advantage of the confusion in the rebel camp, the Poles stormed in and slaughtered most of the people there. Nalivaiko himself was executed in Warsaw.

After defeating Nalivaiko's detachments, the Poles considered the "Cossack issue" resolved — all the more so because the internal problems of the Cossackdom were already evident by that time. The registered Cossacks, these very wealthy burghers, were mostly inclined to cooperate with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. As landowners, they needed a firm social status and civic peace, so they could continue to safely use their existing property and acquire new ones.

However, most of the Cossacks — Zaporizhian and non-registered — not only had almost no property, but existed under the sword of Damocles of fear: one day they could become serfs again.

It is not surprising that this majority only associated improvement of their situation with decisive change and was in constant conflict with the minority. And the Poles were additionally fomenting these internal Cossack contradictions. It should be noted that in this internal conflict, the majority of the poor Malorussian Cossacks were increasingly looking towards the Muscovite state seeking change.

Chapter 5

WESTERN RUSSIAN LANDS IN THE 17th CENTURY. REUNIFICATION OF MALOROSIYA WITH RUSSIA

The early 17th century, against the backdrop of the Time of Troubles, was characterised by the weakening of Russia and the strengthening of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The policy of the Polish authorities towards the Malorussian population at the time was marked by hypocrisy and duplicity. On the one hand, rarely did a session of the Sejm pass without a resolution or draft regarding the use of the military potential of the Cossacks and without avoiding concessions to Cossack demands for an increased register and greater autonomy. And in 1604 and 1609, when the Poles took advantage of the so-called Smuta (Time of Troubles) in the Russian state, the former Grand Principality of Moscow, to launch an intervention, the Cossacks joined them as well.

In order to obtain new privileges, Zaporozhian leader Petro Sahaidachny took part in long campaigns against Moscow and the Ottoman Empire at the head of large Cossack detachments of regular Polish troops. As an advocate of strict discipline, “generously shedding the blood of those who disobeyed him”, Sahaidachny quickly transformed the free Cossack squads into a combat force, unconditionally subordinate to their commanders. In the Polish interest, the Hetman decided in 1619 to reduce the registry to 3,000, to renounce the sanctioned maritime campaigns, and to recognise the

right of the king to approve Cossack headmen... The most shameful act of Hetman Sahaidachny's policy was dragging Zaporozhian Cossacks into a campaign to Moscow in 1617–1618 on the side of intervening Polish Prince Wladyslaw.

Despite these efforts, the oppression of the Malorussian population by the Polish authorities continued unabated. The persecution on ethnic and religious grounds became more severe. As a consequence, part of the Malorussian population fled to the lands of the Russian state. This led to the formation of Sloboda Ukraine (Slobozhanshchyna) in 1638.

The Malorussian population's liberation struggle against Polish occupation in the form of new Cossack and peasant rebellions of 1620–1638 was on the rise. The struggle against continued Polonisation and Catholicisation was expressed by the founding of the Kiev Collegium (academy) by Petro Mohyla in 1631.

After Sahaidachny's death, a major conflict again erupted between the Cossacks and the Poles. Olifer Golub and Mikhail Doroshenko, the closest heirs of the late hetman, tried to continue Sagaidachny's "peacemaking" efforts, but they had to reckon with the discontent of the Cossacks, especially the non-regular ones, with their lack of rights. In 1621, a powerful 40,000-strong Cossack army defeated Ottoman forces at the Battle of Khotyn and saved the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from Turkish occupation. But the huge Cossack army proved to be unnecessary, and even dangerous for the Poles. According to the register, which the Polish government did not intend to expand at all, there were to be only 3,000 Cossacks — the rest were ordered to return to serfdom. Hetman Doroshenko dispatched the naval forces of the Zaporozhians to the Turks and took part in a dynastic conflict in the Crimea on the side of one of the pretenders to the Khan's throne, who promised to achieve the independence of the Crimea from the Ottoman Empire.

The Poles became greatly irritated by the military wilfulness of the Cossacks and their stubborn desire to be "a state within a state". The king complained in the Sejm that "internal anarchy on the outskirts" was causing new external complications, dragging the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into yet another conflict with powerful neighbours, and that the Cossacks, instead of "performing

royal service”, were setting their own orders, “endangering the lives and property of innocent people”.

An 8,000-strong Polish punitive army was sent to Ukraine. It was met by a 6,000-strong Cossack army from the Sich, led by the radical Mark Zhmail. After the defeat of the Zaporozhians in this clash, the moderate Mikhail Doroshenko again came to hetman power. Through disarmament and negotiation, he reached a compromise with the Poles over 6,000 “legitimate” Cossacks.

It was from this point onwards that the number of registered Cossacks became a fundamental and eternal stumbling block in relations between the Zaporozhian Sich and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Cossacks began to put pressure on the new hetman, Gritsko Cherny, demanding that he increase the registry. Meanwhile, he emphasised his loyalty and devotion to the Poles. In response, the Cossacks kidnapped him from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, brought him to the Sich, tried and executed him.

After that, the Cossacks chose a desperate Taras Fedorovich, nicknamed Tryasilo, as their hetman. He defeated a superior enemy force and secured the unheard-of concession of expanding the register to 8,000. Tryasilo remained unpunished and all rebels were granted amnesty. It is important that in this clash a part of the registered Cossacks sided with the Poles. In fact, it came down to a civil war in Malorossiia.

In order to put an end to the Cossack willfulness for good, the Poles in 1635 attempted to build a powerful fortress, Kodak, on the bank of the Dnieper River, slightly upstream of the Sich. The new fortress was supposed to shut the unruly Cossacks out of the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but only a few months before its completion Ivan Sulima and a group of Cossacks razed the structure to the ground and slaughtered the Polish garrison. The response was frightening: the registered Cossacks, anxious to curry favour with the Poles, turned Sulima over to them. Soon afterwards, a new rebel army led by Pavlo Pavlyuk stood up to fight the Poles. The Polish army inflicted a crushing defeat on the rebels, but the Cossack movement was picked up by new leaders Jakob Ostryanin and Dmytro Gunya until it was finally crushed in 1638.

The Poles, elated by their victories and filled with a thirst for revenge, were no longer going to bargain with the Cossacks. According to the new “ordination”, a law passed by the Sejm, the register was limited to 6,000, and even the registered Cossacks lost their right to self-government. The position of hetman was abolished altogether, with the king appointing a headman from the Poles in his place. Cossack colonels and yesauls were henceforth to be chosen from among the nobility. The territory of Cossack settlements was strictly limited; anyone who tried to flee to the Sich without permission was to be punished by death. Thousands of non-registered Cossacks were declared serfs. On top of these draconian measures, the magnates, and especially Yarema Vyshnevetsky, introduced a brutal terror in the country, indiscriminately seizing, torturing and killing anyone who was even remotely suspected of disobedience.

Cynical noblemen solved the “Cossack issue” in their own way: “The Cossacks,” they said, “are the nails on the hands of our politics: they grow quickly and must be trimmed often”. The decade that followed was indeed so peaceful and stable (peaceful golden times, as Polish historians used to say), that it seemed a repressive solution to the “Cossack issue” was the only effective one. But the “peaceful golden times” proved to be deceptive: if there was calm on the surface, passions were boiling underneath, looking for a way out.

Ten years later, in 1648, the patriotic rise of Malorossiia culminated in a rebellion led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky. His hetmanship proved to be a watershed. The petition of the Zaporozhian army to the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1649 referred to the observance of rights of the Russian Orthodox population, that “the voivode of Kiev should be a Russian and governed by the Greek law, and he should not tread on the churches of God...” But the Zaporozhians were not heard.

The flames of the liberation war of 1648–1657 against Polish occupation, which engulfed all the lands of Rus under the rule of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (from the end of the 18th century, the name Ukraine was increasingly used), also scorched the Galician lands (Russian Voivodeship) with their tongues. The victory of Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s troops at Pyliavtsi in Podolia on 11–13 September 1648 over the army of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth raised

to an unprecedented height the morale of the Russian (Ukrainian) population of Galicia.

Armed clashes between villagers and Polish units broke out everywhere. The rebellious peasants, demanding liberation from villein service, were joined by the townsfolk and the small Orthodox nobility in their opposition to national and religious oppression. Particularly strong unrest occurred in Pokuttia, where a force of up to 15,000 men gathered under the leadership of Semyon Vysochan, most of whom subsequently joined Bohdan Khmelnytsky's army. Research carried out by V. Grabovitsky showed that about 50,000 people took part in armed uprisings against Polish rule in south-western Rus. Even the suburbs of Lublin and Warsaw were in turmoil.

In late autumn of 1648 Bohdan Khmelnytsky's army laid siege to Lviv, the capital of the Russian Voivodeship. However, the city's population did not help to establish Khmelnytsky's rule. The inhabitants of villages and small towns greeted Khmelnytsky very differently. The answer is simple. Lviv, in its ethnic composition, was more of an alien element in the heart of Galicia. Historical accounts show that the majority of the city's population was Polish.

The liberation war, which had raised the entire population of the Russian provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was not such for the Lviv city patriciate, led by Mayor Martyn Grosvaer. Nevertheless, Khmelnytsky did not storm the city of his youth (he studied at the Jesuit school in Lviv in his youth), though Maksim Krivonos' regiment stormed the impregnable High Castle dominating it.

After three weeks of siege and collecting a payoff of 200 thousand ducats (1.2 million zlotys) from the city patriciate, Bohdan Khmelnytsky led an army of 200,000 men further west, to Zamość, 250 kilometres from Warsaw. In 1655 the commander made a treaty with the city, and in early 1657, a few months before his death, he issued a protective proclamation ordering the regiments that were to march into the western Russian territories to protect the interests of the citizens of Lviv and not to cause them any trouble: "I severely order that no one out of greed, either on foot or on horseback, should dare to plunder or rob houses... that the people of the city of Lviv should be treated as our own, and that every merchant and tradesman should not

be hindered... This has been executed in Chyhyryn on 9 March 1657. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, given under my hand”.

Then, because the initiative passed to the Poles, Khmelnytsky's Treaty of Bila Tserkva with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was signed in 1651, which in fact devalued all the achievements of the Cossacks. Eventually Malorossiia was defeated in the war with Poland, which proved the inability of the Malorussian Cossack elite to defend their population.

The reunification of Malorossiia with Russia in the mid-17th century was a consequence of the unity of the Malorussians and Velikorussians, as well as the awareness of the desire for reunification on the part of Malorussian society. For half a century, the Cossack rulers of Ukraine were essentially begging for a high tsar's hand.

In 1651 the Zemsky Sobor in Moscow endorsed the idea of reuniting Malorossiia with Russia. The Zaporozhian embassy was sent to Moscow. This was followed by Bohdan Khmelnytsky's appeals to Moscow, which were considered by the Zemsky Sobors. On 1 October 1653 this supreme representative body of the Russian state decided to support the co-religionists and take them under its patronage. The request of Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian army to take the Orthodox people of Ukraine “under the high hand” of the Russian Tsar was granted.

In January 1654 the Pereiaslavl Rada confirmed this decision. Then Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Moscow's ambassadors toured dozens of towns, including Kiev, whose inhabitants took the oath to the Russian Tsar. There was nothing of the sort, incidentally, at the conclusion of the Union of Lublin. In a letter to Moscow in 1654 Khmelnytsky thanked Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich for “taking the whole Zaporizhian army and the whole Russian Orthodox world under the strong and high hand of the Tsar”. That is, in their addresses to both the Polish King and the Russian Tsar, the Cossacks called, defined themselves as Russian Orthodox people.

The decisions of the Pereiaslavl Rada had an outstanding moral and psychological sense and convincingly expressed the aspirations and will of the Malorussian population. At the same time, they did not have a separate legal burden. In modern Ukraine, this aspect has become

the subject of historical manipulation to question the legitimacy of the 1654 event. “...No legal acts were to be passed at the Pereyaslavl Rada. They had been adopted earlier, in 1653. There was a petition from Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky for acceptance of Malorossiia into Russian jurisdiction, and there was a decision of the Zemsky Sobor of Russia to grant it...”¹

In modern Ukraine there is a propagated myth that as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the Ukrainians had advanced autonomy in the form of the Zaporozhian Sich, but aspired to independence, which would have been quite achievable if not for the expansion of Moscow.

In real historical practice, Ukraine (Malorossiia) or any part of it was not a subject of international relations in the 17th century and had no recognised state sovereignty. Until 1653 it had been a colonial possession of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The 1653 treaty was not an agreement between two equal partners — sovereign states — but a treaty on the incorporation of Ukrainian lands into the Russian state with extensive rights, but with recognition of the supreme suzerainty of the Russian Tsar.

In 1654–1667 the Russian-Polish war for the liberation of Malorossiia took place. In 1654 Russian troops and Zaporozhian Cossacks captured Dorogobuzh, Rostislavl, Polotsk, Mstislavl and Orsha. The army of Lithuanian hetman Janusz Radziwill was defeated. In 1655 Russian troops and Zaporozhian Cossacks liberated Vitebsk, Minsk, Grodno, Vilnius and Kovno. In 1664 the Polish King John II Casimir launched an attack on the Left Bank of Ukraine, but Polish troops were defeated in battles with Russian troops near Novgorod-Seversky and Glukhov. In 1667 Russia signed the Truce of Andrusovo with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which returned to Russia the lands of Smolensk and Chernigov and recognised the reunification of the Left Bank part of Malorossiia with Russia.

The results of the liberation war in the mid-17th century would have been even more impressive had it not been for the Ruin, i. e.,

¹ History of Ukraine. 6th to 21st centuries. / P. P. Tolochko, A. A. Oley-nikov [and others]; led by P. P. Tolochko. 2nd ed., updated and revised. K.; M.: Kievan Rus: Kuchkovo Pole, 2018. P. 11.

the feud in Malorossiia in 1657–1687. During the protracted war between the Russian state and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, some of the hereditary hetmans of Bohdan Khmelnytsky were either “estranged” from Moscow, or sought support from Sweden, Poland and Turkey. But for the people, the war was essentially about liberation.

The Ruin demonstrated the inability of the Malorussian political elites to consolidate and the betrayal of the interests of the people by some of the elites. In 1657, following the death of Khmelnytsky, hetman Ivan Vygovsky, who betrayed the people of Malorossiia by signing the Treaty of Hadiach with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1658, returned Ukraine to the power of the Polish King.

The Hadiach conspiracy could not fail to have an impact on the combat effectiveness of the Tsarist army. In 1659 the Russian army was defeated by a battle with the forces of Vygovsky and the Crimean Khan near Konotop. In 1659 the Cossack Rada in Pereyaslav elected Yury Khmelnytsky, son of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, as the new hetman.

Ukraine was then split into two hetmanates: in 1663 Ivan Briukhovetsky was elected hetman of Left Bank Ukraine and in 1665 Petro Doroshenko was elected hetman of Right Bank Ukraine.

In 1668 it came down to a straightforward power struggle: hetman Briukhovetsky was killed by the Cossacks of Right Bank Ukraine, subordinate to P. Doroshenko. In 1669 D. Mnoghreshny was elected hetman of Left Bank Ukraine at the Cossack Rada in Glukhov, and in 1672 Ivan Samoilovich was elected hetman. In 1674 I. Samoilovich was elected a second time in Pereyaslav, but this time as “hetman of both sides of the Dnieper”. This had a positive effect and ensured that Moscow and Ukrainian troops made their first forays into Right Bank Ukraine. The overall negative results of the Ruin were the maintenance of a discriminatory Polish regime in the Right Bank part of Malorossiia and the occupation of Podolia by the Ottoman Empire.

In the confrontation between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the Treaty of Perpetual Peace of 1686 secured the final outcome. The city of Kiev and the lands on the Left Bank of the Dnieper became part of the Russian state. Their inhabitants were reunited with the bulk of the Russian Orthodox people. The name

“Malaya Rus” (Malorossiya) was established for this region. The name “Ukraine” was then used more often in the meaning in which the Old Russian word “outskirts” is found in written sources from as early as the 12th century, when it referred to various border territories. And the word “Ukrainians” meant border servicemen who defended the external borders.

On the Right Bank, which remained in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the old orders were restored, and social and religious oppression intensified. By contrast, on the Left Bank, the lands taken under the protection of the Russian state, began to develop vigorously. People from the other side of the Dnieper moved there en masse. They sought support from people of the same language and, of course, the same faith. In 1681 the Treaty of Bakhchisarai was signed between Russia, Turkey and the Crimean Khanate, which recognised the reunification of the Left Bank of Malorossiya and Kiev and the Russian subordination of the Zaporozhian Cossacks.

In 1699 the Polish Sejm decided to abolish the Cossackdom. One of the Cossack leaders who led the fight against the Poles was Semyon Paliy. A description of his camp in Khvastovo, prepared by the Moscow priest Lukyanov, survived: “It is an earthen rampart, not very strong by the looks of it, but there are many sitters, and the people in it are like beasts. There are frequent gates around the earth rampart, and pits are dug near all the gates, and straw is laid in the pits. There are twenty, thirty Paliy’s people lying around; naked and very scary. When we arrived and stood in the square, they had many weddings on that day, and they surrounded us like a bear; all the Cossacks are under Semyon Paliy, and they left the weddings; and all beggars had no pants, and another had no shirt on; they were very scary, black, like the Negroes, and dashing like dogs: they can snatch. They marvel at us, and we tell them that we have never seen such freaks before in our lives. In Moscow and Petrovsky Kruzhal, you won’t find one of these in a short time”¹.

From the mid-17th century, Malorussian culture developed under the great influence of Russian spiritual lineage, and in a

¹ The journey of priest Lukyanov. Cit. ex: Ulyanov Nikolay. Origins of Ukrainian Separatism. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2016. P. 23.

number of art directions it was maximally united in types and forms. For example, in 1674 the monk Innokenty Gizel from Kiev compiled a Synopsis, which was based on a comparison of the Velikorussian and Malorussian historical lines. It was used as a textbook for domestic history in the second half of the 17th century. At that time Malorossiya was touched by the secularisation of Russian culture, which was reflected in the creation of the Kiev-Mohyla Academy, the development of typography, the appearance of portrait painting, and the use of Cossack baroque, similar to Moscow's Naryshkin architectural style.

Chapter 6

HISTORY OF SOUTHWEST RUSSIA AND GALICIA IN THE 18th CENTURY

At the end of the 17th century, after the conclusion of a number of wars with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire, the western borders of the Russian state were finally defined and the process of reunification of the Left Bank part of Malorossiya with Russia was completed. The Treaty of Bakhchisarai of 3 (13) January 1681 established the Dnieper River as the border between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Under the so-called “Perpetual Peace”, the treaty between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, signed on 26 April (6 May) 1686 in Moscow, Russia was assigned the land of Chernigov-Severia, Smolensk, Left Bank, Zaporozhye and Kiev. The northern part of Kiev, Volhynia and Galicia remained part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Contrary to the arguments of modern Ukrainian historians, there was no single territory with a single Ukrainian statehood either in the 18th century or in the previous period. Moreover, what they usually refer to as such a “state” – the so-called “hetmanshchina” (hetmanate) – occupying less than a third of modern Ukraine, has never been a state and never aspired to be. The overwhelming part of the Malorussian elite opted for Russia. However, some chose to submit to Poland, resulting in the Right Bank remaining part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Another part sought to recognise subjection to the Ottoman Empire.

For each of them, the main objective was not to create a state entity, but to enter the political elite of these countries and obtain rights to the corresponding material goods and property.

But the territory of modern Ukraine, which by the beginning of the 18th century was part of Russia, was not united and belonged to different administrative units.

The Sumy, Akhtyr, Kharkov, Izyum and Ostrogozhsk Cossack regiments and civil administration system created on the territory of Sloboda Ukraine were subordinated to the Belgorod voivode and belonged to the jurisdiction of the Russian Razryadny Prikaz¹. Kiev had a special position as the centre of the Kiev voivodeship. The other part of the land was part of the so-called hetman's regiment and was administered by a hetman. These included such cities as Chernigov, Baturin, Novgorod-Seversky, Starodub, Nezhin, Glukhov, Gadyach, Sorochintsy, Kozelets, Pereyaslav, Lubny, Priluki and Pogar. That said, part of the territory, Novgorod-Severia, had been part of the Russian state since 1503, but was placed under Hetman rule at the request of Yury Khmelnytsky.

The hetman acted as military and civil administrator and shared governance with the seven-member General Headman's Council, which acted as an advisory and executive body to the hetman. The territory of the regiment was divided as follows: Mirgorod, Starodubsk, Chernigov, Nizhyn, Prilutsk, Kiev, Pereyaslav, Lubensk, Gadyach and Poltava².

The hetman's election was approved by the Russian Tsar, to whom he swore an oath of allegiance. A special agency, the Malorussian Prikaz, was set up in Moscow to administer the hetman's territories. It controlled the activities of the hetman and directly supervised the appointed voivodes, gathered and transmitted to Moscow information about the foreign policy situation in the Malorossiia, monitored the timely provision of military assistance to it in case of external threats, was responsible for the material support of the Russian military units

¹ Malorossiia and the Malorussians in the Russian Empire in the 18th Century: Strategies of Integration [website]. URL: https://inslav.ru/sites/default/files/2018_malorossy_vs_ukraintsy_1.pdf (accessed: 17/01/2022).

² Ibid.

stationed in the Malorossiya. There were four sextons and between 15 and 40 deputies on the Prikaz staff. The Malorussian Prikaz was subordinate to the Ambassadorial Prikaz¹.

In 1687, the general yesaul Ivan Mazepa was elected hetman of the Russian army on the proposal of Vasily Golitsyn, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army. Mazepa came from the Right Bank, was brought up in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, at the court of the Polish king John Casimir, and performed the duties of a “royal Gentleman of the Bedchamber”². In 1663 he left the court and was hired as hetman of the Right Bank by Petro Doroshenko. He was known for his pro-Polish orientation and ended up in Russia as he was captured and sent to Moscow. It is historically documented that Mazepa himself gave an unprecedented bribe of 11 thousand chervonets to Vasily Golitsyn, a favourite of Russian Tsarevna Sophia, which gave him an opportunity to become hetman. Mazepa himself later wrote a denunciation about this to Peter I³. Mazepa supported Peter during his struggle for power, took an active part in the Azov campaigns, received the Order of Saint Andrew and had a dizzying career in Russia⁴.

Using Peter I’s trust, Mazepa became Russia’s richest nobleman in a short time. In actively enforcing the policy of enslaving the Malorussian peasants, the hetman was primarily concerned with his own wealth. He eventually became the owner of vast tracts of land, 19,654 estates and 100,000 serfs⁵. The annual income from the estates was fantastic for that time 200,000 roubles⁶.

¹ Malorussian Prikaz [website]. URL: <http://ponjatija.ru/node/18828> (accessed: 30/01/2022).

² A court Polish post, similar to that of Groom of the Chamber in a number of European countries.

³ Mazepa. Oathbreaker Awarded the Order of Judas [website]. URL: <https://topwar.ru/150788-mazepa-kljatvoprestupnik-prokljatyj-cerkovju-iu-dostoennyj-ordena-iudy-ch1.html> (accessed: 06/02/2022).

⁴ History of Ukraine. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2015 [website]. URL: <https://www.litres.ru/raznoe/istoriya-ukrainy/> (accessed: 17/01/2022).

⁵ History of Ukraine. From the 6th to the 21st century. / P. P. Tolochko, A. A. Oleynikov [and others]; led by P. P. Tolochko. 2nd ed., updated and revised. K.; M.: Kievan Rus: Kuchkovo Pole, 2018. P. 209.

⁶ Mazepa: On the History of Betrayal [website]. URL: <https://rusarchives.ru/online-project/mazepa-k-istorii-predatelstva> (accessed: 17/01/2022).

During the Great Northern War, amid growing Swedish power and the collapse of the anti-Swedish coalition, hetman Mazepa considered the outcome of the Russian-Swedish confrontation resolved, and hastened to defect to the other side. And there was double treachery, for by going over to the side of Polish King Stanisław Leszczyński, he simultaneously committed himself to Sweden and then joined its forces.

Back in 1707 Mazepa conveyed to Stanisław Leszczyński, through the rector of the Jesuit College of Vinnitsa, Zalessky, that “he was ready to recognise his authority over all Ukraine and Zaporozhye”¹. For betraying Russia, Mazepa received from the Polish king a voivodeship in Poland and the title of Prince of Severia².

Simultaneously with his oath to the Polish king, he asked the Swedish king to establish his authority over Malorossiia and Zaporozhye.

The hetman explains his betrayal in a letter to the Colonel of Starodubsk Ivan Skoropadsky by the invincibility of the Swedes:

“...[Meanwhile the powerless and unarmed Moscow army,] fleeing from the unconquerable Swedish armies, is saved only by destroying our settlements and capturing our cities. Therefore we, Hetman, with the common consent of the general noblemen, colonels and the whole army, surrendered ourselves to the invincible patronage of the most powerful king of Sweden, always the almighty defender of the abused, who loves the truth and hates lies, in the certain hope, that his majesty of Sweden will defend our dear fatherland and our army with his invincible weapon against the tyrannical yoke of Moscow, and will not only defend our freedom and rights, but will so extend them, in which he assures us, by his word and in his inescapable word and in writing”³.

¹ Cit. ex: *Stavitsky A. V.* The Image of Hetman Mazepa in Ukrainian History: From Traitor to Hero // Actual problems of humanitarian education and culture in modern conditions: materials of two scientific-practical conferences: collection of research papers / compiled by A. N. Baranetsky, A. V. Stavitsky. Sevastopol: Ribest, 2006. P. 122–131 [website]. URL: <https://davaiknam.ru/text/obraz-getmana-mazepi-vukrainskoj-istorii-pute-ot-predatelya-d> (accessed: 19/01/2022).

² Ibid.

³ Letter from hetman I. S. Mazepa to the Colonel of Starodubsk I. I. Skoropadsky on the reasons for going over to the side of the Swedish King, urging him

However, Mazepa's expectation that he would be supported by the population of Malorossiya did not materialise. The overwhelming majority of the people remained loyal to Russia. Moreover, as the Swedish forces advanced, Malorussian peasants and Cossacks organised guerrilla units and fought the invaders, and a significant number of Malorussians also fought in the Russian army near Poltava.

In reality, only small units of hetman Mazepa and commander of Cossack camp Gordienko were allied with the Swedes. However, even these units did not want to take part in the war with Russia on Mazepa's side. As the Swedish historian P. Englund noted about Mazepa's troops, "Their morale reached a low point, it was difficult to get the Cossacks to obey orders, they were just about ready to revolt"¹. As a consequence, during the siege of Poltava, the Swedes tried to use them for auxiliary work as diggers, woodcutters and carriers².

On 12 January 1709 Count I. Golovkin wrote to the Ambassador to Denmark Prince V. L. Dolgoruky: "...All the Malorussian people are loyal to His Royal Majesty and from those places where the Swedes were, namely, from Romny and Priluki, they have all sent their messengers with a declaration of their loyalty"³. The historical record of the Battle of Poltava shows that the participation of Mazepa's Cossacks in the Battle of Poltava was minimal.

A modern researcher of the Battle of Poltava, Vladimir Artamonov, notes: "A small handful of Zaporozhian volunteers marched with the Swedish army to storm the Russian redoubts. The rest of Mazepa's forces (6–8 thousand sabres) stood in a convoy near Pushkaryovka. The Cossacks of the new pro-Russian hetman Skoropadsky, however, took a much more active part in the Battle of Poltava. Not to mention

to join him in Baturin. 30 October 1708 [website]. URL: <https://rusarchives.ru/online-projects/mazepa-k-istorii-predatelstva/doc-21-1708-pismo-getmana-mazepy-starodubskomu-polkovnikuskoropadskomu> (accessed: 19/01/2022).

¹ Cit. ex: *Tolochko P.* Ukraine between Russia and the West: historical and journalistic essays [website]. URL: <https://libking.ru/books/sci-/sci-history/1085712-petr-tolochko-ukraina-mezhdu-rossiej-i-zapadomistoriko-publicisticheskie-ocherki.html#book> (accessed: 19/01/2022).

² Ibid.

³ Mazepa: On the History of Betrayal [website]. URL: <https://rusarchives.ru/online-project/mazepa-k-istorii-predatelstva> (accessed: 17/01/2022).

the spontaneous guerrilla warfare in Ukraine, which depleted the Swedish army”¹.

After Poltava, all that remains in Mazepa’s biography is the theft of the hetman’s treasury, his hasty flight and his ignominious death in a foreign land. In Russia, he became a symbol of betrayal. On this occasion the so-called Order of Judas was produced in Russia in a single edition. The Order contained an inscription: “Cursed Judas who would die for his thirty denarii”².

Nevertheless, in modern Ukraine the historical fact of Mazepa’s double and even triple betrayal, including his flight and theft of the treasury, has been transformed into a myth of his patriotism and rational choice. Thus, when discussing the impact of the Great Northern War on Ukraine, modern Ukrainian historians A. K. Strukevich, I. M. Romanyuk and T. P. Pirus draw the following conclusion: “What fate awaited Ukraine? If Charles XII and his ally S. Leszczyński were victorious, it would, as an ally of Russia, fall under Polish rule. If Peter I and his protégé Augustus II had won, Ukraine would have been divided between Russia and Poland. The search for the salvation of the Homeland prompted Mazepa to negotiate secretly with Moscow’s enemies. In the autumn of 1705 he established links with S. Leszczyński, and in 1706 with Charles XII. Mazepa decided to take advantage of the tradition of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance of the times of Khmelnytsky and Vygovsky... Abandoned to the mercy of his ally, with a nation weakened by military expenditures and 8-year campaigns, in the face of a powerful enemy capable of defeating the enemy — what decision had hetman Mazepa to make? He decided to unite with the Swedes in the war against Moscovia”³.

These judgements are illiterate not only from a factual point of view (the Emperor Peter I was not an ally but a sovereign and tsar to the hetman Mazepa), but also incorrect from a historical point of view. What really took place was an act of betrayal of the interests of the

¹ Mazepa: On the History of Betrayal [website]. URL: <https://rusarchives.ru/online-project/mazepa-k-istorii-predatelstva> (accessed: 17/01/2022).

² Ibid.

³ *Strukevich A. K., Romanyuk I. M., Pirus T. P. History of Ukraine: textbook for the 8th grade.* K.: Gramota, 2008. P. 202–203.

hetmanate inhabitants (most of whom supported Russia), dictated by Mazepa's personal self-interest.

Another modern pseudo-historical myth deals with the so-called Baturin massacre. The basis for the construction of a myth by modern Ukrainian history is the description of the destruction of Mazepa's headquarters, Baturin, in the so-called "History of the Rus", a pseudo-historical work, which is more a political pamphlet than a historical source¹.

To prove the conclusion about the incredible brutality of the Russians, the example of the capture of Baturin is cited: "Baturin was seized on 2 November. It was completely destroyed and all the inhabitants <...> were exterminated"². Modern Ukrainian "historians", such as V. S. Vlasov, for example, conclude that "the destruction of Baturin and its inhabitants was not just revenge. With this punitive act, Peter I tried to intimidate the Ukrainians and finally subdue them, depriving them of aspirations for the freedom"³.

However, the fact of the mass murder of its inhabitants is a historical fantasy unsupported by scientific facts. Neither documentary evidence nor archaeological data support the myth of the mass murder of the inhabitants of Baturin. Mazepa's residence was seized by Russian troops led by Prince Alexander Menshikov after the hetman's betrayal. Because of the need to counter the Swedes effectively and the large quantities of cannons, ammunition, food and forage in the fortress, it was easier to destroy it and either destroy the existing stocks or take them away with themselves.

¹ According to the historian Nikolai Kostomarov, this work contains "much untruth and therefore it, at that time being rewritten many times and passing from hand to hand according to various lists, produced a scientifically harmful effect, because it spread false beliefs about the past of Malorossiya". Cit. ex: *Ulyanov N. I.* Origins of Ukrainian Separatism [website]. URL: <https://web-kamerton.ru/2013/10/proisxozhdenie-ukrainskogo-separatizma-iv> (accessed: 19/01/2022).

² *Strukevich A. K., Romanyuk I. M., Pirus T. P.* History of Ukraine: textbook for the 8th grade. K.: Gramota, 2008. P. 205.

³ The Baturin Massacre: How Ukraine is Taught to Hate Russia [website]. URL: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/baturinskaya_reznya_kak_na_ukraine_uchat_nenavidet_rossiyu (accessed: 19/01/2022).

The defeat of Baturin is mentioned in Russian chronicles (Novgorod, Chernigov, Lizogub) and in reports by foreign ambassadors and diplomats. It is also remembered by some of the participants in Charles XII's campaign. However, the direct participants in the war only write about the destruction, but not about the extermination of the inhabitants of Baturin. The sources also include the complete correspondence between Peter I and the leaders of the Russian army. Where it mentions Baturin, it refers only to the destruction of the fortress, but not to the killing of people.

The multi-year Canadian-Ukrainian archaeological expedition to the former hetman's residence resulted in the discovery of only 170 individual burials, with no trace of a mass execution¹.

Moreover, immediately after Mazepa's betrayal, letters urging the population of Malorossiya to remain loyal to Peter I were sent out, and tsarist decrees were issued under which officers and soldiers of the Russian army who committed acts of looting were to be subjected to the death penalty².

Most of the Malorussian nobility did not support the betrayer. On 11 November 1708 Colonel Ivan Skoropadsky of Starodubsk was elected hetman and remained at his post until 1722. Almost all the regiments remained on Russia's side.

Despite Mazepa's betrayal, armed units from Malorossiya fought valiantly in the ranks of the Russian army. An auxiliary corps of Cossacks from the Left Bank and Sloboda Ukraine took an active part in military operations in the Baltics. A 1,000-strong unit of Cossacks was sent as part of Repnin's army to Poland, to the aid of the Russian ally King Augustus II. In 1701, Russian troops won their first victory in the Great Northern War, near Dorpat. The victors included the Malorussian Cossacks.

Subsequently, military units manned by Malorussians took an active part in all the wars of the Petrine epoch, including the

¹ The Baturin Massacre: How Ukraine is Taught to Hate Russia [website]. URL: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/baturinskaya_reznya_kak_na_ukraine_uchat_nenavidet_rossiyu (accessed: 19/01/2022).

² History of Ukraine. From the 6th to the 21st century. / P. P. Tolochko, A. A. Oleynikov [and others]; led by P. P. Tolochko. 2nd ed., updated and revised. K.; M.: Kievan Rus: Kuchkovo Pole, 2018. P. 210.

Great Northern War, the Pruth Campaign of 1711 and the Persian Campaign

of 1722–1723. The latter involved a 10,000-strong corps under the command of Colonel and future hetman Daniil Apostol. Thanks to the actions of the corps, a Russian detachment under the command of Brigadier Veterani that occupied the residence of the Cherkasy Sultan Makhmut was rescued. For these heroic actions, Colonel Apostol received a diamond-studded portrait from the Emperor.

The remnants of Mazepa's supporters fled to Ottoman Empire. After Mazepa's death in 1709, they elected a hetman, Philip Orlik, a general clerk, who was recognised by the Swedish king and the Turkish sultan. Orlik continued his policy of betraying the interests of the Malorussians and in 1711 allied himself with the Poles, Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Empire in a war against Russia by launching a campaign against Bila Tserkva. The result of the campaign was Orlik's military defeat. At the same time, the Crimean Tatars allied to him committed mass acts of violence against the Malorussian population.

Claiming independence, Orlik was a puppet in the hands of Charles XII. Soon, acting on the king's orders, he set off for Poland, where he lost the remnants of his army. He later lived in Sweden, the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire, calling himself "the leader of the Cossack nation" and repeatedly offering his services to all of Russia's enemies. During the Russian-Swedish war of 1741–1743, he unsuccessfully tried to organise an anti-Russian uprising in Malorossiia as a Swedish agent. Nowadays in Ukraine, betrayers such as Philip Orlik, like Ivan Mazepa, are counted among the pantheon of Ukrainian heroes.

In the conditions of the Great Northern War, Peter I embarked on a series of reforms aimed at optimising the administrative and territorial division of the state. These reforms were of direct relevance to the western Russian lands. In 1707 the cities of Kiev, Chernigov, Nezhin, Pereyaslav, etc. were transferred from the jurisdiction of the Malorussian Prikaz to Razryad¹.

¹ History of Ukraine. 2nd ed., updated and revised. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 229.

On 18 (19) December 1708, the territory of Russia was divided into eight governorates. The Malorussian lands became part of the Kiev Governorate. The jurisdiction of the Kiev governor also extended to much of Sloboda Ukraine and the former Severia. However, the lands of the Donetsk Basin, with the cities of Bakhmut, Stary Aydar, Novy Aydar and Yampol, were included in the Azov (later Voronezh) Governorate.

The reform of the administration of the western Russian lands ended in 1722 with the creation of the Malorussian Collegium headed by Brigadier S. Veliaminov. The Collegium exercised financial and administrative control over the hetmanate, as well as the right of supreme court of appeal. The hetmanate was transferred from the Department of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs to the Senate. During this period, the practice of appointing Russian officers to colonel positions in Malorossiia was established. They carried out both military and civil administration.

Following the death of Ivan Skoropadsky on 3 July 1722, the election of a new hetman was postponed indefinitely. Peter I's verdict was as follows: "It is known to everybody that starting from Bogdan Khmel'nitsky to Skoropadsky all hetmans were betrayers, from what the Russian State, especially Malorossiia, suffered much, and therefore it is necessary to find a faithful and reliable person for a hetman, and until such person is found, it is the government which must obey and not to bother about the choice of hetman"¹.

Some of the nobility, led by Colonel Pavel Polubotok of Chernigov, who was acting hetman, addressed a petition to Peter. The petition asked for the election of a new hetman and for the abolition of the levies imposed by the Malorussian Collegium. The noblemen were arrested and imprisoned in the Petropavlovsk fortress, where Polubotok died in December 1724.

After Peter I's death in January 1725, Catherine I released the noblemen from the fortress and returned their confiscated property to them. There was a partial restoration of hetman rule. In June 1727 Malorussian affairs were again transferred from the Senate to the

¹ History of Ukraine. 2nd ed., updated and revised. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 236.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On 29 September 1727 the Malorussian Collegium was abolished and on 1 October, after a break of five years, a new hetman was elected. He was a Mirgorod Colonel and former associate of Ivan Mazepa, Daniil Apostol.

The taxes imposed by the Malorussian Collegium were abolished. Thus Malorossiia was once again given an economic position privileged over other Russian lands, consisting in exemption from taxation. In addition, Russian nobles were forbidden to acquire land in Malorossiia. The Malorussian merchants were allowed to conduct foreign trade operations. Credits were arranged for merchants and the payment of bills of exchange was deferred.

It retained its own judicial system and military formations, the so-called “hunter troops”, which numbered no more than 1,500 men.

Russian troops were stationed on the territory under hetman rule, and militarily the hetman was to report to the Russian Field Marshal-General. The hetman’s nobility was appointed from the candidates proposed by the Emperor, as were half of the judges. Finally, a special representative of the Russian Emperor, the Resident Minister, was sent to the hetman’s residence, without whose consent the hetman had no right to make any decisions. The distribution of estates on the territory of Malorossiia, formerly the prerogative of the hetman, was now carried out only by decision of the Emperor¹.

Thus, in military, administrative, judicial and economic terms, power in Malorossiia was in the hands of the central government, as in other Russian territories.

In 1733 the Zaporozhian Sich, which had been in disrepair since the Great Northern War and the betrayal of Kostya Gordienko, the commander of Cossack camp, was restored. The Zaporozhians received 20 thousand roubles a year from the treasury for military and patrol service. In addition, they were allowed to engage in steppe crafts.

The territory of the Zaporozhian Sich was divided into 38 kurens and six districts (palankas): Bugochardovaya, Ingulskaya, Kodatskaya, Samarskaya, Kalmiusskaya and Prognoinnskaya. The Zaporozhians were governed by an elected nobility who reported

¹ Ibid. P. 240.

directly to the Kiev governor-general. In all, just over 10,000 Cossacks lived in the Sich¹.

In the 1730s, during the reign of Anna Ioannovna, hostilities resumed in the territories bordering Malorossiia. In 1733 Russian troops campaigned in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to support a pro-Russian candidate for the throne, and 1735–1739 saw war between Russia and allied Austria and the Ottoman Empire. The registered Cossacks (up to 15,000) and Zaporozhians took an active part in hostilities in the ranks of the Russian army. In 1736, the Cossacks took part in the Crimean campaign, in 1737 — in the siege of Ochakov, in 1738 — in the Moldavian campaign, and in 1739 — in the Khotyn campaign. In the latter campaign Field Marshal Lassi entrusted the Cossacks to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind enemy lines, which they performed brilliantly.

In 1734, after the death of Daniil Apostol, the election of hetman was postponed once again indefinitely, and governance passed into the hands of the reconstituted Malorussian Collegium, appointed by the Empress. The Collegium was chaired by the Resident Minister, Prince Shakhovskoi.

The last period of hetman rule is associated with the reign of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna. On 6 December 1741, Peter I's daughter ascended the Russian throne in a successful palace coup. Soon afterwards a deputation of Malorussian noblemen arrived in the capital, asking for an indulgence for the “Malorossian people” to cover the losses incurred during the Russian-Turkish war. The need to consolidate power, as well as the desire to contrast their “just” rule with that of the predecessors, created favourable conditions for satisfying the nobility's appeal.

Malorossiia received yet another preferential treatment compared to other Russian regions. It was forbidden to take the Malorussians into bondage, and Russian officials were not allowed to “cause offence, take away provisions, firewood, etc. for free”². The nobility, exiled for various crimes during the harsh era of Anna Ioannovna, were returned from exile.

¹ History of Ukraine. 2nd ed., updated and revised. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 243.

² Ibid. P. 245.

In 1744 Elizabeth Petrovna visited Kiev. This was followed by a decision to restore the hetmanate in 1747.

On 22 February 1750 Kirill, brother of the Empress's favourite, Aleksey Razumovsky, was elected hetman. He was educated at European universities and was appointed President of the Imperial Academy of Sciences back in 1746. He held this position for 20 years. The new hetman had great influence at the imperial court.

The Malorussian Collegium was abolished and Malorossiya was once again transferred from the Senate to the control of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, the new hetman was also given control of the Zaporozhian Sich.

In the same year, the "Baturin Construction Expedition" was established. In a short time, the hetman's residence turned into "Little Petersburg", becoming one of the most comfortable cities in the Russian Empire.

At the same time, the hetman's treasury had to report annually to the government on revenues and expenditures, and Kiev was removed from his jurisdiction.

During Kirill Razumovsky's hetmanate, the Malorussian Cossacks took part in all wars with the Russian army, particularly in the Seven Years' War. In 1757, a thousand Cossacks took part in the Battle of Gross-Jägersdorf. In 1760 a further 2,000 Cossacks were sent to the war. At the same time, Zaporozhians were mobilised to reinforce the garrison of the fortress of St Elizabeth to protect it against the Turks.

The Malorussian nobility decided to use the ascension to the throne of Catherine II to further expand the privileges of Malorossiya. In the autumn of 1763 the nobility prepared the "Petition of the Malorussian nobility for restoration of various ancient rights of Malorossiya" for delivery to the young Empress.

Referring to the "Articles of Bogdan Khmel'nitsky", the authors of the "Petition" claimed: "He has secured this voluntary allegiance by treaties... These treaties have been renewed and confirmed from time to time by the decision of each hetman"¹.

¹ Petition of the Malorussian nobility for restoration of various ancient rights of Malorossiya // Kievskaya Starina. The Year Two. Vol. VI. May – August 1883. P. 320 [website]. URL: <https://runivers.ru/upload/iblock/280/may83.pdf> (accessed: 17/01/2022).

The nobility asked for a special judicial and legislative system and privileges for the Malorussian Cossacks, clergy and burghers. It also requested that the lands of Malorossiya be liberated from the Serbs, the “Georgians”, the Russian Old Believers and even the Sloboda Cossacks.

The Malorussian nobility also requested that the “Malorussian peasants” be deprived of the right to freely migrate and to enrol as Cossacks: “Prohibit all ranks of men henceforth from ever entering the Cossacks. We ask all the above from Your Imperial Majesty, not only to keep our rights in force, but also for the general welfare of Malorossiya, for if such a complete transfer and entering into the Cossacks is not forbidden to the peasants, then Malorossiya will never expect any permanent well-being and good order, because the nobility will become poor, and the peasants, working for the other freely transferring and for the Cossacks, will come to utmost exhaustion and bankruptcy, and in the end the whole of Malorossiya will be devastated”¹. In other words, the Cossack elite were directly proposing to introduce serfdom in the territory of Malorossiya in their personal interests.

At the same time, the nobility appealed to the original Polish and Lithuanian order: “The Malorussian men, according to the rights of Malorossiya and many similar to those rights, issued by the Sejms, have no liberty to move freely from place to place, except in such a case as their landlord sacks them; for by virtue of the above mentioned rights, any landlord may find a fugitive peasant or servant, wherever he may be, with all his house and belongings, and own him, as is still the case in Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania”².

Special mention should also be made of the request to confirm the hereditary rule of the Razumovsky family in Malorossiya. Surprisingly, this proposal was accompanied by speculation about the need for an elected hetman.

¹Petition of the Malorussian nobility for restoration of various ancient rights of Malorossiya // *Kievskaya Starina*. The Year Two. Vol. VI. May – August 1883. P. 320 [website]. URL: <https://runivers.ru/upload/iblock/280/may83.pdf> (accessed: 17/01/2022).

² Ibid.

Overall, the “Petition” clearly expressed the aspirations of the top ranks of Malorussian society, who wanted to expand their economic and political privileges at the expense of the interests of broad sections of the Malorussian population.

However, the new empress and her entourage had very different views on the future of Malorossiia. At the same time, an anonymous document was sent to Catherine, called “The Most Secret Notes on the Present State of Malorossiia”. The document was most likely compiled by G. N. Teplov, former head of hetman Razumovsky’s chancellery and now secretary to the Empress. The “Notes” contained a brief historical overview of Malorossiia and the Zaporozhian Sich, as well as a detailed description of the abuses and problems generated by the hetman’s rule. It also included accusations of systematic falsification of statistics on the state of Malorossiia by the hetman and his entourage. Soon afterwards, the Empress invited Kirill Razumovsky to resign.

In the instructions to Prince A. A. Vyazemsky, who was taking up the post of Procurator-General of the Senate, in February 1764, among other instructions, Catherine II formulated her vision of the policy towards Malorossiia as follows: “Malorossiia, Livonia and Finland are provinces with special privileges that have been bestowed upon them. They should not be drastically curtailed or abolished altogether. On the other hand, to consider these provinces as foreign territories would not only be erroneous, but also foolish. They should be treated like the province of Smolensk. They should be gradually, in the most cautious way, transferred to the state of Russian regions, so that they cease to be “wolves looking into the woods”. It will not be difficult to achieve this goal if only clever people are placed at the head of these provinces... As for Malorossiia, when there will be no more hetmans, it is necessary to make it forget the very word “hetman” and the whole period of hetmanate. This would be better than keeping an eye on the people who are going to take over the place”¹.

¹ *Vasilyev Aleksandr*. “Wolves looking into the woods”. How Catherine the Great Began the Integration of Malorossiia [website]. URL: <https://ukraina.ru/history/20211121/1032705259.html> (accessed: 20.01.2022).

These words are often misinterpreted in modern Ukraine as a policy of ethnic assimilation of the Malorussians, which the Russian government wanted to carry out. However, the example of the Smolensk land, cited above, tells a different story. The fact is that the population of Smolensk land was Russian, but the Smolensk nobility was mainly of Polish origin. Smolensk land was finally incorporated into Russia at the same time as Malorossiia, as a result of the Russian-Polish war of 1654–1667. In other words, in this case it is not about any policy of assimilation of the population, but about a change in the composition of the local elites and their political orientation. This, incidentally, applied not only to Malorossiia, but also to regions such as Finland and Livonia, where the loyalty of the nobility was also in doubt. The desire of the Malorussian nobility to preserve the order that had been “until this time in Poland” was a clear indication that this judgement of the Russian Empress was correct.

Thus, Catherine II developed a perception of the perniciousness of the Malorussian nobility’s desire for more rights and privileges.

On 10 November 1764 the “Manifesto to the Malorussian People” was published. The manifesto announced the dismissal of hetman Razumovsky, the abolition of the institution of hetman power and the establishment of a Malorussian Collegium headed by President and Governor-General Count Pyotr Rumyantsev, who had spent his childhood in Malorossiia. The Collegium consisted of four Great Russian nobles and four representatives of the Malorussian nobility, General Obozny Kochubey, General Clerk Tumansky, General Yesaul Zhuravko and General Standard-bearer Apostol. All members of the Malorussian nobility were given the Russian ranks of Major-General, State Councillor and Colonel respectively¹.

The instructions given to Rumyantsev by the Empress drew attention to the fact that the state was not receiving any revenue from Malorossiia. Soon afterwards a census of the population of Malorossiia was carried out, and the population was divided into Cossacks and peasants. Peasants were banned from crossing over.

¹ *Vasilyev Aleksandr*. “Wolves looking into the woods”. How Catherine the Great Began the Integration of Malorossiia [website]. URL: <https://ukraina.ru/history/20211121/1032705259.html> (accessed: 20.01.2022).

At the same time, there was an independent process of expanding the borders of the Russian Empire to the south and west and developing new lands, later called Novorossiya.

Back in the 1750s, settlers from Serbia and other European countries began to settle in the former Wild Fields. In 1752, a military-agricultural settlement called New Serbia, founded by Serbian and Hungarian natives from the Austrian Empire, was established there. The settlers were then joined by Bulgarians, Wallachians and other Balkan peoples who were welcomed into the Russian Empire. And from 1789 a large influx of immigrants from Germany began.

By 1760 the population of New Serbia numbered 26,000. The region was divided into two parts: New Serbia proper, west of the Dnieper to the borders with the Polish and Turkish lands, and Slavic Serbia, east of the Dnieper to the borders with the lands of the Don Cossacks. In 1764 New Russia took the place of New Serbia, and these territories were transformed into the Novorossiya Governorate. This territory was never subject to hetman rule. By the time the governorate was formed, its population was multi-ethnic and those groups that became known as Ukrainians in the 20th century were a small minority.

The further development of Novorossiya is linked to the successful outcome of two Russian-Turkish wars and the inclusion of vast areas of the Northern Black Sea Coast, the Azov Sea region and the Crimea into the Russian Empire. As a result of the Russian-Turkish war of 1768–1774 Russia incorporated the lands between the Dnieper and the Bug rivers, Azov and Kerch. Crimea gained formal independence from the Ottoman Empire. In 1783 the Crimean Khanate was abolished and Crimea became part of Russia. In the following year, 1784, the Taurida region was formed here. The end of the Russian-Turkish war of 1787–1791 that followed the accession of Crimea secured Crimea as part of the Russian Empire. The territory had never been subject to hetman rule, and was settled mainly by immigrants from Great Russian governorates and settlers from Europe. At the same time, a significant number of Crimean Tatars, Krymchaks, Karaites, Bulgarians, Germans, Jews, Armenians, Greeks and others remained in Crimea. Compared to them, the ethnic groups that came to be called Ukrainians in the 20th century were a small minority.

The cessation of the Crimean Khanate and the incorporation of the Northern Black Sea coast into the Russian Empire put an end to the shameful trade of Christian slaves in Europe. For several centuries, the inhabitants of Malorossiia filled the slave markets. Until the 18th century, France and Venice used Slavic slaves on the war galleys as convict oarsmen.

The expansion of the Russian territory, the weakening and subsequent elimination of the Crimean Khanate turned the Zaporozhian Sich into an internal Russian region and made the further existence of the Sich as a military settlement irrelevant. Back in 1772 the Dnieper line of forts was built and the garrisons were made up of new settlers. These include St. Peter's Fortress, Zakhariievskaya Fortress, Alekseevskaya Fortress, Kirillovskaya Fortress, Grigorievskaya Fortress, Nikitinskaya Fortress and Aleksandrovskaya Fortress¹. The Zaporozhian Sich found itself in the rear of the new defensive line, and its existence was rendered meaningless.

On 5 June 1775 Russian troops under the command of General P. A. Tekelli occupied the Sich. On 14 August a manifesto was issued on the abolition of the Zaporozhian army. Zaporozhye became part of the Novorossiysk Governorate. The distribution of Sich lands to Russian nobles began. Cossacks were given the right to enrol in carabineer regiments or as peasants.

Part of the Cossacks decided to choose the path of betrayal of interests. Around 7,000 people fled to the Ottoman Empire, accepted Turkish citizenship and founded the so-called Zadunai Sich. Many of the fugitives subsequently returned to Russia and were welcomed back home. The Trans-Danube Sich ceased to exist in 1828, when a large part of the Cossacks decided to defect to Russia in the face of another Russian-Turkish war.

In 1783 Prince Grigory Potemkin gave permission to Anton Golovaty, Zakhary Chepega and Sidor Bely "to invite hunters to serve as Cossacks" in the lands of Novorossiia. In 1787 the Black Sea Cossack Army was established on their basis. This new army had a strength of 11,000 men. A territory between the Southern Bug and

¹ History of Ukraine. 2nd ed., updated and revised. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 252.

the Dniester, centred in the city of Slobozia, was allocated for their deployment. The Cossacks of the Black Sea distinguished themselves in the Russian-Turkish war of 1787–1791 in the battles of Khadzhibey, Ternovets and Bender and took part in the assault of Ochakov, Izmail and Berezan.

After the war ended, in 1792, the new Black Sea Cossacks were given land on the Kuban, newly incorporated into Russia, with a centre in Yekaterinodar, where a large army was formed, consisting of 40 kurens.

In the 1770s, a period of active development of the northern Black Sea coast began. In 1776 the city of Ekaterinoslav was founded, in 1778 — Kherson and Mariupol, in 1789 — Nikolaev, in 1794 — Odessa. From 1775 onwards, Greek settlers began to actively settle in Novorossiia. In the late 1770s Novorossiia received a part of the hetmanate territory: the Poltava Regiment and part of the Mirgorod Regiment.

The Austrian Emperor Joseph II, who visited the Crimea with Catherine II in 1787, was astonished at the scale of the development work carried out by the Russian authorities. In his travel notes, he wrote the following: “We, in Germany and in France, would not dare to undertake what is being done there... there roads, harbours, fortresses are being built, palaces in swamps, forests are being bred in deserts”¹.

And in 1780–1781 the process of reforming the governance of Malorossiia was completed. The Malorussian Collegium, the General Court and the regimental administration were abolished, and the territory of the hetmanate was divided into three vicegerencies: Kiev, Chernigov and Novgorod-Seversky. Thus, a standard system of government was introduced on the territory of Malorossiia, similar to the rest of the Russian Empire.

In 1783 the Cossack regiments were transformed into Carabinieri ones. In 1785, Catherine II adopted the “Charter on the Rights, Freedoms and Privileges of the Honorable Russian Nobility”, which

¹ History of Ukraine. From the 6th to the 21st century. / P. P. Tolochko, A. A. Oleynikov [and others]; led by P. P. Tolochko. 2nd ed., updated and revised. K.; M.: Kievan Rus: Kuchkovo Pole, 2018. P. 212.

granted the nobility extensive rights and privileges, including in the formation of local governing bodies. The Malorussian headmen were equated to the Russian nobility and became part of it. At the request of the nobility, the peasants of Malorossiia were finally enslaved.

Thus, by the end of the 18th century, in political, economic and social terms, the development of Malorossiia was generally in line with all-Russian processes.

At the end of the 18th century, as a result of the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, a considerable part of the western Russian lands, which had been under Polish occupation for several centuries, became part of the Russian Empire. In 1793, the Second Partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth resulted in the incorporation of the Right Bank — the Zadneprovsky region, which by this time had been in disrepair and decline. The Russian Empire incorporated 4,533 square kilometres of territory, 410 towns and cities, and over 10,000 villages with 3 million inhabitants¹. Two years later, in 1795, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was abolished. The Polish lands were divided between Prussia and the Austrian Empire, with Volhynia and Podolia going to Russia. As a result, the incorporated lands were included partly in the Kiev Governorate and partly in the newly created Volhynian and Podolia Governorates.

The 18th century was a period of rapid economic growth and prosperity for the population of the Left Bank. After centuries of exploitation by Poles, constant attacks of Crimean Tatars, the Russian-Polish war (1654–1667), popular uprisings of the 17th century and bloody feuds of the Ruin times, the population of Malorossiia under the Russian Empire's sceptre found long-awaited peace, tranquillity and stability. The economic upswing that began at the end of the 17th century continued into the 18th century.

Malorussian industry was flourishing. At the beginning of the 18th century, the first enterprises emerged on the basis of tannery and cloth production. The use of the waterwheel became commonplace. Glass, glazed tiles, saltpeter and potash were produced. The production of

¹ History of Ukraine. From the 6th to the 21st century. / P. P. Tolochko, A. A. Oleynikov [and others]; led by P. P. Tolochko. 2nd ed., updated and revised. K.; M.: Kievan Rus: Kuchkovo Pole, 2018. P. 208. P. 213.

jewellery and the casting of cannons and bells reached a high level. Even today, Red Square in Moscow is decorated with cannons produced in the 18th century in Glukhov. Construction reached an unprecedented scale. St. Sophia Cathedral was rebuilt, taking on a modern appearance, and Pustynno-Nikolaevskiy, Bratsky Bogoyavlenskiy, Kirillovsky, Mikhailo-Zolotoverkhovskiy and Mezhygorskiy monasteries were built in Kiev. New cathedrals appeared in Pereyaslavl and Chernigov.

The financial basis for economic prosperity was the tax exemptions granted in the Russian Empire to the inhabitants of Malorossiia. For example, even by the end of the reign of Peter I, the capitation tax on men in Malorossiia was half that in Great Russia: 37.4 kopecks against 74 kopecks¹.

The introduction of a monopoly on tobacco and alcohol production played an important role. At the same time, rental rights for production were given to cities and villages. A kind of joint stock companies were created. Part of the rent was given to the hetman's treasury, while the rest of the proceeds went directly to the needs of urban and rural communities. Until 1708, the rent yielded 80,000 gold coins a year².

Integration into the vast empire created opportunities for the development of culture, education and science. In the last quarter of the 18th century in Malorossiia and Novorossiia, as part of the general reform of the education system in the Russian Empire, two types of public schools were created: main, involving four years of study and intended for the children of the nobility, and small, involving two years of study, for merchants, burghers and officials. Main institutions were opened in Kiev, Chernigov, Novgorod-Seversky, Kharkov and Yekaterinoslav, and minor ones in Nezhin, Poltava, Priluki, Romny, Pogor, Izyum, Akhtyrka, Sumy and Bogodukhov³.

The Malorussian military and political elite, the clergy, scholars and cultural figures achieved their long-standing goal of taking their

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² History of Ukraine. 2nd ed., updated and revised. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 222.

³ History of Ukraine. From the 6th to the 21st century. / P. P. Tolochko, A. A. Oleynikov [and others]; led by P. P. Tolochko. 2nd ed., updated and revised. K.; M.: Kievan Rus: Kuchkovo Pole, 2018. P. 219.

rightful place among the country's ruling and cultural elite. Many of them had brilliant careers in the capital and the vast expanse of the Russian Empire.

These included distinguished theologians and philosophers Stephan Yavorsky, the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, and Feofan Prokopovich, the first member of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, famous Russian scholars, the author of *Grammatics*, Melety Smotritsky, and *Arithmetic*, Leonty Magnitsky, major statesmen: the favourite of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna, Field Marshal-General Aleksei Razumovsky, his brother, President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Field Marshal-General and last hetman Kirill Razumovsky, Chancellor of the Russian Empire, one of the initiators of the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Prince Aleksandr Bezborodko.

The example of Aleksei Grigorievich Razumovsky is particularly telling. Coming from a simple family of Malorussian registered Cossacks of the village of Lemeshi in the Kozelets hundred of the Kiev regiment, he was able to make a most dizzying career. The young man had a beautiful voice and joined the Court Choir at the age of 22. In St. Petersburg Aleksei met the future empress Elisabeth Petrovna and became her favourite. In the autumn of 1742 Aleksei and Elisabeth were married in secret in the village of Perovo near Moscow. Razumovsky became Russia's greatest nobleman, receiving the Order of St. Andrew, the rank of Lieutenant Colonel of the Horse Guards, the title of Count and the rank of Field Marshal General, considerable land and other property, including the magnificent Anichkov Palace. After the Empress' death, Aleksei Razumovsky retained his position as one of the most influential members of the Russian nobility.

No such story of the rise of a common Malorussian Cossack could ever take place in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. There, the Malorussians were an oppressed and discriminated minority, occupying one of the last places in the social hierarchy.

Another example of a distinguished career can be seen in the life of Alexander Bezborodko. He was the son of general clerk Andrei Bezborodko, educated at the Kiev-Mohyla Academy, and in 1765 was appointed governor of the office of Rumyantsev, governor-

general of Malorossiya. In 1775, on Rumyantsev's recommendation, he was admitted to the Empress's court and became one of her State Secretaries and chief rapporteur on internal political affairs. Aleksandr Andreyevich was the compiler of all the imperial manifestos for the years 1776–1792. In 1780 he was appointed second member of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, and in 1797 he was appointed first president of the Collegium and a senator. Bezborodko was bestowed the title of count, the Orders of St. Vladimir, First Class, St. Alexander Nevsky and St. Andrew, as well as 20,000 serfs¹.

The mass and successful integration of natives of Malorossiya into the ruling stratum demonstrates the complete invalidity of the myth of Ukraine as a colony of the Russian Empire.

Unlike on the Left Bank, the fate of the Russian population of Right Bank, Galicia and Volhynia, occupied by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was tragic. In the 18th century, the process of Catholicisation and Polonisation continued.

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was in a deep internal political crisis, on the one hand, and strong external pressure from Prussia and Russia, on the other. In an attempt to avoid the collapse of the country in every way possible, the Polish aristocracy, the nobility and the Catholic clergy increased their open persecution of the Orthodox, seeing them as the main cause of internal instability. The ideological justification for this policy was laid down by the Jesuit S. Zhebrovsky of Vilna in his "Project for the Destruction of the Greek-Russian Religion in the Polish Possessions" (1717). In a very Russophobic tone, he wrote that the prosperity of Poland was hindered by "the difference of beliefs", therefore "state officials and every Pole... should make it their duty to eradicate the Greek confession from the Latin one by means of contempt, persecution, oppression of those who hold to it, and by other... active means". And further on: "...Every Pole shall be alienated from the Russian in meetings... not to make friends with him, to speak of superstition in the presence of the Russian... It is necessary to bring them [Russians] to poverty and ignorance, and being in it, they will not be able to know their rites, as and when they

¹ Bezborodko [website]. URL: https://bigenc.ru/domestic_history/text/3788684 (accessed: 30/01/2022).

are established from the Greek Church... it is not difficult for us Poles... to forbid the children of their peasants to study in church schools”¹.

What is remarkable in this libel is that then, in 1717 (during the Great Northern War), referring to the Orthodox population of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, S. Zhebrovsky calls it Russian and only in one case (item 13) “the Ukrainian, Podolian and Volhynian people”.

In 1733 a confederation of Polish nobles who supported the pretender to the Polish throne, Stanisław Leszczyński, organised in Grudziądz, passed the following resolution: “The Catholic Church shall not tolerate in any way other denominations near it; non-Orthodox and Protestants shall be deprived of the right to be elected as deputies, to tribunals (regional courts) and to special commissions constituted for any case whatsoever. Their rights shall be equated with those of the Jews. Their clergymen shall not openly walk in the streets with holy gifts; they may not perform baptisms, marriages or funerals except with the permission of the Catholic priest, for a fee set by the latter. Public funerals shall be forbidden to non-Catholics at all: they shall bury the dead at night. In the cities, non-Catholics shall be present at Catholic processions. There shall be no bells at churches in the villages. Children born of mixed marriages shall be affiliated to the Catholic Church, and even the Orthodox stepchildren of a Catholic stepfather shall adopt Catholicism. The canon laws of Catholics shall also be binding on non-Catholics”².

Ranks, positions and senatorial jobs were granted exclusively to Catholics, and especially to those who converted from Orthodoxy to Catholicism. As a result, the noble Orthodox families became poorer and, succumbing to the propaganda of the Jesuits, converted to the Roman faith in search of hope for worldly goods. The forced Catholicisation of Orthodox Russians was increasing year by year.

¹ *Slyunkova I. N.* Project for the destruction of the Greek-Russian faith, presented in 1717 to the state officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by the Jesuit S. Zhebrovsky // *Bulletin of Church History*. 2007. No.3 (7). P. 186–195.

² *Antonovich V.* Outline of the Relationship of the Polish State to Orthodoxy and the Orthodox Church [website]. URL: <http://litopys.org.ua/anton/ant19.htm> (accessed: 19.05.2022).

At the same time Orthodoxy was being supplanted by Uniatism. For example, the Lvov Brotherhood accepted Uniatism in 1708, the Slovit Monastery in 1718 and the Krekhov Monastery of St. Nicholas in 1721. In the second half of the 18th century there was only one remaining Orthodox church in Galicia, named Manyava Skete of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross, which still preserved its Orthodoxy. And its influence in Galicia had been reduced to a minimum by the First Partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1792.

Thus, the Polish policy of all-consuming annexation of Galician territory during the Middle Ages was a colossal success in the struggle for the minds of the local Russian population. The Polish kings succeeded in essentially nullifying the influence of the centres of Orthodox Christianity in their traditional canonical territory in Galicia. This was an absolute victory for the Vatican and the Polish aristocracy, allowing the ideological basis for the existence of the Russian (Ruthenian) people of south-western Rus to be destroyed and their values and historical reference points to be blurred. There was a giant historical gap of 13–15 generations, which is almost unparalleled in the world. As the further course of history showed, the resulting ideological vacuum began to be filled by another, but already palliative influence (Uniatism) on the consciousness of the autochthonous population, cut off from the main Russian massif. It was only at the cost of the loss of the Orthodox faith that the autochthonous population of Galicia, who had converted to Uniatism, was allowed to participate in various areas of city life.

By the end of the 18th century, the indigenous population was in a catastrophic situation. A people deprived of their ancestral faith, national elite, culture and education in their native language, as well as opportunities for their own economic development, were dissolved in an alien foreign environment on their territory, never having formed their national identity.

Between 1733 and 1768, the Right Bank, Galicia and Volhynia were shaken by a series of popular rebellions by the haidamaks against the Polish nobility. The rebellions were brutally suppressed and their leaders subjected to brutal executions. 12 men were quartered, 251 were beheaded, one was impaled, one was wheeled, 39 were hanged and 115 others were subjected to other executions. The leader of the

rebellion, sotnik Ivan Gonta, was sentenced to 14 days of execution, during which he was skinned and his body parts were cut off¹.

The protracted domestic political crisis in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which began in the 18th century, together with the growing might of its neighbouring countries (Austria, Prussia and Russia) was leading the country towards national catastrophe. Unlike other European countries, Poland in the earlier 16th-17th century did not enter the phase of an absolutist state, remaining an estate monarchy with weak royal power. Neither the magnates nor the nobility were interested in centralising state administration and strengthening the power of the king. The magnate nobility regarded the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a territory solely for their corporate interests. The king was elected by the nobility at an elective Sejm, while the nobility elected members (deputies) at provincial Sejms. The Sejms were held every two years. Decisions were taken by unanimous consent, which meant that any member could nullify legislation of vital importance to the country, either by issuing a *liberum veto* or a *sisto activitatem* (“I stop the activity”). As a result, out of 55 Sejms convened between 1652 and 1764, only 7 ended successfully, the other

48 were thwarted. During the reign of Augustus III (30 years, from 1733 to 1763) only one Sejm ended with the adoption of resolutions.

Poland's neighbours, especially the King of Prussia, used to bribe their noble members and regularly disrupt the Sejms in order to prevent them from taking decisions on increasing the army. There was no question of internal political consolidation in Poland. In 1768, with the support of the Catholic powers of Austria and France, a conservative part of the magnates and nobility, headed by the bishop of Kamenets, A. S. Krasinsky, proclaimed a confederation (armed alliance) against Russia and its king, Stanisław August Poniatowski, in Bar (Podolia). The activities of the Conservative Confederates provoked a civil war in Poland, a haidamaks' rebellion in the Russian voivodeships of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and served as a catalyst for the war between Russia and Turkey (1768–1774). The bloody events of 1768–1774 ended in the defeat of the Polish confederates and the

¹ History of Ukraine. 2nd ed., updated and revised. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 258.

defeat of Turkey. Prussia invited Vienna and St. Petersburg to jointly carry out the partition of Poland (the first one). It took place on 17 February 1772. According to partition original Polish territories passed to Prussia — West Prussia, without Gdansk and Torun, part of Kujawy and Great Poland (36 thousand sq. km), and to Austria — the most part of the Red Ruthenia with Lvov and Galicia and southern part of Lesser Poland with Oswiecim and Tarnow, without Krakow (83 thousand sq. km). Russia received the eastern part of Belarus and Black Ruthenia (92 thousand square kilometres), i. e. the territories of the old state of Kievan Rus. Thus, the lands of Galicia Rus were incorporated into Austria, with the status of crown land with the official name of Królestwo Galicji i Lodomerii.

By incorporating the original Polish Krakow lands into the kingdom, the Austrian authorities divided it into Western Galicia and Eastern Galicia. Despite the fall of Poland, the process of Polonisation, which began with aggression in the 14th century, continued further under Austro-Hungarian rule. It was the result of the unequal economic situation of the two nations. Taking into account the multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of the Austrian state, Joseph II (1741–1790) of the Habsburg family, Holy Roman Emperor, King of Germany and Archduke of Austria, upon taking the throne initiated a policy of enlightened absolutism, attempting to lead the country out of a severe crisis, exacerbated after the Seven Years' War, through reforms from above. Personal dependence of peasants was abolished; Orthodoxy was recognised in a number of Slavic lands, with the exception of Galicia, where Roman Catholicism and Uniate Christianity were considered official religions. The only remaining Orthodox monastery in the region, the Manyava Skete, was closed. The monks, who refused to recognise union, left for the monasteries of Southern Bukovina and the Kiev Pechersk Lavra. In Lvov, a small Orthodox community was allowed to open a small house church in a private house.

The final line under Orthodoxy was drawn in 1790 by the decree of Leopold II (1747–1792) on the equalisation of rights between Catholics and Uniates. This was how the new Austrian authorities resolved the five hundred-year-old Orthodox issue in Galicia.

Chapter 7

HISTORY OF THE SOUTH-WEST RUS IN THE 19th CENTURY

After the incorporation of Left Bank Ukraine into Russia in the 17th century, the incorporation of Right Bank Ukraine into the Russian Empire and the collapse of Poland in the 18th century, the territorial composition of south-western Russia, containing Malorossiya and Novorossiya, stabilised.

At the beginning of the 19th century a new administrative structure of the territory was completed, which in 1802 included three regions comprising nine governorates: the Left Bank region (Chernigov, Poltava and Kharkov governorates); the Right Bank region (Kiev, Volhynian and Podolsk governorates); and the Southern region, or Novorossiya governorate, which was divided by Alexander I decree into the Yekaterinoslav, Kherson and Taurida governorates.

In 1802, before the European threat of Napoleon, the Malorussian Governorate-General comprising Poltava and Chernigov governorates, was created. On 24 May 1822 the Novorussian-Bessarabian Governorate-General was established for the better management of the southern territories of the Russian Empire. These governorates were divided into powiats. In 1806, the borders of the Novorussian governorates were approved, where they existed until the beginning of the 20th century. The tradition of the old Magdeburg Law, which had established special privileges for cities in the field of self-government, but which usually severely restricted the rights and discriminated against Orthodox Christians

and Jews, was gradually disappearing. In 1835 the Magdeburg Law was abolished in Kiev.

The Russian Empire traditionally gravitated towards supporting regional noble elites regardless of their ethnicity. The administration of the governorates was in the hands of the local nobility, from which all the main officials were chosen. On the Right Bank, the Polish nobility largely retained control of social and economic life. Polish landlords generally controlled noblemen's assemblies (only owners of more than a hundred male serfs had the right to vote). On the Left Bank, the central government relied on loyal members of the Sich nobility. In Poltava and Chernigov governorates in particular, descendants of Cossack headmen were given the main administrative powers.

Russian laws equated the Cossack noblemen with the nobility: "... The desire to be part of the privileged part of society led to the fact that merchants, and burghers, and ordinary Cossacks declared themselves descendants of the nobility. As a result, up to 20,000 people who were not members of the nobility were added to the "nobility lists". The Imperial Heraldic Chancellery then questioned the right of all heirs to the nobility. There was a flurry of protests among the Ukrainian nobility and petitions were presented to the Emperor. Descendants of the nobility began collecting documents proving the high position of their ancestors (Markovich, Chernysh, Poletika, Miloradovich). Between 1801 and 1808 they wrote a number of articles on the merits of their families. Although the conflict was over by 1835, the interest in the historical roots remained..."¹

There were 8.7 million people in the nine governorates of southwestern Rus in 1811. The population, due to various historical events and constant migrations, was highly mixed. According to the 1897 census, 44.7% of the urban population of southwestern Rus spoke Russian, while 18.2% spoke Ukrainian. Other notable ethnic groups were Moldovans, Greeks, Jews and Armenians.

Integrated rather rapidly into the Russian Empire, Novorossiia acquired a number of special social, economic, demographic and cultural characteristics thanks to its favourable geographical location,

¹ *Danilevsky I., Tairova T., Shubin A. Mironenko V. History of Ukraine. 2nd ed., updated and revised. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020.*

the circumstances of its incorporation and the mechanism of settlement.

The ethnic space of Novorossiia was developing in all its components in a distinctive way: “...In the first half of the 19th century a new social and cultural space was being formed in the Donbas (as well as in all of Novorossiia), embracing all sections of the population. There was a rapprochement and mutual cultural enrichment of the different ethnic groups in the region. Long-term joint living, economic, trade and cultural contacts, and mixed marriages all led to a gradual smoothing out of ethnic features. The local population developed a sense of belonging to a common destiny. A community of people living in the Donbas began to form...”¹

In addition to official resettlement supported by the authorities and landowners’ colonisation, there was an active people’s voluntary movement from the central governorates of Russia and Malorossiia. At the same time, other peoples were eagerly settled there. Novorossiia became characterised by both the multi-ethnic character of its population and the formation of a new community of Russian man and subject of the empire, which was created from representatives of diverse ethnic groups on a Russian-Slavic basis. The peculiarity of the Novorussian type is an all-Russian imperial identity, which prevails over local or ethnic features.

From the very beginning of the 19th century, southwestern Rus was characterised by the uneven development of industrial relations. The most developed economic base was on the Left Bank, which from the mid-18th century was already actively integrated into the general Russian economy. On the Right Bank, the negative “legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth” was long felt: the dominance of Polish latifundia, an artificial bias in favour of the agrarian sector, and the absence of large industrial enterprises, even of the traditional manufactory type.

Novorossiia experienced the most rapid economic boom, with its state-owned enterprises being transformed intensively into

¹ *Bespalova S. V., Bobrovsky A. S., Kolesnik A. V. and others.* Russian Donbass: Historical, Spiritual-Intellectual and Economic Foundations. Donetsk: Don-NU, 2021. P. 30.

modern factories. As a result, by the end of the 19th century, due to industrial development, the Left Bank and Novorossiia formed the basis of the Russian Empire's new southern industrial region. The industrialisation of the Donbas was the realisation of the idea of Novorossiia as the new advanced industrial, commercial and agrarian centre of Russia.

Important structural changes were taking place in agriculture in southwestern Rus, where traditional grain and cattle farming were actively supplemented by horticulture and winegrowing. The landowners' farms were becoming entrepreneurial, specialising in the production of cash grain. Much of the wheat grown on the landowners' estates and the colonists' economies was exported through the Black Sea and Sea of Azov ports. By the mid-19th century, many serfs had become owners of agricultural processing plants, paying tribute money to their owners.

The all-Russian system of serfdom in Malorossiia, which was gradually entering a state of deep crisis at the time, was developing in a rather contrasting way. For the serfs on the Right Bank, who for the most part remained under the private ownership of the Polish feudal lords (90 % of the total number of dependent peasants), there were no exemptions. There were five times as many Polish landlords on the territory of the Kiev governorate as there were Russians and Ukrainians, and this state of affairs continued until the Polish rebellion of 1863. At the same time, the number of state-owned economic peasants, whose situation was much better, was growing on the Left Bank. In Sloboda Ukraine, for example, only 50 % of the dependent peasants in that time were owned by the landlords.

In the 19th century, in the governorates with the most fertile land (Taurida, Kherson, Yekaterinoslav and Kharkov) the share of landlords' estates was particularly large, while peasants' land parcels were decreasing against a background of population growth. Peasants' wages were falling and arrears were rising. As a result, it became common practice for landlords to allow their serfs to work with their stock and livestock on leased land in fertile areas or to leave their homes temporarily to work in towns and on agricultural work in infertile areas. The labour resources freed up went to the cities, which were actively developing.

The most striking changes were noticeable in the industrial sector, where Novorossiia was already in the second or third decade of the 19th century actively involved in the all-Russian industrial revolution, replacing manual manufactory labour with already partly mechanised factory production.

The world's and nationwide experience of modernising production was actively applied. The first machines were installed at cloth enterprises which were turned into new factories. Technological change then spread from light industry to heavy industry. For example, the Lugansk foundry was established. The Yekaterinoslav Manufactory, which became a factory, was known for its high level of professionalism and division of labour: 37 professions were employed on an annual wage.

With the development of the country's productive forces, the creation of a coal-metallurgical complex in the Donbas was put on the agenda. After the Northern Black Sea Coast and the Crimea were incorporated into the Russian Empire, the Black Sea Fleet began to be built. New ports and naval bases were established on the Black Sea coast: Sevastopol, Taganrog, Kherson, Nikolaev, Odessa and others. Fuel, weapons and metalwork were needed and these could be produced by enterprises in the Donbas.

National defence issues were also of great importance. It was clear that Turkey, which had lost the Northern Black Sea Coast in the war with Russia, would not accept defeat. And Russia was actively preparing for this. For example, the Commander of the Black Sea Admiralty, Vice-Admiral N. S. Mordvinov insisted on the immediate rearmament of the Black Sea Fleet. However, heavy weaponry was produced far to the north and north-east at that time: in Petrozavodsk and in the Urals. In the event of war, it would require a huge effort to deliver it to the south. The needs of national defence also implied a state need to establish heavy industry in the Donbas, including cannon foundries.

In the spring of 1794, the government sent Karl (Charles) Gascoigne, director of the Alexander Cannon Factory, to the Donbas. Gascoigne chose the site for the foundry at the mouth of the Olkhovaya River on the right bank of the Lugan River, opposite the village of Kamenny Brod.

The first half of the 19th century saw the start of an active exploration of the region. Systematic subsoil investigations were linked

to the activities of the Lugansk state-owned factory, as the duties of mining engineers also included geological surveying. In 1810, after graduating from the Mining Cadet Corps, the Lugansk factory was visited by Ye. P. Kovalevsky, who later became a prominent scientist and public figure, an honorary member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences. It was with him that the intensive development of hard coal deposits in the Donbas began.

In 1827 Ye. P. Kovalevsky mentioned that in the Yekaterinoslav Governorate and in the adjacent part of the Don Cossack Host, a special mountain ridge was found, which he called Donetsk after the name of the Seversky Donets River. In the same year, 1827, Kovalevsky made the first geological map of the Donbas, on which he plotted 25 deposits of coal known to him. Thanks to his works, the term “Donetsk Basin” entered the scientific and socio-political lexicon¹.

In the 1820s, when the Russian government began actively searching for coal fields in the south of the country, coal mining was outsourced, and in 1826 a law was issued on the excise duty — coal production became taxable. From then on, coal mining was carried out only under the supervision of officials. In time, however, this order was abolished because of a sharp decline in coal production, and in 1829 a law was issued allowing free mining of coal seams. This measure can be considered a successor to Peter the Great’s decree “On Berg Privileges” (“mining privileges”), adopted back in 1719.

The expedition organised by a descendant of the famous miner A. Demidov was of great importance for the geological study of the southern region. Thanks to him, from 1837 to 1839, the French scientist Frédéric le Play, along with 20 other specialists, explored and described the area. In 1841–1842, the geologist R. Murchison drew attention to the poor exploitation of minerals in Russia. Donbas coal became popular, and Donetsk mining engineers began to be recruited for work and consultancy in Tula, the Urals, Eastern Siberia, Amur and Sakhalin.

¹ *Kovalevsky Ye. P. The Experience of Geognostic Investigations in the Donetsk Mountain Range // Mountain Magazine or Collection of Information on Mining and Salt Science, with New Discoveries in the Sciences Related to the Subject. St. Petersburg, 1827. P. 31–60.*

The Novorussian and Bessarabian Governor-General, Count M.S. Vorontsov, tried to create favourable conditions in the south for the development of capitalist relations in industry, entrepreneurial activity and improvement of agrarian production. The rapid growth of the ports, bases and ships of the Azov-Black Sea Fleet led him to invite an experienced mining engineer, A.V. Guryev, to serve in the Novorussian Governor-General's Office, who was tasked with organising coal mining for the needs of industrial centres and the fleet. The relevance of this objective was also due to the fact that the Russian coal market was at that time being replenished by cheaper English coal, which was brought in as ballast by the ships carrying Russian grain to Great Britain.

After analysing earlier geological surveys, A.V. Guryev chose the upper reaches of the Kalmius River. In addition to the high quality of coal available there, factors such as the already established networks of dirt roads and water mills, and the proximity of neighbouring villages — future sources of labour — influenced his decision.

To organise coal mining, in 1841 Count Vorontsov leased the Aleksandrovka sloboda and all the former land from poruchik (lieutenant) Yevdokim Shidlovsky to build the Aleksandrovka mine. It was there that the Guryevskaya mine was commissioned in 1842. It proved to be the first mechanised mine in the Russian Empire, with 78 miners using a steam hoist and elementary mining equipment workshops to extract 18 poods of coal per person per day. This was a visible confirmation of the transition of the coal mining industry in southern Russia to an effective industrial revolution.

Between the turn of the century and 1860, coal production in Novorossiya increased 41-fold. In the mid-19th century, the Donbas was the second largest coal producer in the Russian Empire, trailing only the Silesian coal basin in Poland.

The aforementioned A. Guryev noted in his report of 1856 the high quality of Donbas coal, "...particularly suitable for all metallurgical works, in the melting of ores, for the production of iron and laths and for the heating of steamships and railways"¹.

¹ History of the Donbas from Antiquity to the Present / led by L. G. Shchepko, V. N. Nikolsky. Donetsk: DonNU, 2018. P. 256.

The development of agriculture and industry stimulated the growth of domestic and foreign trade. New forms of commerce emerged. In addition to fairs in towns and large villages, there were shops owned by guild merchants. Small traders were peddling their wares. In Ekaterinoslav Governorate alone, 220 fairs were held in 1825. The Black Sea trade boomed, serving both exports to other countries and deliveries to the hinterland of the empire. Its share in the country's total exports increased fivefold (from 4.7 % in 1802 to 22.5 % in 1816).

The researcher of the Black Sea Coast Ye. I. Druzhinina concluded that "... preconditions for the development of capitalism along the 'American' way were clearly visible in the southern Ukraine already in the first quarter of the 19th century..."¹.

In the first half of the 19th century inconsistent aspirations of the Malorussian elite for autonomy within the Russian Empire were noticeable. However, first, they did not find support among the broad masses; second, they did not develop into clearly defined political programmes and, third, they were harshly rebuffed by the imperial authorities in the Polish rebellions or European revolutions, when they could be suspected of showing dangerous freethinking or attempting to destroy the foundations of the Russian state.

The tradition of the old Magdeburg Law, which had given substantial autonomy to the Malorussian cities, was gradually being destroyed. In 1835 Kiev was the last to lose its special status. After the suppression of the Polish rebellion in 1830, the main concern of imperial policy on the Right Bank was to limit Polish influence there. In November 1831, Nicholas I set up a special commission for the western governorates in Kiev. Viktor Kochubey, who had been appointed its chairman and was of Malorussian descent, was expressly instructed by the Tsar to harmonise the life of these governorates in all spheres with that of the Great Russian governorates. After that, all Polish schools were closed within months, and the education system was reorganised along common imperial lines.

Thereafter, General Dmitry Bibikov, appointed Governor-General of Kiev, Podolsk and Volhynia governorates, pursued a

¹ *Druzhinina Ye. I.* Southern Ukraine During the Crisis of Feudalism. 1825–1860. M.: Nauka, 1981. P. 148.

strict protectionist policy on the Right Bank from 1837 to 1852. In all positions, Polish officials were replaced by Russians. In 1840 the Lithuanian Statute (a code of laws based on medieval Western models) was officially abolished on the Right Bank. In 1839 Bibikov continued the campaign begun by Catherine II for the conversion of Greek Catholics to Orthodoxy.

The spiritual community of the Malorussian nationality — the basis for the formation of national culture — developed considerably. Cultural activity at that time was concentrated mainly on the Left Bank, where Sloboda Ukraine played a leading role in spiritual development during the 20s-30s of the 19th century.

As the Ukrainian emigrant historian O. Subtelny stressed, “...there were few signs of interest in Ukrainian folk culture in other regions of Russian Ukraine. On the Right Bank several Polish nobles... saw Ukraine’s Cossack past in a romantic light and dreamed of a time when the Ukrainian peasantry, forgetting their past wrongs from the nobility, would help incorporate the Right Bank into a renewed Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But this trend did little to weaken Polish cultural hegemony on the Right Bank. As for the newly-settled Black Sea coastal regions, there was virtually no sign of Ukrainophilia...”¹

At that time, the influence of the Malorussian folk speech on the ancient written language increased. The logical result was the creation of the poem “Aeneid” by I. P. Kotlyarevsky

in the folk, but not in the literary language, at the end of the 18th century. Russian capital society was not only friendly towards the Malorussian folk language and works in that language, but loved them and encouraged them as an interesting cultural phenomenon. In 1812 the first collection of old Malorussian songs compiled by N. A. Tsertelyev was published in St. Petersburg. Prince Tsertelev, a Georgian by birth and Russian by culture, grew up in Malorossiya and knew its folklore traditions well. Folklore was collected by A. Ya. Storozhenko, I. I. Sreznevsky, who published “Zaporizhian Antiquity”, and others.

The centres of the new Malorussian literature in the 19th century were not so much Kiev and Poltava as St. Petersburg and Moscow. The first “Grammar of Malorussian dialect” compiled by

¹ *Subtelny Orest*. History of Ukraine. K.: Lybid, 1994. P. 125.

Velikorussian A. Pavlovsky was published in St. Petersburg in 1818. In the preface the author explained his work by the desire “to put on paper a faint shadow of the vanishing dialect of the people close to me, my kindred fellow-speakers, my brethren originating from the same branch with me”. In 1823 I. Voytsekhovich published a dictionary of Ukrainian folk language.

In 1827 “Malorussian Songs”, collected by M. A. Maksimovich, who was a professor at the University of Moscow and in 1834 became the first rector of St. Vladimir’s University in Kiev, were published in Moscow. Osip Bodyansky, another Malorussian professor at the Moscow University, born in Poltava, defended his master’s thesis “On the Folk Poetry of the Slavic Tribes” in 1837, based on a comparative study of Russian and Ukrainian folk songs. The works of I. P. Kotlyarevsky, E. P. Grebenka and T. G. Shevchenko were published in St. Petersburg. In the capital of the Russian Empire, authors who wrote in Ukrainian were published, brought out into the public eye and made them popular.

T. G. Shevchenko’s personal and artistic destiny is the best example of this. Thanks to the renowned painter Karl Bryullov, he became known to the poet and tutor of the heir to the throne, V. A. Zhukovsky. The latter, with the help of Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, organised Shevchenko’s redemption from serfdom in 1838. With his freedom, Shevchenko gained admission to the Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg and became one of Bryullov’s closest disciples.

“...It was no secret that Shevchenko’s patrons belonged to the liberal circles of Russian society and ardently desired a speedy emancipation of the peasantry from serfdom. Accordingly, Taras Grigoryevich interested them not so much in himself, but as a living protest against serfdom...”¹.

The personality of Taras Shevchenko caused much controversy, with divergent assessments of his work. From the Academy of Arts Shevchenko “... took only a superficial acquaintance with ancient mythology, necessary for a painter, and with some famous episodes of

¹ History of Ukraine. From the 6th to the 21st century. / P. P. Tolochko, A. A. Oleynikov [and others]; led by P. P. Tolochko. 2nd ed., updated and revised. K.; M.: Kievan Rus: Kuchkovo Pole, 2018. P. 223–224.

Roman history. He had no systematic knowledge, no holistic view of life. He did not even try, unlike many of the common people, to make up for the lack of schooling by self-education...”¹

According to the sculptor Mikhail Mikeschin, who knew him closely, Shevchenko was not noted for his desire to acquire systematic knowledge: “...He never seemed to read in front of me; he did not collect books, nor anything at all. His tattered “Sovremennik” and Mitskevich’s books in Polish were scattered on the floor and on the table... Taras Grigorievich knew Russian general history very superficially, he could not draw any general conclusions from it; he either denied or did not want to take into account many clear and well-known facts; this protected his uniqueness and direct attitude towards everything Malorussian”².

“...There are innumerable disrespectful and vicious attacks in his poems against Muscovites. And it cannot be interpreted as hatred of the ruling Tsarist Russia alone. All Muscovites, all Russian people are hateful to him...

...Complaining to Osovyanyonok about his life in St. Petersburg (“there are strangers around”), he sighs: ‘It’s hard, father, to live with enemies...’

...He was neither a “genius” nor a great poet; three quarters of his poems and verses are imitative, tasteless, provincial; all their significance is that they are a tribute to the Malorussian language. But even in the remaining quarter, a significant proportion were valued not by poetry lovers, but by revolutionary intellectuals...”³.

The approach of Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol, who was of Malorussian descent but wrote only in Russian, to national issues is illustrative. Throughout his life, Nikolai Vasilievich was interested in his native folklore, customs and way of life, and collected vast amounts of material on these subjects, which was directly reflected, for example, in

¹ *Ulyanov Nikolai*. Origins of Ukrainian Separatism. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2017. P. 182.

² *Dragomanov M.* Shevchenko, the Ukrainophiles and Socialism // *Gromada*. 1879. No. 4.

³ *Ulyanov Nikolai*. Origins of Ukrainian Separatism. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2017. P. 188.

“Evenings on a Farm near Dikanka”. Moreover, when Gogol arrived in St. Petersburg, he had no thoughts of any Ukrainian subjects, was writing “Hans Küchelgarten” and intended to follow the then current literary fashion. The formation of high Malorussian culture was not yet complete, so it was simply impossible for Gogol to write serious works in his native language.

But after a while he wrote to his mother to send him his father’s plays: “Everyone here is so preoccupied with all things Malorussian that I will try to put them on the theatre.” While living in Nezhin, he was not interested in Malorossiia, but once in St. Petersburg, he began to inundate his family with letters requesting a detailed description of the Malorussian way of life.

The situation changed fundamentally only after the Polish rebellion of 1830. “...Until the Polish rebellion stirred the hearts and minds in Russia,” N. I. Kostomarov wrote, “the idea of two Russian nationalities did not appear in an ominous form and the desire to develop the Malorussian language and literature not only did not scare anyone with the spectre of the state collapse, but the Velikorussians themselves accepted it with brotherly love...”¹

In the field of education, the Imperial University of Kharkov (1803) was established on the basis of Alexander I’s educational reform. Later, the Imperial University of St. Vladimir in Kiev (1834) and the Imperial University of Novorossiysk in Odessa (1865) were established.

In Kharkov the local patriotic nobility, led by the educator Vasily Karazin, initiated the establishment of the university. It was through his efforts that the local gromada raised the money needed to establish the university, and that Emperor Alexander I granted a certificate to this effect.

The establishment of the University of Kharkov happened during a liberal period in Russian history. A printing house was established at the university, which started to publish newspapers and magazines that covered not only social, economic and political issues, but also the historical past of the Ukrainian people and the identity of Malorussian culture. In 1816–1819 the first popular Ukrainian-language magazine

¹ *Kostomarov N. I.* Two Russian Nationalities (Letter to the Editor) // *Os-nova*. St. Petersburg, 1861. No. 3.

“Ukrainian Bulletin” was published in Kharkov. It popularised knowledge of the history, ethnography and geography of Malorossiya. Literary works were also published there. In particular, P. Gulak-Artemovsky’s Ukrainian works were published there. In 1812 the first association of sciences in Ukraine was founded at the University of Kharkov as a prototype of the modern National Academy of Sciences.

After the Polish rebellion in 1830, the famous Polish lyceum at Kremenets was closed. Instead, a university was opened in Kiev. The Minister of National Education, Sergei Uvarov, in his address of welcome on the occasion of the opening of this university described its aims as “the planting of Russian enlightenment and Russian nationality in the Polonised lands of western Rus”. Lyceums appeared in Odessa and Nezhin, a number of gymnasiums and private schools, and a network of primary schools was established. Universities and lyceums also became centres of scholarship, particularly in national history and folklore studies.

In the first half of the 19th century, the Ukrainian National Professional Theatre emerged. I. P. Kotlyarevsky, G. F. Kvitka-Osnovyanenko and the outstanding Russian actor M. S. Shchepkin played a major role in its formation. The great Russian composer M. I. Glinka, the Ukrainian composer and singer S. S. Gulak-Artemovsky (the author of the first Ukrainian opera “A Zaporozhian Beyond the Danube”), composer L. Kh. Vitvitsky and others stood at the origins of Ukrainian national opera. The founder of the realistic direction in Ukrainian painting and graphics was T. G. Shevchenko, a graduate of the St. Petersburg Academy of Arts, the author of “Picturesque Ukraine”, more than 130 portraits, many etchings and engravings, etc.

Other forms of art also reflected the national charm. Many masterpieces of architecture and decorative landscape parks (“Alexandria”, “Sofievka”, etc.) were created. Outstanding architects worked in Ukraine. In particular, the academician V. I. Beretti designed the buildings of the University and the Institute for Noble Maidens in Kiev in the style of classicism and taking into account the local charm. Well-known palaces with parks were built in Baturin (architect C. Cameron) and Sokirintsy (architect P. A. Dubrovsky). The sculptural composition “Samson tearing apart a lion’s mouth” in

Kiev, by an unknown author, symbolised the victory of the Russian peoples in the Battle of Poltava. A sculptural monument in the classicism style was the Monument of Glory in Poltava.

All these facts prove that the myth of Russian colonial oppression of Ukrainians (Malorussians) is untenable. One of the basic ideas of modern Ukrainian historiography is the idea of the enslavement and exploitation of Ukrainians by Russia. It is based on the thesis that in addition to freedom, the Muscovites stole the name of the people from the Ukrainian people and called Ukrainians by the infamous ethnonym “Malorussians”.

Proceeding from this, O. K. Strukevich stated: “...At the beginning of the 19th century Ukrainians were in a state of stateless oppressed ethnos, doomed to a complete loss of their culture and with it their own essence...”¹. In reality, national inequality in the Russian Empire was mainly of a social nature. In comparison to other nationalities, the Malorussians were not particularly discriminated against and were not subjected to religious exclusion at all, being overwhelmingly Orthodox. Ukraine was not a colony within the Russian Empire. The Malorossians had the same rights as the Great Russians. Many Ukrainians were part of the Russian political and cultural elite. We can find brilliant examples of the synthesis of Great Russian and Malorussian cultures.

The claim about Ukraine’s intolerably difficult fate, its discrimination and oppression, first within the Moscow Tsardom (the Russian Empire) and then as part of the USSR, is detached from reality.

“...The new textbooks present Ukraine exclusively as a victim of Russian imperialism, which for more than 300 years has been a colony exploited and oppressed by Muscovites... The new history textbooks do not contain evidence that Ukrainians were as much creators of Russian statehood and culture as the Russians, that one of the authors, in modern parlance, of the Russian Empire project was an associate of Peter I, former rector of the Kiev-Mohyla Academy, Professor F. Prokopovich, that in almost all Russian governments, beginning with Elizabeth Petrovna, Ukrainians played secondary roles. These were the brothers

¹ *Strukevich O. K.* History of Ukraine: Textbook for the 9th grade. K.: Gramota, 2009. P. 14.

Aleksei and Kirill Razumovsky, Kirill's son Aleksei Razumovsky, A. Bezborodko, V. Kochubey... Where else had representatives of the oppressed people such access to government, became chancellors, ministers, senators, major military leaders and other high-ranking officials of the metropolis?... Even greater was the participation of Ukrainians in the creation of all-Russian culture... Even today we cannot divide many figures of history, culture and science between Russia and Ukraine with a sufficient degree of conviction and, most importantly, without prejudice to the historical truth..."¹.

The fate of Malorossiia within the Russian Empire in the first half of the 19th century was greatly influenced by the geopolitical processes of that historical era, the trials and achievements of Russian foreign policy.

As a result of the Russian-Turkish war of 1806–1812 and Russia's victory over the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Bucharest made Bessarabia part of the Russian Empire and liberated the western Russian Transnistrian territories from the Turkish occupation.

In the Napoleonic wars, for geopolitical reasons, there was a unification of the divided parts of the Ukrainian (Malorussian) nation in a common struggle. In the famous Battle of Austerlitz on 2 December 1805, where the combined forces of three empires — the Russian and Austrian armies on one side and the French on the other — reached a total of 160,000 men, the soldiers, recruited in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia, fought against Napoleon together with soldiers and officers born in Dnieper Ukraine.

The population of Malorossiia was most dramatically affected by the events of the Patriotic War of 1812. At the outbreak of war with the Russian Empire, Napoleon viewed Malorossiia as a bridgehead for an offensive from the south. Remembering the historical experience of Mazepa and Orlik, the French government tried to rely on mass anti-Russian sentiment. At the time, there were 132,000 Ukrainians living in St. Petersburg alone, and sentiments in favour of autonomy were spreading among them.

¹ History of Ukraine. From the 6th to the 21st century. / P. P. Tolochko, A. A. Oleynikov [and others]; led by P. P. Tolochko. 2nd ed., updated and revised. K.; M.: Kievan Rus: Kuchkovo Pole, 2018. P. 10–11.

A successful Napoleonic campaign would have resulted in the seizure of Malorossiya from Russia and its division into three military-administrative provinces (the so-called Napolinarias), which would be headed by his marshals. Similar to the Duchy of Warsaw, a plan was devised to restore Ukrainian independence within the borders of its central part as a French protectorate. Turkey was to be given the Crimea and most of Novorossiya, while Austria, subordinate to France, was to be given Volhynia. All these plans were not achieved.

The Austrian corps of Field Marshal K. Schwarzenberg was to act against General A. P. Tormasov's 3rd Russian Left Flank Army, which covered the direction to Kiev. On 22 July 1812 the Austrians, joined by Rainier's Saxon corps, moved on to Volhynia. In early August Napoleon set his right flank groups the task of seizing the Ukraine, simultaneously attacking from the north-west with the Schwarzenberg and Reynier Corps and Polish units, and from the north with the 17th Polish Division and a number of separate units.

However, Russian troops thwarted this plan. On 13 September the joint forces of the 3rd and Danube Armies took the offensive and liberated Volhynia. The garrison of the Babruysk fortress delayed the advance of the 17th Polish Division. All attempts by Napoleon's troops to penetrate the Ukraine were repelled by the Russian army.

Literally on the eve of the war, in June 1812, a cavalry army of four regiments of burghers, landlords, government and rank peasants had been formed on the Right Bank (Kiev and Podolsk governorates). The timing of the formation of these regiments was far ahead of schedule: not in two months, as planned, but in 40 days. They were formed from volunteers and joined Tormasov's army.

Encouraged by this success, Alexander I instructed the Governor-General of Malorossiya Ya. I. Lobanov-Rostovsky to form several regiments on the Left Bank from the descendants of Ukrainian Cossacks, promising to keep them as a permanent Cossack army after the war. Thus, instead of 10 regiments as planned, 15 regiments (9 from Poltava and 6 from Chernigov) of 1200 men each were assembled in a month and sent to Count Gudovich. The regiments were formed on a voluntary basis, and those who joined them were exempted from the tribute, but not from the poll tax. Many prominent figures in Ukraine took part in this movement. For example, the author of *The Aeneid*,

I. P. Kotliarevsky, was awarded a silver medal for the successful recruitment of the Fifth Poltava Regiment. As a result, the Cossack militia ended up with almost 30,000 men.

Moreover, by Alexander I's decree, a militia was formed in Malorossiya in July 1812 to fight the invasion of Napoleon, which confirmed the general patriotic attitude of the citizens of the Russian Empire. "The wives themselves sent their husbands off to war; the mother, holding back tears, blessed her son to defend the Homeland; the old man, forgetting his grey hair, joined the ranks with his young grandson," said the Ukrainian and Russian writer Ye. P. Grebenka, who was only six months old when his father joined the Russian army as a volunteer.

In total, Malorossiya fielded 68,900 warriors and Cossacks, including 33,400 mounted men (without officers and non-commissioned officers).

All attempts by Napoleon at the most dramatic moment of the war to raise a rebellion in Malorossiya failed. On the contrary, the 1st Bug regiment fought as part of Denis Davydov's partisan unit, while the 2nd regiment was with A. Figner. Three Kiev regiments were awarded silver trumpets.

The Malorussian regiments took part in all the battles of the Patriotic War of 1812. They covered the southern regions of Ukraine with large supplies of food, forage and gunpowder, fought at Borodino Field, took part in the Russian army's foreign campaign, in the "Battle of the Nations" at Leipzig and in the assault on Paris.

Russia's success in the Patriotic War and the liberation campaign of the Russian army in Europe confirmed the strength of the Russian patriotic spirit and the superiority of domestic military doctrine. Napoleon's defeat saved the nations from French colonisation and raised Russia's international prestige and authority.

The common victory over the conquerors "...brought together those peoples who had long bound together their historical destinies and spiritual aspirations. Of course, these nations did not include the Poles, who instead took advantage of Napoleon's arrival in Eastern Europe to try to regain their lost independence, and took an active part in his march on Russia. At the same time, Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, people of other nationalities and estates who in peacetime

not only would not communicate and interact with each other, but would never even meet, fought shoulder to shoulder against the French in the Patriotic War of 1812...”¹

The incorporation of the Kingdom of Poland into the Russian Empire at the Congress of Vienna definitively eliminated the danger of Polish revenge and expansion into the Malorussian territories.

However, the hopes of the advanced sections of Russian society for the emancipation of the peasants from serfdom after the defeat of Napoleon were not fulfilled. Similarly illusory were the expectations of M. P. Miklashevsky’s project to “create Cossack regiments in Malorossiya” from the government peasants, numbering up to 42,000 men.

The Malorussian issue, combined with the Polish one, gained particular importance in the political programme and forms of activity of the Decembrists’ organisations in Russia after the Napoleonic wars.

As is well known, the development of anti-monarchist and anti-serfdom sentiments among the Russian nobility manifested itself in the emergence of the Decembrist movement, which after numerous organisational transformations concentrated in the form of two leading societies: Northern in St. Petersburg and Southern in Chernigov.

In Ukraine, in addition to the Southern Society of Decembrists, the “Society of First Concord”, founded by the Borisov brothers, was active. It was founded, according to some sources, in 1818, at the same time as the first Decembrist organisation, the “Union of Welfare”, and was given immediate impetus for development after the rebellion of the Chuguev military settlements (June 1819). In 1823 in Novograd-Volhynsky brothers A. I. and P. I. Borisov and an exiled Polish nobleman Yu. K. Lublinsky founded the “Society of United Slavs”.

The unification of these two organisations of noble revolutionaries was a notable shift in the development of the Decembrist movement. This strengthened the anti-Tsarist movement and gave it a more radical content. The programme of the “Society of United Slavs”, according to some researchers, was the first to give a clear revolutionary

¹ History of Ukraine. From the 6th to the 21st century. / P. P. Tolochko, A. A. Oleynikov [and others]; led by P. P. Tolochko. 2nd ed., updated and revised. K.; M.: Kievan Rus: Kuchkovo Pole, 2018. P. 226–227.

interpretation of the idea of Slavic unity. They believe that by uniting with the Southern Society, the United Slavs enriched its political programme by including in its foreign policy part the task of fighting for a Slavic federation. However, an analysis of Pavel Pestel's "Russian Pravda" as a programme document of the Southern Society confirms that this organisation advocated a unitary structure of the future state, while the principle of equal federation was the basis of Nikita Muravyev's "Constitution" as a programme document of the Decembrists' Northern Society.

In addition, the Decembrists' "Society of Malorussians" was active on the territory of Malorossiia. It is clear from the files of the Commission of Inquiry into the Decembrists that the residence of this organisation was in Borispol and that most of its members were in Chernigov governorate, with some in Chernigov itself¹.

M. P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin was not very favourable to them: the head of the society, V. L. Lukashevich, was "of very bad morals, despised in the governorate, and I have heard that his society is made up of people of his kind"². This was the same Lukashevich who once raised a glass to Napoleon's victory over Russia³. He was one of the most active figures in Decembrist-Malorussian-Polish relations.

In fact, in preparing the coup d'état, the Decembrists were counting on Polish and Malorussian separatism, glossing over their contradiction with each other. It was hoped that if not all of Malorossiia would be returned to Poland, then at first a significant part of it would be. Under the treaty of 1824, the Southern Society encouraged the Poles to take over Volhynia, Minsk, Grodno and parts of Vilna governorates⁴.

During the investigation, Ryleev was asked about the Decembrists' links with Polish secret societies. He pleaded ignorance of the situation, but confessed that he had heard about it from Trubetskoy and Kornilovich, who two days before 14 December had brought Trubetskoy a copy of some agreement between the Poles and the

¹ The Decembrist Revolt: Materials. Vol. IX. P. 41.

² Ibid.

³ Kievskaya Starina. 1903. No. 12. P. 137; *Semevsky V. I.* Political and Social Ideas of the Decembrists. St. Petersburg, 1909. P. 302.

⁴ The Decembrist Revolt: Materials. Vol. IX. P. 72.

Southern Society of the Decembrists concerning the future Russian-Polish borders. He heard from Trubetskoy that “the Southern Society, through one of its members, had constant relations with the Poles, that it was the duty of the Southern directors to recognise the independence of Poland and to return to it from Russia the provinces of Lithuania, Podolia and Volhynia which had been conquered”¹.

But the main Polish aspirations were connected with the Ukrainian autonomist movement. According to S. G. Volkonsky, the Poles had “great hope for the assistance of the Malorussian nobility, offering them the separation of ‘Malorossia from Russia’”².

During one of the interrogations Bestuzhev testified that Lukashevich “addressed Khodkevich, believing him to be an important member of the Polish society, offering to join it and to unite Malorossiya with Poland”³.

This raises the reasonable question of how the Decembrist conspirators intended to present to Malorussian society the expediency of restoring Polish colonisation and the re-subordination of Malorossia to a revived Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

There is also no doubt that the Decembrists adopted a view of Malorossiya as a victim of tsarist tyranny and of Cossack leaders as fighters and martyrs for freedom. The names of Petr Doroshenko, Ivan Mazepa and Pavel Polubotok were associated with the cause of national liberation. Their figures were shrouded in a veil of romance and as such were presented to the intellectual public and later generations. “I do not know how Ryleev’s Confession of Nalivaiko ended up in my hands,” the leader of the terrorist “Narodnaya Volya”, Vera Zasulich, later wrote in her memoirs, “but it became the most sacred thing for me”⁴.

Russian revolutionary intellectuals’ attitude towards separatism followed not that of A. S. Pushkin, who wrote the poem “To the Slanderers of Russia” after the Polish rebellion of 1830, but that

¹ The Decembrist Revolt: Materials. Vol. I. P. 80.

² *Semevsky V. I.* Political and Social Ideas of the Decembrists. St. Petersburg, 1909. P. 300.

³ The Decembrist Revolt: Materials. Vol. IX. P. 40, 62.

⁴ The Past. 1919. XIV. P. 94.

of K. Ryleev, who composed such poems as “The Confession of Nalivaiko”, “Bogdan Khmelnytsky”, “Voynarovsky” and “Mazepa”. “Ukrainophilia”, which meant love not for the people of Malorossiya, but for the Cossack front, became an obligatory feature of the Russian liberation movement for most of the 19th century.

Some time after the defeat of the Decembrist movement in Ukraine a number of secret societies arose which advocated the abolition of autocracy and serfdom: the Kiev Secret Youth Circle, the Malorussian Secret Society, and the Kharkov Circle of Ukrainian Youth.

The activities of the secret Cyril and Methodius Society (1846–1847), based in Kiev and named after the Slavic enlighteners Cyril and Methodius, became nationally renowned. The social composition of the society differed from that of the Decembrists’ circles, being diverse rather than noble. Formally continuing the ideas of the Decembrists’ Society of United Slavs, the Cyril and Methodius Society put forward a programme for the liberation of all Slavic peoples, followed by the creation of a federation of equal states. T.G. Shevchenko, N. I. Kostomarov, N. I. Gulak, V. M. Belozersky, P. A. Kulish and others were active participants in the society.

The political role of these leaders was greatly questioned by a prominent socialist and Ukrainophile figure such as M. P. Dragomanov. Shevchenko seemed to him to be a bloated figure in the literary and political sense. He did not rate his revolutionariness highly and would never subscribe to the combination of the words “revolutionary and thinker”. He believed that Taras Grigorievich was in the worst position as a thinker¹.

In the first half of the 19th century, a lively debate about the historical past developed in Malorossiya, and camps of public thought and movements began to form on this basis. Against the background of the “Cossack fashion” and the enthusiasm for folklore, there was a need for a serious study of history. The aforementioned O. Bodyansky was at the time head of the magazine “Readings in the Imperial Society of Russian History and Antiquities”. It was there that he first published the Cossack Chronicle of Samovidets, the Rigelman and Simonovsky

¹ *Ulyanov Nikolai*. Origins of Ukrainian Separatism. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2017. P. 182.

chronicles, and other important sources on Ukrainian history. Bodyansky's commentary was in the spirit of Cossack Romanticism.

The emergence of the "History of the Rus" caused a considerable public outcry. There are still debates in historiography as to when and where it was created, and especially as to its authorship. It is suggested that the "History of the Rus" was written in a circle of the Chernigov nobility leader Stepan Shiray in Starodub. Other likely authors of this work include Malorussian social leaders Grigory Poletika, Vasily Poletika, Opanas Lobosevich, Aleksandr Bezborodko.

For many decades, the "History of the Rus" was not published, but it was distributed in handwritten copies throughout Ukraine and Russia. We do not know the exact date of its appearance, but it can be assumed that it was compiled around 1810, against the background of the constitutional dreams of Alexander I and M. M. Speransky at the time. In any case, the "History of the Rus" began to be distributed before 1825.

It was distributed in a large number of copies throughout Russia and was known to Pushkin, Gogol, Ryleev, Maksimovich, and later to Shevchenko, Kostomarov, Kulish, and many others, influencing their work: some of them were inspired, while others were alarmed. The "History of the Rus" was published only in 1846. It was more a political treatise than a scholarly work. Its main point is the apologetics and idealisation of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. It stressed that the Ukrainian nation originated, existed and developed separately from the Russian one. At the same time it was argued that Little Russia, and not the Moscow (Russian) Empire, was the direct heir of Kievan Rus.

The author wrote that in contrast to the freedom-loving Ukrainians, "the people of Moscow are dominated by slavery and servitude in the highest degree ... men, according to their thoughts, were brought into the world, as if to have nothing in it, but to be slaves"¹.

In contrast to this approach, D. N. Bantysh-Kamensky wrote a 4-volume "History of Little Russia" in 1822. The son of a famous archivist, Senator Teplov, he gave up a diplomatic career and, as the author of several historical and biographical works, went to Poltava, where he served under the Malorussian governor, Prince Repnin,

¹ History of the Rus. M., 1846. P. 98.

formally as head of his chancellery and actually as a researcher and author.

Drawing on convincing archival material, carefully documenting his work, D. N. Bantysh-Kamensky defended the concept that Ukrainians were only part of the Russian people, and thus managed to gain the support of many Malorussian nobles. His concept culminated in a description of the act of reuniting Little Russia with Greater Russia.

Thus, the social movement in Malorossiya and Novorossiya reflected fundamental changes in its economy and the social composition of its population, characteristic of the crisis of the serf system of the Russian Empire in the second quarter of the 19th century. The remarkable development of agriculture and industry, the reclamation of new lands on the Black Sea coast and the opening of promising trade routes directed the enriched ruling classes towards a stiffening of the serf system.

The key event of Russian Empire's foreign policy in the second half of the 19th century was the Crimean war of 1853-

1856, which to some extent influenced the development of Malorossiya, and to the maximum extent — the destiny of Novorossiya. As is well known, this war arose out of a clash between Russian geopolitical interests and the expansionist actions of England and France, which provoked Turkey's revanchist activities.

The dramatically unfolding military events demonstrated a fundamental contradiction in Russian reality at the time. On the one hand, there was the high patriotic spirit of the society and the military genius of its leading commanders: Nakhimov, Kornilov, Istomin; on the other hand, there was Russia's technical and economic backwardness compared with the leading Western countries, and its foreign policy isolation resulting from certain diplomatic miscalculations.

As is known, the main theatre of military operations of the Crimean War in its second stage (1854–1855) was the Azov-Black Sea region where the coalition forces of England, France and Turkey were opposed by the Russian army which was joined by the Azov Cossackdom created in 1837. The enemy navy controlled the whole basin of the Black Sea. Members of the anti-Russian coalition planned to land an amphibious

assault on the shores of the Sea of Azov with the aim of completely isolating Crimea.

Through the cities of Taganrog and Mariupol, Russian troops were supplied with cannons and shells from the Lugansk Ironworks. Between 1853 and 1855 the production of shells there increased more than ninefold. Donbas-made guns were installed in the bastions of Sevastopol, turning them into impregnable fortresses.

The Crimean War, despite the courage and heroism of its Russian participants, ended in shameful defeat for Russia. Its negative consequences were particularly severe for the western territories of the Russian Empire. In accordance with the Treaty of Paris, the mouth of the Danube was handed over to the Ottoman Empire. Russia temporarily lost the Black Sea Fleet and was imposed the disadvantageous principle of neutralising the Black Sea.

Russia's inglorious defeat in the Crimean War motivated a thorough modernisation of its social and economic system in the form of systemic reforms of the 1860s and 1870s.

Despite its inconsistency and half-heartedness, the peasant reform led to significant changes in agriculture, which was gradually becoming capitalist. After the abolition of serfdom in the 1860s, land gradually became a free commodity in the structure of agriculture and was redistributed among the estates.

For Malorossiya, which, thanks to its magnificent black earth, yielded 68 % of the wheat of European Russia, the land issue had always been of particular importance. As a result of the reform, peasants who became owners of their new land parcels lost 15 % of the total area of land previously used by them. The average land parcel of a peasant in the Malorussian governorates was 4.5 desyatinas.

"...The land reform dealt a particularly heavy blow to noblemen's land ownership, which from 1887 to 1905 lost about half of its area in the three 'Donbas districts' of Yekaterinoslav governorate alone. The hopes of some local nobility for the intercession of the authorities and the introduction of artificial mechanisms to protect landlords from bankruptcy were unsuccessful..."¹.

¹ History of the Donbas from Antiquity to the Present: Textbook / S. N. Abukov and others; led by L. G. Shechepko, V. N. Nikolsky. Donetsk: DonNU, 2018. P. 275.

At the same time, after the personal liberation of the peasants and their allotment of land, numerous and burdensome vestiges of serfdom persisted, which were particularly painful in Malorossiia and Novorossiia. The peasants were subject to redemption payments, which they had to pay to the state for the land they had received under the reform. Peasants' land parcels often did not provide a living wage, forcing peasants in all regions of Russia to rent land from landlords for money ("izdolshchina") or to work it off ("ispolshchina"). With low yields and extensive agricultural production, this did not generate sufficient income. There was a rapid process of social stratification. While some peasants not only rented but also bought land as property, others were turned into labourers or left for the cities.

Another important reform was the creation of zemstvos (they were not introduced on the Right Bank for fear of increasing the influence of the Polish nobility). Schools, hospitals, roads, post offices and statistics were transferred under the jurisdiction of the zemstvos. This created the conditions for rural Malorussian intellectuals to organise primary education. In St. Petersburg, the Malorussian community organised the publication of "folk books" and school textbooks.

In 1864 a military reform was carried out which established conscription for all classes. To implement it, the Kiev and Odessa military districts were created in Malorossiia.

The reform of 1861 was a turning point in the development of industry in Russia, including Malorossiia and Novorossiia. It created the conditions for the more rapid development of industrial capitalism. The abolition of serfdom paved the way for the modernisation and industrialisation of the economy, the pace of which was extremely rapid, "...especially in Ukraine in the 1890s, when whole industries sprang up in a few years. It should be noted that Ukraine, primarily the southern part, while playing a prominent role in this process, was nevertheless dependent on the results achieved by the whole of Russia. It should be noted that only a radical change in the centre made it possible to settle and industrialise the south quickly, widely and in an American way. The emancipation of peasants and the influx of workers from Russia transformed the

south and south-east of Ukraine into a rapidly developing region of the country...”¹.

The Donetsk coal basin and the Krivoy Rog iron ore basin were developed. They formed the industrial areas of the Donbas and Krivbas.

Already in the late 1860s and especially in the early 1870s, there was an industrial boom in the Donbas. Mines such as the state-owned Lisichansk mine, the Korsun mine and the Golubovskaya mine were rapidly rebuilt, and new coal mines and joint-stock companies with foreign capital were set up. The coal industry in the Donets Basin developed particularly rapidly during the industrial boom of the 1890s. In 1900, 671 million poods of coal were mined in the Donbas, which was more than $\frac{2}{3}$ of Russian coal production. Almost all coke production was also concentrated there.

At the turn of the 1860s and 1870s, the construction of metallurgical plants in southern Russia began. A British capitalist, John Hughes, started building one in the Donbas. The settlement, which sprang up at the plant in 1869, was called Yuzovka (now Donetsk). The development of the rich deposits in the Krivoy Rog basin and its connection by rail with the Donetsk coal basin were of great importance for the development of the metallurgical industry. Over 40 years, the iron ore industry in Krivoy Rog increased its output 156-fold.

The booming railway construction had a major impact on the development of all industries, the movement of the labour force, the growth of the domestic market, the blossoming of cities and the emergence of workers' settlements. From the end of 1860s to the beginning of 1870s such railway lines as Kursko-Kharkovsko-Azovskaya (1861), Odessko-Baltskaya (1865), Kozlovo-Voronezhsko-Rostovskaya (1868–1871), Konstantinovskaya (1872), Kievo-Brestskaya (1873) and Donetskaya (Coal) (1874) were built. In 1884 the Catherine railway was built. Coal mines, factories and workshops began to spring up around the railway stations of Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Konstantinovka, Gorlovka, Khartsyzsk, Ilovaisk, Amvrosievka and Debaltsevo, and factory settlements grew up.

¹ History of Ukraine. From the 6th to the 21st century. / P. P. Tolochko, A. A. Oleynikov [and others]; led by P. P. Tolochko. 2nd ed., updated and revised. K.; M.: Kievan Rus: Kuchkovo Pole, 2018. P. 231–232.

The construction of the Donetsk coal road is linked to the famous Russian industrialist Savva Mamontov. He invested his own money in the project and sold the road to the state in 1890. Thanks to the active improvement of transport infrastructure almost all cities and settlements in the Donbas were well connected, and the railway became an important factor in attracting foreign investment to the region¹.

In the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, during the industrialisation of the Donbas, its regional integrity was formed.

The second migration wave led to a sharp increase in the population. The Donbas became Russia's largest industrial centre with a population of 1 million people and became the main part of the new Donetsk-Krivoy Rog industrial region, uniting a large part of Novorossiia into a single entity.

“The peculiarities of industrialisation in the Donbas compared to other Russian regions were the rapid pace, advanced technological level, high role of private capital, private initiative combined with public policy, reliance on heavy industry, rapid population growth due to migration of wage labour and rapid urbanisation”².

In the second half of the 19th century, the Donbas became one of Russia's driving forces in industrial development: an advanced industry and technology, a working class, and a technical intellectual community were formed there. A large proportion of the latter were second-generation mine and factory owners who were technically educated. Generally, they inherited seats on boards and councils: D.A. Alchevsky, M.L. Uspensky, D.I. Illovaytsky. A significant percentage of the top managers were technical intellectuals, mainly mining engineers, who became quite influential over time. These included F.I. Yenakiev, P.N. Gorlov, A.F. Mevius, N.S. Avdakov, I.P. Bardin, L.I. Lutugin, M.K. Kurako and others. Many settlements are named after them.

¹ History of the Donbas from Antiquity to the Present: Textbook / S.N. Abukov and others; led by L.G. Shchepko, V.N. Nikolsky. Donetsk: DonNU, 2018. P. 281.

² *Bespalova S. V., Bobrovsky A. S., Kolesnik A. V. and others.* Russian Donbass: Historical, Spiritual-Intellectual and Economic Foundations. Donetsk: DonNU, 2021. P. 31–32.

During the last two decades of the 19th century, 17 large (by the standards of that time) metallurgical plants were built in the Yekaterinoslav and Kherson governorates, which produced 91.9 million poods of cast iron.

Large steam locomotive factories were built in Kharkov and Lugansk. In 1882, Lugansk factory and the village of Kamenny Brod were united to form the city of Lugansk.

Agricultural engineering factories played an increasingly important role in the economy, producing more than half of all agricultural machinery produced in European Russia, including the Kingdom of Poland, as early as the 1890s. As before, the southern governorates — Yekaterinoslav, Taurida and Kherson — were ahead of the rest in this area.

The growth of capitalism in Malorossiia and Novorossiia led to the formation of about 130 cities by the end of the 19th century. In total, the number of workers in industry, crafts and agriculture reached 2.5 million in Ukraine in 1900¹.

The 1860s in the Russian Empire proved to be a period of liberal concessions and therefore a time of national awakening for peoples who had developed a strong national consciousness. The centre of the Malorussian spirit moved to St. Petersburg. Shevchenko, Kulish and Kostomarov returned there after their exile. Malorussian philanthropists V. Tarnovsky and G. Galagan founded there a Malorussian printing house, which published Kulish's works "Notes about Southern Rus" and "The Black Rada", as well as works by T. Shevchenko and I. Kotlyarevsky. In 1861–1862 the magazine "Osнова" was published in St. Petersburg. It published for the first time over 70 of Shevchenko's works, numerous memoirs and valuable documents on the history of Malorossiia.

At the time Kostomarov wrote: "...We would like the government not only not to prevent us, Ukrainians, from developing our language, but to assist us in this work and to order that schools, which — as it has

¹ See: Development of Capitalism in Ukraine in the 2nd Half of the 19th Century [website]. URL: <http://histua.com/ru/knigi/istoriya-ukrainy-ot-drevnejshih-vremen/rozvitok-kapitalizmu-vukraini-v-p-j-polovini-xix-st> (accessed: 19/09/2022).

already announced itself — will be opened for our people, the subjects to be taught in our native language, understandable for people, not in official Velikorussian...”.

In the 1860s, a mass gromada movement also began and became the basis for the Ukrainophile social movement.

In Kiev, at the end of the 1850s, the first Ukrainian gromada (public association) was created, calling for people to devote all their energies to the development of self-awareness. The members of the gromada movement believed that all Slavic brothers should be treated with friendliness and be helped in their struggle. They proclaimed solidarity with the ideas of the progressive Russian intellectuals. The Gromads had no political agenda and were not supporters of terror.

A radical wing of *chłopomania* developed within the gromada movement. More often they were students, demonstrating their unity with the people. The Chłopomans dressed up in national costumes, went to the villages, collected folk songs, and organised rural education. This was similar in form to the “going to the people” undertaken in Russia by the revolutionary Narodniks in the 1870s.

Many were wary of the behaviour of the Chłopomans, especially the Polish nobility on the Right Bank. The Chłopomans were soon put under police surveillance, unjustly accused of taking part in the Polish rebellion of 1863–1864, and their activities were discontinued.

The second strand of the gromada movement was of a cultural and educational nature. The leader of this strand was Kostomarov. Its participants opened schools, libraries and gave public lectures. The trustee of the Kiev district at the time was the eminent Russian physician N. I. Pirogov, who supported the initiatives of the Gromads. Pirogov was not only noted for his religious tolerance, but also for his respect for all the peoples of his district.

At the very beginning of his reign, Emperor Alexander II was sympathetic to the moderate proposals of the Ukrainophiles for the spread of the Ukrainian language. Sometimes this led to curiosities.

In 1861, the idea of printing official state documents in Malorussian appeared, and the first such experience was to be the Manifesto of 19 February on the Emancipation of the Peasants. The initiative came from P. Kulish and was welcomed at the highest levels. On 15 March 1861 permission was granted for the translation. But when the translation

was made and submitted to the State Council for approval a month later, it was not deemed possible to accept it. Kulish had a scandalous case of translating the Bible even before this with his famous “Khai doofae Srul na Pan” (May Israel trust in the Lord). Then, in translating the manifesto, the total absence of state-political terminology in the Malorussian language became apparent. The Ukrainophile elite had to compose it in a hurry. It was composed by introducing Polonisms, or by deliberately misspelling Russian words. The result was not only linguistic ugliness, but also a text that the Malorussian peasant could not understand at all, at least less understandable than ordinary Russian. Later published in the *Kievan Starina*, it served as humorous material.

But when in 1862 the Petersburg Literacy Committee petitioned for the introduction of teaching in the local dialect in public schools in Malorossiya, it was accepted for consideration, and the Minister of National Education A. V. Golovnin himself supported it. He strongly opposed the ban on the use of the Ukrainian language. He wrote that “...the effort of literary men to treat grammatically every language or dialect and to write and print in it is very useful for public education and deserves full respect”. He pointed out that if “books written in the Malorussian language are used as a tool for anti-religious and political propaganda, then the censorship is obliged to ban such books, but ban them for the thoughts they contain and not for the language in which they are written”. In all likelihood, the project would have been approved had it not been for the outbreak of the Polish rebellion, which alarmed the government and social circles.

It turned out that the insurgents were banking on Malorussian separatism and on fomenting peasant agrarian unrest in southern Russia by means of propaganda leaflets and proclamations in vernacular. And it was noted that some Ukrainophiles willingly cooperated with the Poles in the distribution of such leaflets. Papers found during searches of the Polish ringleaders revealed direct links between the Ukrainian nationalists and the rebellion. The case of Potebnya, a cousin of the famous linguist, who joined the rebels, is well known¹.

¹ *Ulyanov Nikolai*. Origins of Ukrainian Separatism. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2017. P. 224.

At the height of the Polish rebellion in 1863, the Tsarist government saw the Malorussian national movement as a threat. At the same time, St. Petersburg proceeded on the basis of maintaining control over the internal political situation on the Right Bank, fearing Polish influence in the region. In 1863, the Kiev Censorship Committee initiated to distribute a decree by P. A. Valuyev, who was in charge of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, stating that “only works in Malorussian language, which belong to the sphere of fine literature, should be allowed to be printed”. The censorship of “books in that language of religious content, educational and generally intended for initial reading by the people” was suspended until further notice.

The decree, although given in secret only to a certain authority, was highly approved by Emperor Alexander II. “There was not, is not and cannot be any separate Malorussian language”, the document declared. There was only the Malorussian dialect used by commoners, which was nothing more than the Russian language, corrupted by the Poles. Attempts to create a “Ukrainian language”, to translate the New Testament into it, etc. were seen as “a generated desire to isolate the Ukrainian language and to allow the local people to do without the use of the all-Russian language”.

It was stressed that “this phenomenon is all the more regrettable and deserves attention as it coincides with the political intentions of the Poles and hardly owes its origins to them”. However, ironically, the concept of Ukrainian as a corrupted Russian language was widespread among the Poles, who, after declaring the restoration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within the borders of 1772 as their goal, reacted strongly to the Ukrainian autonomy claims¹.

After the suppression of the Polish rebellion, the government began a policy of active Russification. The lack of printed publications in Ukrainian made the task of Russification easier. In this regard, Kostomarov wrote to I. S. Aksakov: “Deep in the soul of every thinking and intelligent Ukrainian there is a sleeping Vygovsky, Doroshenko and Mazepa — and they will wake up when the time is right”.

¹ *Danilevsky I., Tairova T., Shubin A. Mironenko V. History of Ukraine. 2nd ed., updated and revised. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 274–275.*

At the end of the 1860s, the revival of gromadas as organisational centres of Ukrainophilia began in Kiev, Poltava, Chernigov and other cities. The entry into the gromadas was not advertised and the meetings were held in secret. The gromadas did mostly scientific and publishing work. The meetings discussed general political and theoretical problems of the national movement.

The fact is that, at its best, Ukrainophilia had so few followers and was such a subtle phenomenon that sometimes it drove its leaders to despair. The common people had absolutely nothing to do with it, and 99 % of intellectuals had a negative attitude; they saw it as “fashion” — an outward imitation of Provençal, Irish, Norwegian separatism, either foolishness or a peculiar form of liberal-revolutionary movement¹.

Indeed, the gromadas at the time were heterogeneous in their ideological and political attitudes. The liberal wing was led by historian, archaeologist and ethnographer V. Antonovich. In January

1873 together with like-minded people he founded the “Historical Society of Nestor the Chronicler” at St. Vladimir’s University in Kiev. The meetings and publications of the association focused on the history and archaeology of Malorossiia.

The radical current of Ukrainophilia at the time was centred around the South-Western Branch of the Imperial Geographical Society, also founded in 1873. The Society had 200 members, who undertook a comprehensive study of their native land. Its active participants included the publicist M. Dragomanov, historian A. Lazarevsky and ethnographer P. Chubinsky. Under this organisation, Dragomanov published a collection of Ukrainian fairy tales, Lazarevsky published a series of articles on the history of the Cossack noble families, and Chubinsky produced an extensive work on the ethnography of the Right Bank.

In 1874 the society held the 3rd All-Russian Archaeological Congress in Kiev, which called for the opening of archaeological museums and the study of ancient monuments.

Beginning in 1859 the “Kiev Telegraph” newspaper was published with a “Literary Supplement”. Over time, it actually became the

¹ *Ulyanov Nikolai*. *Origins of Ukrainian Separatism*. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2017. P. 235.

printed organ of radical Ukrainophiles. It gradually supplanted literary and historical publications with articles on topical political issues, such as proposals for a federal structure of Russia with extensive autonomy for Ukraine.

Such ideas sparked a public controversy that turned into a political struggle. In particular, the Poltava landowner M. Yuzevovich accused the authors of wanting Ukraine to be a republic headed by a hetman and called the newspaper itself an organ of separatists.

A special commission was set up “to put an end to Ukrainophile propaganda”, the result of which was the Ems Decree of 1876, which continued the tradition of Valuyev’s decrees of 1863. It banned the South-Western Geographical Society and closed the “Kiev Telegraph” newspaper. The preservation of the “Malorussian dialect” was seen as a potential threat to Ukraine’s secession from Russia.

It provided for restrictions on the importation, printing and publishing of literature in the territory of the empire in the Malorussian dialect (Ukrainian); it prohibited the staging of performances, the use of texts for sheet music and public lectures “having the character of Ukrainophile manifestations” in the Ukrainian language. An exception was allowed for “historical documents and works of fine literature”. The Ukrainian language was not allowed to be taught in primary school¹.

No sooner had the decree been published than its gradual annulment began. The Kiev and Kharkov administrations themselves have raised with the government the issue of the unnecessary and inappropriate bans.

Although formally and officially all restrictions on the Ukrainian press fell away only in 1905, in fact they were not respected from the start.

Despite the uproar over the decree of 1876, it was no blow to the Ukrainian movement. In practice it was hardly respected. The performances were staged under the noses of the police without any permission, flyers and leaflets were printed with the full connivance of the authorities. A certain Taras Novak talked to Sofia Vitalyevna

¹ The Ems Decree [website]. URL: <http://www.opocuu.com/emskiy-ukaz.htm> (accessed: 19.02.2022).

Tobilevich, Karpenko-Kary's elderly widow, who recalled with delight the tour of the Kropivnitsky theatre in 1941 just as the years of "reaction" were in full swing. The theatre was welcomed throughout Russia, especially in Moscow and St. Petersburg. He was invited to court at Tsarskoye Selo, where Emperor Alexander III himself paid all sorts of compliments to the actors. When Kropivnitsky complained to one of the Grand Princes about the Governor-General of Kiev not allowing (in execution of a decree) performances of the theatre in Kiev, the Grand Prince calmed down: he would talk to the Minister of Internal Affairs about "this old fool". After that, there were no obstacles anywhere¹.

The 1876 decree thus had the opposite effect. In this radical form it firstly compromised the imperial regime and secondly, it created a martyr's crown for radical Ukrainophiles.

The over-politicisation of the Ukrainian language as an instrument of separatism had no real basis at the time. Ukrainians studied in all-Russian schools, read Russian books and received Russian education.

Moreover, Malorussian social and political propaganda in that era could rely not on Ukrainian, but only on Russian, a fact acknowledged by the leader of the radical Ukrainophiles Dragomanov. "I can safely say," he said afterwards, "no Moscow Slavophile has distributed as many Moscow books in Austria as I, a 'Ukrainian separatist'." With the primary aim of socialist propaganda and education, and without being a narrow nationalist, he understood in which language the most successful results in this direction could be achieved. In 1893, he drew his Dnieper readers' attention to the fact that the Moscowphiles were invariably outvoted in all elections to the Sejm and the Reichstag².

M. P. Dragomanov urged caution in "romantic" attempts to limit the teaching of the Ukrainian language exclusively: "As long as we do not have a scientific grammar and a scientific dictionary of our language, until then it will not be decided whether this language is as independent in relation to the Russian language... as, for example, Italian (or Provençal) in relation to French... And if it is not clear

¹ *Ulyanov Nikolai*. *Origins of Ukrainian Separatism*. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2017. P. 224.

² *Ibid.* P. 242.

what our scientific language is, is it not timely to wish that the state authorities introduce it in schools, not only in the basic, but also in universities in Kiev and Kharkov, as one of our and Galician peoples wrote pitifully about it”¹. His wish for a scientific elaboration of the Ukrainian language was greatly realised later by Boris Grinchenko, who edited the first fundamental “Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language” in 1907–1909 and for which material was collected for many years by the editorial board of the magazine “Kievan Starina”.

After the decree of 1876, the Ukrainophiles were removed from the political scene in Russia. Lazarevsky and Antonovich concentrated on scholarly activities and launched the magazine “Kievan Starina” in 1882, which played a part in the awakening of national consciousness.

Dragomanov and Podolinsky emigrated and founded the magazine “Gromada” in Geneva. Dragomanov’s programme envisaged granting autonomous rights to the Kiev, Odessa and Kharkov regions. He was an advocate of socialist ideas in the form of a federation of workers and agricultural gromadas.

The place of the Ukrainophile enlighteners was taken by the Malorussian nationalist extremists. They developed a model of political Ukrainism as an anti-Russian ideological concept. The Ukrainian national project began to be developed as an ideological weapon against Russia, with strong support from Poland and Austria-Hungary. The main theorist of this project was Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who published the “History of Ukraine-Rus” in Lvov and developed an anti-scientific concept of Ukraine’s historical past. The work “Ukrainism in Russia. Its needs and demands” was published. Political Ukrainism was criticised by Malorussian intellectuals. N. I. Kostomarov’s opinion: political nationalism is an anti-people affair that destroys and distorts the spiritual image of the people.

Eventually, radical Ukrainian nationalism was transformed into chauvinism with a pronounced Russophobia.

In 1882 a book by a certain Bestronny, “Przestroga Historii” (Prevention of History), was published in Lvov, in which he descended

¹ *Dragomanov M. P.* Intermission from the History of Ukrainophilia // *M. P. Dragomanov. Selected writings.* K., 1991. P. 229.

into exclusive Ukrainian nationalism: “If we are talking about Ukraine, we must operate with one word — hatred for its enemies... Rebirth of Ukraine is synonymous with hatred for one’s wife the Muscovite, for one’s children the katsaps, for one’s brothers and sisters the katsaps, for one’s father and mother the katsaps. Loving Ukraine means sacrificing your katsapian kin”¹.

The Malorussian nationalists, despite their long-standing antipathy to Poland, became diligent disciples of them. Polish nationalism became a model for the most petty imitation, to the point that P. P. Chubinsky’s hymn

“Shche ne vmerla Ukraina” was a blatant imitation of the Polish “Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła”.

At the end of the 19th century, a new wave of the gromada movement completed its move into the political camp of extreme nationalism. The “Brotherhood of Tarasovs” emerged, which set itself the task of realising the poet’s main ideas. This organisation used exclusively illegal forms of activity and adopted its own policy document, the “Young Ukrainians’ Creed”. They stated their disagreement with traditional Ukrainophiles because of their association with Russian culture and their attempts to become cosmopolitans. The Tarasovs advocated demonstrative Ukrainisation: speaking only Ukrainian, pushing for the introduction of the language in schools, and educating children in the Ukrainian spirit. In 1893 mass arrests of the Tarasovs took place and the organisation ceased to exist.

In 1898 an illegal congress of representatives of all the student gromadas was convened. In 1900 students in Kharkov formed the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, which stood up for national rights, political independence and social revolution in Ukraine.

The general tendency that emerged during the previous period continued in the development of Ukrainian culture in the second half of the 19th century. It consisted in the integration of Velikorussian and Malorussian spirituality in two main directions: the inclusion of representatives of Malorossiia and Novorossiia in the common Russian cultural process, and also the appeal of Velikorussian authors

¹ Ukrainska Khata. 1912. VI. P. 350.

to Ukrainian subjects, which evoked a response and empathy of a wide Russian public.

Social and economic changes required a modernisation of the education system. By the end of the 19th century there were 129 gymnasiums, 19 non-classical secondary schools and 17 commercial schools in Malorossiia and Novorossiia. Specialists were trained at the Universities of Kiev, Kharkov and Novorossiysk (Odessa), opened in 1865 on N. Pirogov's initiative. The industrial revolution at the end of the 19th century led to the establishment of the Kharkov Technological and Veterinary Institutes, the Kiev Polytechnic and Commercial Institute, the Yekaterinoslav Higher School of Mining, and the Nezhin History and Philology Institute. In Galicia and Volhynia, the University of Lvov, the Lvov Polytechnic Institute and the University of Chernovtsy were active.

The works of the Kiev researcher of the new algebraic theory M. E. Vashchenko-Zakharchenko became famous in Russia and abroad. A graduate of the University of Odessa, S. P. Yaroshenko discovered the then-new projective geometry. Astronomer at the University of Kiev V. S. Bredikhin was the creator of the theory of the origin of meteorite streams of comets. The opening of the Department of Theoretical Physics at the University of Kiev in 1884 was an important event. The societies of naturalists and societies of physics and mathematics founded in Kiev, Kharkov and Odessa played a major role in the development of science.

Many well-known Russian and Ukrainian scientists were working in Ukraine at the time. These included the mathematician A. N. Lyapunov, the economists Tadey Rylsky and Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky, the chemists M. M. Beketov and S. R. Reformatsky, embryologist A. A. Kovalevsky. Microbiology made a particularly big step forward thanks to the tireless work of I. I. Mechnikov and his disciple N. Gamaleya. In 1886, they set up the world's second (after Pasteur's in Paris) bacteriological station in Odessa, where they carried out experiments against such epidemic diseases as plague, cholera, typhus, rabies and consumption. They were the first to introduce inoculations against these diseases. At the same Novorussian (Odessa) University in 1871–1876 I. Sechenov, founder of the Russian physiological school, headed the laboratory.

A whole epoch in the history of Malorussian and Russian literature was created by Ivan Franko. He was a poet (From Peaks and Lowlands, Withered Leaves), writer, translator, playwright, and literary scholar. The complete works of Ivan Franko number fifty volumes. Another prominent poet and public figure Lesya Ukrainka (Larysa Kosach) composed poetry collections “On the Wings of Songs”, “Thoughts and Dreams”, and “Reviews”.

The origins of a new, realistic domestic theatre were given by an amateur company of playwright I. K. Tobilevich (Karpenko-Kary), which acted in 1874–1876 in Yelizavetgrad. The Ukrainian theatre was finally formed in 1882 when Marko Kropivnitsky, Mikhail Staritsky and Maria Zankovetskaya joined the company.

The rich Ukrainian song and epic folklore attracted both Malorussian and Russian composers. For example, the Ukrainian theme (based on the works of N. V. Gogol) was reflected in operas by P. I. Tchaikovsky (“Cherevichki”), M. P. Mussorgsky (“The Fair at Sorochyntsi”) and N. A. Rimsky-Korsakov (“May Night”, “Christmas Eve”). In 1863 the first Ukrainian opera, “A Zaporozhian Beyond the Danube”, premiered in St. Petersburg and told the story of the Cossacks’ aspirations to return from the Danube to their native Ukraine. The libretto and music were written by S. S. Gulak-Artemovsly, a disciple of M. I. Glinka.

The most popular Ukrainian composer and founder of the newest national music was Nikolai Vitalievich Lysenko, who gained worldwide fame with his works. He wrote such operas as “Taras Bulba”, “Christmas Night”, “The Drowned Woman”, and “Natalka Poltavka”, as well as operas for children — “Koza-Dereza”, “Pan Kotsky”, and “Winter and Spring”.

A lot of paintings on the Ukrainian theme were created by I. Ye. Repin, who was born and grew up in Ukraine, in Chuguev, Kharkov region. These are, above all, such paintings as “Vechernitsy”, “Reply of the Zaporozhian Cossacks”, “Gopak” and a portrait of T. G. Shevchenko. With his encouragement, Nikolai Murashko founded the Drawing School in 1875 in Kiev, which became a training centre for professional artists. Apart from Repin, other natives of Ukraine became famous in the Association of Artists-Peredvizhniki: N. Yaroshenko (“Prisoner”, “Girl Student”), A. Kuindzhi (“Landscape”).

In the field of sculpture, the opening of a monument to hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky in Kiev in 1888 was an outstanding event. The author of the project was the sculptor M. Mikeshin, the creator of the monument to the 1,000th anniversary of Russia in Veliky Novgorod. The monument to B. Khmelnytsky reads: "From the great, united and indivisible Russia".

Chapter 8

SOUTHWESTERN RUSSIA AND GALICIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 20th CENTURY

Southwestern Russia (Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, Volyn and other provinces) at the beginning of the 20th century — one of the rapidly developing regions of the Russian Empire. The population was constantly increasing, the industrial potential and transport infrastructure were developing, and the well-being of the inhabitants was growing. First of all, this concerned Little Russia and New Russia, which experienced rapid industrial growth accompanied by urbanization.

The right bank lagged behind in its development, remaining the agrarian outskirts of the country. To a large extent, this was due to the negative historical past — the prolonged period of Polish colonization and predatory exploitation of its territory and population. It was there that serfdom was most widespread. On the Left Bank and in New Russia, on the contrary, scale of the spread of serfdom was lower compared to the Right Bank.

Determining factor of the economic development of Southwestern Russia is industrial growth, primarily in the Donetsk Basin and the Black Sea region. Heavy industries began to play a key role — coal, iron ore, metallurgical, machine-building. The Donetsk-Krivoy Rog coal basin developed most intensively, which by this time had become the main coal base of the Russian Empire and shared the leading positions in the area of ferrous metallurgy with the Urals. For 40 years, from 1861 to 1900, the extraction of coal here increased by more than

115 times and amounted to 691.5 million poods. This accounted for about 70% of extraction of the entire Russian Empire. Extraction of iron ore over the same period increased 158 times, to 210 million poods, and exceeded half of the general imperial production¹.

Development of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog basin began in the 1860s. In 1866, a concession for development of a coal deposit on very favorable terms was received by a native of the Little Russian nobility and one of the major Russian nobles, Prince Kochubey. However, his plant was not successful. In 1868, Kochubey ceded a concession to the English manufacturer John Hughes, who created the Novorossiysk joint-stock company. The company has attracted significant Russian and foreign capital. The Russian citizen General Ottomar Gern entered the board of the company. Prince Kochubey was elected honorary director of the company.

In 1869, the company signed an agreement with the Russian government and received extensive assistance and significant benefits from it. The government ceded land and mineral resources to the company free of charge, gave the right to duty-free import from abroad of all types of products necessary for the installation of factories and mines, issued a loan for the construction of a railway track to the deposits, paid an annual subsidy based on the results of production².

Due to support of the government, Donbass quickly took place of the main metallurgical center of the Russian Empire. In production of cast iron, it was ahead of the Urals in the beginning of XX century. The metallurgical plants of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog basin had the largest blast furnaces. The latest technology was used here — Bessemer and Thomas converters, open-hearth furnaces. Outstanding Russian engineers M. A. participated in creation and improvement of metallurgical production: M. A. Pavlov, M. A. Kurako, V. E. Groom-Grzhimaylo.

In 1913, the number of employees at the enterprises of Donbass was 262 thousand people, including 168.4 thousand miners,

¹ Economic development of Ukraine in the XIX — early XX century. [website]. URL: <https://history.wikireading.ru/304389> (access date: 03.02.2022).

² Flourishing of the Novorossiysk Company [website]. URL: <https://info-don.org.ua/uzovka/16> (access date: 07.02.2022).

54.2 thousand metallurgists, 20 thousand railway workers, 19 thousand workers in other industry sectors. Donetsk enterprises employed highly qualified workers from St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tula, Bryansk, Sormov. The main skilled workers were from rural areas of Central Russia, Ryazan, Kaluga, Tula, Oryol, Tambov, Kursk and Voronezh provinces¹.

There is an active development of transport infrastructure linking Southwestern Russia with the central part of the empire and with European countries. Railway lines, stations, bridges are built and functioning.

Large-scale railway construction in Russia is carried out in the post-reform period, in the second half of the XIX century, at the initiative and with the direct participation of the Russian government. In 1865, the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Empire was created, which became the main organizer of railway construction. Finance Minister Sergey Witte played a prominent role in the railroad construction boom. Construction was carried out both at the expense of public funds (state-owned railways) and by attracting private capital, Russian and foreign. In total, 43 joint-stock railway companies were created in Russia, the total capital of which, 574.9 million rubles, accounted for almost half of the total capital of all joint-stock companies in Russia².

Samuil Polyakov's company built a number of railway lines, including the Kursk-Kharkov-Azov railway, which was a key in terms of integrating the region into the all-Russian railway network.

It was the explosion of railway construction that served as the basis for development of Donbass as an industrial center of the Russian Empire. Railways connected Donetsk coal with Krivoy Rog ore, providing favorable conditions for development of heavy industry in the region.

Railway construction also gave impetus to development of maritime trade through the ports of New Russia.

¹ Industrial development of Donbass [website]. URL: <http://letopis.donbass.name/promyshlennoe-osvoenie-donbassa/> (access date: 07.02.2022).

² How railways were built with the help of securities in Tsarist Russia [website]. URL: <https://finance.rambler.ru/markets/40539892-kakstroili-zhelezye-dorogi-s-pomoschyu-tsennyh-bumag-v-tsarskoy-rossii/> (access date: 07.02.2022).

Odessa is turning into the southern gate of the country, being the main trading port connecting Russia with the countries of Southern Europe and the Middle East. If in 1862 the cargo turnover of the Odessa port was 37 million rubles, then by 1893 it had almost quadrupled, to 128 million rubles, and in 1903 it was already 174 million rubles. Odessa has become the second port of the Russian Empire after St. Petersburg¹.

Near Odessa and competing with it, at the beginning of the XX century trade ports in Kherson and Nikolaev are actively developing.

On the territory of the Right Bank, traditional industries are mainly developing: salt, tobacco, timber, sulfur. However, here, too, the results of the industrial revolution are gradually manifesting. Thus, at the beginning of the XX century there is an oil production enterprise near Borislav.

Due to the growth of industrial production, demographic structure of the population is changing, and the urban population is increasing. Out of 10 largest cities of the Russian Empire, four were located in Little Russia and New Russia: Kiev, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav and Odessa. Thus, in Odessa in 1875 the population was only 193 thousand people, and by 1914 it had increased up to 669 thousand. At the same time, an intensive process of ethnic mixing takes place. Residents of various Russian regions come to developing urban agglomerations. Majority of the population of large cities are Great Russians (only a third of the urban population are Little Russians), a significant proportion is also made up of foreigners who have moved to the Russian Empire. Due to the active influx of population, Southwestern Russia occupies a leading position in the empire in terms of urbanization of the population.

The agricultural sector is also developing intensively. By the beginning of the XX century Southwestern Russia becomes the main agricultural base of the empire. Presence of a developed network of Black Sea trade ports and railway lines to them ensures growth of the share of commodity production in agriculture and an expansion of

¹ Chronology of the development of Odessa [website]. URL: <http://odesskiy.com/chisto-fakti-iz-zhizni-i-istorii/hronologija-razvitija-odessy.html> (access date: 03.02.2022).

exports. The region occupies key positions in the export of grain crops: 40% of all-Russian wheat exports and 50% of barley exports¹.

An important positive role in the development of rural settlements of the Left Bank and New Russia was played by creation of the county self-government bodies. By the beginning of the XX century the County Councils took control of a wide range of issues, from development of education and healthcare to popularization of modern agricultural culture, rental of agricultural machinery and equipment, assistance in raising breeding stock, melioration, forestry, and road construction. County Councils played an important role in increasing welfare of the peasant population of the region.

The situation was different on the Right Bank, where the County Councils system appeared much later than on the Left Bank and in the central regions of the Russian Empire, in 1911. Issue of the spread of County Councils in the so-called Western Territory (Right Bank and Belarus) caused an acute political crisis in the Russian Empire. Dominance of the Polish gentry in the economic, cultural and social spheres in these regions created a high probability that the gentry would take a dominant position in the county bodies and this would lead to an increased inequality and exploitation, using modern

terms, of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian population (at that time for they used one concept — Russian) on the part of the Polish nobility. Therefore, the initiator of the reform, Prime Minister Petr Stolypin, proposed an introduction of a special model here that would help the Russian (including the future Ukrainian and Belarusian) population to get rid of dominance of the Polish minority. The draft law he developed provided for holding of elections to the county institutions by national curias: separately for the Polish and Russian population, in order to “balance” the Polish landlords with Russian peasants.

However, the bill met with serious resistance from the State Council, which rejected it on 4 March, 1911. At the request of Stolypin, Nicholas II used his powers and dissolved the State Duma and the State Council for three days in order to make a decision bypassing the legislators.

¹ *Danilevskiy I., Tairova T., Shubin A., Mironenko V.* History of Ukraine. 2nd Ed., revised and amended, St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 285.

On 27 March, 1911, the Emperor signed a Decree on the Western County Council. County Council was introduced in Volyn, Kiev, Podolsk, Minsk, Mogilev and Vitebsk governorates.

The Decree stated: “Finding it timely to introduce population of the Western Territory to the benefits of County Council self-government, which other indigenous areas of Russia have long enjoyed, We recognized it necessary ... to extend to this region where, according to local conditions, this seems feasible, the Highest, approved on 12 June, 1890, Regulations on governorate and County Council institutions ...”¹

For Stolypin, the price of this decision was too high. His position was shaken. Nevertheless, the prime minister succeeded in the main thing — to create a system of County Council self-government on the territory of the Right Bank and Belarus, protecting the rights of the local Russian (including the future Ukrainian and Belarusian) population. Soon the Prime Minister, while on a trip to Kiev, was killed in an assassination attempt.

It was Stolypin’s agrarian reform that created in Little Russia and New Russia a wide stratum of prosperous peasant families engaged in commodity production.

Here, the ideas of communal land use were traditionally weak, so the reform was the most successful. By 1916, there were 440,000 farms in the region, or 14 % of all peasant farms. At the same time, the peasants, taking advantage of the reform, bought out almost 500 thousand acres of land².

Government of the Russian Empire also invested great efforts and significant funds in development of the education system in Little Russia and New Russia.

By 1917, there were 27 higher educational institutions operating in the region, in which about 35 thousand students studied³. Leading

¹ On 27 March, 1911, County Council [website] was introduced in the western governorates of Russia. URL: <https://newsland.com/community/5134/content/v-interesakhrosskogo-naseleniia-27-marta-1911-g-v-zapadnykh-guberniiaakh-rossii-bylovvedeno-zemstvo/5753783> (access date: 03.02.2022).

² *Danilevskiy I., Tairova T., Shubin A., Mironenko V.* History of Ukraine. 2nd Ed., revised and amended, St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 285.

³ *Shevchuk Sergey.* Analogies. Education in Ukraine under the Tsar, the USSR and Today [website]. URL: <https://inpress.ua/ru/society/17117-analogii-obra-zovanie-v-ukraine-pri-tsare-sssr-i-segodnya> (access date: 03.02.2022).

positions were occupied by the universities: Kiev, Kharkov and Novorossiysk, located in Odessa. In addition, there were a number of specialized higher educational institutions. Among them are the Kharkov Veterinary Institute, the Kiev Polytechnic Institute, the Kharkov Technological Institute, the Ekaterinoslav Higher Mining School, and the Nizhyn Institute of History and Philology.

At the beginning of the XX century, active development of higher education for women begins. To the higher women's courses in Kiev, which opened at the end of the 19th century, in 1906 the higher women's courses were added in Odessa, in 1907 — women's medical institute in Kiev, and in 1913 — higher women's courses in Kharkov.

It is significant that on the territory of Galicia, which was under the rule of Austro-Hungary, higher education practically did not develop and was represented by only four universities — universities in Lvov and Chernovtsy the Lvov Polytechnic Institute and the Lvov Academy of Veterinary

Medicine¹. Not a single higher educational institution for women was also opened.

Serious efforts were also made by the Russian government to develop secondary education in Little Russia and New Russia. At the turn of the century,

there were 150 male and female gymnasiums, as well as 19 real schools in this territory. Gymnasiums were opened in all governorate and a significant number of county centers.

Fundamentally different situation was in Galicia occupied by Austro-Hungary. Predominantly Polish gymnasiums were here. There were only two Russian (Ukrainian) gymnasiums: in Lvov and in Peremyshl. Gymnasium classes with teaching in Russian (Ukrainian) were only in three Polish gymnasiums: in Kolomyia, Ternopol and Chernovtsy².

At the same time, the Left Bank and New Russia were significantly ahead of the Right Bank in terms of the level of education. Thus, the

¹ Ibid.

² Culture of Ukraine in the second half of the XIX century [website]. URL: <https://geomap.com.ua/ru-uh9/1055.html> (access date: 03.02.2022).

Kherson governorate had the highest level of literacy, about 30%, while in the Podolsk and Volyn governorates it was only 15%¹.

Thus, at the beginning of the XX century Southwestern Russia occupied the place of one of the most developed and economically successful regions of the Russian Empire. The results achieved would have been unthinkable if these territories had not become the parts of Russia. The significant backlog of Galicia and the Right Bank occupied by Austro-Hungary (which became part of Russia a century later) is a direct evidence of this.

Economic progress, however, was associated with an increased social stratification in society and the growth of social tension and conflict. At the beginning of the XX century protest moods are growing, the prerequisites for a revolutionary situation are formed. These all-Russian tendencies were also manifested in the Southwestern Russia. Moreover, Little Russia and especially the industrially developed New Russia are becoming one of the significant centers for development of the revolutionary process.

Nationalist circles tried to use the revolutionary situation in their own interests. On the outskirts of the Russian Empire, separatism is growing, nationalist parties and political movements are emerging. This process did not bypass the South-Western Russia either. Here, the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism, which took shape in the 19th century, spread.

Back in 1899, massive student unrests took place at the St. Petersburg University. A year later, they covered many universities in the country and reached Little Russia. In 1900, a student demonstration dedicated to 1 May took place in Kharkov. Demonstrators demanded an 8-hour day and civil liberties.

In February 1900, at the III Congress of Student Societies of Kharkov, a creation of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party was proclaimed. Ideology of the party was based on a combination of the ideas of socialism and nationalism. Program of the party substantiated the right of Ukraine (South-Western Russia) to an independent statehood, and return of the rights determined by the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654 to Ukraine was proclaimed as a goal. The party's activities

¹ Culture of Ukraine in the second half of the XIX century [website]. URL: <https://geomap.com.ua/ru-uh9/1055.html> (access date: 03.02.2022).

were of an underground nature. In 1905, the party ceased to exist as a result of opposition activities of the law enforcement structures of the Russian Empire.

The following year, protests swept the large masses of students. In response, 183 students of Kiev University were arrested and sent to soldiers as punishment.

This story caused a wide resonance at the all-Russian level. The famous writer Maxim Gorkiy wrote to the poet Valeriy Bryusov: “Sending the students to soldiers is a nasty thing, insolent crime against individual freedom, an idiotic measure of cunning rascals, overstuffed with power. My heart is boiling, and I would be happy to spit in their arrogant physiognomies of misanthropes¹.” Vladimir Lenin wrote an article to the *Iskra* newspaper entitled “183 Students Sent to Soldiers.” In the article, he appealed to the workers to rise in support of the arrested Kiev students: “The student went to the aid of the worker — the worker must come to the aid of the student².”

The result was an all-Russian student strike, which covered 35 higher educational institutions of Russia. 30 thousand students went on strike, including students from Kiev, Kharkov and Odessa higher educational institutions³.

At the same time, there is an activation of liberal opposition sentiments among County Council leaders, which will later become the basis for development of a number of liberal political parties. completely similar to the all-Russian process was observed in the territory of South-Western Russia. In 1901, a congress of County Councils was held in Poltava. The assembled County Council leaders demanded political freedoms, an abolition of corporal punishment for peasants, and convening of an All-Russian Assembly of the Land to adopt a constitution.

In 1902, peasant unrest began on the Left Bank, engulfing 337 villages. About 40 thousand peasants took part in the unrest. 105

¹ *Gorkiy M.* Collected Works. V. 28. Moscow, 1954. P. 153.

² *Lenin V. I.* Complete Set of Works. V. 4. P. 395.

³ Student movement in Russia in 1899–1907. [website]. URL: <https://youngspace.ru/faq/studencheskoe-dvizhenie-rossii-1899–1907> (access date: 04.02.2022).

landowners' estates were destroyed. As a result of actions, 1092 people were put on trial, 836 people were sentenced to prison¹.

In July-August 1903, a series of mass political strikes took place in the large cities of New Russia and Little Russia. In Odessa, 40–50 thousand people took part in the action, in Kiev — 15 thousand, in Ekaterinoslav — 14 thousand, in Nikolaev — 10 thousand. Actions were also held in Kharkov, Kerch, Konotop, Bakhmut, Aleksandrovsk, Berdichev, Zhitomir, Nemirov and other cities. The movement took place under the slogans: “No to autocracy!”, “No to capitalism!”, “We want political freedom!”²

Population of New Russia and Little Russia took an active part in the Russian Revolution of 1905–1907. Thus, in January-March 1905, 170 thousand inhabitants of the region took part in the strike. In October, peaceful strikes escalated into armed clashes with the police. Armed demonstrations took place in Kharkov, Aleksandrovsk, Ekaterinoslav and Gorlovka. The most dramatic events occurred in Gorlovka. Here clashes between armed workers and troops ended in numerous casualties on both sides.

Revolutionary events also pervaded the countryside. From October to December 1905, peasant uprisings took place in 64 districts of Southwestern Russia. About 300 landowners' estates were destroyed, mainly on the Left Bank and in New Russia. In December 1905, one of the largest peasant uprisings in Russia occurred in the Poltava village of Velikie Sorochintsy, the suppression of which led to numerous victims.

One of the most significant events of the revolution, which has become its symbol, is also connected with Southwestern Russia — the uprising of the battleship *Potemkin*. Revolt on a warship occurred on 14 June, 1905, when the ship was at anchorage in the port of Odessa. The Black Sea squadron was sent against the rebels, but the sailors refused to shoot at their rebel comrades. As a result, the rebels fled Russia and on 25 June, 1905, surrendered to the Romanian authorities in the port of Constanta.

¹ *Danilevskiy I., Tairova T., Shubin A., Mironenko V.* History of Ukraine. 2nd Ed., revised and amended, St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 281.

² *Ibid.* P. 282.

17 October, 1905 Nicholas II signed the manifest “On Improvement of the State Order.” The Russian Empire was turning into a dualistic monarchy. Political parties were formed.

In February–March 1906, elections were held for the first composition of deputies of the State Duma. 102 deputies were elected from nine governorates of Southwestern Russia. Most of them joined the ranks of all-Russian parties. However, 45 MPs, representing various all-Russian political parties, at the same time composed the deputy association “Ukrainian Duma Gromada.” Association demanded political autonomy for Ukraine (Southwestern Russia), as well as an introduction of the Ukrainian language into the system of public education and public administration.

The active part of the society of the South-West of Russia was divided. At the same time, some of them supported the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism, some advocated all-Russian values, others defended a priority of the Russian national idea.

For example, in 1908, an informal Partnership of Ukrainian Progressives arose, bringing together politicians representing different parties, but united by the idea of political autonomy. The purpose of the Partnership was to coordinate the activities of the Ukrainian national movement. The organization was headed by the ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism, Professor Mikhail Grushevskiy, and the Partnership included prominent figures of the former Revolutionary Ukrainian Party — Vladimir Vynnichenko and Simon Petlyura. For the period up to 1917, the Partnership became the main base for promoting the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism in a society, often called Ukrainophilism or Ukrainianism at that time, and uniting politicians and public figures on these ideas.

Simultaneously with the creation of the Partnership of Ukrainian Progressives in 1908, the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists was founded — an organization that aimed to unite nationally-minded Russian people, regardless of their party affiliation. The founders of the Club were well-known representatives of the Kiev intellectuals: writer and journalist Anatoliy Savenko and professor Vasily Chernov.

The Charter of the Club emphasized: “The Club of Russian Nationalists bases its activity on the following principles:

Russian people, who created the great Russian state with their labors, suffering and blood, own sovereign rights in Russia in relation to other peoples.

Nobody should be granted any autonomy, because this would be the first step towards the dismemberment of Russia into parts ...

The Southwestern Territory is a native and purely Russian region.

There is only one “Russian people.” There is no Little Russian or “Ukrainian-Russian” people, but there is only the South Russian branch of the sole Russian people. The Ukrainophile movement is a phenomenon that is as harmful as it is groundless...

Activities of the club of Russian nationalists will consist of development and implementation of the ideas of peaceful political and cultural development of Russia, of the fight against the harmful influences of cosmopolitanism, as well as anti-Russian, anti-state and anti-social teachings, of identification of the needs and requirements of the population of the region and the entire state¹.”

The Club of Russian Nationalists carried out its activities until 1917.

A consistent position of criticism of Ukrainian nationalism was occupied by one of the most influential Kiev newspapers, *Kievlyanin*. One of the most popular Kiev politicians, State Duma deputy Vasiliy Shulgin, as a regular author of the newspaper, defended the unity of the Russian people on its pages.

In particular, on 4 January, 1912, he wrote: “Yes, we are fighting them. We are fighting political traitors. We are fighting the traitors of Russia. We are fighting those small-minded mad people who want to disunite what is united by god! We despise these people because in the only poet they gave, they honor not his beautiful language, not his poetic soul, they honor the frenzied cries of anger, hatred against the brotherly tribe that this man spewed, drunk to the point of loss of consciousness and conscience with “Kulisheva vodka.” We will fight these people. They bring grief to our beloved land. They bring it slavery... they will poison it with hatred for everything native and old, they are worse than the Tatars, worse than the Polovtzy.

¹ Charter of the Club of Russian Nationalists [website]. URL: https://rus-neb.ru/catalog/000199_000009_003749235/ (access date: 05.02.2022).

These are the people whom Gogol once described in his *Terrible Revenge*¹.”

Development of the artistic culture of Little Russia, as well as the Russian Empire, in which it was then, at the beginning of the 20th century. took place in conditions of a deep social crisis, a painful social and cultural turning point and a mass revolutionary movement. The cultural process of this historical epoch in Little Russia was distinguished by several relief features. First, in the struggle for the thoughts and feelings of contemporaries, various directions of the social movement clashed, such as revolutionaries and liberals, Ukrainophiles, Russophiles and internationalists. Secondly, the dynamics of cultural development directly depended on the social and economic and political situation in the country. Thirdly, in the field of scientific and artistic creativity, the Little Russian line was, of course, an integral part of the all-Russian cultural tradition.

Already during 1900–1904, in the conditions of a revolutionary upsurge, the movement for the creation of new works in the field of Ukrainian studies intensified. The most complete (for that time) edition of *Kobzar*, T. G. Shevchenko, was printed in St. Petersburg. Several Little Russian literary almanacs were published: «Хвиля за хвилею», «Вік» (in three volumes), «Літературний збірник на честь Кониського», «На вічну пам'ять Котляревського», etc.

During the revolution of 1905–1907 some schools switched to teaching in Ukrainian language. For a short time, lectures on Ukrainian studies were given at universities. Libraries, public universities, literary, democratic, educational societies were opened. Broad scope of the revolutionary movement, the growth of the proletarian and democratic press contributed to further development of popular culture. Folklore forms such as songs, ditties, sayings, proverbs, etc. developed.

After suppression of the first Russian revolution and dispersal of the Second State Duma, all this was canceled. In the context of the reaction to revolutionary speeches, censorship intensified, not allowing publication of works by national Little Russian writers. In 1908, a

¹ *Shulgin Vasilii*. We are fighting them in the name of Ukraine [website]. URL: <https://buzina.org/golos-naroda/1956-shulgin-vo-imia-ukrainy.html> (access date: 05.02.2022).

young scientist Grigoriy Tkachenko-Petrenko, who participated in the archaeological excavations of D. Evarnitskiy, was executed for participating in the uprising in the Donbass (1905). It was prohibited to raise money for the monument to T. Shevchenko in Kanev, and the “Prosivty” was closed. In 1908, the draft law on introduction of the Ukrainian language in elementary schools was defeated in the Third State Duma, as well as the project of the Kiev University professor I. Luchitskiy on introduction of legal proceedings in the Ukrainian language. The conservative rebuff evoke a response of radical Ukrainophiles. P.A. Stolypin drew attention to the Ukrainian social movement, since, in his opinion, behind it was an idea of “revival of the old Ukraine on autonomous national-territorial principles.”

In general, the trend towards social democratization stimulated a development of various scientific areas, in which people from Little Russia took an active part. In medicine, Academician D. K. Zabolotnyi gained world fame in the fight against smallpox, plague and other diseases. Academician N. F. Gamaleya worked in Odessa for many years, organizing the first bacteriological station in Russia there, which played a huge role in the fight against infectious diseases.

Part of the scientific activity of the outstanding geologist V. I. Vernadskiy was connected with Little Russia. For many years, the famous blast-furnace innovator M. K. Kurako worked in Donbass. A significant contribution to science was made by the outstanding biologist N. F. Kashchenko, who worked at the Kiev Polytechnic Institute. He founded an acclimatization nursery of cultivated plants in Kiev.

In 1908, for the first time in Russia, an aero club was founded in Odessa, whose members (M. Efimov, S. Utochkin) did a lot for the development of aeronautics. Professor of the Kiev Polytechnic Institute A. S. Kudashev in 1910 flew on an airplane of his own design. The following year, a worker of the Kiev plant Arsenal F. F. Anders flew on an airship also of his own design. The Russian pilot P. N. Nesterov, while serving in the military in Little Russia in 1913–1914, made the first in the world “dead loop,” which went down in the history of aviation.

Development of science in Little Russia was greatly influenced by leading Russian scientists — I. I. Mechnikov, D. I. Mendeleev, K. A. Timiryazev, I. P. Pavlov, I. V. Michurin and others.

Mendeleev contributed to opening of the Kiev Polytechnic Institute. As a chairman of the examination committee of the first graduation of students of this institute, he highly appreciated preparation of the graduates: “General impression that the graduate students have made on me is quite favorable, especially with regard to their general development.”

In the area of social sciences, writers, revolutionary democrats P. Grabovskiy, I. Franko, L. Ukrainka, M. Kotsiubinskiy were familiar with the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin. In many of their writings, they exposed untenable nationalist concepts, in particular the concepts of the historian Mikhail Grushevskiy.

The first woman in Russia, Doctor of Historical Sciences Aleksandra Efimenko, presented a great generalizing work “History of the Ukrainian People.” In Ekaterinoslav, historian D. Yavornitskiy carried out major scientific work, and in Kharkov — D. Bataliy. The works of these historians contained significant factual material. Professor of Kharkov University N. Sumtsov worked on Little Russian folklore and the history of Little Russian literature. Significant event in development of Ukrainian linguistics was the publication in 1906–1908 of four-volume dictionary of the Ukrainian language, edited by B. Grinchenko.

M. Gorkiy, the founder of revolutionary romanticism and a representative of critical realism in Russian literature, was closely associated with Little Russia. In his speech at a meeting of cultural and literary figures in Moscow in 1916, M. Gorkiy said: “I cannot but say about the talented and powerful Ukrainian people. This people is extremely meek, very capable... Having visited one of the Ukrainian fairs for the first time, I could not tear myself away from the art of the kobza players, bandura players, lyre players — this pearl of folk art. Folk poetry of Ukraine is the apotheosis of beauty... Look at the gentle and song-like world that is revealed in its immortal songs.”

M. Kotsiubinskiy visited the island of Capri (Italy) between 1909 and 1912 and met Gorkiy there. I. Franko spoke out against the persecution of M. Gorkiy, calling him one of the lights of the Russian people.

True pictures of poverty of the rural poor people were drawn in his works by the writer A. Teslenko, who was directly involved in the

revolutionary events of 1905–1907 in the village, for which he was severely persecuted by the tsarist authorities.

At the beginning of the XX century. Stepan Vasilchenko began his literary activity, who in his works paid much attention to depicting the hard life of the rural poor people and teachers. At this time, the realist writers P. Mirnyi and V.G. Korolenko continued their activities. I. Franko in his works condemned the center of reaction and obscurantism — the Vatican.

Little Russian writers V. Stefanyk, O. Kobylyanskaya, M. Cheremshina worked fruitfully, who in their works showed the life and way of life of peasantry of the Western Ukrainian lands. The short stories written by them were widely recognized and highly appreciated by leading figures of Russian culture.

Gradually, the motives of ethnic exclusivity began to appear in the liberal-nationalist literature of Little Russia, turning literary works into political pamphlets. This was especially evident in the work of the prose writer and playwright V. Vinnichenko, the poet G. Chuprynka, and in Eastern Galicia — B. Lepkiy, V. Pachovskiy.

Little Russian theater art was improved. The activity of a stationary theater began, the organizer and leader of which was N. Sadovskiy. A group of outstanding Little Russian actors, which included N. Sadovskiy, P. Saksaganskiy, M. Zankovetskaya, I. Maryanenko, got the opportunity to perform in Kiev and go on tour to other cities of Little Russia.

The School of Music and Drama in Kiev, founded in 1903 on the initiative of N. Lysenko, played an important role in preparation of theatrical and musical forces, and was officially opened at the beginning of the next academic year. With its curricula, it approached to the type of conservatory and the drama department of the Moscow Musical College. N. Lysenko, G. Lyubomirskiy, M. Zotova, E. Muravyova, A. Mishuga, M. Staritskaya taught at the school.

Famous composers and artists came out of the walls of this educational institution: K. Stetsenko, L. Revutskiy. Classic of Little Russian music N. Lysenko, together with such works as “Taras Bulba,” “The Night Before Christmas,” “The Drowned Woman,” “Natalka Poltavka,” wrote the music for I. Franko’s hymn “The Eternal Revolutionary.” In 1904, at the initiative of the composer

A. Vakhnyanin, the Little Russian Musical Institute named after Lysenko was founded in Lvov. Under the influence of N. Lysenko, composers S. Lyudkevich, D. Sichinskiy, F. Kolessa and others grew up in Western Ukraine. At the beginning of the XX century, two more talented Little Russian composers, N. Leontovich and K. Stetsenko, performed.

Fine arts also received further development. The first exhibition of artists was organized in Poltava in 1903 on the occasion of opening of the monument to I. P. Kotlyarevskiy. Author of illustrations for “Kobzar” T. Shevchenko — A. Slastion taught at the Mirgorod School of Applied Arts. The Little Russian landscape painter S. Vasilkovsky, who graduated from the St. Petersburg Academy of Arts, was known at that time. For the painting “On the Donets” he was awarded the Gold Medal. Together with him, N. Samokish studied at the Academy. These two artists created the album “Ukrainian Antiquity.” Vasilkovskiy’s works of art reflect the native nature, life and way of life of the Little Russian people, their heroic past. Among the paintings which he created over three thousand, the most famous are “Cossack’s Levada,” “Winter.”

The political, social and cultural situation in Galicia, which was under the rule of Austro-Hungary, was fundamentally different. Here, the Russian (Ukrainian) national minority was forced to defend its rights both in confrontation with the Austrian administration and the Polish minority, which occupies a leading position in the economy and cultural area. The Russian community itself, due to the efforts of the Austrian authorities, was not united.

Russian political parties in Galicia occupied by Austro-Hungary by the beginning of the XX century already were divided into two camps. The Ukrainian-nationalist party included the Russian-Ukrainian Radical Party (RURP, 1890), later the Ukrainian Radical Party (URP), the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP, 1899) and the Ukrainian National Democratic Party (UNDP, 1896).

Russophil — was represented by the Russian People’s Party (RPP), founded on the basis of the Russian Rada in 1900. The more radical wing of the younger generation of Russophils in the newly formed party initiated a demand for legal recognition of the Russian language as a regional language along with Polish, German and

Ukrainian. At the same time, the traditionalists-Old Russians, led by M. Korol, V. Davidiyak, and later O. Monchalovskiy, O. Kostetskiy, Y. Paventskiy, did not support the aspirations of the Galicians for general Russification and declared loyalty to Austria. The final split between the two currents of Russophiles occurred on 2 February, 1909, at a congress in Lvov. The People's Council and the Russian Rada passed to the Russophiles, they began to publish the newspaper "Prikarpatskaya Rus" and the weekly "Voice of People." The Old Russophiles retained the newspaper Galicianin and the weekly Russian Word. The ideological divergence in the Russophile environment hit the political influence of the movement. This was evidenced by the deplorable results of the elections to the Galician Seim in 1913, when only deputy D. Markov was elected to it.

The further political fate of the Russophile political trend in Galicia was tragic. In 1914, after the entry of Austro-Hungary into the war with Russia, its members underwent the most severe repressions, and some of the activists died in the Talerhof and Terezin concentration camps. Those who remained at large left Galicia in 1915 with the retreating Russian troops.

By the beginning of the XX century there is a rapid process of unification of all Ukrainian nationalist movements and groups: Narodovtsy and radicals, headed by their representatives Y. Romanchuk, K. and E. Levitskiy, V. Okhrymovich, E. Olesnitskiy, I. Franko, M. Grushevskiy and others on the anti-Russophile platform to the Ukrainian National Democratic Party (UNDP).

Russophile leaders understood that they were left without moderate allies. In January 1900, in Lvov, at the "congress of men of trust", in which 182 delegates took part, a decision was made to create the Russian People's Party (RPP) headed by the People's Council.

Obviously, the ruling Austro-Polish class of Galicia regarded the Young Ukrainians, who gained political weight with its help, only as temporary allies in the fight against the dangerous Russophile movement, which had half a century of experience in political struggle and influence on the autochthonous population. Especially in the context of the growing contradictions between Austro-Hungary and Russia. The explicit patronage of the "Narodovtsy", which coincided with the restrictions on Little Russian (Ukrainian) activities in the Russian

Empire, led to the fact that the active adherents of this movement in Little Russia began to gravitate towards Galicia, cooperate with local “Ukrainians” and move there, counting on the patronage of Vienna.

Thus, the foundations of the future political Ukrainian separatism in relation to the Russian state were laid. Ukrainian nationalism needed an ideological justification for its activities, which would be based on a scientific and historical platform. Soon it was published in the works of an associate professor at Kiev University, a Russian citizen M. S. Grushevskiy, who was invited by the Austrian authorities to teach at a department that was opened especially for him at Lvov University, where he was provided with serious financial resources.

In the work “History of Ukraine-Rus” (published at the expense of the Austrian treasury), Grushevskiy used the results of his predecessors’ research and significant documentary material collected in the archives of Russia, Poland, Sweden and other countries. However, the scientific significance of Grushevskiy’s works is limited by tendentiousness and artificial selection of facts, the anti-scientific nature of a number of his conclusions, and a clear political bias. M. Grushevskiy put the national problem in the first place, considering it the main one in history. He argued that national interests are higher than social ones. At the same time, he portrayed the Ukrainian nation as a nation without national exploitative classes and a place for class struggle, and promoted the antiquity of the “Ukrainians” that struck the imagination with absurdity.

These discussions about the various centuries-old history of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples became the most important part of the Austro-Hungarian, and in the future, German-fascist propaganda. The authorities of Austro-Hungary understood that M. Grushevskiy laid the fundamental foundations for the future separatist movement in Russian Little Russia (Ukraine), which, according to Vienna, should undoubtedly weaken and deplete the geopolitical rival, as well as strike at its policy of supporting the Slavs, primarily in the Balkans. In addition, the dissemination of Grushevskiy’s views in the Russian environment made it possible to eliminate the danger, represented by the Russophil movement. At the same time, the separatism of Grushevskiy and his adherents, according to the Austro-Polish circles, did not pose any threat to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, since it

declared as its ultimate goal an annexation of the vast Little Russia to Galicia within this state, following an example of Hungary.

On their part, the Austrian authorities believed that an independent Ukrainian state was out of the question. For the Catholic Church, there were also amazing prospects for restoring its influence on the territory of the former first Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Interest of the Galician Poles was not only in expanding their influence on the territory of Little Russia, but also in the possibility of separating its Polish territories from Russia.

Support by the Austro-Hungarian authorities for Ukrainian nationalist propaganda and organizations was comprehensive: the best parishes were allocated for nationalist priests, places in the administration for employees, and the media they created were actively funded. Thus, in his report in 1903 O. A. Monchalovskiy says: “Clear support of Ukrainophilism on the part of the government

is proved by the annual allowance in the amount of 20,000 crowns received by the Society named after Taras Shevchenko in Lvov. From the Sejm of Galicia, i. e. from the Poles, Ukrainophile societies and editorial offices annually receive the following amounts: the Besida society in Lvov for the maintenance of the theater — 14,500 crowns; singing society Boyan in Lvov — 600 crowns, editors of the magazine Teacher — 1000; Society Prosvita — 10,000; Society named after T. Shevchenko — 8000; editors of the children’s magazine Dzvinok — 400; brochure publishing house — 12,000; girls’ school in Peremyshl — 400; a pedagogical society for the publishing house of the Ukrainian-Russia library — 600; women’s school in Lvov — 3200; Basilians for the publication of pamphlets — 400; for the maintenance of boarding schools for poor student youth — 5000. Total — 50,100 crowns. Meanwhile, Russian societies do not receive (from the Austrian authorities) a penny¹.”

Epicenter of aggravation of the domestic political and international situation in Galicia in the late XIX century — beginning of XX century became Lvov University. Austrian authorities pursued a deliberate policy of replacing the term “Ruthen” in

¹ *Monchalovskiy O. A. Provisions and Needs of Galician Rus.russian and Ukrainian Idea in Austria. Moscow, 1915. P. 26.*

official documents with the term “Ukrainian.” In the schools and gymnasiums of Eastern Galicia, a history course was introduced, which boiled down to a summary of the history of this region as part of Poland. At the same time, nothing was said about the national hero Bogdan Khmelnytsky, or about the Cossack uprisings of the Middle Ages against the Polish magnates.

The authorities drew attention to an inadmissibility of using the Russian language not only in official correspondence, but also in private. On the eve of the general population census, the authorities of Austro-Hungary, by a circular dated 10 August, 1910, excluded the Russian language from the census questionnaires, thereby removing it from the scope of the legislation of the empire. At the same time, German, Czech, Moravian, Slovak, Polish, Ruthenian, Slovene, Serbo-Croatian, Italian, Romanian and Magyar languages were on the list.

In the winter of 1910, the senate (rectorate) of the Lvov University made a statement about preservation of the Polish nature of the university. Response from the deputies of the Russian Club in the Reichsrat and the Galician Seim was immediate. The Russian professors came out as a united front. On 24 April, 1910, a “great evening of Ruthens in the city of Lvov” took place, at which deputy A. Kolesa called for a return to the issue of creating a university for the autochthonous population. In another armed clash with the Poles, the Ukrainian nationalist Adam Kotska was shot dead, many students were injured. As a result of the investigation, most of the Poles were held only as witnesses.

L. P. Urusov, Russian Ambassador to Vienna, gave an assessment of the events at Lvov University in relation to the situation regarding the entire Galicia. In a report to Petersburg, he noted that these riots were not unexpected. Mutual relations between Polish and Russian students have always been hostile. He believed that the riots might not lead to creation of a separate Russian university, but they would create difficulties for the government, which would not benefit from antagonizing both the Poles and Ukrainians. Vienna would support the Austrian-created Ukrainian Nationalist Party, especially after the Russian Party gained the political success of the Russophiles in the 1908 elections.

The Austrian government in 1912 announced plans to open a Ukrainian University in Lvov by 1916. In Galicia, occupied by Austro-Hungary, it was understood that this would accelerate Ukrainization of the Russian population. On 18 June, 1912, in his letter announcing opening of the university, Emperor Francis Joseph for the first time used the term “Ukrainian” instead of the traditional “Ruthenian.” In fact, from that moment on, the Russians of Galicia were declared Ukrainians.

This news provoked a strong reaction not only from the Russians, but also from the Austrian parties. Considering this, the Minister of the Interior Affairs of the Empire, Baron Heinold, was forced to apologize for “mistake in translation.” This testified to the insufficient coverage of Ukrainian influence by the Russian population in Galicia in 1912. Plans to open a university were not destined to materialize, since in 1914 Austro-Hungary entered the First World War, and in 1918 ceased to exist.

The real population of the entire of Galicia, based on religious statistics in 1910, was about 8 million people. Of these, Poles — 3.6 million (45.5%), Russians (Ukrainians) — 3.4 million (43%), Jews — 856 thousand (10.7%), other peoples (Germans, Czechs, etc.) — less than 1%. From 1849 to 1910, the number of Poles remained at the level of 45–46%, while the number of Russians decreased from 47 to 43%, in Eastern Galicia (Galicia) — from 71 to 62%. This was explained by the internal migration of Poles from the western to the eastern part of the province, the large-scale emigration of Russians to other countries, as well as the lower life expectancy of the poor autochthonous population.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century Russian literary language is gaining more and more strong positions in Galicia. Among the Russian Galicians, there is a desire to join the all-Russian cultural space, of which they considered themselves as a part. The struggle of the Russian intellectuals for free thought in Russia and the revolution of 1905 made a strong impression on the Russophil youth.

The leaders of Russophil movement paid great attention to the education of the youth. The Russian-Galician community at the beginning of the XX century began to create bursas in small towns. For a small fee, children received housing and food in them, as well

as elements of patriotic education, for example, lessons in the Russian language, singing and music. Bursa's students attended church services and sang in the choir. Sometimes Russian gymnasiums were built and bursas under them, as, for example, in Buchach in 1910 through the efforts of O. O. Getsev and doctor V. O. Mogilnitskiy. At the very beginning of the war, in August 1914, both buildings and the doctor's house "were razed to the ground by a brutal mob, who proved their Austrian patriotism to these authorities." Doctor V. O. Mogilnitskiy with his wife and son ended up in the Talerhof concentration camp, and O. O. Getsev died before the start of the war, otherwise he would have suffered the same fate.

During this period, there were three Russophil bursas for boys in Lvov (Stavropigon, Narodny Dom and Selyansk) and one for girls (Russian Ladies' Boarding School). One of the pupils recalls that such an environment was created in it, in which the children retained the faith inherited from their parents that they were "part of the great Russian people, and it is impossible to move away from Russian culture and go to a hostile camp", it was not for nothing that the Bursa was called "Katsap citadel." It got to the point that in the Lvov "Ukrainian" gymnasium, Ukrainian gymnasium students went to a rally in front of the Austrian vicegerency demanding: "We will not sit together with the Russophils." The event ended with the singing of the Austrian anthem in Ukrainian language and smashing of the windows in Russian bursas¹.

In fact, the bursas became a parallel educational system, and, in contrast to the political parties loyal to the Habsburgs, completely anti-government views were expressed in the bursas. The authorities were alarmed by this, and by the circular of the vicegerent M. Bobzhinskiy of 28 July, 1910, the bursas were banned. However, this was only a prelude to the mass repressions that followed. At the beginning of the First World War, hundreds of activists of the Russophil movement ended up in the dungeons of the Austrian concentration camp Talerhof.

Growing influence of the Galician-Russian movement in Galicia led to success in the elections to the Austrian parliament (Reichsrat) in 1907. Vienna openly supported the Polish political forces, and

¹ New life. 1913. No.2. P. 25–26.

Ukrainian nationalists oriented themselves towards the radicals (RURP, then URP), national democrats (UNDP) and social democrats (USDP), operating under the slogan “Ніщити кацапів” (“Eliminate katsaps”). Police abuses reached the point of murdering the Russophil supporters. However, despite this, the Russophiles managed to get five deputies into the Austrian parliament.

At the beginning of the XX century, contradictory relations developed between the Galician-Polish and Galician-Ukrainian social and political movements. The Polish gentry-magnate circles of Galicia, having supported at first the young people’s, Ukrainian nationalist movement, as its political influence, ambitions, and aggressiveness grew, began to experience more and more signs of discontent and even hatred on its part. The leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists tried to avoid topics related to criticism of the Austrian authorities. On the contrary, in any situation they showed loyal feelings towards the Habsburg dynasty. At this historical moment, Ukrainian nationalists fought not only with the Galician “Russians,” but also with the Poles.

In Galicia, the emerging Ukrainian nationalism saw the success of its movement solely in relying on the occupiers — the Austrians, whom it could use to expand its influence — in Little Russia. Ukrainian nationalists assigned the Poles only the role of temporary allies in the fight against the Russophiles. In fact, in Galicia at the beginning of the XX century, one can observe the phenomenon of history, when hatred of a potential enemy was cultivated in absentia, without historical reasons, and, surprisingly, was successful.

Pro-Austrian sentiments were directly declared by M. Grushevskiy. He believed that he would serve the idea of becoming Galicia Piedmont for a future independent power. In this regard, the declaration of representatives of all Ukrainian parties in Galicia, adopted at a meeting in December 1912, is interesting: “In the event of a war between Austria and Russia, the entire Ukrainian public will unanimously and decisively side with Austria, against the Russian Empire as the biggest enemy¹.”

¹ *Levitsky K.* History of political thought of Galician Ukrainians, 1848–1914: in 2 v. V. 2. Lvov, 1927. P. 634.

Ukrainian nationalism of the late XIX century developed in Austro-Hungary under incubation conditions created by the Austrian authorities for subsequent spread to the territory of greater Ukraine. The same can be said about the Poles, who planned to make Galicia a bridgehead for revival of the second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The main difference between them was that the latter had real levers of power in Galicia, while the former only relied on loyalty to Vienna, wanting to arouse its approval with their Russophobic actions.

Fearing for their fate in Eastern Galicia, the Polish public turned to a well-known political figure, Marshal of the Galician Seim, Count Andrzej Potocki, in search of a “firm” hand. A Polish landowner and a well-known conservative, he agreed to head the governorship, but only after receiving additional powers from Vienna, which gave him the right to make final decisions on Galician affairs. Emperor Franz Joseph accepted his conditions and appointed him governor of Galicia on 8 June, 1903. This was a harsh response to the challenge of the Ukrainian party, which threatened further deep shocks to Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia.

At the beginning of the first decade of the twentieth century, the main efforts of the Austrian vicegerency and the Polish elite were focused on the final solution of the Russophil issue. The offensive was carried out through the encouragement of creation of Ukrainian nationalist cultural, educational, economic and national organizations under the control of the authorities. These spoiler societies were organized in parallel with the existing Russophil and similar tasks. The goal is to divert attention of the population and weaken the authority of successfully working Russophil social movements and unions.

In 1904, Ukrainian nationalists formed the “Regional Credit Union” and “Union of Dairy Cooperatives” societies, in 1905 — the “Union of Cattle Breeding Cooperatives,” in the ideological sphere — “Prosvita.” They quickly covered the territory of Eastern Galicia with a dense network. Paramilitary sports societies of the Galician-Ukrainian youth were actively created: “Ukrainian Falcon” (1894) and “Sech” (1900). They set as their task the formation of a nationalist-political worldview among young adherents in the perspective of “Independent Ukraine.” By 1910, the number of “Falcons” and “Sechs,” united in

the central “Falcon-Father,” was already 601, and by 1914–1974. Sech associations did not pursue educational goals.

The structure of the Galician “Sechs” was outwardly copied the Zaporozhian Sech. At the head of each “Sech” was the commander of Cossack camp, who was subordinate to the county administrator. The county members made up the “Main

Sech Committee” under the leadership of the ataman, who had a symbol of power — a gilded warder. Strict discipline reigned in the structure, regular marches, reviews and parades. Uniform of the Sech people is Cossack trousers, a Guzul chip-ax behind the belt and a wide crimson ribbon over the shoulder.

The paramilitary nature of these structures is beyond doubt. The Austrian authorities created and directly supported these organizations, seeing them as units to fight both Galician Russians and Russia. For example, in the summer of 1914, Austrian generals were present at the general meeting of the Sech.

As they expected, during the First World War, the Ukrainian Sichov Striltsy (USS) took part in the hostilities against the Russian army. For example, some of them were included in the 129th and 130th brigades and the 55th infantry division of the Austro-Hungarian army. According to some reports, they fought one of their first battles against the Kuban Cossacks.

At the end of February 1908, elections were scheduled for the Galician Seim, which were held according to the old curial system. Ukrainian nationalists planned to hold up to 40 ambassadors to the regional parliament, while the success of the Russophile party was ruled out by them. However, events began to develop according to a different scenario, since the ruling Polish elite of the region this time did not plan to strengthen the political ambitions of the leaders of Ukrainian nationalism with their administrative resources. In addition, the governor of Galicia A. Pototskiy, fearing a repetition of the incidents of the election campaign that took place a year earlier, due to the unmotivated aggression of the Narodovtsy, this time limited himself to supporting the Polish conservatives, hoping to strengthen them.

Such a position, course and, most importantly, the results of the elections caused undisguised irritation among Ukrainian nationalists.

Hysteria in the literal sense of the word spilled over into the pages of Ukrainian publications. In the Galician-Ukrainian press, A. Potockiy was called a satrap, a Turkish pasha, a rapist.

In April 1908, the Ukrainian nationalist M. Sichinskiy committed an act of political terror — the murder of A. Pototskiy. The degree of indignation among the Polish youth of Lvov was unprecedented. In Ukrainian educational institutions — “Dnester,” “Enlightenment,” “Academic House,” the theological seminary, all the windows were broken. The next day, the bookstore named after T. Shevchenko was destroyed, the riots continued for several more days. To maintain order in the city, the authorities sent troops.

The fact of the attack on the highest official representing Vienna in the region, a Polish aristocrat, testifies to the sharp radicalization of Ukrainian nationalists.

The well-known Russian public figure Count V. A. Bobrinsky wrote about this danger: “If the Russian movement is broken and Eastern Galicia is completely Ukrainianized, then the entire force of the enemy onslaught will be directed at our Little Russia, and Ukrainian propaganda will intensify in our country. It is clear that the defense of the Russian cause on the Dnestr and San is its defense on the Dnieper, and, working in Galicia, we are working for our national self-defense, regardless of the question of the state reunification of Chervonnaya Rus with us¹.”

In a certain sense, the Poles became a victim of their political shortsightedness, creating and supporting Ukrainian nationalist movements against Russians for decades.

As subsequent historical events showed, this terrorist act served as the starting point for the unleashing of a bloody confrontation in which not only Russophiles, but also Poles became an object, not a subject of domestic politics.

The Viennese authorities appointed a supporter of Ukrainian nationalists M. Bobzhinskiy to the post of governor in Galicia. The parliamentary elections in June 1911 were held in an atmosphere of widespread abuse. This time, the authorities did not hide their support for Ukrainian nationalists, while at the same time intensifying repressions

¹ AVPRI. F. 135. Op. 474. D. 152. L. 19.

against Russophiles. The results were not long in coming: supporters of the Ukrainian nationalists received 24 mandates in Galicia and five in Bukovina, while the leaders of the Russian movement received only two mandates. On voting day in Drohobych, troops opened fire on a crowd of outraged citizens, killing 28 and injuring more than a hundred people. The Russophil movement was defeated, receiving 60% fewer votes than in 1907 (two against five).

Real political life was active in the representative bodies of power and local self-government of Galicia. Gradually, the intensity of political battles increased, which eventually led Galicia to disrupt the political balance and get out of the strict control of the metropolis. This trend was timely caught by the Russian ambassador in Vienna, M. Girs. In January 1912, in his dispatch to St. Petersburg, he reported that “due to the weakness of the Austrian government, Galicia has become a completely autonomous province, over which the central Viennese government has no power¹.”

As the international situation in Eastern Europe worsened, “Austrophilian” sentiments intensified among Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia. They manifested themselves especially brightly at the II All-Ukrainian Student Congress in Lvov in June 1913. D. Dontsov, a well-known Russophobe and ideologue of radical Ukrainian nationalism, delivered the main report “Current Political Situation of the Nation and Our Tasks.” Released in 1908 on bail from a Kiev prison, he moved to Galicia, where he acted as an ardent opponent of his own Ukrainian Social Democratic Party and a critic of the foreign policy program of the national liberation movement of Ukraine, declaring his support for the so-called integral nationalism. Before the student youth of Galicia, he voiced the position of the radically anti-Russian part of the Ukrainian political elite. In his opinion, Russia was the main obstacle for the Ukrainian-Polish cooperation. D. Dontsov reported: “The current moment is most conducive to the eventual (possible under appropriate conditions) implementation of the program of separatism ... We are experiencing a time of extreme aggravation of interstate contradictions ... major national movements: Turkish, Albanian ... Ukrainian. We are rapidly approaching the pan-European chaos,

¹ AVPRI. F. 135. Op. 474. D. 152. L. 19.

which has now brought freedom to Albania, and tomorrow, perhaps, will bring freedom to us... I mean the conflict between Austrian and, in general, German imperialism and Russian... We must together answer clearly and unambiguously the big question that has confronted us: where to go?¹

Even then, one of the most devoted supporters of D. Dontsov was a participant of the congress, the future founder of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UMO) Evgeniy Konovalts. Among the active allies of D. Dontsov, who sought to unleash a war between Austria and Germany against Russia, one should also include his Polish associate J. Pilsudskiy. He and his associates were impressed by Dontsov's call to educate the people in military organizations. The listeners were especially impressed by the bold criticism of the authorities of the Galician youth M. Drahomanov and M. Grushevskiy, who took a moderate position on the Ukrainian issue, as well as V. Lipitskiy and V. Vernadskiy, who excluded solution of the issue within the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

At the same time, sympathy of a part of the intellectual and political elite for the Russian Galicians was actively revived in Russia.

On 15 December, 1902, the Galician-Russian Charitable Society (GRCS) was formed in St. Petersburg. Its charter envisaged for "providing all kinds of moral and material support to Russian Galicians and their families temporarily or permanently residing in St. Petersburg²." The society declared its desire to familiarize the Russian population with the life of Carpathian Rus, its past and present. In 1908, through the efforts of Anton Budilovich, chairman of the Galician-Russian Charitable Society (GRCS) in St. Petersburg, the newspaper "Moskovskie Vedomosti" begins to print materials on Slavic topics. GRCS expands its activities in a number of cities of the Russian Empire under the leadership of a new chairman, Count Vladimir Alekseevich Bobrinskiy. This period is marked by an increase in the visits of guests from the "under-yoke" (Galician) Rus' to the

¹ Essays on the History of Ukraine / ed. by P. P. Tolochko. Kiev, 2010. P. 293.

² Report on the Activities of the Galician-Russian Charitable Society in St. Petersburg for 1912, St. Petersburg, 1913. P. 25.

“sovereign” (Moscow), which was observed until the military terror unfolded in Austro-Hungary on the eve of the First World War. With the participation of Galician Russians, numerous scientific meetings and musical evenings were held, which often ended with a friendly dinner for members of the society and guests. Thus, in February 1912, a peasant youth theater group from Galicia performed in St. Petersburg, which showed three plays. A group of State Duma deputies headed by Chairman M. Rodzianko attended the play *Podgoryany* based on the melodrama by I. Gushalevich.

At the All-Slavic Congress held in July 1908 in Prague, a member of the Russian delegation V. A. Bobrinskiy “personally spoke in defense of the Galician Russians¹.” Position of the Russian delegation played an important role in the desire of the Galician Russophiles to popularize their movement in Russia. Support of its leaders by nationally expressed circles in the State Duma of the third convocation against the backdrop of the increasingly louder Galician Ukrainian nationalist movement — anti-Russian and pro-Austrian — was noticed by the ruling circles of the Russian Empire. In addition, it was supported by alarming messages from the Russian Ambassador to Vienna, L. P. Urusov. Commenting on the situation in Galicia, he noted: “This party, with its activities aimed at development of the Ukrainian nationality, supports the Ukrainian separatist movement in our Little Russia. <...> The Ukrainophile Party is a social revolutionary center on our border. As for the Russian People’s Party, its development is only useful for us, this creates a friendly element on the same border².” Olfierov, an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia writes about this in his note, written to the leadership in 1908. Concerning the policy of the authorities of Austria-Hungary, he reported: “Ukrainians will merge into an independent people, and then the fight against separatism will become impossible. While the Russian spirit still lives in Galicia, Ukrainianism is not so dangerous for Russia, but as soon as the Austro-Hungarian government succeeds in fulfilling its dream of destroying everything Russian in Galicia, and making it forget forever about the once-existing Red Orthodox

¹ AVPRI. F. 151. Op. 482. D. 3425. L. 12.

² AVPRI. F. 135. Op. 474. D. 156. L. 3 ob.

Rus', then it will be too late, and Russia will not be able to cope with the enemy¹.”

For these reasons, an influence of the Galician-Russian society in the Russian political circles of St. Petersburg increased. On 1 June, 1909, a new charter was adopted, which significantly expanded the goals and objectives of this organization. On 19 October, the People's Congress of supporters of the Russophil movement was held in Lvov, at which the charter and the name of the new structure — the Russian People's Organization (RPO) were adopted. Although it was not a party, it gave an additional impetus to the movement. In the autumn of 1909, the daily newspaper “Pricarpathian Rus” in Russian began to be published in Lvov.

In the spring and summer of 1913, meetings and demonstrations were held in St. Petersburg dedicated to the grave situation of the Galician Russians. On them, in the presence of members of the State Duma, the State Council, the Russophobic nature of the policy of the Austrian and Polish authorities of Galicia was denounced.

In 1913, a terrible famine broke out in the Carpathians. The Russian Rescue Committee was formed to provide assistance to the population in Lvov. In October of the same year, the leadership of the committee appealed to the Russians with an appeal “A Cry from Russian Galicia.” Within the framework of the GRCS in St. Petersburg, the Committee for Assistance to the Starving in Red Ruthenia was formed. By May 1914, more than 100 thousand rubles were collected in all parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church and sent to the starving in Galicia². At a Galician-Russian rally on 1 March, 1914 in St. Petersburg, reporting on the Marmarosh and Lvov political trials against Russian-Carpathian figures, a member of the Society I. Nikanorov drew the attention of the participants to the lack of “that firmness of Russian policy, as a result of which such a dismissive attitude was possible to the Russian name, which we now see in these two processes³.”

¹ AVPRI. F. 135. Op. 474. D. 43. L. 13 ob.

² *Pashaeva N. M.* Essays on History of the Russian Movement in Galicia in XIX–XX Centuries. Moscow, 2001. P. 135.

³ Report on the activities of the Galician-Russian charitable society in St. Petersburg for 1913–1914. St. Petersburg, 1915. P. 44.

Thus, the complex social, economic, national and religious problems of Galicia on the eve of the First World War did not portend a peaceful development. In the near future, this trouble region had to go through devastation, bloodshed and numerous victims.

In 1914, the former Minister of the Interior Affairs, member of the State Council P. N. Durnovo sent an analytical note to the Emperor, in which, referring to Galicia, he wrote: "... The so-called Ukrainian or Mazepa movement is not terrible for us now, but we should not let it grow, increasing the number of restless Ukrainian elements, since in this movement there is an undoubted germ of an extremely dangerous Little Russian separatism, which, under favorable conditions, can reach completely unexpected dimensions¹." The First World War became precisely such conditions and a serious test for Southwestern Russia.

The Western Territory became a frontline zone. Bloody battles unfolded in Galicia.

It should be noted that in Russia the residents of Little Russia were and were officially considered an organic part of the titular nation, the Russian people. In political, cultural, religious respects, they enjoyed the same rights as the Great Russians. In Austria-Hungary, the Russian (Ukrainian) population was a discriminated minority.

Part of its inhabitants, who adhered to Ukrainian nationalist views, supported the Austrian authorities. About 250 thousand Ukrainians served in the Austrian troops. However, this figure is incomparable with the number of residents of Little Russia and New Russia who fought in the Russian army. Their quantity was 3.5 million people. In other words, only about 7% of the residents of Little Russia (Ukrainians) who fought in the Russian army were on the side of Germany and Austro-Hungary. It is also interesting to note that some of the Ukrainian nationalists also took the side of Russia.

In this regard, the propaganda thesis spread in modern Ukraine that the Ukrainians were divided into two equal parts during the First World War is completely untrue.

The outbreak of hostilities was greeted with enthusiasm and caused an increase in patriotic sentiments both in the central regions

¹ *Durnovo P. N.* Note of Durnovo. February 1914 // *Krasnaya Nov.* 1922. No.6.

of the empire and in New Russia and Little Russia, which led to the consolidation of society. The task of defending the Fatherland temporarily subdued political conflicts and social strife. Most of the opposition parties came out in support of the actions of the government and the army. The exception was the radical wing of the socialists, who came out with defeat ideas and advocated refusal to support the government in the “imperialist war.”

On the contrary, there was a split among Ukrainian nationalists. One part, led by Vladimir Vynnichenko, launched a campaign against participation in the war and for continuation of struggle for the political autonomy of Ukraine. Another part of the representatives of the Partnership spoke from patriotic positions. In particular, these views were shared by Simon Petlyura, who called in the manifest “War and Ukrainians” to fight against Germany and Austro-Hungary.

Petlyura declared the following: “When crossing the border, Russia’s opponents will, of course, try to win over the Ukrainian population to their side and sow confusion among them with all sorts of political and national promises. Ukrainians will not succumb to provocative influences and will fulfill their duty as the citizens of Russia in this difficult time to the end, and not only on the battlefield, in the ranks of army fighting against violators of world peace and law, but also as citizens — ordinary people who are obliged to the best of their ability and opportunities to contribute to the successful fulfillment by the Russian army of an exceptionally responsible task that their fate prepared for them...”

We can affirm that the integrity and strength of that unanimity, which, under the influence of a perceived danger, united the entire diverse population of Russia, all classes and groups of society, unanimity, unprecedented for a long time, and manifested itself so brightly, refreshingly and invigoratingly, was created with the participation of Ukrainian society, which managed to find both political development and civic tact are sufficient in itself to place at the forefront an idea of defending the state and repulsing the danger threatening it during a state upheaval. This unanimity is the key to success and the root of hope for a happy end to a difficult test¹.”

¹ *Petlyura S. V.* War and Ukrainians [website]. URL: <http://doc20vek.ru/node/1757> (access date: 05.02.2022).

From the beginning of 1914, the authorities of Austro-Hungary clearly outlined the course for the destruction of the Russophil trend in Eastern Galicia, considering it to be a conductor of Russian policy. This was fully manifested during the staged trials in 1913 in Marmarosh-Siget and in March 1914 in Lvov.

Before the war, all of Galicia became the territory of youth paramilitary organizations, the so-called Sokol organizations, both Ukrainian and Polish. The number of Polish was about 40 thousand people. In addition, the parties actively formed and developed numerous rifle unions and squads, as well as organizations such as the Military Union named after Kostyushko, organization “Z” and others. On 16 August, 1914, at the initiative of J. Pilsudskiy, recruitment to the Polish legions was announced.

The structures of Ukrainian nationalists should include those similar in name, for example, Sokol, Sich and Plast. By the summer of 1914, these organizations united about 135 thousand members in their ranks¹. They were actively created, supported and funded by the Austro-Hungarian authorities as their combat units.

This calculation was largely justified — already in the first days of the war in Lvov and other cities of Galicia, leaders of Ukrainian nationalist organizations initiated mass demonstrations in support of the Habsburg empire. On 1 August, 1914, representatives of the parties of Ukrainian nationalists (seven national democrats, four radicals and four social democrats) united to create a new organization — Golovna Ukrainian Rada (GUR). This structure was headed by the deputy of the Austrian parliament Kost Levitskiy. From the first day, the GUR announced its participation in the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary, about uniting against the Russian Empire, and on 6 August, 1914, it appealed for the creation of a paramilitary formation of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (USR), which subsequently fought in the ranks of the Austro-Hungarian army. Vast majority of them were members of the aforementioned paramilitary organizations of the Ukrainian nationalists.

During the war, after occupation of Galicia by Russian troops, the leaders of Ukrainian nationalists moved their political activities to

¹ Austro-Hungary. Military training of the population: a collection of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. 1914. Issue 62. P. 26–27.

Vienna, which also became a center for emigrants from Little Russia. The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Ukr. Союз Визволення України, UFU), founded in August 1914 in Lvov. The main goal of this organization was propaganda work on the recruitment and “Ukrainization” of prisoners of war from Little Russia, held in Austria, Germany and Hungary for their subsequent use as their supporters in the fight against Russia. At the suggestion of the UFU, prisoners from Little Russia were concentrated in separate camps (about 50 thousand in Germany and 30 thousand in Austria). Together with the German General Headquarters, the UFU was engaged in the recruitment and training of sabotage groups that were sent to the rear of the warring Russian troops. Each member of such a group received from 500 to 1000 rubles. The first sabotage detachment began to operate in February 1916.

On 5 May, 1915, Ukrainian nationalists from Galicia and Bukovina founded the General Ukrainian Rada (GUR) in Vienna. Kost Levitskiy became the head of this structure. The organization proclaimed as its goal the creation of autonomy on the territory of Galicia and Bukovina within the borders of Austria-Hungary. However, the Austrian authorities were categorically against even such moderate demands, since they believed that the division of Galicia could turn the Poles away from Vienna, and this was fraught with negative consequences in the context of a major war.

Within the Habsburg Empire, mass repressions were directed mainly against the Serb population in Bosnia and the Russophil population in Eastern Galicia. First of all, this concerned its intellectual elite. First of all, this concerned intellectual elite. I. I. Terekh writes: “At the very beginning of this war, the Austrian authorities will arrest almost the entire Russian intelligentsia of Galicia and thousands of advanced peasants according to lists prepared in advance and handed over to the administrative and military authorities by the Ukrainophiles”¹.

Together with the mobilization on 31 July, mass arrests began. In Lvov, a member of parliament, Doctor of Law D. A. Markov was arrested. They arrested all those suspected of sympathy for Russia —

¹ *Terekh I. I.* Ukrainization of Galicia // Free speech of Carpathian Rus. 1952. No.5. P. 8.

members of the reading room of the Society name after Kachkovskiy, people who read a Russian newspaper or were known as Russophils. On 18 August, when the retreat of the Austro-Hungarian troops began, mass executions took place according to “abbreviated proceedings.” In Lvov alone, before the evacuation, about 8,000 people suspected of being Russophils were arrested. Later, with the assistance of the chairman of the main Regional Charitable Committee, V. A. Bobrinskiy, the fates of only 2 thousand were established. Informing about Russophils was paid with bonuses from 50 to 500 crowns¹ depending on the social status of the victim. Particular zeal in this was shown by supporters of Ukrainian nationalism, who were then called “Mazepa’s followers.” They used an opportunity to help physically exterminate the Russophils.

For example, 60 peasants were killed without trial in the Gorodetskiy district, 5 in the village of Zaluzhye, 6 in the village of Porechi, 16 were hanged in Zushitsy, 55 people were executed in Kamenobrod, and this is only in one county². All Russian societies in Lvov since the beginning of the war with the beginning of the war. By 28 August, there were already 2,000 prisoners in the prisons of Lvov, as they were called, “Russophiles dangerous for the state³.”

The methods of action of the Austrian military authorities are described in detail by the Austrian writer Josef Roth, who can hardly be suspected of disloyalty to the authorities. In his novel about Austro-Hungary, he reports on the events of the beginning of the war in August 1914: “Numerous and very contradictory orders came from the headquarters of the army ... in churchyards ... shots were heard from hasty executors of reckless sentences, a gloomy drum roll accompanied the monotonous decisions of the courts read out by auditors; the wives of those who had been shot, screaming for mercy, lay in the mud in front of the mud-stained boots of the officers, and blazing, red and

¹ *Cornwall M.* The Undermining of Austro-Hungary. Battle for Hearts and Minds. New York, 2000. P. 20; Ukrainians ... Can Become Decent Austrians // Military History Journal. 1997. No.3. P. 60.

² Talerhof Almanac: Memorable Book of Austrian Cruelties, Fanaticism and Violence Against the Carpatho-Russian People during the World War of 1914–1917. Issue 1. Terror in Galicia during the first period of the war of 1914–1915. Lvov, 1924. P. 40–43.

³ *Ibid.* P. 27.

silver fire burst out of the huts and barns, sheds and stacks. The war of the Austrian army began with field courts. For days on end, real and false traitors hung on the trees of church yards, terrifying all living people¹.”

Starting the war, Russia counted on the liberation of the Russian lands of Galicia. On 3 August, 1914, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolayevich, addressed the “Russian people!”

The manifest said, particularly, the following:

Patiently, with Christian humility, the Russian people languished for centuries under a foreign yoke, but neither flattery nor persecution could break its aspirations of freedom.

As a stormy stream tears stones to merge with the sea, so there is no force that would stop the Russian people in their impulse to unite.

Yes, there will be no more under-yoke Rus. The property of St. Vladimir, the land of Yaroslav Osmomysl, Princes Daniel and Roman, throwing off the yoke, let him hoist the banner of a single, great, indivisible Russia.

May the Providence of God come to pass, blessing the work of the collectors of the great Russian land.

May the Lord help His Royal Anointed Emperor Nikolay Alexandrovich of All Russia to complete the work of Grand Duke Ivan Kalita. Freed Russian brothers! All of you will find a place in the bosom of Mother Russia².”

7 August, 1914 General A. A. Brusilov appealed to his officers: “We are entering Galicia, although it is now part of Austro-Hungary, but this is the originally Russian land, inhabited mainly by the Russian people ... I express full confidence that none of the officials who have the honor of belonging to the army will allow themselves any violence over a civilian and will disgrace the name of a Russian soldier.”

On 10 August, an order was published of the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front, Adjutant General N. I. Ivanov,

¹ *Rot J. March of Radetzkiy*. Moscow, 2000. P. 331.

² Appeal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the Russian people [website]. URL: https://russportal.ru/index.php?id=russia.patriotic_war1914_00_011 (access date: 06.02.2022).

which clearly spelled out what shall be a benevolent attitude towards the population. Soldiers were encouraged to visit Uniate churches, crosses and icons from Kiev and Pochaev were distributed. It was recommended to learn some local Russian customs. For example, during a greeting: “Glory to Jesus Christ!” the answer should be: “Glory forever!”

Russia’s military operations on the Southwestern Front were successful. 18 August — 21 September, 1914, during the Battle of Galicia, the Austrian army was defeated. Losses amounted to 400 thousand people, including 100 thousand prisoners. On 2 September, 1914, Russian troops liberated the ancient Russian city of Galich, on 3 September — Lvov. Six centuries after the start of the Polish occupation, Galicia returned to Russia. Liberation of the ancient Russian lands was completed on 22 March, 1915, after a four-month siege of Peremyshl.

On 5 September, 1914, the Galician General Government was created on the newly acquired lands. The well-known public official Count Georgy Bobrinskiy was appointed military governor-general of Galicia. subsequently, four governorates were created here: Lvov, Ternopol, Chernovtsy and Peremyshl.

On 28 September, 1914, Nicholas II instructed to conduct “a careful resolution of the religious issue in Galicia.” A policy of faith tolerance was proclaimed. Conversion of the Greek Catholic parishes to Orthodoxy was allowed only if 75 % of the members of the community were in favor of this decision. The policy towards the Polish population of Galicia was just as cautious. The Russian administration took their personal and property interests under protection.

The big problem was to provide aid to the poorest strata of the population of Lvov. In order to prevent famine, a food charitable committee was formed in September, chaired by Major General G. F. Eikhe. At the end of September, products worth 60,000 rubles (at a rate of 0.3 rubles per crown) were brought into the city, mainly salt, sugar, corned beef, flour, cereals and rice. In October 1914, the population of Lvov received food worth 100,000 rubles. In November 1914, food aid was provided in the form of 16,000 poods of flour, 1,500 poods of cereals, 12,000 packs of canned coffee, etc., which was received by 19,537 people.

A serious problem was the presence in the city without a livelihood of 12,000 families of Austrian officials. Solution of the issue on them took place at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire and the Council of Ministers and received the approval of Nicholas II. It was decided that a consortium of Lvov banks would lend the city 1,350,000 crowns for this, under the promise of the Russian government to consider returning this amount to the banks when concluding a peace treaty with Austro-Hungary. Also, the mentioned committee opened 83 canteens in the city by May 1915. Tens of thousands of certificates for free aid were issued (only in October 1914—15 thousand). In general, the measures taken made it possible by the spring of 1915 to stabilize the food situation in Lvov and eliminate famine.

To assist the peasants of Galicia during the sowing season of 1915, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire allocated 11 million rubles. By 18 April, the region received 166,549 poods of grain. It was sold to the population for cash or in installments until 1 March, 1916, subject to payment of 25% of the cost, however, the poorest peasants received grain without a deposit. Unfortunately, the unsold part of the grain had to be destroyed during retreat of the Russian troops. Also in April 1915 the draft cattle arrived from Russia for the peasants.

Many orphans in the region were admitted to orphanages; after the retreat of the Russian troops, they were evacuated to Russia. For temporary free courses for teachers at the women's gymnasium of M. A. Lokhvitskaya-Skalon from Galicia (originally they were organized in St. Petersburg), the government allocated 35 thousand rubles¹. Also, 7.5 thousand rubles were allocated for this purpose by the Petrograd City Duma².

The result of capturing of well-fortified Peremyshl was imprisonment of 120 thousand Austrians. However, it was not possible to develop further success. By April 1915, the Russian offensive army had gotten completely exhausted. During the offensive Carpathian operation, losses of the Russian army amounted to 1 million people.

¹ Special Magazine of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire. 1915. Moscow, 2008. P. 53.

² Ukrainian Life. 1915. No.1. P. 81.

At the same time, the Austrian army received significant reinforcements from Germany. The Germans transferred Mackensen's 11th Army from the Western Front to help their demoralized ally. In May 1915, the Austro-German troops went on the offensive. The "Great Retreat" of the Russian army began. Main reasons for the defeat were an acute shortage of weapons and ammunition, as well as German reinforcements.

Retreat of the Russian army led to a huge outflow of the Russian population of Galicia, who did not want to get into the Austro-Hungarian concentration camps and fled with the Russian troops.

According to various sources, the outflow of local population from Galicia in the spring and summer of 1915 became a mass phenomenon. An analysis of the press shows that by August 1915, about 100 thousand refugees arrived to Russia. "Only from Lvov in the month of June, every hour and a half, a train with the refugees to Russia departed¹."

In the words of the renowned Russian general Anton Denikin: "I remember the days of a difficult retreat from Galicia, when a distraught crowd of people, with women, children, cattle and belongings, spontaneously moved behind the troops, burning their houses and villages ... Markov walked in the rear guard and had to immediately blow up the bridge, I think over Styr, at which a live human sea was crowded. But human desperation touched him, and for six more hours he fought for the crossing, risking being cut off, until the last cart with refugees passed²."

According to the results of appeal of Archbishop Evlogiy of Volyn to Adjutant General N.I. Ivanov, it was decided to resettle about 50 thousand refugees in the Volyn governorate in the houses abandoned by German colonists³. Refugees from Galicia also arrived to Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Kaluga, Smolensk, Chernigov and Kharkov governorates. In Kiev, they were located mainly on Podol and the city

¹ Morning of Russia. 1915. 18 June.

² *Denikin A. I.* Essays on Russian Troubles. Volume I [website]. URL: <https://он-лайн-читать.рф/деникин-очерки-русской-смуты/11>. (access date: 05.02.2022).

³ During 1915 and the beginning of 1916, all the German colonists were deported from Volhy, after which the authorities sequestered 98,000 acres of land. Refugees from Galicia and the Kingdom of Poland were settled there.

hippodrome. In order to provide them with the food aid, the Council of Ministers decided to allocate funds (300 thousand rubles from the budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as 160 thousand rubles from the funds of the Committee of Princess Tatyana Nikolaevna)¹ for the purchase of 30 million poods of rye (and this is in war conditions). Also, refugees from Galicia were paid daily for food from 20 to 50 kopecks. In addition, pupils of educational institutions, shelters and students of courses were financed. Due to the excessive overload of Kiev, it was decided to make Rostov-on-Don one of the main centers for accommodation of the refugees. And already in the autumn of 1915, the city received thousands of refugees (only Galician intellectuals and students were more than 6 thousand people)². Vladimir Feofilovich Dudykevich, one of the leaders of the Galician Russophils, headed the Russian refugees. With his active participation, a special gymnasium for Russian Galicians was opened in the city, which earned a good reputation.

On 2 June, German troops captured Peremyshl. On 9 June, Russian troops left Lvov. Galicia was lost. However, further advance into the depths of Russian territory was prevented.

After the Austrian army returned to Galicia in the summer of 1915, the wave of repression resumed with renewed vigor, and thousands of Russophils were arrested and sent to the Talerhof concentration camp. At the same time, two high-profile trials took place in Vienna (1915 and 1916), in which 31 people were held accountable. Kost Levitskiy, the leader and ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism, who later became one of the founders of WUPR, Professor of the Lvov University Kirilo Studinskiy, editor of the Ukrainian Lvov "Dila" Yaroslav Veselovskiy and others, took part as witnesses for the prosecution in the proceedings. According to the verdicts of the courts, 24 Russophils from Eastern Galicia and Bukovina, including two deputies of parliament (Dmitry Markov and Vladimir Kurilovich), were sentenced to death, later changed to life imprisonment (released in the spring of 1917 under the amnesty of Emperor Charles I). The seven people sentenced in the first case

¹ RSIA. F. 909. Op. 1. D. 431. L. 14 ob.

² Ibid. L. 16.

were saved from death by Nicholas III, by appealing through the Spanish king Alphonse XII with a request for pardon.

To isolate and eliminate the Russophiles, the Austrian authorities organized the first concentration camps in Europe, the most famous of them — Terezin and Talerhof. The Talerhof camp (4 September, 1914—10 May, 1917) was established by the Habsburg authorities already in the first days of the war in a sandy valley at the foot of the Alps, not far from the city of Graz, the capital of the Austrian province of Styria. It was here that those who were suspected of pro-Russian and Orthodox sympathies were deported under guard, usually, as a result of denunciations. The first batch of Russian Galicians in the amount of 2 thousand people was delivered by the Austrian soldiers of the Gratsky Regiment already on 4 September, 1914. People were brought in freight cars of 80–100 people each and unloaded directly into the field. There was practically no food, no water was given, the death rate was high. At the end of November, the number of concentration camp prisoners reached 7 thousand people, including children under 10 years of age. Until the winter of 1915, there were not even barracks in Talerhof, so people doomed to suffer laid on the ground under the open sky in rain, snow and frost.

Here is the testimony of an eyewitness, priest Theodore Merena: “There were priests, prelates, lawyers, judges, doctors, instructors, private and state officials, teachers, peasants, bourgeois, psalmists, writers, students, actors, military, military priests — all Russian Galicians, with the exception of a small percentage of Romanians, gypsies, Jews, Poles, Mazepins and three dissolute women from Peremyshl. <...> The Talerhof audience was also diverse in age, ranging from almost a century old to infants. The internees were escorted to the latrines by guards. There was no distinction between men and women. Natural functions were performed on command, and those who did not have time were pierced with bayonets. <...> The interned Ukrainophiles were under the care of lawyer Gankevich, son-in-law of Kostya Levitskiy, a well-known proxy of the Austrian government. Indeed, they were soon released and left the camp. There were also captured Russian soldiers. A bullet was prepared for the slightest violation of the regime¹.”

¹ Talerhof Almanac. Issue 4. Talerhof. Lvov, 1932. P. 20, 64, 158.

According to the testimony of concentration camp prisoners, in particular, G.A. Polyanskiy, A. V. Karabelesh, P. S. Gardego, at least 30 thousand people passed through the concentration camps of Austria Talerhof, Terezin and others¹. Significant part of them died. Only after death of the Emperor of Austro-Hungary Franz Josef, his heir Charles I liquidated Talerhof in May 1917, having written in his rescript the following sentence, striking in its cynicism: “All arrested Russians are not guilty, but they were arrested in order not to become such².” This is a classic example of the genocide of Russians by a European state, which was repeated in the 20th century.

By 1916 the situation at the front had undergone significant changes. Russia managed to establish mass production of weapons and ammunition, which allowed the Russian army to make another attempt to liberate Galicia, called the Brusilov offensive (also Lutsk offensive) in honor of the commander of the Southwestern Front, General Alexey Brusilov.

The operation began on 22 May, 1916. After massive artillery preparation, the front was broken through, and on 7 June, 1916, units of the 8th Army of General Aleksey Kaledin liberated Lutsk. On 15 June, the city of Dubno was liberated, on 18 June, Chernovtsy. On 30 June, Russian troops liberated Kolomyia and reached the Carpathians. On 11 August, they were able to free Stanislav. However, further progress turned out to be impossible. By the autumn of 1916, the offensive of the Russian troops was over, the front stabilized. To counter the Russian army, the Germans and Austrians had to transfer 34 divisions from other fronts, primarily from the Western and Italian ones. Nevertheless, the Austrian army suffered such serious losses that until the end of the war it was no longer able to conduct independent offensive operations.

Total losses of Austro-Hungary and Germany during the Brusilov offensive amounted to 1.2 million people, the losses of the Russian Southwestern Front — 500 thousand people.

¹ War crimes of the Habsburg Monarchy of 1914–1917 Galician Golgotha. Vol. 1. 1964. P. 12.

² War crimes of the Habsburg Monarchy of 1914–1917 Galician Golgotha. Vol. 1. 1964. P. 17.

Russian troops managed to liberate most of Volyn and Bukovina and the southern part of Galicia. However, Lvov remained under the control of Austro-Hungary.

The Brusilov offensive was the last major successful operation of the Russian army during the World War I. Already at the end of 1916, crisis processes intensified in Russia, the result of which was a revolution, the collapse of the monarchy and the Civil War.

Chapter 9

UKRAINE DURING THE GREAT RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE CIVIL WAR

In 1917, the Great Russian Revolution occurred. The center of revolutionary events was the capital city of the empire – Petrograd. These events covered the entire territory of the country, including its central regions and outskirts. It is interesting to note that in modern Ukraine, the Great Russian Revolution is often viewed in isolation from all-Russian events and is even called the «Ukrainian revolution».

The February revolution in Petrograd and collapse of the monarchy led to a rapid exacerbation of the situation in the Southwestern Russia. The Tsar's officials were resigning. Official power passed to the governorate commissars appointed by the Provisional Government, whose functions were performed by the chairmen of governorate's local governments (zemstvos). Socialist parties were coming out from the underground, including the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Social Democrats and Bolsheviks. Soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies were created everywhere. In most places, a situation of dual power was created.

A similar situation occurred in Kiev, but a third one was added to the two power centers — the Ukrainian nationalist one. In the years that followed it seized the power under the Central Rada name. Let us explore its creation and formation in more details. According to some reports, the first name of the Central Rada was proposed by the assistant of the sworn attorney Maxim Sinitskiy, who organized a meeting of 27 people in the house of the newspaper publisher Evgeny

Chikalenko. On 4 March 1917 an article “Among Ukrainians” was published on the pages of “Kievskaya Mysl”, later reprinted in the publication “Kievlyanin”: “Appeal of the Ukrainian Representatives.

A crowded meeting of representatives of local and some Governorate organizations and groups took place last night. In total, over 100 people attended, including representatives of the Ukrainian organizations of all local higher educational institutions and working groups. After reading the telegrams and personal messages of the representatives, the assembly unanimously welcomed the creation of a new government and decided to provide it with all possible assistance. 10 representatives were selected for participation in the city and other committees in which representation of the Ukrainian organizations was required. The meeting very warmly accepted the Central Rada’s proposal to send a deputation to Petrograd to declare urgent needs of the Ukrainian people to the new government.

In its telegram to the head of the Provisional Government, Prince Lvov, on 4 March 1917 the Central Rada declared its support for the Provisional Government, and later elected in absentia Mikhail Grushevskiy, whose anti-Russian pseudo-historical constructions we discussed above in detail, as its chairman.

On 13 March 1917, he returned to Kiev, and on 28 March he held a meeting of the Rada in person as a chairman. Grushevskiy advocated granting Ukraine national and territorial autonomy within Russia.

Creation of the Central Rada was not only as far as possible from the elections in terms of compliance with any democratic standards, but it was not at all about participatory elections. Deputies were considered people who came to its meeting on the basis of dubious or absurd documents (for example, papers on an official trip for receipt of the boots), soldiers of various military units, members of cooperatives, partnerships, study groups, public or political organizations of various levels. At the same time, during the work of the Central Rada itself, the number of these “organizations” and their representatives, who were recognized as deputies, increased all the time. A significant part of the “deputies” (according to historical evidence there were about 300 of them), including M. Grushevskiy, provided various papers that supposedly entrusted them with deputy powers, and thus voted with several, up to 25, votes at once.

Here are the testimonies of the members of the Central Rada themselves: "... There were no elections to the Central Rada anywhere. Deputies from the army participated in the meetings on the basis of certificates that such and such was sent to Kiev to receive a batch of boots from the quartermaster's depot; to submit the machine guns to the repair; to conduct monetary settlements; to undergo medical treatment; etc. The deputies of the "rear areas" had private letters addressed to Grushevskiy and other leaders, with approximately the same content: "we are sending such and such, known to us" ... At the end — signature of the chairman or secretary of some party or public Ukrainian organization. Our representative managed to make a copy of the document confirming powers of the Poltava deputies. All of them were elected by the board of headmen of the Ukrainian club during a meeting attended by 8 people. There were 800 deputy documents in total. The secretary confusedly replied to the official request that all the documents were there. The rest of the deputies (about 300) were Grushevskiy, Vinnichenko, Norsh and other members of the presidium, who were "entrusted" with deputy powers and each of them was equal to 10–15–25 deputies. Finally, the secretary explained that some of the deputies have not yet had time to register, but, he reassured them, we were giving out only receipts for lunch instead of deputy tickets."¹

On 6–8 April at the initiative of the Rada, the All-Ukrainian National Congress was convened. According to its organizers, it was supposed to represent the interests of the entire population of Ukraine. However, the delegates of this Congress were also not elected, and the procedure for their selection was clearly undemocratic in nature with a bright Russophobic component and deliberate discrimination of Russians and violation of their political rights.

Not only was this not hidden, but it was openly declared — in his "Memoirs" Mikhail Grushevskiy described the principles he invented for the formation of the Congress: "For the congress,

¹ *Makarov Yu.* What you need to know about Ukraine. Buenos Aires, 1939. P. 87. Quoted in: *Dikiy Andrey.* Undistorted History of Ukraine — Rus. V. II [website]. URL: <https://history.wikireading.ru/140356> (access date: 22.09.2022).

I developed a mixed system of representation, so that in addition to the national representation, there was something of the territorial representation. Representation was provided to the Ukrainian national organizations — from every ten Ukrainians united in any organization, one representative could be sent to the congress; but one representative could be sent by every rural community that would want it, every factory or plant, and every military unit”¹. Considering that in the end only 900 people attended the congress, and comparing this figure with the total number of rural communities, factories, plants, military units and organizations, it is easy to see that this number represented only a small fraction of the entire population. In fact, only structures controlled by or ideologically close to the leadership of the Rada with nationalist Ukrainian views participated in the congress.

Russians, as well as representatives of other peoples living in Ukraine, according to the plan of M. Grushevskiy, were openly discriminated against and deprived of their political rights. Also people who did not support the Ukrainian nationalist views were deprived of these rights. This was openly declared by the norms of representation developed by the leadership of Rada: delegates to the Congress could be sent by “all political, cultural, professional, territorial Ukrainian organizations that supported the demand for broad national and territorial autonomy of Ukraine and the entirety of Ukrainian political and cultural life, namely parties, cultural, educational and economic societies; workers’, peasants’, military organizations, organizations of clergy, public servants, students of all types of educational institutions; villages, cities and counties”².

In other words, the principles of formation were not at all democratic. They excluded participation in the Congress of opponents of the national and territorial autonomy of Ukraine, i.e. they did not assume availability of alternative views and positions among the delegates. Participation in the work of the Congress of representatives of non-Ukrainian organizations and societies was not provided, despite

¹ Грушевський М. Memories. К., 1989. P. 144.

² Novaya Rada, March 28, 1917. Quoted in: Nature of the Ukrainian national government has hardly changed in 100 years [website]. URL: <https://vz.ru/politics/2017/12/25/900177.html> (access date: 09.02.2022).

the fact that in addition to the Little Russians, a significant number of Great Russians, as well as Poles, Jews, and representatives of other ethnic groups lived on the territory of South-Western Russia.

It is interesting to note that in the near future the leadership of the Central Rada directly stated that it claims power not only in Little Russia, but also in New Russia, parts of the territories of the Kingdom of Poland, as well as on Russian lands, including the Kuban, as well as the territories of Kursk and Voronezh Governorates.

Ukrainian organizations with less than 50 members could delegate one person to the Congress, with the number of members from 50 to 100 — two, from 100 to 200 — three, from 200 to 300 — four, over 300 — five. In total, 900 delegates participated in the Congress.

The result of work of the Congress was the adoption of three resolutions based on the ideas of the national and territorial autonomy of Ukraine within Russia and the need for a federal structure of Russia. The first resolution, adopted on April 6, contained the following provisions:

“1. In accordance with the historical traditions and modern real needs of the Ukrainian people, the congress recognizes that only the national and territorial autonomy of Ukraine is able to satisfy the aspirations of our people and all other peoples living on Ukrainian soil, 2. that full guarantee of this autonomous status of Ukraine, as well as other autonomous regions of Russia, will be a federation, 3. therefore, the Congress considers the Russian Federative Democratic Republic as the only acceptable form of government, 4. and one of the main principles of Ukrainian autonomy is to fully ensure the rights of national minorities that live in Ukraine”¹.

Thus, the delegates of the Congress not only defined Ukrainians as a separate nation from Russians and demanded recognition of the political subjectivity of Ukraine, but also designated the Great Russian population of Ukraine as a national minority. At the same time, the leaders of the Congress meant Ukraine as the territory of not only Little Russia, with a predominantly Little Russian population, but also New Russia, with a mixed, predominantly Great Russian population.

¹ Ukraine Autonomy Project [website]. URL: <https://constitutions.ru/?p=9088> (access date: 09.02.2022).

The resolution, adopted on April 7, was related to clarification of the principles of relations between Ukraine and Russia, and also contained the claims of the self-proclaimed Ukrainian autonomy for international subjectivity, Ukraine's participation in the upcoming international conference on the results of the World War I:

“1. The Ukrainian National Congress, recognizing the right of the Russian Constituent Assembly to approve a new state system in Russia, including the autonomy of Ukraine and the federal structure of the Russian Republic, considers, however, that until convocation of the Russian Constituent Assembly, supporters of the new order in Ukraine cannot remain passive, and in agreement with the small nationalities of Ukraine, they must immediately create the foundations for its autonomous life.

2. The Ukrainian Congress, following the wish of the Provisional Government regarding an arrangement and unification of public forces, recognizes an extreme necessity of organizing a Regional Council Regional Council of representatives of Ukrainian territories and cities, nationalities and social strata. This initiative shall be undertaken by the Ukrainian Central Rada.

3. The Ukrainian Congress, recognizing the right of all nations to political self-determination, considers:

a) that borders between the states should be established in accordance with the will of the population living on the border;

b) that in order to ensure this, it is necessary that, in addition to representatives of the belligerent states, representatives of those peoples on which territory the war is going on, including Ukraine, shall be admitted to the peace conference.”

Attention is drawn to the negligent attitude of the self-proclaimed political elite of not yet created Ukrainian state towards representatives of other peoples who live on the territory of the future Ukrainian state, called “small nationalities of Ukraine”¹.

On April 8, 1917, the work of the Congress ended with an adoption of the third resolution. It focuses on the fight against Polish claims to the “Ukrainian” territories:

¹ Ukraine Autonomy Project [website]. URL: <https://constitutions.ru/?p=9088> (access date: 09.02.2022).

“1. The Ukrainian National Congress protests against the claims to non-Polish lands declared by the Provisional Polish State Council in a declaration to the appeal of the Russian Provisional Government to unite the Polish people with a free Russian state. The Ukrainian people will not tolerate any attempts to seize the rights to the territory of Ukraine, where they shed their sweat and blood.

2. The Ukrainian National Congress, having listened to the statements and specific proposals of the Ukrainian delegates from the army and navy, instructs the Central Rada to submit these specific claims to the Provisional Government for consideration.

3. The Ukrainian National Congress decided to send greetings to Ukrainians at the front.

4. The Ukrainian National Congress instructs the Central Rada to take into its own hands as soon as possible the initiative of the union of those peoples of Russia who, like the Ukrainians, are striving for national and territorial autonomy on democratic principles in the Federal Russian Republic.

5. The Ukrainian National Congress instructs the Central Rada to organize a committee of its deputies and representatives of national minorities to develop a draft of the autonomous state structure of Ukraine. This draft must be submitted for approval to the Congress of Ukraine, organized in such a way that it expresses a will of the population of the entire territory of Ukraine. Approval of the autonomous structure of Ukraine shall be entrusted, according to the resolution of the previous days, to the Constituent Assembly.

6. The Ukrainian National Congress, having heard the resolutions passed to it from the meeting of the Peasant Union on the prohibition, sale and pledge of land and forests, as well as on the long-term lease of underground minerals (coal, ores, etc.), decides to transfer them to the Central Rada for a corresponding statement to the Provisional Government”¹.

The latter document outlines two important positions in shaping the future policy of Ukrainian nationalists: an attempt to reassign Russian military units fighting on the Southwestern and Romanian

¹ Ukraine Autonomy Project [website]. URL: <https://constitutions.ru/?p=9088> (access date: 09.02.2022).

fronts, declaring them the “Ukrainian army”, and a desire to cause separatist sentiments in other Russian regions — an appeal to other national outskirts. Both strategies will be developed in the future and will be used by Ukrainian politicians repeatedly, right up to modern history.

On 8 April the Congress elected a new composition of the Central Rada. It included 115 members based on the following quota: 13 representatives from organizations in Kiev, eight from the Kiev military post, five from cooperative organizations and the Peasant Union, five representatives from the Union of Ukrainian Federalist-Autonomists, four representatives from the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party, three representatives each from the Ukrainian Party of Socialists- Revolutionaries and from the Ukrainian Radical Democratic Party, one representative from the Ukrainian Women’s Union, one representative from the Independence supporters, four representatives each from the Governorates, three representatives from the Governorate centers. committee of the Central Rada (later called the Small Rada) consisting of 20 members was also elected, which received the authority to administer work between sessions of the Rada. Mikhail Grushevskiy was re-elected Chairman of the Committee, and his deputies were well-known figures of Ukrainian nationalism, publicist Vladimir Vinnichenko and literary critic Sergey Efremov. It was the Committee that from that moment carried out activities on behalf of the Rada. Dominant positions in the Committee were occupied by the Ukrainian socialists.

Within a few months, the membership of the Central Rada more than tripled. At first, representatives of parties, workers’, military and soldiers’ organizations were included in its composition. Under pressure from the Provisional Government, representatives of other national groups were also included in it, which, however, did not have an opportunity to influence what was happening. By August, the Rada had already 639 members.

The appeal of the delegates of the Congress to the army and a wish to establish control over the military units had their consequences.

On 5–8 May 1917, the First Ukrainian Military Congress was held in Kiev. 700 congress delegates declared that they represent “900

thousand armed organized Ukrainian people”¹. They were meant as parts of the Russian army of the Southwestern and Romanian fronts, as well as rear posts located in Kiev and other cities of Southwestern Russia.

Participants of the military congress supported the Rada and spoke in favor of the national and territorial autonomy of Ukraine. At the same time, they went further and demanded from the Provisional Government an introduction of a special position of the Minister for the Ukrainian Affairs: “... For greatest unification and agreement of all democratic masses in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Military Congress considers it necessary to demand from the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies an immediate declaration by a special act of the principle of national and territorial autonomy of Ukraine as the best way to ensure all national and political rights of the Ukrainian people and the entire region. As the first step towards real implementation of this act, the congress finds it necessary to immediately appoint a Minister for Ukrainian Affairs under the Provisional government.”

The key idea of the military congress was the demand for the so-called “Ukrainization of the army”, that is, a reform of the Russian army on a national basis, with allocation of a special Ukrainian army. The congress participants stated that “the system of formation of troops from different nationalities adopted under the old despotic regime is based on anti-democratic principles and is associated with a completely waste of people’s money and destruction of the moral principles of nationalities”².

The ways of solving the problem of Ukrainization of the army were determined by separation of the Ukrainian military personnel and creation of a separate “national army” from them: “In the existing military units in the rear units, all Ukrainian soldiers, both officers and soldiers, should be immediately allocated to separate units”; “The best way to maintain conscious discipline, which is now the

¹ From the resolutions of the 1st Ukrainian military congress [website]. URL: <http://www.illuminats.ru/component/content/article/29-new/6669-i-18-21-1917> (access date: 09.02.2022).

² Ibid.

only thing possible in the people's army, which should be based not on fear, but on the trust and mutual understanding of soldiers and officers, as well as on high military spirit, which, in turn, can only be raised by any great common, unifying idea, and one of such ideas for the Ukrainians is an idea of national revival, the Congress considers it necessary to immediately unite all Ukrainians in the troops into one national army.”¹

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian nationalists failed to establish control over the army. The army, in a state of crisis and disorganization, was not ready to support the self-proclaimed Kiev leaders. The demand of the Ukrainian Military Congress did not find support among the units of the regular army.

An idea of national and territorial autonomy did not receive the support of the Provisional Government either. The Cadets who dominated the government were consistent supporters of a unitary state. As a result, the Provisional Government opposed the granting of a special status to Ukraine, and the Military Minister Alexander Kerenskiy banned the Second Ukrainian Military Congress.

A government message published on 3 June 1917 stated: “A negative decision on the issue of publishing an act on the autonomy of Ukraine was taken by the government unanimously”².

However, the Ukrainian nationalists ignored the decision of the Provisional Government. Despite the ban, a Second Military Congress was held on June 8–10, 1917. In total, about 2 thousand delegates participated in the congress. On the last day of the military congress, the Committee of the Central Rada adopted a manifesto developed by Vladimir Vinnichenko, called the “First Proclamation”, which declared the autonomy of Ukraine. The text of the Proclamation contained the following statement: “Without separating from all of Russia, without breaking up with the Russian

¹ From the resolutions of the 1st Ukrainian military congress [website]. URL: <http://www.illuminats.ru/component/content/article/29-new/6669-i-18-21-1917> (access date: 09.02.2022).

² *Sokolova M. V.* Great Power vs. Nationalism: Provisional Government and the Ukrainian Central Rada [website]. URL: <http://www.hist.msu.ru/Labs/UkrBel/sokolova.htm> (access date: 09.02.2022).

state, let the Ukrainian people on their land have the right to manage their own lives. Let the order and system in Ukraine be determined by the All-People's Ukrainian Assembly (Seim) elected by total, equal, direct and secret voting¹.

It is noteworthy that the Proclamation was printed in the Ukrainian language and contained an appeal “to the members of our nation.”

The Proclamation introduced a “special tax on native business”, which all residents of Ukraine had to pay to the self-proclaimed Kiev authorities.

The Proclamation, initiated by Simon Petlyura, was also supported by the delegates of the Second Ukrainian Military Congress.

Five days later, on 15 June 1917 the Central Rada created a prototype of the government — the General Secretariat. Vladimir Vinnichenko was appointed head of the Secretariat.

The Provisional Government was not ready for a conflict with the Central Rada, and did not have sufficient political will to implement its own policy. Therefore, a government delegation was sent to Kiev, consisting of supporters of a compromise position — Military and Navy Minister Alexander Kerenskiy, Minister of Communications Nikolay Nekrasov, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs Irakliy Tsereteli and Minister of Foreign Affairs, the major Ukrainian businessman Mikhail Tereshchenko. The parties reached an agreement. Representatives of the Provisional Government agreed to the granting of autonomy to Ukraine, an introduction of the position of Minister for Ukrainian Affairs and the staffing of Ukrainian units by Ukrainians, stipulating the need for representation of the non-Ukrainian population in the Central Rada.

The compromise reached led to the crisis of the Provisional Government. On 2 July 1917 the Cadet Party, which did not agree with the granting of autonomy to Ukraine, decided to withdraw from the government. Finance Minister Andrey Shingarev, Minister of Public Education Alexander Manuylov and Minister of State Care Prince Dmitriy Shakhovskoy left the government. Negotiator Nikolay Nekrasov preferred to remain in the government and left the party.

¹ *Shubin Alexander*. The First Proclamation [website]. URL: <https://историк.рф/journal/30/perviyj-universal-86.html> (access date: 09.02.2022).

After that, the Provisional Government recognized the General Secretariat as a supreme body for managing regional affairs, appointed by the government in agreement with the Central Rada.

The retaliation measure was an adoption by the Central Rada on 3 July 1917 of the Second Proclamation. The Rada welcomed the steps of the Provisional Government and confirmed the status of Ukraine as part of the territory of Russia: “The Provisional Government, standing guard of the freedom won by the revolutionary people, recognizing each people’s right to self-determination and referring the final establishment of its form to the competence of the Constituent Assembly, stretches out its hand to the representatives of Ukrainian democracy — the Central Rada — and appeals, in agreement with it, to create a new life of Ukraine for the benefit of all revolutionary Russia. We, the Central Rada, which has always stood for not separating Ukraine from Russia, in order, together with all its peoples, to follow the development and well-being of all of Russia and the unity of its democratic forces, we gladly accept the Government’s appeal for unity.”¹

The Rada confirmed its consent to approval of the composition of the General Secretariat by the Provisional Government, as well as to the preparation of legislation on the national and territorial autonomy of Ukraine for the future approval of status by the Constituent Assembly of Russia. In accordance with the agreements reached, representatives of national minorities joined the Central Rada and the General Secretariat.

A compromise was facilitated by the military assistance provided by the Provisional Government to the Central Rada in suppressing the so-called Polubotkovism — the uprising in Kiev of the Polubotko regiment. One of the first Ukrainianized regiments created by the Rada refused to go to the front and seized the key objects of the city. On 7 July an uprising was suppressed with the help of the Provisional Government. However, the compromise did not last long. As soon as

¹ Proclamation II of the Ukrainian Central Rada [website]. URL: https://prostopravo.com.ua/klub_yuristov/zakonodatelstvo/istoriko_pravovye_dokumenty/ii_universal_ukrainskoy_tsentralnoy_rady_03_07_1917 (access date: 10.02.2022).

the situation in Kiev returned to normal, the Central Rada went on the offensive, deciding to unilaterally change the agreements reached in its favor and thus seize all power.

On 18 July the Rada published a document entitled “Fundamentals of Provisional Governance in Ukraine”. The General Secretariat was declared the highest authority to which all local authorities must submit. It included the creation of a collegium of 14 general secretaries — in fact, ministers, whose competence extended to all areas that usually make up the totality of the functions of a sovereign state, with the exception of international relations. The Provisional Government was left with three functions — approval of composition of the General Secretariat, bills adopted by the Rada, and its financial requests. All laws of the Provisional Government were deprived of their direct effect — they could come into force only after they were published in the Ukrainian government bulletin in the Ukrainian language¹.

Thus, the Rada tried to implicitly expand the limits of its powers as much as possible. Adoption of the Fundamentals of Provisional Governance meant a step towards further strengthening of the Rada’s power. The power of the Provisional Government became more and more ephemeral.

At the same time, a delegation of the Central Rada, headed by Vladimir Vinnichenko, went to Petrograd to approve the draft charter of the General Secretariat and composition of the Secretariat. However, the Provisional Government refused to approve the draft charter, based on the ideas of Fundamentals of Provisional Government. On 4 August 1917 the government issued an instruction to the General Secretariat, which established the direct administrative subordination of the Secretariat to the Provisional Government and significantly limited the powers of the Secretariat:

“3. The General Secretariat is formed from the General Secretaries of the following departments: 1) internal affairs, 2) finance, 3) agriculture, 4) education, 5) trade and industry, and 6) labor, as well as the secretary of national affairs and the clerk general; besides this, at

¹ *Sokolova M. V.* Great Power vs. Nationalism: Provisional Government and the Ukrainian Central Rada [website]. URL: <http://www.hist.msu.ru/Labs/UkrBel/sokolova.htm> (access date: 09.02.2022).

the General Secretariat there is a General Controller for control over its affairs, participating in meetings of the General Secretariat with the right of a decisive vote...

4. The General Secretariat considers, develops and submits for approval to the Provisional Government assumptions regarding the life of the region and its administration. These assumptions can be, after their preliminary presentation to the Provisional Government, submitted for discussion by the Central Rada ...

8. Relations between the highest state institutions and individual civil departments with the general Secretariat and individual secretaries, according to their affiliation, as well as the latter with the highest state institutions and departments, are carried out through a special commissioner of Ukraine appointed by the Provisional Government in Petrograd; legislative proposals and drafts related only to local affairs of Ukraine, as well as measures of national importance that have arisen in individual departments or are discussed by interdepartmental and departmental commissions and require, in view of their special relationship to Ukraine, participation of a representative of the Commissioner's office in the said commissions"¹.

The issue of the territories covered by the powers of the General Secretariat was of the key importance. And here the Ukrainian party was seriously disappointed. As is known, the Central Rada quite arbitrarily interpreted the scale of the territory of Ukraine, including in it not only Little Russia, but also New Russia, as well as part of the territories of the Kingdom of Poland. Moreover, the claims extended to the lands located much to the east of Little Russia and New Russia, including the Kuban, the territories of the Kursk and Voronezh Governorates.

The instruction of the Provisional Government defined only four Governorates as the territory covered by the powers of the General Secretariat: Kiev, Volyn, Podolsk and Poltava, as well as partly the territory of the Chernigov Governorate. Mglinskiy, Surazhskiy, Starodubskiy and Novozybkovskiy counties were excluded from the

¹ Revolution and the national issue: documents and materials on history of the national issue in Russia and the USSR in the XX century. V. 3. M., 1930. P. 63–64. Quoted in: [website]. URL: <http://www.illuminats.ru/component/content/article/29-new/5796-----17-1917> (access date: 09.02.2022).

latter¹. Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson and Taurida Governorates were not included in jurisdiction of the Secretariat. Thus, neither New Russia nor part of Little Russia, from the point of view of the Provisional Government, had anything to do with the territory of Ukraine.

The Central Rada, in a resolution adopted on 9 August 1917 expressed its indignation and stated that the content of instruction testifies to the “imperialist tendencies of the Russian bourgeoisie towards Ukraine”². Nevertheless, the Rada obeyed the decision of the Provisional Government. After approval on 21 August 1917 it formed a new composition of the General Secretariat in accordance with the requirements of the instructions. On 1 September 1917 the composition of the Secretariat was approved by the Provisional Government.

Leading figures of the Rada declared their loyalty to the Provisional Government. Simon Petlyura made an appeal to the military: “If, due to military circumstances, you will have to go to any front, you will definitely need to go, because the front is the same”³.

Temporary compromise on the part of the Central Rada was well explained. Despite significant limitation of its powers, the instruction contained the most important thing – recognition of the autonomy of Ukraine. In this regard, the reaction of Vladimir Vinnichenko is indicative: “Instruction is already a recognition of the principle of autonomy, which we initially only strived for. However now we have achieved more than we wished two months ago. Recognition of the very idea of autonomy, and not “regional self-government”, is much more important”⁴.

The Kornilov rebellion and its suppression led to a significant change in the balance of power in Petrograd in favor of the Soviets and the Bolsheviks. The days of the Provisional Government were numbered.

¹ Ibid.

² *Sokolova M. V.* Great Power vs. Nationalism: Provisional Government and the Ukrainian Central Rada [website]. URL: <http://www.hist.msu.ru/Labs/UkrBel/sokolova.htm> (access date: 09.02.2022).

³ *Danilevskiy I., Tairova T., Shubin A., Mironenko V.* History of Ukraine. 2nd Ed., revised and amended, St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 293.

⁴ Ibid. P. 292–293.

The strengthening of the positions of the Bolsheviks was also taking place on the territory of Little Russia and New Russia. On 8 September 1917 the Kiev Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies adopted for the first time a Bolshevik resolution on the current situation. On 21 September the general meeting of the workers of the Kharkov plant Ekonom demanded an immediate transfer of power into the hands of the Kharkov Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Bolsheviks won the election of the Lugansk Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, receiving 82 places out of 120, while the Mensheviks received only 22 places, the Socialist-Revolutionaries — 13, and the Ukrainian nationalists — only three¹.

The Central Rada hastened to take advantage of the weakening of the Provisional Government. At the end of September, the Declaration of the General Secretariat no longer mentioned the July agreement, and the government structure, which was vetoed in the Instructions dated August 4, was implicitly introduced. Moreover, the Declaration stated that the Secretariat for Military Affairs (the creation of which, we would like to recall, the Provisional Government banned) should be given the right to appoint and dismiss “military officials in military districts on the territory of Ukraine and in all Ukrainian military units”, and the “higher military power” should have only a purely formal right to “approve” these orders of the Ukrainian authorities. In response, the Provisional Government, referring to the absence of an official decision on establishment of the Central Rada, decided to consider it, the General Secretariat, and at the same time the Instruction of 4 August as “non-existent”. A week later, the Provisional Government sent a telegram to three leaders of the Rada — V. K. Vinnichenko (Chairman of the General Secretariat), A. N. Zarubin (General Controller) and I. M. Steshenko (General Secretary) to Petrograd “for personal explanations”.

Of course, the Rada ignored this challenge, organizing a stream of protest resolutions. One of them said that those who adopted the resolution “would support the General Secretariat and the Central

¹ The Great October Socialist Revolution. Chronicle of the Events. V. 4. M., 1961. P. 100–114. Quoted in: [website]. URL: <http://www.illuminats.ru/home/29-new/6919-2-1917> (access date: 10.02.2022).

Rada with all the means at (their) disposal and would not allow to conduct an investigation of the Ukrainian revolutionary people's institution".

Thus, in September 1917, there was a significant weakening of the positions of the Provisional Government with the growth of power and influence of alternative centers: The Central Rada, on the one hand, and the Bolsheviks, who relied on the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on the other hand. At the same time, there was no significant antagonism between the Ukrainian nationalists and the Bolsheviks. Moreover, on 9 August 1917 the Bolsheviks joined the Rada and made the following statement: "Entering the Central Ukrainian Rada, we will conduct a relentless struggle here against the bourgeoisie, bourgeois nationalism, and we will call the workers and peasants of Ukraine under the red banner of the Internationale for complete victory of the proletarian revolution".

This step meant the following — the Bolsheviks considered the Rada as a potential ally in the fight against the Provisional Government.

On 25 October 1917 the Bolsheviks destroyed the Provisional Government in Petrograd and announced the transfer of power into the hands of Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies. The first Soviet government was formed — the Soviet of People's Commissars. It should be noted that in the October Revolution in Petrograd, the most active part was taken by people from Little Russia and New Russia, who by that time occupied the key positions in the Bolshevik Party. Among them were the Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet and the second person in the party after Vladimir Lenin, a native of the Kherson Governorate, Lev Trotskiy, head of the Military Organization under the Petrograd Committee of the Bolsheviks, a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee and the organizer of an assault on the Winter Palace, the son of a Little Russian priest from the Chernigov Governorate, Nikolay Podvoiskiy, leader of the detachments of revolutionary sailors during the revolution and the future people's commissar for maritime affairs, the son of a Little Russian peasant from the Chernigov Governorate, Pavel Dybenko, the organizer of an assault on the Winter Palace, a member of the committee of military and naval affairs under the Council of People's Commissars, another native of Chernigov, Vladimir Antonov-

Ovseenko, the organizer of an assault on the Winter Palace and an arrest of ministers of the Provisional Government, a native of Ekaterinoslav, Grigoriy Chudnovsky, People's Commissar of State Control, a native of the Kharkov Governorate, Eduard Essen. It is noteworthy that the direct leadership of the armed uprising was in the hands of the so-called "group of three", all the members of which were from the South-Western Russia: Podvoiskiy, Antonov-Ovseenko and Chudnovskiy.

Thus, from the moment the Bolsheviks came to power, representatives of Ukraine occupied key positions in the party. This refutes the pseudo-historical myth about the alleged colonial oppression of Ukraine immediately after the October Revolution by the Soviet authorities. Throughout Soviet history, the Ukrainians occupied worthy and often dominant places in the Soviet party and economic nomenklatura, the leadership of the Red Army and Soviet intelligence agencies.

The October coup in Petrograd led to an armed confrontation in Kiev between the Bolsheviks and their allies, on the one hand, and supporters of the Provisional Government, on the other. The Bolsheviks created a Revolutionary Committee and appealed to the Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies to take the power into their own hands. However, the Kiev military post remained loyal to the Provisional Government. Having received support from units of the Czechoslovak corps and a Cossack division sent from the front, supporters of the Provisional Government on 28 October arrested members of the Bolshevik Revolutionary Committee. However, subsequent protection of the interests of the Provisional Government turned out to be senseless. On 31 October Kerenskiy's attempt to regain control of Petrograd by force ended in defeat.

At this time, the Central Rada decided to take the initiative in Kiev into its own hands. On 30 October the Central Rada announced that the power of the General Secretariat now extends not only to Little Russia, but also to the territory of New Russia: Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson and Taurida (excluding Crimea) Governorates. On 1 November the Rada appointed a new Commander of the Troops, V. Pavlenko. Military units of the Kiev military post came under the power of the Central Rada. In addition, the Rada had its own volunteer

Ukrainianized formations — Haydamaks. The troops called from the front were from the city.

The Bolsheviks set a course for cooperation with the Rada. On 3 November 1917 they outlined their vision of the political situation: “Regional power is the Central Rada, and the Bolshevik faction demands the convening of a congress of workers’, peasants’ and soldiers’ deputies for reorganization of the Central Rada into the Central Rada (Council) of Soviets of Workers’, Peasants’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.” Local power shall be transferred to the Soviets, which shall implement the decisions of both the Central Rada and the Soviet government in Petrograd.

On 14 November the Bolsheviks announced that the Rada did not accept their proposals. However, at this stage, this had not yet led to open conflict. The Bolsheviks used a wait-and-see approach. Their strategy was based on pragmatic considerations. As the main danger in the South of Russia, they considered an armed uprising on the Don. On 25 October 1917 General Aleksey Kaledin, military ataman of the Don, declared a seizure of power by the Bolsheviks as criminal, introduced martial law, and began to crush the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies in the Don and Donbass. On the territory controlled by Kaledin, General Lavr Kornilov began creation of the Volunteer Army. Insurgency of Kaledin and Kornilov posed a significant threat to the Soviet power.

Under these conditions, the Bolsheviks sought to concentrate all efforts on one front, considering the Rada as a lesser evil and even a potential ally in the fight against Kaledin.

On 7 November 1917 the Central Rada adopted the Proclamation III, which was intended to record the new status of the Ukrainian authorities in the conditions of liquidation of the Provisional Government. The Rada announced creation of a special territorial and political entity — the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR). At the same time, it was emphasized that the Republic was a part of Russia and this was not about its independence:

“A tough and difficult hour has come to the land of the Russian Republic. In the north in the capital cities there is an internecine and bloody struggle. There is no central government, and anarchy, disorder and ruin are spreading throughout the state. Our region is

also in danger. Without strong, united, people's power, Ukraine can also fall into the abyss of dissension and decay. Ukrainian people! You, together with the fraternal peoples of Ukraine, appointed us to protect the rights gained by the struggle, to create order and to shape all destiny on our land. And we, the Ukrainian Central Rada, by your will, in the name of creating order in our country, in the name of saving all of Russia, announce:

From now on, Ukraine becomes the Ukrainian People's Republic. Without separating from the Russian Republic and preserving its unity, we will firmly stand on our land in order to help all of Russia with our forces, so that the entire Russian Republic becomes a federation of equal and free peoples.

The Rada declared that it was taking full power in Ukraine into its own hands and proclaimed a course towards formation of a special Constituent Assembly of Ukraine at the same time with the Constituent Assembly of Russia: "To the Constituent Assembly of Ukraine, all the power to create order on our lands, to give laws and rule belongs to us, the Ukrainian Central Rada, and our government — the General Secretariat of Ukraine". However, this idea remained unrealized. The Ukrainian Constituent Assembly was never convened.

Thus, the declaration of Proclamation III was another step towards separation of Ukraine from Russia.

The territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic was declared "the lands inhabited by the Ukrainians mostly." However, the boundaries of this territory were interpreted arbitrarily and included not only Little Russia, but the entire New Russia, with an exception of Crimea: "Kiev region, Podolia, Volyn, Chernigov region, Poltava region, Kharkov region, Ekaterinoslav region, Kherson region, Taurida (without Crimea)". At the same time, in the same New Russia, the Ukrainian (Little Russian) population obviously did not make up the majority.

Moreover, the UPR also claimed the territory of the "Kurshchyna, Kholmshchyna and Voronezhshchyna", as well as some "adjacent Governorates and regions, where the majority of the population was Ukrainian". It was proposed to establish whether or not these territories belong to Ukraine "by consent of the organized will of the people".

In other words, as the political crisis in Russia developed, the Ukrainian territorial claims to Russian territories increased.

The reaction of Soviet Russia to the demarche of the Central Rada was rather indifferent and expectant. Proceeding from the principle of the right of nations to self-determination, the leader of the Bolsheviks, Vladimir Lenin, at the First All-Russian Congress of the Navy on 22 November 1917 spoke out in support of the “complete and unlimited freedom of the Ukrainian people”:

“Now we are witnessing a national movement in Ukraine and we are saying: we unconditionally stand for the complete and unlimited freedom of the Ukrainian people. We must break that old, bloody and dirty past, when the Russia of the capitalist oppressors played the role of executioner of other peoples. This past we will sweep away, on this past we will not leave a stone unturned. (Enthusiastic applause.) We will say to the Ukrainians: as Ukrainians, you can arrange your life as you want. But we will extend our fraternal hand to the Ukrainian workers and say to them: together with you we will fight against your and our bourgeoisie. Only a socialist alliance of the working people of all countries will remove all grounds for national hounding and fight (Enthusiastic applause.)”

However, already in a few days, an attitude of the Bolsheviks changed to negative. The reason was that Kaledin went on the offensive, and a position of the Central Rada prevented movement of Red Guard units to the Don and Donbass. In addition, the Rada tried to strengthen itself in opposition to the Bolsheviks. On 17 November 1917 the Rada began disarming non-Ukrainian units in Kiev and expelling them to the east. On 23 November 1917 Military Secretary Simon Petlyura announced withdrawal of the Southwestern Front and the Romanian Front from the Russian command and turned them into the Ukrainian Front.

On 25 November 1917 the Council of People’s Commissars adopted an Appeal “To All the Population” on the fight against counter-revolutionary uprising of Kaledin and Dutov. Kaledin and Dutov were outlawed, and for assisting the counter-revolutionaries, punishment was promised “to the full extent of the revolutionary laws.” Regarding Ukraine, the following was stated in the Appeal: “Kaledin introduced martial law on the Don, prevents the delivery of grain to the front and gathers forces, threatening Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov and Moscow ... The bourgeois Central Rada of the Ukrainian Republic, conducting a

struggle against the Ukrainian Soviets, helps Kaledin to gather troops to the Don, prevents the Soviet government from sending the necessary military forces across the land of the fraternal Ukrainian people to suppress the Kaledin rebellion”.

Kharkov, the most important railway junction and the largest industrial center, played a key role. Back in November, the influence of the Bolsheviks was growing here. On 24 November the well-known Bolshevik Artyom (Sergeev) was elected chairman of the executive committee of the Kharkov Soviet. The Rada attempted to take control of the city and disarm non-Ukrainian military units, but was met by the Bolsheviks' rebuff. On 4 December a section of the Kharkov Soviet rejected a demand for disarmament.

On 4 December 1917 the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets began its work in Kiev, convened on the initiative of the Bolsheviks. There was still hope for a peaceful transfer of power. However, the Rada attempted to seize the Congress into its own hands. On the initiative of the Rada and in opposition to the established representation of delegates, 679 delegates from the Peasants' Union and 905 delegates from the Ukrainianized military units arrived at the Congress. This was a gross violation of the established regulations. The Credentials Commission refused to register the incomers and, under their pressure, was forced to dissolve itself. Supporters of the Rada registered themselves. 125 delegates from the Bolsheviks and their allies were in an evident minority and were forced to leave the meeting room. The next day they left for Kharkov. Thus, the remaining self-proclaimed delegates could no longer be recognized as participants of the Congress. This meant that work of the Congress in Kiev was over.

On the same day, the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia sent an appeal to the delegates of the Congress — “Manifest to the Ukrainian people with ultimatum demands to the Central Rada.”

In the Manifest, the Council of People's Commissars confirmed the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination and appealed to Ukraine to enter into federal relations with Soviet Russia: “Proceeding from the interests of the unity and fraternal alliance of the workers and working people, the exploited masses in the struggle for socialism, proceeding from the recognition of these principles by the numerous decisions of the bodies of revolutionary democracy, the Soviets,

and especially the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the socialist government of Russia, the Council of People's Commissars, reaffirm the right for self-determination for all nations that were oppressed by tsarism and the Great Russian bourgeoisie, up to the right of these nations to secede from Russia.

Therefore, we, the Council of People's Commissars, recognize the Ukrainian People's Republic, its right to secede completely from Russia or to enter into an agreement with the Russian Republic on federal or similar relations between them.

Everything that concerns the national rights and national independence of the Ukrainian people is recognized by us, the Council of People's Commissars, immediately, without restrictions and unconditionally."

At the same time, the Soviet government accused the Central Rada of acting in a hostile fashion towards Soviet Russia and betraying the cause of the revolution: "We accuse the Rada of pursuing an ambiguous bourgeois policy under the guise of national phrases, which has long been expressed in the Rada's non-recognition of the Soviets and Soviet power in Ukraine (by the way, the Rada refuses to convene, at the request of the Soviets of Ukraine, a regional congress of Ukrainian Soviets immediately). This ambiguous policy, which deprives us of the possibility of recognizing the Rada as an authorized representative of the working and exploited masses of the Ukrainian Republic, has recently brought the Rada to steps that mean destruction of any possibility of an agreement.

These steps were, firstly, disorganization of the front. The Rada is moving and recalling Ukrainian units from the front by unilateral orders, thus destroying the united common front to the point of disengagement, feasible only through an organized agreement between the governments of both republics.

Secondly, the Rada began to disarm the Soviet troops located in Ukraine.

Thirdly, the Rada supports the Cadet-Kaledinsky conspiracy and the uprising against the Soviet regime. Referring deliberately falsely to the supposedly autonomous rights of the Don and Kuban, thereby covering up Kaledin's counter-revolutionary actions that contravene the interests and demands of the vast majority of working Cossacks, the

Rada allows troops to pass through its territory to Kaledin, refusing to let the troops against Kaledin pass.

The Council of People's Commissars demands from the Rada an affirmative answer to the following questions:

“1. Does the Rada undertake to renounce attempts to disrupt the common front?

2. Does the Rada undertake not to allow any military units going to the Don, the Urals or other places to pass without consent of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief?

3. Does the Rada undertake to assist the revolutionary troops in their struggle against the counter-revolutionary Cadet-Kaledin uprising?

4. Does the Rada undertake to stop all its attempts to disarm the Soviet regiments and the workers' Red Guard in Ukraine and immediately return the weapons to those from whom they were taken away?”

48 hours were given for implementation of the ultimatum. In case of non-fulfilment, the Council of People's Commissars stated that “it will consider the Rada in a state of open war against the Soviet regime in Russia and Ukraine”.

The General Secretariat of the Rada on the same day prepared a response in which it rejected all demands presented by the Council of People's Commissars and threatened Soviet Russia with war: “Ukrainian soldiers, workers and peasants, defending their rights and their land, will give a proper answer to the people's commissars”.

On 5 December the Congress of Soviets of the Donetsk and Krivoy Rog basins began its work in Kharkov. On 6 December the Northern Flying Detachment of the Red Guards led by Rudolf Sievers arrived in Kharkov. On 10 December the Sievers detachment disarmed the Ukrainian armored division. After that, the main units of the Red Army, led by Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, entered Kharkov.

On 11 December 1917 the 77 delegates of the Congress of Soviets of the Donetsk and Krivoy Rog basins who had gathered in Kharkov were joined by 125 delegates — supporters of the Bolsheviks who came from Kiev. After that, the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets resumed work at a new location.

The Congress was attended by delegates from 46 Soviets of the Ekaterinoslav and Kharkov Governorates, 32 Soviets of Poltava,

Chernigov, Kiev and Podolsk Governorates, as well as four Soviets of the Kherson Governorate. Thus, the Congress represented most of the territory of Ukraine, with an exception of the Volyn Governorate.

Before the Congress, the Pravda newspaper published a letter of support on behalf of the Russian workers to the delegates of the Congress, expressing confidence that “the fraternal alliance between us and the Ukrainian workers, soldiers and peasants will grow stronger no matter what. There is no force in the world that would break this union”.

On 12 December 1917 the Congress proclaimed creation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic: “Power on the territory of the Ukrainian Republic now belongs exclusively to the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies; on the spot — to the county, city, Governorate and regional Soviets, and in the center — to the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, its Central Executive Committee and those bodies that it will create. Ukraine is declared a Republic of Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Villagers’ Deputies”.

At the same time, the delegates of the Congress considered Ukraine as part of Russia as a federal state. The Congress decided to establish “full coherence in the goals and actions necessary on behalf of the workers and peasants of all peoples of the Russian Federation, based on the principle that these relations can be correct and normal only if the governments of all parts of Russia will be the bodies of power of the Soviets of workers’, soldiers’ and peasants’ deputies”.

In contrast to the nationalist Central Rada, the Congress emphasized the international character of Soviet power and the struggle of the Soviets against national enmity and hatred: “Will fight for the self-determination of Ukraine on behalf of the workers and peasants, for their domination, for elimination of all national restrictions, all national enmity and hatred, for the Ukrainian Workers’ and Peasants’ Republic, based on close solidarity of the working masses of Ukraine, regardless of their nationality, with the working masses of all Russia”.

The Congress formed the Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets, consisting of 41 members, of which 35 were Bolsheviks. The first government of Soviet Ukraine was formed — the People’s Commissariat, which included Artyom (Sergeev), Evgeniy

Bosch, Sergey Bakinskiy, Nikolay Skripnik, Vladimir Zatonskiy and other leaders of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks.

Soviet Russia welcomed the proclamation of the Soviet Ukraine. A telegram of the Council of People's Commissars noted: "Welcoming an establishment in Kharkov of truly people's Soviet power in Ukraine, seeing in this workers' and peasants' Rada the true government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Council of People's Commissars promises the new government of the fraternal republic full and comprehensive support in the struggle for peace, as well as in the transfer of all land, factories, plants and banks to the working people of Ukraine".

Holding of the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in Kharkov and proclamation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic meant that the Rada was no longer a legitimate authority representing the Ukrainian people, the right to represent the interests of which passed to the Congress of Soviets and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic formed.

Thus, on the territory of Ukraine, the formation of dual power was completed with the presence of two alternative political centers: the Ukrainian Soviet Republic recognized by Soviet Russia in Kharkov and the Ukrainian People's Republic hostile to the Soviet power in Kiev.

On 25 December 1917 by order of the Rada in Kiev, the chairman of the Kiev Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the leader of the Kiev Bolsheviks, Leonid Pyatakov, was arrested. A month later, it became known that immediately after the arrest and severe torture, Leonid Pyatakov was shot. This hastened the final break and the beginning of hostilities between the Ukrainian nationalists and the Bolsheviks.

On 25 December detachments of the Red Army headed by Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko launched an offensive against the troops of Kaledin and detachments loyal to the Central Rada. A month later, Kaledin's units were defeated, and on 29 January 1918 he committed suicide. Donbass, the left-bank part of Ukraine and the Black Sea region came under control of the Soviet power. On 28 December the Red Army took control of Ekaterinoslav, on 2 January — Aleksandrovsk, on 6 January — Poltava, on 16 January — Odessa, on 23 January —

Nikolaev. At the same time, armed clashes with supporters of the Central Rada took place in Ekaterinoslav and Odessa. In other cases, the power was transferred to the Bolsheviks without resistance.

On 15 January 1918 the Bolsheviks' uprising began in Kiev. The Kiev military post declared its neutrality. Nevertheless, the military commissar of the UNR, Simon Petlyura, managed to gather units of the Haydamaks loyal to the Rada, on 21 January 21 regained control over Kiev and suppressed the uprising. However, the power of the Rada lasted for only several days. From the east, units of the Southern Revolutionary Front under the command of the Left Social Revolutionary Mikhail Muravyov entered the city.

On 16 January 1918 the troops of the Rada were defeated on the outskirts of Kiev, near Kruty. On 22 January the Red Army occupied the left-bank part of Kiev. Muravyov reported to Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko: "The peasants enthusiastically welcome the revolutionary troops".

On 26 January 1918 Muravyov's troops took over Kiev. Immediately after that, the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic moved there.

The day before, on 25 January representatives of the Central Rada fled from Kiev, first to Zhitomir, and then to the village of Sarny, Volyn Governorate, to the front line, under protection of the Germans.

In the battles with Kaledin and the Haydamaks, the anarchist Nestor Makhno took an active part. Back in August 1917 he formed the Committee for Salvation of the Revolution in Gulyaipole, Ekaterinoslav Governorate, from members of the anarchist fighting squad.

The success of the Soviet power in Ukraine was not the result of an invasion from outside. A significant part of the residents of the region, including Ukrainians (Little Russians), sympathized with the Bolsheviks and supported their actions.

As for the south and east, the vast majority of the population of these territories did not consider themselves a part of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. Therefore, the establishment of Soviet power here led to creation of territorial and political structures that existed independently from the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. On 17 January 1918 the Odessa Soviet Republic was proclaimed, and on 30 January

30 1918 in Kharkov, at the IV Regional Congress of Soviets of Workers' Deputies of the Donetsk and Krivoy Rog basins, a creation of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic was proclaimed.

The Donetsk Bolshevik Semyon Vasilchenko formulated the need to create a republic as follows: "As Soviet power strengthens on the spots, the federations of the Russian Socialist Republics will be built not along national lines, but according to the features of economic and household life. such an economic self-sufficient unit is the Donetsk and Krivoy Rog basins. The Donetsk Republic can become a model of socialist economy for other republics". Artyom (Fyodor Andreevich Sergeev) was elected Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Republic.

During the hostilities in Ukraine, on 9 December 1917 negotiations began in Brest — Litovsk between Soviet Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Coalition on conclusion of a peace treaty. On 18 December with the consent of Germany and its allies, a delegation of the Central Rada joined the negotiations. From that moment, intensive contacts began between Germany and Austro-Hungary, on the one hand, and representatives of the Ukrainian People's Republic, on the other hand. While still formally recognizing their presence as part of Russia, Ukrainian nationalists had already conceived an idea of concluding a separate agreement with Germany at the expense of Russia and against Russia.

On 27 January 1918, the powers of the Quadruple Alliance signed a separate treaty with the delegation of the Central Rada. The preamble of the Treaty contained the following idea: "Since the Ukrainian people during this world war declared themselves independent and expressed a desire to establish peace between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the powers that were at war with Russia, the governments of Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey decided to conclude a peace treaty with the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic; by this, they want to take the first step towards a lasting and honorable world peace for all parties, which should not only put an end to all the horrors of war, but also lead to the restoration of friendly relations between peoples in the political, legal, economic and spiritual areas."

Article II of the Treaty established the western borders of Ukraine: "1. Between Austro-Hungary, on the one hand, and the Ukrainian

People's Republic, on the other, since these two powers will have a common border, there remain those borders that existed between the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and Russia before the start of the war.

2. Further north, the border of the Ukrainian People's Republic will pass, starting from Tarnograd, in general along the line Bilgoray — Shcheshreshin — Krasnostav — Pugachev — Radin — Mezhireshye — Sarnaki — Melnik — Vysoko-Litovsk — Kamenetz-Litovsk — Pruzhany — Vigonovskoe Lake “.

Article IV stated the “resumption” of diplomatic and consular relations between the parties to the treaty. Article VII dealt with the development of economic relations: “The contracting parties mutually undertake to immediately establish economic relations and establish an exchange of goods”. This article was of particular interest to food-scarce Germany. Germany did everything in order to receive the Ukrainian bread.

Thus, the Treaty formally meant recognition by Germany and its allies of Ukraine as an independent state outside jurisdiction of Russia, but in fact assumed a transition of the UPR into a protectorate of Germany.

In addition, a secret agreement was signed between the UPR and Austro-Hungary, which contained a promise to unite by 31 July 1918 the territories of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina inhabited by Ukrainians into one administrative-territorial unit — Kronland. However, on 4 July Austro-Hungary unilaterally disavowed this agreement.

On 31 January the Rada turned to Germany for help against the Bolsheviks and invited German and Austro-Hungarian troops to enter the territory of Ukraine. Betrayal had occurred. On 5 February 1918 the period of occupation of Ukraine began.

The offensive was conducted by 200,000 troops of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies, which was opposed by Red Army detachments numbering no more than 25,000 soldiers. On 16 February German troops took over Kiev. Despite the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed by Soviet Russia on 18 February hostilities continued. On 12 March Nikolaev was captured, on 23 March — Kherson.

Together with the Germans, on 5 January 1918 the Central Rada also returned to Kiev. On 9 January 1918 the Proclamation IV was declared.

The Proclamation declared the creation of a sovereign state: “From now on, the Ukrainian People’s Republic becomes a non-dependent, independent, free, sovereign state of the Ukrainian people. With all neighboring states, such as: Russia, Poland, Austria, Romania, Turkey and others, we want to live in harmony and friendship, but none of them can interfere in the life of an independent Ukrainian Republic”.

However, neither the Entente countries nor any other states recognized the Ukrainian People’s Republic, and it itself ceased to exist after a few months.

Actually, the leaders of the Rada counted on the expectation that Germany would support the Ukrainian nationalists, with the help of which it took over Ukraine. However, for the German Empire, Ukrainian nationalists were useful tools but were not equal partners. A similar situation, by the way, was repeated during the Great Patriotic War.

In 1918, Germany from the very beginning considered Ukraine as an occupied territory. The government of the Central Rada did not suit Berlin. Firstly, it did not have sufficient administrative resources to effectively manage the territory and was not able to maintain order and stability on the territory of Ukraine. Secondly, the Germans were not satisfied with the socialist nature of the government. Germany was distrustful of the declarative statements of Rada figures regarding the need for social transformations and sought to establish a more understandable, effective and ideologically close Ukrainian government to the German Empire.

On 15 April 1918 the Central Rada was dispersed at the request of the commander-in-chief of the German occupation forces, General Eichhorn. The next day, however, the Rada met for its last session and adopted the Constitution of the Ukrainian People’s Republic.

The Constitution proclaimed the sovereignty of Ukraine: “1. Having restored its state law as the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Ukraine, for better defense of its land, for more reliable enforcement of its rights and protection of liberties, culture and well-being of its citizens, proclaims itself and is now a sovereign state, independent and not dependent on anyone.”

As a form of government, the Constitution established a parliamentary republic: “The supreme body of power of the Ukrainian

People's Republic is the All-People's Assembly, which directly exercises the highest legislative power in the Ukrainian People's Republic and forms the highest executive and judicial body of the Ukrainian People's Republic.”

However, the Constitution never entered into force. Already in a few hours, the Central Rada completely lost the power. Under pressure of the Germans, the power was transferred to the former lieutenant general of the Russian Imperial Army and a descendant of the hetman Pavel Skoropadskiy. At the All-Ukrainian Congress of Grain Producers, assembled on 29 April Skoropadskiy was proclaimed Hetman.

The Ukrainian People's Republic was liquidated and the Ukrainian State was proclaimed — a state in which the hetman had broad power, more correspondent to the monarch.

Upon assuming the office of Hetman, Skoropadskiy issued a letter in which he confirmed his loyalty to Germany and its allies: “All of you, Cossacks and citizens of Ukraine, are aware of the events of recent times, when the blood of the best sons of Ukraine flowed as a spring and the newly reborn Ukrainian state stood on the brink of death. It became healthy due to the powerful support of the Central Powers, which, true to their word, continue to this day to fight for the integrity and peace of Ukraine. With such support, everyone revived the hope that the restoration of order in the state would begin and the economic life of Ukraine would finally return to normal. However, these hopes were not fulfilled. Previously, the Ukrainian government did not carry out the state building of Ukraine, because it was not at all capable of this. Riots and anarchy continue in Ukraine, economic devastation post and unemployment increase and spread every day, and finally, for the once richest Ukraine, a horrible nightmare of famine arises. In such a situation, which threatens Ukraine with a new catastrophe, all working masses of the population were deeply stirred and they came out with a categorical demand to immediately build such a State Power that would be able to provide the population with peace, law and the possibility of creative work. As a faithful son of Ukraine, I decided to respond to this appeal and temporarily assume full power. With this letter, I declare myself the Hetman of all Ukraine”.

In reality, Skoropadskiy had no real power. He was supported only by German bayonets. The Hetman also failed to get the support of the population of Ukraine.

The Hetman's government headed for the return of land to the landowners. On 14 May a law was issued, according to which the old landowners received the right to harvest winter crops, and for the harvest of spring crops the peasants had to pay rent to the landowners. Commissions were set up to compensate for the losses caused by peasants to landowners during the revolutionary era. With the support of German troops, punitive expeditions were carried out against those peasants who refused to return the landowners' lands.

German military field courts and concentration camps were established. Repressions affected not only the peasants, but also the socialists and other political opponents of the Hetman.

On 8–10 May 1918 the Social Revolutionaries held an underground peasant congress in Kiev. Its participants condemned the Skoropadskiy regime and decided to create partisan detachments and prepare for an uprising.

At the same time, the Hetman was supported by Ukrainian cadets who joined the Hetman's government. Despite the earlier negative attitude towards Ukrainian separatism, the Cadets now viewed Skoropadskiy's government as a possible ally in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Leader of the Cadets Pavel Milyukov saw positive moments in the coming to power in Ukraine of Skoropadskiy, and on the Don of another henchman of Germany, Ataman Krasnov: "In both facts, I saw a phenomenon of the same order — and a positive phenomenon — within the meaning that here and there we are dealing with the revival of Russian statehood".

In the summer of 1918, Ukraine was pervaded by peasant uprisings, actively supported by various political forces, from Ukrainian nationalists, supporters of the overthrown Rada, to the Bolsheviks. On 26 May 1918 an uprising began in the Kiev Governorate, which penetrated the Zvenigorod and Tarashchanskiy districts. In total, about 40 thousand peasants participated in armed actions in the Kiev region. In July 1918 there was a railroad strike. On 17 July 1918 the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Boris Donskoy committed an assassination

attempt and killed the commander of the German troops in Ukraine, Hermann von Eichhorn.

In August 1918, in accordance with Order No. 1 of the All-Ukrainian Central Military Revolutionary Committee, the Bolshevik Nikolay Krapivnyanskiy initiated an uprising in the Chernigov and Poltava Governorates. On 9 September 1918 Krapivnyanskiy headed the First Ukrainian Insurgent Division, made up of partisan detachments that supported the Bolsheviks.

In September, a detachment of Nestor Makhno began armed operations in the Ekaterinoslav Governorate, which was soon joined by a detachment of Theodosius Shchus.

Simultaneously with the partisan movement, there was a unification of Ukrainian nationalists who were in opposition to Skoropadskiy's government. In May 1918 the Ukrainian National-State Union was created. The organization included the Ukrainian Democratic-Grain Producers Party, the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Federalists, the Ukrainian Party of Independent Socialists, and the Ukrainian Labor Party. In August, Ukrainian Social Democrats and Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries joined the union. After that, the organization was renamed the Ukrainian National Union.

In October 1918 the military situation in Germany deteriorated significantly. At the same time, crisis of the Skoropadskiy regime began. On 7 October the Cadets left his government. On 11 October a new government was formed, but it also resigned on 24 October.

Skoropadskiy tried to stay in power. He negotiated with the Ukrainian nationalists, included their representatives in the government, but did not receive full support from the Ukrainian National Union. Then he radically changed his position and announced his readiness for Ukraine to join the Russian Federation. On 1 November he stated that Ukraine "should be the first to act in formation of the All-Russian Federation. Its ultimate goal will be the restoration of Great Russia".

However, the Hetman retained power only as long as the German military post was in Kiev. On 20 October 1918 a revolution began in Germany. On 28 October (11 November) Germany capitulated. The World War was over.

On 30 October Soviet Russia terminated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and began to prepare for an offensive in the South-West. On the same

day, the Ukrainian National Union announced the re-establishment of the Ukrainian People's Republic and formed the highest authority — the Directory, consisting of five directors. Vladimir Vinnichenko became the Chairman of the Directory, but Simon Petlyura was the most powerful figure.

The reconstruction of the Ukrainian People's Republic and creation of the Directory was not a legitimate step. These actions were not based on the will of people or their legal representatives. The new government was not elected. The Directory was in fact the same usurper as Hetman Skoropadskiy, with whom it declared war.

On 1 November the Directory proclaimed an uprising against the "abuser and usurper" Skoropadskiy. Petlyura published an appeal in which he announced the deposition of Hetman and called on Ukrainians to support the uprising: "By order of the Directorate of the Ukrainian Republic, I, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, appeal to all Ukrainian soldiers and Cossacks to fight for state independence, against the traitor, the former tsarist hireling, General Skoropadskiy, who arbitrarily appropriated the rights of the Hetman of Ukraine.

According to the decree of the Directory, Skoropadskiy was outlawed for the crimes he committed against the independence of the Ukrainian Republic, for the destruction of its freedom, for overcrowding prisons with the best sons of the Ukrainian people, for shooting peasants, for ruining villages and for violence against workers and peasants."

The Directory promised to return all the gains of the revolution and convene a constituent assembly. Many units of the Hetman's army went over to the Directory's side, including the Separate detachment of Sich Riflemen under the command of Evgeniy Konovalts.

On 4 November the council created by the German soldiers signed an agreement of neutrality with the Directory. German troops did not intervene in the hostilities in exchange for the Directory not obstructing an evacuation of the Germans to their homeland.

On 5 November a detachment of Sich Riflemen from Konovalts defeated the Hetman's troops in the vicinity of Kiev, near Motovilovka.

On 1 December 1918 Hetman Skoropadskiy fled Kiev in the echelon of the retreating German troops. The non-glorious career of a traitor

was over. Pavel Skoropadskiy spent the rest of his life in Germany. On 4 December the troops of the Directory entered Kiev.

Defeat of the powers of the Quadruple Coalition and collapse of Austro-Hungary led to the dramatic events in Galicia.

On 16 October 1918 Emperor Charles I issued a Manifesto to “My Faithful Austrian Peoples (Völkermanifest).” It contained a program for transformation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into a federal state. “Each tribe on the territory of its residence creates its own organism”.

On 18 October of that year, Ukrainian deputies of the Austrian Reichsrat, Galician and Bukovinian Seims, leaders of political parties, prominent Uniat clergy headed by Metropolitan A. Sheptytskyi (150 people in total) gathered in Lvov and proclaimed creation of the Ukrainian National Rada (UNRada). It was headed by a well-known public figure Evgeniy Petrushevich. Despite the demands of the radical deputies for the immediate unification of Western Ukraine with the Great (mainland) Ukraine, these ideas were rejected. The leaders of the UNRada did not want to unite with P. Skoropadskiy’s Hetmanship, which was collapsing before one’s eyes, hoping that the fate of the new state formation would be decided in Vienna. As a result, it was decided to peacefully advocate for the autonomy of this region under the auspices of Vienna. This was stated in Clause 1 of the Charter: “The Ukrainian National Rada is the Constituent Assembly for that part of the Ukrainian people that lives in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy throughout its ethnographic territory”. Immediately after an adoption of this document, members of the executive committee of the Rada went to Vienna in full force to legally obtain autonomy within the empire from Charles I. This position of the leadership of the UNRada, of course, influenced the entire course of confrontation with Poland for the rights to Eastern Galicia.

On 1 November 1918 representatives of the Austrian authorities in Lvov agreed to transfer power in Eastern Galicia to the Ukrainian National Rada, which on the same day published an appeal to seize power in Lvov and throughout Eastern Galicia. On 3 November 1918 the UNRada published a Manifesto. It announced the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, granting of national autonomy to national minorities, an elimination of large land ownership and allocation of land to landless and land-poor peasants (mainly Ukrainians). Private

ownership of land was preserved. Ukrainian was declared the state language.

On 8 November the region administration was taken over by a temporary executive body, the State Secretariat (SS) of 13 people, headed first by K. Levitskiy, and from January 1919 by S. Golubovich. On 13 November 1918 the UNRada in Lvov approved a temporary Basic Law, according to which creation of an independent West Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR) was proclaimed. The borders of the state with a territory of 70 thousand square meters were determined and a coat of arms depicting a golden lion on a blue background and a yellow-blue flag was accepted. On the basis of the Decree of President E. Petrushevich of 2 December 1918 in parallel with military operations, the process of formation of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UGA) from separate detachments of Sich Riflemen and recruits was going on. The vast majority of them were members of paramilitary organizations of the Ukrainian nationalists.

In November 1918 the Polish Republic (Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) was proclaimed, which from the first days of its formation focused on the winners — the countries of the Entente. The Polish National Committee (PNC), founded on 15 August 1917 in Lausanne (with headquarters in Paris) by the leaders of a number of Polish bourgeois parties, began to play a particular part in promoting the interests of Warsaw. In a short time it was recognized as the official representative of Warsaw by the leading countries of the world: France, the UK, Italy and the USA. The main task of the PNC was to create, with the assistance of the Entente, an independent Polish state with the inclusion of Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian lands in its composition.

The PNC completely ruled out possible Ukrainian statehood in Eastern Galicia and believed that an establishment of the borders of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the east was permissible only directly with Russia, since an independent Ukrainian state would necessarily fall “under German influence.” Since solution of this issue depended on the countries of the Entente, immediately after an international recognition of the Committee, the chairman of the PNC, R. Dmovskiy, sent a letter to London demanding that not only Eastern Galicia (Galicia), but also Volyn and part of Belarus

be included in Poland. A little later, in his memorandum to the US President Woodrow Wilson dated 8 October 1918 he already raised an issue of transferring almost all of Belarus, Galicia and Podolia to Warsaw. In his argumentation, the PNC leader emphasized that “the Russian national spirit of Eastern Galicia, under the name of Ukrainian, is an anti-Polish missile in the hands of Germany and Austria. The Ruthenes are an irresponsible and indifferent element from national point of view, that has no intellectuals and experience in governing the state ... If during occupation of Austria the Galician administration ended up in Polish hands, it was only because there was no other element for exercising power.” Further, the “convincing” concept conceived by Dmovsky was presented. Its idea was that an importance of normal development of the region is beyond doubt, but “it is necessary to give the Ruthenes the freedom to develop national life, language, school education.” This must continue “for a long time, so that the people can establish a progressive, modern government.” In the meantime, the process will continue, “Eastern Galicia must remain an integral part of the Polish state”.

The Polish historian N. Sivitskiy characterized this situation as follows: “A strong pattern was established: as soon as the Ukrainian problem appeared on the Entente forum, Polish diplomacy always took an uncompromising position, trying to form a negative opinion of the Entente, acting as an arbiter, regarding Eastern Galicia”.

The Polish population of Eastern Galicia was categorically against the creation of the WUPR. On 4 November 1918 a Polish uprising broke out in Lvov. On 21 November 1918 Lvov was taken over by Polish troops. The Sovereign Secretariat of the WUPR was evacuated to Ternopol, from 2 January 1919 to Stanislav, and then to Kamenets — Podolskiy, on the territory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic.

On 13 December 1918 the Directory formed a new UPR government headed by the Social Democrat Vladimir Chekhovskiy. On the same day, a declaration was issued proclaiming the restoration of the legislation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, an 8-hour working day, return of land to the peasants and a fair land reform. The declaration, in particular, contained the following:

“The heroic impulse of the Ukrainian armed working people swept the destroying landowner-monarchist domination — the

Hetmanate from the face of the Ukrainian land. Ukraine was cleared up from punitive expeditions, headmen, gendarmes and other criminal institutions of the ruling classes. National-personal autonomy was restored, ensuring the right of every nation to a free life. Census Dumas and Country Councils, created by the Hetman's government, were abolished and democratic bodies of local self-government elected by popular vote were restored.

Until the complete resolution of the land reform, the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic announced: all small peasant farms and all labor farms remain in the use of their former owners unshakeable, and the rest of the lands are transferred to the use of landless and land-poor peasants, and first of all, those who joined the army of the Republic for struggle with the former hetman. The supreme right of disposal of this land belongs to the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic. This decree also applies to monastic, church and government lands. To carry out the reform, people's land councils were organized".

Thus, initially the Directory set a course for social transformations. At the same time, Ukrainization, which began in the period of the Central Rada, was reaching a new level. There is a rejection of the Russian language in favor of Ukrainian both in the official document flow and in the education system. Persecutions of the trade unions and soviets of workers' deputies started.

The specific feature of the regime of the Directory was the power of "field commanders" — atamans of the Haydamaks detachments. Formally submitting to the central government, in fact the atamans ignored orders from Kiev. As early as in January 1919 uprisings against the Directory were occurring in different parts of Ukraine.

Realizing that it was impossible to keep power on its own, the WUPR government took steps to unite with the Ukrainian People's Republic. In January 1919, in Stanislav, at the first session of the Galician parliament, a draft agreement on unification with the UPR was approved. It was based on the preliminary agreement concluded on 1 December 1918 in Fastov between the government of the WUPR and the Directory on unification of the two republics into one "state unit".

For its conclusion, an official delegation of Galicians, consisting of 36 people, was formed and sent to Kiev. In the capital city of

great (mainland) Ukraine, the agreement was approved by the Labor Congress. On 22 January 1919 the “Act of Unification of Western Ukraine with Great Ukraine” (Act of Zluka) was adopted by the Proclamation of the Directory and solemnly declared at a rally in front of St. Sophia Cathedral. The act declared the following:

“From now on, on all Ukrainian lands that were separated for centuries, in Galicia, Bukovina, Transcarpathian Rus and the Dnepr region, there will be a single great Ukraine. Dreams, for the sake of which the best sons of Ukraine fought and died, have come true.”

In accordance with the statement, the WUPR was part of the UPR on the basis of wide autonomy and received a new name — the Western Region of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (WRUPR), and the capital city of Galicia became the regional center.

In fact, the Galician Ukrainians pursued an independent diplomatic and military policy due to tactical and strategic interests diametrically opposed to the UPR’s the future development of their territories. By the way, the Zluka Act did not arouse much enthusiasm among the leadership of the Directory. The principles laid down in it made the WUPR a “state within a state”, which allowed E. Petrushevich to be largely independent in decision-making. The UPR did not have the resources to help its kinsmen. At the same time, it received another potential front with a strong army of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

However, the association proved to be ephemeral. Already by this time, most of the territory of the WUPR was captured by Polish troops.

Back in November 1918, an intervention of the Entente countries began on the territory of New Russia, which sought to take control of the region. Starting from 13 November 1918 English, French and Greek ships appeared in the harbor of the Odessa port. On 16 November Serbian troops dropped in at Odessa, on 18 November Polish troops, on 24–27 November a French division entered Odessa. At the same time, on 29 November military units of the Directory occupied Odessa. Hostilities began between detachments of the Directory and the White Guard units supported by the Entente.

On 5 December 1918 the French command demanded the Directory withdraw its troops from Odessa and locate them 40 km from the city. Petlyura, fearing a conflict with the Entente, ordered the withdrawal of the Directory troops from Odessa.

A puppet administration was established in Odessa, headed by General Aleksey Grishin-Almazov, who was appointed as the Military Governor. Formally, he was subordinate to the Volunteer Army of General Anton Denikin, but the real power belonged to the French General Philippe d'Anselm.

In late January — early February 1919 the French expanded the occupation zone, capturing Kherson and Nikolaev.

On 7 February 1919 d'Anselm declared: “France and its allies have not forgotten the efforts that Russia made at the beginning of the war, and now they have come to Russia in order to give all trustworthy elements and patriots an opportunity to restore order in the country, which was destroyed long time ago by the horrors of the Civil War”.

At the beginning of January 1919 an offensive of the Red Army began on the territory controlled by the UNR. On 4 January 1919 the Ukrainian Front was created, headed by Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, which launched an offensive in the Left-Bank Ukraine. Poltava was occupied on 16 January and Ekaterinoslav on 26 January.

On 6 February Kiev was taken over. On 13 February Vladimir Vinnichenko resigned as Chairman of the Directory, transferring leadership to Simon Petlyura.

In the conditions of the defeat and loss of Kiev, the Directory decided to enter into relations with the Entente and try to achieve patronage from its side. However, the negotiations were not successful. The Entente took a course to support the Volunteer Army. The Directory, defeated by the Red Army and having already lost control over Ukraine, was not considered by the Entente countries as an effective force in the fight against the Bolsheviks.

Nevertheless, negotiations continued until the French left Odessa.

In March 1919 the Bolsheviks went on the offensive against positions of the Entente and the White Guard detachments supporting them. The Red Army relied on numerous rebel and partisan units. A large detachment of the army of the Directory under the leadership of Ataman Nikifor Grigoriev also went over to the side of the Bolsheviks. The detachments of Grigoriev and Makhno became part of the First Zadneprovskaya Division of the Red Army under the command of the famous Bolshevik Pavel Dybenko.

In one of the reports, d'Anselm was forced to admit that “the Bolshevik movement is a purely popular movement, to which the entire mass of the population warmly sympathizes; as for the Bolshevik troops, the latter, in their high fighting qualities, resemble the Napoleon legions.”

In early March the Entente troops were evacuated from Kherson and Nikolaev.

On 2 April 1919 the commander of the Entente troops in Odessa, General d'Anselm, received an order from Paris to evacuate Odessa and the territories adjacent to it and to withdraw troops to Romania. Official reports indicated that the allied command decided to evacuate Odessa due to the inability to provide the city with food: “In order not to worsen the food supply of the population of the city, we decided to evacuate Odessa”.

Soviet power was restored throughout the entire land to Bessarabia, including territories of the Kherson and Ekaterinoslav Governorates.

On the Western Ukrainian-Polish front at this time, in February and the first half of March 1919, the Ukrainian Galician army achieved certain tactical successes. We are talking about the Vovchukhov operation (16–23 February 1919) and the blockade of Lvov until 18 March 1919. This was facilitated by an introduction of compulsory military service. By the spring of 1919, about 100 thousand soldiers were mobilized. Of these, it was possible to prepare, equip and arm 40 thousand soldiers (weapons, ammunition and uniforms were taken from the Austrian military depots in Galicia, as well as disarming the retreating Austrian and German units). A positive role in this was played by a split of the territory of the WUPR into three military regions — Lvov, Ternopol and Stanislav, the strengthening of the army with foreign officers (there were almost no of their own), as well as the numerical superiority at the first stage of the war.

However, by the end of March 1919 the Polish troops went on the offensive, which catastrophically worsened the position of the Galician army. The situation was aggravated by the severe political crisis that erupted in the WUPR between the socialists (communists), who were oriented towards Soviet Ukraine, and conservative Westernizers from the leadership of the WUPR. Its apogee was brutal, with a large number of victims, and the suppression of the

communist uprising in Drogobych on 14 April 1919 by the UGA troops.

Prior to that, in January 1919, in the city of Drogobych (oil production area) a conference of workers of the Carpathian region was held. At the conference, 500 delegates represented 10,000 workers. A resolution was adopted to support the October Revolution and the establishment of Soviet power in Eastern Galicia with subsequent reunification with Soviet Ukraine, as well as to disperse the UNRada. In February 1919 the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia (CPEG) was formed in Stanislav, later renamed the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (CPWU). On 14 April 1919 an armed uprising broke out in Drogobych. The military post and the gendarmerie went over to the rebels' side. All key points in the city were occupied. However, it was quickly stopped by this city and then drowned in blood by the Galicians — nationalists from the UGA. In the summer of 1920, when the Red Army, crushing the Polish army, entered the territory of Eastern Galicia, Soviet power was established in 16 counties. Landowners' lands and churches were confiscated, banks were nationalized, etc. However, this did not last long. With the withdrawal of the Red Army, the power of Poland returned to these lands again.

In the second half of March, the Red Army went on the offensive against the remnants of the Directory troops west of Kiev. Here, hostilities were conducted by the First Ukrainian Division under the leadership of the Ukrainian Bolshevik, a native of the Chernigov Governorate Nikolay Shchors. On 18 March 1919 Shchors' troops entered Vinnitsa, and on March 20 they took over Zhmerinka. On 26 March Petlyura's troops were defeated in a major battle on the Teterev River.

In April 1919 Petlyura's followers lost Rovno, and on 14 May 1919 the Poles attacked the Volyn' from the west. On 16 May the city of Lutsk was taken in Volyn', and about 1000 soldiers and more than 100 officers of the UPR army were captured by the Poles. By the beginning of June 1919, almost the entire territory of the WRUPR (WUPR) was occupied by Poland,

Romania and Czechoslovakia. The UGA controlled only a small area on the right bank of the Zbruch river, called the "triangle of death", a space between the rivers Zbruch, Dnestr and the railway

of Gusyatin — Chortkov (90 km perimeter). From all sides it was surrounded by the enemies: Romanian troops, the Red Army, and White Guard units.

On 2 June Polish troops occupied Ternopol. The entire territory of the WUPR was under the control of Poland. By this time, under the control of the Directory, there remained a narrow strip between the advance units of the Red Army and the Polish troops, not exceeding 10–20 km in the area of the Zbruch River.

Taking advantage of Denikin's offensive, the Directory managed to capture a number of the territories east of Zbruch. On 6 June Petlyura's troops occupied Kamenetz-Podolskiy.

At the same time, the Ukrainian Galician army managed to push back the Poles. This was preceded by the resignation of the government of WUPR S. Golubovich. Realizing an urgent need to concentrate the power of the president and the head of government in the same hands, the Ukrainian National Rada empowered the president of the WUPR with the powers of a dictator. Appointment of Evgeniy Petrushevich as a dictator caused an extremely negative reaction in the Directory. He was expelled from its membership, and the Ministry of Galicia Affairs was formed in the UNR. Thus a split of the newly emerging union began. In fact, the WRUPR again started to act in accordance with the political and military course of the former WUPR.

By that time, the Polish command, confident that the UGA had only a few days left, removed a significant part of the troops from this direction and redirected its forces towards the advancing Red Army, as well as to the area of the Polish-Czechoslovak conflict. Taking advantage of this, the dictator — President E. Petrushevich replaced the commander of the UGA M. Omelyanovich-Pavlenko with the former Tsar's General A. Grekov (who left S. Petlyura after a conflict with him), who reorganized the troops of the Galicians. A. Grekov convinced the WUPR leadership of the successful outcome of the attack on Lvov. On 7 June 1919 the Chortkov operation began. On 15 June the Galicians took over Ternopol. During this tense period Simon Petlyura began separate negotiations with the Polish authorities behind the backs of the Galicians. On his behalf, UPR General S. Delvig concluded an agreement on a demarcation line between the UGA and the Polish army along the front line at the time of its signing.

However, the dictator-president of the WUPR did not recognize it and the offensive continued. In this critical situation, the Head of the Polish State, J. Pilsudskiy, arrived to Lvov and personally took command of the troops of the Vostok group. On 28 June the Polish army went on the offensive along the entire front. A disorderly retreat of the UGA troops began. General A. Grekov was removed from his position. The WUPR leadership decided to evacuate the troops. On the night of 16–17 July UGA units numbering about 50 thousand soldiers, together with the head of the WUPR E. Petrushevich, went into the territory of the UPR across the Zbruch River. By 18 July 1919 the entire territory of Eastern Galicia was occupied by the Polish army. The war was lost. The history of the WUPR, which lasted 257 days, was actually over. The WUPR government was located in Kamenetz-Podolsk, where it remained until November 1919.

In the conditions of the Civil War and devastation on the territory of Ukraine, as well as everywhere in Soviet Russia, the regime of war communism was established, the main element of which was the food surplus requisitioning with the seizure of grain from the peasants. The only exceptions were poor peasants, who were exempted from the food surplus requisitioning.

Confiscation of the grain aroused an indignation of broad sections of the peasant population. As a result, uprisings against the Soviet power occurred. In April 1919 Ataman Zelenyi rebelled near Kiev. Soon the uprising unleashed on the territory of the Kiev, Poltava and Chernigov Governorates.

But the main danger to the Soviet government was Ataman Nikifor Grigoriev, who had gone over to the side of the Soviet government. Both Grigoriev himself and his entourage shared the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism. On 2 May the Grigoriev followers organized the first Jewish massacre at the Znamenka station. 50 Jews were killed, 120 houses were devastated. On 4–6 May massacres were carried out in Elizavetgrad and Alexandria. Among the victims were Chekists and commissars.

But even in this situation, the Soviet authorities hoped that these were spontaneous actions that had nothing to do with the “red commander” Grigoriev. On 7 May the commander of the Third Ukrainian Soviet Army, Nikolay Khudyakov, ordered Grigoriev to stop the outrage and restore order within 24 hours.

In response, Grigoriev officially announced the beginning of the struggle against the Soviet regime. On 8 May he published the Proclamation “To the people of Ukraine and soldiers of the Red Ukrainian Army.” The manifest stated:

“Ukrainian people! Take the power in your own hands. Let there be no dictatorship of either an individual or a party. May the dictatorship of the working people live. May the rough hands of the peasant and worker live. No to the political speculators! No to the violence on the right, No to the violence on the left! Let the power of the people of Ukraine live! You have a new struggle ahead of you. Fight — and you will win!

I, Ataman Grigoriev, and my headquarters laid down our lives for the rights of the working people. Last bet. We are not looking for anything for ourselves. Give us support and this you will save your rights. Here is my order: in three days, mobilize all those who know how to handle weapons, and immediately seize all railway stations, and put your commissars at each.

Each volost, each village, form detachments and go to your county town, from each county town, from your detachments, send 400 of the best fighters to Kiev and 200 to Kharkov. If there is a weapon — with a weapon, if there is no weapon — send with a pitchfork, but I ask you to fulfill my order, and the victory will be ours! Everything else I will do myself. The General Staff at my Headquarters. Only with your support will we attain the rights for people. organize the people’s power Immediately”.

Grigoriev came up with a program to change the composition of the Soviets, which were supposed to be formed on a national basis, subject to the complete dominance of Ukrainians in them:

“The Soviets may include representatives of all nationalities in proportion to their number in Ukraine, i.e. for Ukrainians in the Soviet — 80 %, for Jews — 5 %, and for all other nationalities — 15 %!”

Under the banners of Ataman Grigoriev were 16 thousand people. The Grigoriev followers captured Alexandria, Kremenchug, Cherkassy, Uman, Elizavetgrad and Ekaterinoslav. However, the riots of Grigoriev’s detachments caused rejection by the broad sections of the Ukrainian population. Nestor Makhno did not support the Ataman either, on whose help he counted.

On 14 May the Red Army went on the offensive from three sides, from Kiev, Poltava and Odessa. On 21 May the Grigoriev supporters were defeated on the outskirts of Kiev. By the end of May, all the cities captured by Grigoriev came under the control of the Bolsheviks.

In June 1919 the remnants of the Grigoriev followers united with the detachments of Makhno, who by this time had already entered into conflict with the Soviet authorities. However, contradictions arose between the two allies. On 27 July 1919 during a conflict with the Makhno followers, Nikifor Grigoriev was killed.

Detachments of the “ideological anarchist” posed no less of a threat to the population of Ukraine than the Grigoriev followers. They never differed in discipline, representing outlaws with elected commanders. Makhno’s army practiced robbery of captured settlements and arbitrary shootings. In 1919 the Makhno followers committed a Jewish massacre in the Gorka colony, killing 30 Jewish families. Not only political opponents, supporters of the Whites, Reds and Petlyura, but also a wide strata of the urban population underwent repressions. As the positions of the Makhno followers weakened, robberies and violence also spread to the peasants, whom Makhno had previously considered his supporters. According to the Soviet researcher of the Makhno movement Mikhail Kubanin: “The peasant, who used to sympathize the Makhno follower, began to hate him and turned into his enemy. This was happening at the same time with the economic and political stratification of the village, and was even an expression of this stratification — the further, the more, and by the end of 1920 the Makhno army almost completely turned into a number of small criminal gangs that terrorized the peasants, which only accelerated its own destruction.”

By this time, the army of General Anton Denikin, which began a campaign against Moscow, became the main threat to Soviet power in Ukraine. The first army corps of the Volunteer Army under the command of General Andrey Shkuro occupied the Donbass. On 19 May the Red front in Ukraine was broken. On 25 June the Whites occupied Kharkov. On 29 July Shkuro’s corps occupied Ekaterinoslav. On 31 August the White Guards entered Kiev. Most of Ukraine was under the control of Denikin. Mobilization was carried out in Ukraine. Denikin’s army more than doubled, from 64,000 to 150,000 soldiers.

Denikin was a staunch supporter of a united and indivisible Russia and an opponent of the autonomy of Ukraine. On 12 August on the eve of capture of Kiev, he made an appeal: “To ancient Kiev, the mother of Russian cities, regiments are approaching in an irresistible desire to restore to the Russian people the unity they have lost, that unity, without which the great Russian people, weakened and fragmented, losing young generations in fratricidal civil discords, would not be able to defend its independence, — that unity, without which a full and correct economic life is unachievable, when the North and South, East and West of a vast power in free exchange bring to each other everything that each region is rich in, each region, without which the mighty Russian speech would not have been created, in equal share woven by the efforts of Kiev, Moscow and Petrograd. Wanting to weaken the Russian state before declaring war with it, the Germans, long before 1914, sought to destroy the unity of the Russian tribe forged in a hard struggle.

To this end, they supported and inflated the movement in the South of Russia, which set itself a goal of separating its nine southern Governorates from Russia under the name of the “Ukrainian State”. The desire to tear the Little Russian branch of the Russian people away from Russia has not been stopped to this day. The former henchmen of the Germans, Petlyura and his associates, who initiated the decomposition of Russia, continue to do their evil deed: creation of an independent “Ukrainian State” and a struggle against revival of United Russia”.

At the same time, Denikin declared that he was taking under protection the “Little Russian language”: “Leaving the Russian language as the state language throughout Russia, I consider it completely unacceptable and forbid the persecution of the Little Russian people’s language”.

Denikin’s policy in the occupied territories was based on a combination of harsh terror against opponents of the White movement and indulgence towards the broad masses of supporters of the Bolsheviks and Petlyura. In the order to the “Special Meeting” Denikin wrote:

“1. United, Great, Indivisible Russia. Protection of faith. Establishment of the order. Restoration of the productive forces of the country and the national economy. Increase of the labor productivity.

2. The fight against Bolshevism to the end.

3. Military dictatorship. Any pressure of political parties shall be rejected, any opposition to the authorities — both from the right and from the left — shall be punished ...

To speed up and simplify the procedure for rehabilitation of those who are not entirely unimpaired in terms of Bolshevism, Petlyra support, and so on. If there was only a mistake, but they are fit for the cause — indulgence”.

However, in practice, this contributed to unwinding of a repressive policy, which rather quickly led to the fact that the broad masses of the Ukrainian population became disillusioned with the Denikin’s government. In the rear areas of the Denikin army advancing on Moscow, a partisan movement began.

In August 1919 Nestor Makhno proclaimed a creation of the “Revolutionary Rebel Army of Ukraine”. In September, in the area of Gulyay-Pole and Ekaterinoslav, a vast area appeared, controlled by the Makhno supporters. On 11 November they even managed to take over Ekaterinoslav.

In these conditions, the Directory became active. In August 1919 the UPR army occupied Zhmerinka and Vinnitsa. On 30 August Kiev was taken. However, at the request of Denikin, the Petlyura supporters left the city.

On 24 September 1919, the Directory declared war against Denikin. However, in mid-October 1919, the troops of the Directory were defeated and soon ceased resistance. Part of the army of the Directory went over to the side of Denikin. On 6 November 1919, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Galician army, Miron Tarnavskiy, signed an agreement with Denikin on the transfer of the UGA to the Whites, confirmed on 17 November by the new commander, Osip Mikitka.

As a result of two treaties, Zyatkovsk of 6 November 1919 and Odessa of 17 November 1919 the Ukrainian Galician Army in full force with rear units was transferred to the command of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the South of Russia, Lieutenant General A. Denikin. It was directly subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the Novorossiysk region, General N. Schilling. The WUPR government was asked to move to Odessa. Staff officers of the White Army were assigned to all divisions of the Galicians. Telegraph

communication was established between the troops. It was planned to take the sick and wounded soldiers of the UGA to the hospitals of the Volunteer Army, in particular in Odessa, and after recovery, return to the units. Issues of the political future of Eastern Galicia were not mentioned in the treaty.

On 15 November the Directory transferred full power to Petlyura. By this time, the territory controlled by the UPR had been reduced to a minimum. On 22 November the Whites occupied Proskurov, and on 2 December the last stronghold of the Ukrainian nationalists, Starokonstantinov, was taken.

After that, Petlyura committed another betrayal. As early as 30 October he began negotiations with Poland. This is how Petlyura justified his position in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the UPR Andrey Livitskiy: “Never forget that Great Russia, and even such a black suit as Denikin’s, is unacceptable for us, and we must look for allies of our position regarding Denikin. In this regard, the combination of an alliance against Russia: Poland – Ukraine – Latvia – Lithuania – Estonia is perfectly acceptable to us. When we will get weapons with the help of Poland, military luck will then go over to our side, and this will bring closer a possibility of joining such an alliance of Kuban, Georgia and Azerbaijan, thus realizing the coalition system of the Baltic-Black Sea states”.

On 2 December 1919, the UPR and Poland signed the Warsaw Declaration. The UPR abandoned Galicia in favor of Poland, defining the Zbruch River as a border. By this time, the Ukrainian People’s Republic had lost all its territories.

On 5 December Petlyura left for Warsaw. Emigration of the former dictator of Ukraine began.

Signing of the declaration led to a break in the agreement between the UPR and the WUPR, which regarded declaration as a betrayal of the interests of Ukrainians. President of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic Evgeniy Petrushkevich emigrated to Vienna and on 20 December 1919 officially denounced the Zluka Act.

On 1 January 1920 becoming more and more convinced of the inevitability of the defeat of the White Army and no longer considering a possibility of an alliance with the UNR, the command of the UGA signed an agreement with the military leaders of the Workers ‘and

Peasants' Red Army (WPRA) on transfer under its command, while receiving the name "Chervona" (Red) Ukrainian Galician Army (CHUGA). This step in that situation was positively perceived by the supporters of Soviet power in Ukraine and made them stronger at a certain stage. It also contributed to preservation of the main army units of the Galicians, who were in critical condition.

However, this union also did not last long. After a short time, a significant part of the soldiers fled, joining the ranks of Ukrainian nationalist organizations in Galicia. Part of the units went over to the side of the Polish army and participated in the campaign of the Poles against the Red Army in Kiev.

Nevertheless, on 6 December despite the defeat and loss of allies, remnants of the Petlyura troops, headed by General Mikhail Omelyanovich-Pavlenko, crossed the Zbruch and inflicted a number of defeats on the White Army. During the so-called First Winter Campaign, the Petlyura's army occupied Vinnitsa on 24 December and Uman on 31 December 1919. By this time, however, Denikin had already been defeated by the Red Army, which soon occupied most of the territory of Ukraine.

On 21 April the Warsaw Treaty (Pilsudskiy-Petlyura Pact) was signed by Poland and the UNR. The Treaty contained a recognition by Poland of the sovereignty of the UNR: "Recognizing the right of Ukraine to an independent state system on the territory within the borders from the north, east and south, established on the basis of treaties of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the border states, the Republic of Poland recognizes the Directory of the independent Ukrainian People's Republic, headed by Chief Ataman Pan Simon Petlyura, as the supreme power of the Ukrainian People's Republic".

However, the treaty was not an agreement between two equal powers. A secret agreement adopted by Simon Petlyura, which was an integral part of the treaty and signed on 24 April, established the subordinate position of Ukraine in relation to Poland.

Article three of the agreement established the following order of relations: "Joint Polish-Ukrainian actions against Soviet troops on the territory of the Right-Bank Ukraine, located to the east of the current line of the Polish-Bolshevik front, are carried out ... under the general

command of the Polish troops” The UPR also undertook to supply the Polish army with food.

Petlyura explained his submission to Poland by the need to fight against Russia, which he considered the main enemy of Ukraine. In 1921 Petlyura wrote: “When I concluded an agreement with the Poles in April 1920, my goal was to start a persistent struggle against the inclinations and tendencies in our society towards political agreements and treaties with Moscow, which I consider our historical and eternal enemy”.

In modern Ukrainian literature, it is customary to idealize Simon Petlyura, to present his actions as a struggle for liberation of Ukraine. However, this interpretation does not correspond to the real facts. Petlyura followed the same path that Getman Mazepa went through two centuries earlier. Starting with a betrayal in favor of Germany, Petlyura completed his political biography with a betrayal in favor of Poland.

At the same time, it is important that Petlyura began contacts with the Poles immediately after the Act of Zluka. In February 1919, S. Petlyura, secretly from E. Petrushevich, sent Colonel B. Kurdinovskiy to Warsaw with a proposal to join forces against the Reds and Whites. In return, the Poles were offered Volyn, Podlachie, Polissya and Eastern Galicia. In May 1919, an emissary from J. Pilsudskiy, intelligence officer J. Mazurkevich, arrived to S. Petlyura with an invitation to visit Warsaw. Negotiations took place throughout the entire period from February to December 1919.

In modern Ukraine, Petlyura’s anti-Semitism, the totalitarian nature of his regime, the destruction of political opponents organized under his rule, massacres and murders of the non-Ukrainian population are concealed. More than 50 thousand Jews were killed. Most of them were the victims of the Petlyura’s army. In total, about 2 thousand massacres were carried out on the territory of Ukraine during the Civil War.

The leader of the Ukrainian nationalists himself was a well-known and open anti-Semite. In particular, in his last book, published in Paris in 1926, he stated: “When we remember the Ukrainian Jews, many of them also went to the Bolsheviks’ side, hoping that they would come up here, they would have strength, they would get through to

the leading positions. In the old days they were not given a way. Then they thought that they would become the leaders for the Bolsheviks. Thus many Jews, and especially the young ones — juveniles, went to the Bolsheviks and became communists”.

Thus, Ukrainian nationalism in the views of Petlyura naturally combined with anti-Bolshevism and anti-Semitism.

In October 1919 the Red Army went on the offensive against Denikin. In the first half of December, the Soviet power was restored in Kiev, Kharkov and Poltava. On 4 April 1920 Denikin handed over the command to General Petr Wrangel. By this time, the entire territory of Ukraine was already under the control of the Bolsheviks. Wrangel’s army took refuge in the Crimea.

However, in April the threat to Soviet Ukraine emerged from the west. The day after signing of the secret protocol to the Pilsudskiy-Petlyura Pact, on 25 April 1920 Polish troops invaded the territory of Ukraine. Petlyura’s troops also acted on the side of Poland.

The Soviet-Polish war was not a part of the Civil War. Warsaw did not hide its desire to occupy Ukraine and recreate in one form or another the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, “from sea to sea.” Thus, it was no longer an internal Russian conflict, but a war between Soviet Russia and a neighboring aggressive and expansionist state. In this war, Ukrainian nationalists fought on the side of the external enemy of Russia and against the Red Army, in which ranks thousands of the Ukrainians fought.

On 28 April 1920, the Polish troops reached Vinnitsa. On 7 May Kiev was occupied and a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnepr was captured. But this Polish offensive was exhausted.

On 5 June the Southwestern Front of the Red Army under the command of Alexander Egorov went on the offensive. The front was broken, and on 7 June the troops of the First Cavalry Army of Semyon Budyonnyi liberated Zhytomyr and Berdichev, entering the rear area of the Kiev enemy group. On 10 June Kiev was liberated. In July, the troops of the Southwestern Front reached the Zbruch River and, having crossed the river, developed an offensive on the territory of Galicia.

On 23 July the Red Army launched an assault on Lvov. On 17 August, the troops came close to the city, but they could not take it over.

In September 1920, J. Pilsudskiy refused the Warsaw Pact as unnecessary. The UPR actually ceased to exist.

Simon Petlyura fled to Poland with a group of associates, where he announced creation of the State Center of the Ukrainian People's Republic — the Government of the UPR in exile. In 1923 Petlyura moved to Hungary, then to Austria and Switzerland, and finally, in 1924, to France.

After the death of Petlyura in 1926, the government-in-exile was headed by Andrey Livitskiy, who lived in Warsaw under supervision of the Polish authorities. After the occupation of Poland by fascist Germany, the UPR government in exile cooperated with the occupation regime. Prime Minister Andrey Livitskiy became a member of the Ukrainian Central Committee, an organization of Ukrainian collaborators created by the Nazis. It was the Ukrainian Central Committee that was involved in formation of the Galicia SS Division. Later he became a member of the Ukrainian National Committee, established on March 17, 1945 in Weimar with the support of the German authorities to organize the activities of all Ukrainian collaborationist structures.

Throughout the entire period of the World War II, leaders of the UPR Government in exile collaborated with the Nazis.

After the end of the World War II, the Government of the UPR in exile cooperated with the United States and actively participated in the struggle against the Soviet Union.

In March 1992, the Government in Exile decided to transfer its powers to the Ukrainian government. On 22 August 1992 there was an official transfer to the President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk of a letter stating that Ukraine is the legal successor of the UNR. Thus, modern Ukraine traces its origins to a political organization that has stained itself with cooperation with the Nazis.

On 18 August 1920, the Red Army suffered a serious defeat on the Vistula. Polish troops went on the offensive. Western Ukraine was lost. On 12 October 1920 an armistice was concluded in Riga between the delegations of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, on the one hand, and Poland, on the other.

On 18 March 1921 the Riga Treaty was signed by Poland, on the one hand, and the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR and BSSR, on the other hand, according to which the territories of Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia)

and Western Belarus became part of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Thus, Article I declared that both parties of the treaty declared that the state of war between them was terminated. The border was established along the Zbruch River. This meant that the entire territory of Western Ukraine with a large Ukrainian (Russian) population remained within Poland.

It should be emphasized that, having agreed with the terms of the treaty and realizing their injustice, the Soviet side stated that with a change in the situation it would raise the question of their annulment.

At the same time, in accordance with Article VII of the treaty, Poland guaranteed the rights of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian population, including in the area of language and culture: “Poland grants to persons of Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian nationality, residing in Poland, on the basis of equality of nationalities, all the rights that ensure free development of culture, language and the performance of religious rites. Mutually, Russia and Ukraine provide persons of Polish nationality residing in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, all the same rights.

Persons of Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian nationality in Poland have the right, within the limits of domestic legislation, to cultivate their native language, organize and maintain their own schools, develop their culture and create societies and associations for this purpose. The same rights, within the limits of domestic legislation, shall be used by persons of Polish nationality residing in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus¹.

However, the obligations formally accepted by the Polish state were grossly violated by it during the entire period of occupation of Western Ukraine.

It shall be noted that the established Soviet-Polish border did not correspond to the so-called Curzon Line, the demarcation line recommended by the Entente Council for Russia and Poland, based on ethnic composition of population of the territory. In accordance with the Curzon Line, the border was supposed to pass much westward

¹ Collection of legalizations and orders of the government for 1921. Administration of the Affairs of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR. M., 1944. P. 343–369.

along the line Brest-Litovsk — Dorogousk — Ustilug — Krylov — east of Przemyshl and west of Rava-Russkaya.

Simultaneously with the Polish attack on Ukraine, General Wrangel also began active operations. In September 1920 he occupied Aleksandrovsk, Nikopol and approached Yuzovka.

On 26–27 October 1920 after the end of the Soviet-Polish war, the Red Army went on the offensive. The units of Nestor Makhno provided active support to the Soviet troops.

On 9 November the Red Army broke through the defenses of Wrangel in the Perekop area. On 14 November the remnants of Wrangel's army fled from the Crimea.

However, in Ukraine there were still areas of resistance to the Soviet power. The largest of them was the volnitsa of Nestor Makhno. On 26 November 1920 the military operation of the Red Army began against the anarchist detachments of Makhno. At the beginning of July 1921, Makhno's detachments were defeated. On 28 August 1921 Makhno crossed the Dnester with a small unit and took refuge in Bessarabia. Soviet power established itself throughout the territory of Ukraine, except for its western territories occupied by Poland. The civil war was over.

The cultural process in Ukraine in the era of the Great Revolution and the Civil War has turned into a subject of acute political controversy in modern conditions, in which historical science in Kiev has taken a clearly subordinate position. Modern Ukrainian academic and educational literature interprets these historical events as an unprecedented spiritual take-off that grew out of political revival of the Ukrainian nation. In this case, the culture is perceived as a “state-forming mechanism”.

In historical reality, any cultural initiatives of the past nationalist regimes and state formations of Little Russia were populist tactics with an aim of culturally cementing the past national pseudo-statehood, sometimes with the attempts to expand into neighboring territories. At the same time, cultural creativity to a certain extent relied on the democratic demands of society, which the then Little Russian liberals and radicals used for speculative political purposes.

According to the author of one of the modern Ukrainian school textbooks: “With an expansion of aspirations for social justice, for

social renewal, for the liberation of people from the “instinct of exploitation”, the culture was increasingly perceived as a way to transform a person, to acquire a new identity. After cruelty of the world war, the Russian-Bolshevik intervention, the Civil War, the red and white terror, the atamanhood, the culture was seen as a way to cleanse the filth of confrontation, militancy, animal instincts.”¹

In this arbitrary interpretation of historical facts either the symbolic and demonstrative cultural initiatives of the new Ukrainian authorities are exaggerated, or the long-term achievements of Little Russian spirituality are ascribed to them. Thus, in the area of education, it is stated that the Central Rada established the national education system through several measures. The first three Ukrainian gymnasiums were opened: named after T. Shevchenko, named after the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood (at the expense of the Ukrainian Association of School Education), on Shulyavets (at the expense of the Prosveschenie partnership).

In May 1917 the Rada School Commission organized about 100 monthly teacher training courses, and in October of the same year opened the Ukrainian Teachers' Institute in Zhytomyr.

In May 1917 the Central Rada began an introduction of the Ukrainian language in all elementary schools. A working group was created to write the Ukrainian-language textbooks on the Ukrainian language and literature, history, geography, mathematics, chemistry, physics and other school subjects.

Educational hours were introduced in schools, during which students got acquainted with the history of their national liberation struggle, the life and work of prominent Ukrainian hetmans, and held dramatic readings and concerts.

In the creation of higher education, two paths were chosen: Ukrainization of existing higher education schools and the opening of new Ukrainian universities. On 5 October the Ukrainian People's University was opened in Kiev.

The same simplified educational line was preserved during the hetman's regime. Transformation of the elementary school into a

¹ *Strukevich A. K., Romanyuk I. M., Pirus T. P.* History of Ukraine: textbook for the 8th grade. K.: Gramota, 2008. P. 217.

national school has begun. compulsory study of the Ukrainian language and literature, history and geography of Ukraine was introduced in the Russian-speaking gymnasiums and real schools, 40 new gymnasiums were opened, and 150 out of 836 old ones were Ukrainianized.

In October 1918 Kamenets-Podilskyi State University was founded. At the same time, four new institutes were opened in Kiev and Odessa, and the Ukrainian Institute of History and Philology in Poltava. Some elementary schools acquired the status of public schools. Thus, attempts were made to gradually form a national school that could become the basis of Ukrainian statehood.

However, in this process, the new Ukrainian government did not want or could not solve several fundamental problems. The most urgent literacy program was not launched. A unified public system of primary education was not created. Secondary general education and secondary vocational schools did not appear. And, finally, the simplified and forced Ukrainization of the entire educational system narrowed its cognitive potential and violated the principle of social justice, taking into account the multinational composition of the population of Ukraine.

Development of science in the country suffered from similar shortcomings. On November 14, 1918, Hetman P. Skoropadskiy signed a law on the foundation of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (UAS), provided with state funding.

This fact can be considered encouraging, since prominent Ukrainian scientists were appointed the first full members of the UAS: D. Bagaliy, A. Krymskiy, M. Petrov, S. Smal-Stotskiy (historical and philological department); V. Vernadskiy, M. Kashchenko, S. Timoshenko, P. Tutkovskiy (Physics and Mathematics Department); M. Tugan-Baranovskiy, F. Taranovskiy, V. Kosinskiy, O. Levitskiy (Social and Economic Department).

V. Vernadskiy was elected as the President of the UAS, and A. Krymskiy was elected as the Secretary. It should be noted that under the conditions of the Civil War, an establishment of the Academy of Sciences had only a nominal importance and a psychological effect, and besides, not all new academicians agreed to join the UAS.

In the spring of 1917, by the decision of the Central Rada, the Ukrainian National Theater was founded, where the plays were staged

by the traveling theater groups of P. Saksaganskiy and the Young Theater of L. Kurbas. In January 1920 G. Yura began his independent activity, founding the Theater named after I. Franko.

Under Hetman P. Skoropadskiy, the National Archives, the National Museum, the Ukrainian Academy of Arts, and the National Gallery of Arts were created. In the spring of 1918, the Ukrainian National Opera was founded in the capital city under the direction of M. Sadovskiy. At the same time, the Ukrainian State Symphony Orchestra named after N. Lysenko and 27 national professional musical and choir groups were established in Governorate and district centers.

In January 1919, on behalf of S. Petlyura, the Ukrainian Musical Chapel was founded under the direction of O. Koshytsya. In the same year, the Chapel of Folk Minstrels was revived in Kiev. The following year, several choir chapels appeared. The work of the composer M. Leontovich, a student of N. Lysenko, the author of well-known adaptations of Ukrainian folk songs for the choir, was brightly manifested.

At this time, such works by Ukrainian artists appeared as “The Cossacks are having lunch” (1919) by M. Samokish, “Moloch of War” (1919) by O. Novakovskiy, “Autumn Motif” (1918) by A. Manevich, “Poppies and Cornflowers” (1919) by P. Kholodnyi. At the time of the revolution the creativity of the prominent Ukrainian graphic artist Narbut took off.

In the cultural and educational activities of civil organizations, the revived partnership Prosveshchenie played a special role. On 20 September 1917 about 4,000 delegates from Ukraine, Kuban, Bessarabia, and the Don gathered at the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Prosveshchenie. Their work focused on out-of-school education, publication of the textbooks and Ukrainian-language literature.

Ukrainization, which began as the development of Ukrainian cultural projects and institutions, moved into the stage of forcing the use of the Ukrainian language, which was not the very popular in the cities. It was planned to translate the official document flow into the Ukrainian language. As A. Goldenweiser, a member of the Rada from the minority, recalled, “the upcoming Ukrainization embarrassed all non-Ukrainians involved in school, science, and the legal profession.

The Ukrainian language, with which they later became somewhat accustomed, evoked affected ridicules, no one was going to learn this language”¹.

On the other side of the ideological front of the Civil War, even more unprecedented changes were taking place. Since the task of the Soviet government everywhere, including on the territory of Ukraine, was to create a just social and economic system, it strongly welcomed creation of new types of schools and the development of new methods of education and training that could accelerate the process of breaking with the “bourgeois past”. Soviet pedagogics was based on the need to link education with mentoring in the spirit of communist values and ideology. In accordance with this, programs were introduced in schools that combined labor education and training, general and technical education, and the principle of a polytechnic school was introduced.

It is impossible not to notice success in terms of accessibility of education to the general public. Education in the primary seven-year school, as well as in vocational and secondary specialized educational institutions was free, and the children of workers and peasants had all the opportunities to receive it.

¹ *Danilevskiy I., Tairova T., Shubin A., Mironenko V.* History of Ukraine. 2nd Ed., revised and amended, St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 297.

Chapter 10

UKRAINE IN 1920–30S

The End of the Civil War put on the agenda an issue of the future political structure of the state. Upon completion of the military activities, several Soviet republics were present on the territory of the former Russian Empire, including the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. By that time, the ruling political parties in them were the communist ones, which were the parts of the common Russian Communist Party (the Bolsheviks).

The Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (Ukrainian SSR) acted on the basis of the Constitution of the USSR, approved on March 10, 1919 by the Third All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets.

The Constitution established the All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers', Peasants' (Villagers') and Red Army Deputies, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of Soviets (VUTsIK) and the Council of People's Commissars as bodies of the central Soviet power.

The Congress of Soviets was the highest authority in the republic and was elected at least twice a year. In the period between congresses, functions of the supreme authority were performed by the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of Soviets. VUTsIK was elected by the Congress of Soviets for a term until the next congress and was liable to the congress. VUTsIK elected and dismissed the government cabinet — the Council of People's Commissars¹. At the

¹ Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR1919 [website]. URL: <http://yccp.pф/konstitutsiya-ussr/3-konstitutsiya-ukrainskoj-ssr-1919-goda.html> (access date: 20.02.2022).

local level, the authorities were the governorate, county and volost congresses of councils and executive committees of the corresponding level elected by them, as well as city and village councils of workers', peasants' (villagers') and Red Army deputies and executive committees elected by them.

The power system was elective. At the same time, the following persons had an active suffrage right: "a) all who earn their livelihood through productive and socially useful labor, as well as the persons employed in the household, providing for the former the possibility of productive labor, such as: workers and employees of all types and categories employed in industry, trade, agriculture, etc., peasants and Cossack agricultural workers; b) soldiers of the Red Army and sailors of the Red Fleet; c) citizens who are not included in the categories listed in Sub-clauses "a" and "b", due to disability, duly certified"¹.

The Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine was established on April 19, 1918, and in July 1918 the CP(b)U became a part of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), while retaining its own name.

In 1922 the well-known Ukrainian Bolshevik, born into a family of an Orthodox priest from the Volyn governorate, Dmitriy Manuilkiy, was the first Secretary of the CC CP (b) U (Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine) Grigoriy Petrovskiy — the chairman of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee was a native of the Kharkov governorate, a former deputy of the State Duma of the IV convocation, Christian Rakovskiy — a Bulgarian revolutionary, since 1918, participating in the struggle for the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine — was the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

When deciding on the future state structure, the Bolsheviks proceeded, on the one hand, from the equality of nations and the principles of the right of nations to self-determination and proletarian internationalism, on the other hand, from the need to create an efficiently functioning political and economic system in conditions of external pressure and isolation. The result of the discussion in the leadership of the RCP(b) (Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)

¹ Ibid.

was the creation of a new type of state that had no analogues at that time — a national federation based on the formal equality of the union republics, the system of Soviet authorities and the presence of party structures based on centralization.

On 30 December 1922, in Moscow, at the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR, the creation of a new state was proclaimed — the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Congress adopted the Declaration of Formation of the USSR.

The Declaration proclaimed the creation of a single state. The following were noted as reasons for the unification of the Soviet republics: “The years of war took a heavy toll on the country. Devastated fields, stopped factories, destroyed productive forces and depleted economic resources left from the war make the individual efforts of individual republics for economic construction insufficient. Restoration of the national economy turned out to be impossible with the separate existence of the republics.

On the other hand, an instability of the international situation and the danger of new attacks make the creation of a united front of the Soviet republics inevitable in face of the capitalist encirclement.

Finally, the very structure of Soviet power, international in its class nature, pushes the working people of the Soviet republics into the path of unification into one socialist family.”

On the same day, the Treaty of the Formation of the USSR was adopted. The Treaty was signed by four Soviet republics: RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, Belarusian Socialist Soviet Republic and Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, which included Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Parties of the Treaty declared the unification into a single state: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

A wide range of powers were transferred under control of the USSR:

- “a) representation of the Union in international relations;
- b) changing the external borders of the Union;
- c) conclusion of the treaties of admission of new republics to the Union;
- d) declaration of war and conclusion of peace;
- e) conclusion of external state loans;
- f) ratification of international treaties;
- g) establishment of foreign and domestic trade systems;

h) establishing the foundations and general plan of the entire national economy of the Union, as well as conclusion of the concession agreements;

i) regulation of transport and postal and telegraph business;

j) establishing the foundations for organizing the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

k) approval of the unified state budget of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the establishment of a monetary, money and credit system, as well as a system of all-union, republican and local taxes;

l) establishment of general principles of the land management and land use, as well as the use of subsoil, forests and waters at the entire territory of the Union;

m) common union legislation on resettlements;

n) establishing the foundations of the judiciary and legal proceedings, as well as civil and criminal legislation of the Union;

o) establishment of basic labor laws;

p) establishment of the general principles of public education;

q) establishment of general measures in the area of public healthcare;

r) establishment of a system of measures and weights;

s) organization of all-Union statistics;

t) basic legislation in the area of union citizenship in relation to the rights of foreigners;

u) the right to a general amnesty;

v) cancellation of resolutions of congresses of Soviets, Central Executive Committees and Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics that violate the Union Treaty”

A single union citizenship, flag, coat of arms and state seal were introduced. Decrees and resolutions of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR were to be published in six languages of the union republics, including Ukrainian.

The Central Executive Committees of the Union republics had the right to protest the decrees and resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Union republics had their own budgets. An important feature of the Soviet state was the right of secession. Cl. 26 of the Treaty declared: “Each of the union republics retained the right to freely secede from the Union”.

A year later, on 31 January 1924 the first Constitution of the USSR was adopted at the II Congress of Soviets of the USSR. The text of the Constitution included the Declaration of the Formation of the USSR and the expanded, amended and revised Treaty of the Formation of the USSR. Chapter X of the Constitution established the status of the union republics and the principles of organization of republican power. In particular, Clause 64 established that “within the territory of each union republic, the supreme authority of the latter is the Congress of Soviets of the republic, and in the intervals between Congresses, its central executive committee”. The Constitution determined that the Central Executive Committee of the union republic creates an executive body, the Council of People’s Commissars, consisting of the chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, deputy chairmen, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the Republic, as well as People’s Commissars for Agriculture, Finance, Food, Labor, Internal Affairs, Justice, Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, Education, Healthcare, Social Security.

Thus, a single unified system of state authorities was created for all union republics.

In the process of preparation for unification of the republics, the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR were clarified. The republic included the entire territory of Little Russia and New Russia, except for Crimea, that is, nine governorates of the pre-revolutionary period: Volyn, Podolsk, Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson and Taurida (with an exception of Crimea). In addition, back in 1920, by the decision of the communist leadership, the territory of Donbass was transferred to Ukraine, including that part of it that in the pre-revolutionary period was not part of the Ekaterinoslav governorate, but belonged to the Don Cossack Host Region.

Thus, the Ukrainian SSR received even more than the territory that the Central Rada once declared the lands of Ukraine. This evidenced on the desire of the Soviet leadership to take into account the interests of the Ukrainian SSR to the maximum extent.

In 1919–1920 the first administrative and territorial reform of the Ukrainian SSR was carried out. There was a disaggregation of the governorates. Instead of nine, 12 governorates arose. Territory of the Kherson governorate was divided into Odessa and Nikolaev

governorates. On a part of the territory of the Taurida Governorate, which became part of the Ukrainian SSR (Berdyansk and Melitopol counties) and a part of the territory of the Ekaterinoslav Governorate, the Aleksandrov Governorate was created (since March 1921, Zaporozhye Governorate). A number of territories of the Kiev, Poltava and Kherson governorates entered the newly formed Kremenchug governorate. Finally, on the territory of the Donets Basin, which included parts of the Ekaterinoslav and Kharkov governorates, as well as the territories of the Donetsk, Taganrog, Cherkassy and Shakhty districts of the Don Cossack Host Region, the Donetsk governorate was created. The governorates included 102 counties and 1989 volosts.

As a result of the administrative reforms of 1923–1925, governorates, counties and volosts were liquidated. In their place, 41 districts (instead of counties) and 760 districts (instead of volosts) were created. On 12 October 1924 the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was created on part of the territory of the former Odessa and Podolsk governorates (nowadays most of the Moldavian ASSR is part of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic).

In January 1925, by decision of a special commission of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, chaired by Mikhail Kalinin, a decision was made to change the borders between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR. A number of territories of the RSFSR were transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. Including on 16 October 1925, the RSFSR transferred part of the territory of the Kursk governorate to Ukraine: Putivl county and a part of Graivoron and Belgorod counties. On 1 April 1926 the Semenovskaya volost of the Novozybkovskiy county of the Bryansk governorate was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. On 9 May 1926 the Troitsk volost of the Valuysk county of the Voronezh governorate was transferred to Ukraine. Thus, the process of expanding the territory of the Ukrainian SSR continued.

This issue has caused considerable controversy. Territorial disputes between the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR over certain territories of the Kursk and Bryansk governorates continued for a long time, despite the adopted decision.

Creation of the USSR and adoption of the Constitution of the USSR in 1924 led to the need to amend the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR

in 1919. On 15 May 1929 the XI All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, held in Kharkov, approved the second Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR. The Soviet system of administration was preserved in general. At the same time, novelties were added regarding the form of unification of the republics and the status of the Ukrainian SSR within the Union.

In particular, Article 2 of the Constitution contained the statement that the Ukrainian SSR, together with other union republics, creates “on the basis of complete voluntariness and equality, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”.

Article 3 specified the nature of relations within the Union: “The Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic is part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a sovereign treaty state and reserves the right to freely secede from the Union. Sovereignty of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic is limited only within the limits specified in the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and only with respect to subjects that are related to the competence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Outside these limits, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic exercises its state power independently”¹.

Thus, at least formally, the following principles were declared: 1) voluntary nature of unification, 2) the Treaty nature of the federation, 3) the republic’s right to secede from the USSR, 4) the republic’s limited sovereignty.

The Constitution provided Kharkov with the status of the capital city of Soviet Ukraine. The Constitution established the status of the Moldavian ASSR as an autonomous entity within the Ukrainian SSR.

In 1930–1932 transformation of the administrative structure of the republic was completed. Districts were liquidated. Seven regions were created as the main administrative and territorial units: Vinnitsa, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, Chernigov. Together with the Moldavian ASSR, they formed the basis of administrative and territorial division. In 1934 the capital of Ukraine was moved from Kharkov to Kiev.

All transformations in the constitutional-legal and political-administrative areas of the Ukrainian SSR were not unique by their

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nature, they were an organic part of the process of formation and evolution of the Soviet system of government, which occurred simultaneously in all union republics. The result was a creation of the Soviet system of government, combined with the monopoly on power of the Communist Party, centralism within the party and a multi-level system of administrative and territorial administration, including union republics, regions (territories), districts, urban and rural settlements (village councils) and as a separate element of autonomous entities.

Stalin's policy of "Ukrainization" became the key feature of his domestic policy in Ukraine in the 1920s — the Ukrainian analogue of the "nativization" policy pursued by the Bolsheviks, consisting in stimulating development of the Ukrainian education and culture, the Ukrainian language, and expanding the role of ethnic Ukrainians in the management system. The starting point for the policy of "Ukrainization" and "nativization" in general was the X Congress of the RCP (b), held in March 1921 in Moscow.

In the report of the People's Commissar for National Affairs Joseph Stalin, "On the immediate tasks of the party in the national issue" the following was formulated: "I have a note that we, the communists, are allegedly promoting the Belarusian nationality artificially. This is not true, because there is a Belarusian nation that has its own language, different from the Russian, which is why it is possible to raise the culture of the Belarusian people only in their native language. The same speeches were heard five years ago about Ukraine, about the Ukrainian nation ... It is clear that if Russian persons still predominate in the cities of Ukraine, then over time these cities will inevitably be Ukrainized.

In April 1923, the XII Congress of the RCP(b) declared nativization the party's official course in the national issue. The congress decisions on the national issue contained the following:

"To take all measures to ensure that Soviet power in the republics becomes understandable and native, so that the Soviet power in our country is not only Russian, but also international. For this it is necessary that not only schools, but also all institutions, all bodies, both Party and Soviet, be nationalized step by step, so that they act in a language understandable to the people, so that they function in conditions corresponding to the daily life of a given nation. Only under

this condition will we get an opportunity to make the Soviet power from the Russian — the international, close, understandable and native relations for the working people of all republics, and especially for those who are lagging behind in economic and cultural relations”.

In the early 1920s only a tenth of the schools were Ukrainian. Ukrainian language schools prevailed in the west and in the center, in the Volyn, Podolsk and Poltava governorates. Among the university professors, only a few dozen people spoke the Ukrainian language. Moreover, the spelling of the Ukrainian language was not standardized and there were significant differences in different districts of Ukraine.

Among the Soviet government employees, ethnic Ukrainians made up only about a third. Among the members of the CP (b) U even less, about 23 %. At the same time, no more than 10 % knew the Ukrainian language.

Ukrainization began immediately after the end of the Civil War. In September 1920 teaching of the Ukrainian language in schools of the Ukrainian SSR became obligatory. Study of the Ukrainian language was also introduced at all educational institutions. Creation of evening schools for teaching the Ukrainian language to Soviet employees was provided. At least one Ukrainian language newspaper had to be opened in every governorate city.

On 30 May 1921 the Institute of the Ukrainian Scientific Language was established in Kiev. A discussion on spelling was conducted. In 1927, the All-Ukrainian conference on spelling was held in Kharkov. The following year, the spelling rules were approved by the Minister of Education of the Ukrainian SSR Nikolay Skripnik.

On 27 July 1923 the Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR “On measures for the Ukrainization of educational and cultural institutions” was adopted. A decision was made to switch the majority of educational institutions to the Ukrainian language. It was prohibited to hire people for managerial work who did not speak the Ukrainian language.

Citizens entering the Soviet service had to learn the Ukrainian language for six months, and already working Soviet employees had to learn the Ukrainian language for one year.

In April 1925 the plenum of the CC CP (b) U created a commission for Ukrainization, designed to speed up and expand the process of

spread of the Ukrainian language. A state commission was created for the Ukrainization of the Soviet apparatus, headed by the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, Vlas Chubar. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate was instructed to periodically check the Ukrainization of Soviet employees.

An important role in Ukrainization was played by the historian and politician Mikhail Grushevskiy (in 1917–1918, chairman of the nationalist Central Rada of the Ukrainian People's Republic), the author of a significant number of nationalist anti-scientific myths. Despite his Russophobic viewpoints, he repeatedly addressed the Ukrainian Soviet government with statements condemning his own views.

In March 1919 he emigrated to Vienna, where he founded the Ukrainian Sociological Institute. However, already in 1920, he sent a letter to the CC CP (b) U, in which he acknowledged the merits of the Bolsheviks in the fight against capitalism and assured that he realized, like other Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, the fallacy of the desire to isolate Ukraine from general development with “the path of any political combinations”. He claimed to have abandoned the support of the Nationalists and accepted the principles of the Communist International.

In a letter to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, Christian Rakovskiy, Mikhail Grushevskiy wrote: “We were ready to step over the corpses of our party comrades, who innocently died from red bullets, through the ashes of our cultural treasures destroyed “for fear of the Ukrainian counter-revolution” by the Soviet generals. We were ready to work under your leadership”.

He received forgiveness for his anti-Soviet activities from the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and on 7 March 1924 returned to the territory of the USSR from Austria.

Grushevskiy was granted a residence permit and an exemption from liability for anti-Soviet activities in the past: “The Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, at the request of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, grants Academician Mikhail Sergeevich Grushevskiy the right to live freely on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, without blaming or making any accusations for his previous political activities, and therefore the aforementioned academician Grushevskiy is not subject to searches, arrests, or persecution”.

The Soviet authorities showered him with favors — he was appointed a professor at Kiev State University, an academician of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, head of the historical and philological department, and headed the archaeographic commission of the academy, the task of which was to study publications printed in Ukraine in the 16th-18th centuries. In 1929 Grushevskiy was elected a full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In 1926, the 60th anniversary of the historian was solemnly celebrated in Kiev. In response to the greetings, Mikhail Grushevskiy sent a letter to the editorial office of the Proletarskaya Pravda newspaper, in which he noted the following: “The wanderings of Ukrainian science, which was looking for the opportunities of its development in Galicia, Vienna, and Geneva, has ended; now it has got up on its own feet. In our Soviet Ukraine, a wide path unfolded before Ukrainian culture and science. Now I am totally convinced that I did not make a mistake by returning to the Soviet Ukraine.

Grushevskiy was followed by his associates from the ranks of Ukrainian nationalists who returned to Soviet Ukraine: the former chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rada government, Golubovich, the general secretary of Rada Khrustyuk and a number of other well-known politicians.

The result of forced Ukrainization was a rapid spread of the Ukrainian language on the territory of the republic. By the end of the 1920s, a quarter of the higher education institutions of the Ukrainian SSR and about half of technical schools switched to the Ukrainian language. 80 % of the mass media were published in the Ukrainian language.

By 1926, ethnic Ukrainians made up 54 % of the Soviet employees of the Ukrainian SSR. Among the party members, a share of Ukrainians by the beginning of the 1930s doubled and amounted to 50 %. By 1940, ethnic Ukrainians among the members of the CP(b)U amounted already to 63 %.

In 1931, the People’s Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR ordered all applicants to the higher education institutions to submit written works in Ukrainian language, and also introduced a mandatory study of the Ukrainian language for students, including those who were native speakers. Also, the science staff underwent Ukrainization — the

share of Ukrainians among the scientists increased in the Ukrainian SSR from 28.0 % in 1925 to 45.9 % in 1929¹.

The Soviet government actively contributed to opening of the Ukrainian theaters. In total, by 1931, 68 theaters were working.

Already in 1927, the first secretary of the CC CP (b) U, Lazar Kaganovich, summing up the preliminary results of Stalin's Ukrainization at the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, noted undoubted successes:

“Our Ukrainian culture has developed on a grandiose scale. Ukrainian culture in recent years has made such progress in all its branches that the most ardent Ukrainian nationalist could not dream of. In the primary schools, the Ukrainians are taught by Ukrainians in the Ukrainian language. Higher education is gradually becoming fully “Ukrainized”. Ukrainian books and press are currently published in a volume that has never been seen in the entire history of Ukraine. In our Council of People's Commissars, the highest administrative body of our government, 13 of the 20 members are Ukrainians”.

According to the modern Russian historian E. Yu. Borisyonok: “Soviet Ukrainization spread to almost all aspects of life of the national republic: the functioning of the Ukrainian language expanded due to its introduction into the official business area, science, education, periodic literature, books, etc. were published in Ukrainian; supported the development of Ukrainian culture; conditions were created for the professional and career growth of Ukrainians, they replenished the ranks of the CP (b) U, held responsible positions in the Soviet institutions, the number of Ukrainians among students increased”.

Moreover, the Soviet government encouraged a spread of the Ukrainian language outside the Ukrainian SSR. In the RSFSR, there were Ukrainian schools, technical schools, faculties in universities, and Ukrainian newspapers were published in the Ukrainian language. Ukrainization was carried out in the Don and Kuban, in the Stavropol Territory, in the Kursk and Voronezh regions, in the Far East. The result of Ukrainization was a widespread use of the Ukrainian language

¹ *Borisyonok E. Yu.* Concepts of “Ukrainization” and their implementation in national policy in the states of the Eastern European region (1918–1941): dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Historical Sciences. M., 2015. P. 751–752.

in education, science, culture, and official paperwork, accompanied by the priority position of Ukrainian “national personnel” in those areas of the Ukrainian SSR in which ethnic Ukrainians were a minority of the population.

The key events of Soviet history in the late 1920s-1930s were industrialization and collectivization. The need for accelerated modernization and development of the industrial base was the main strategic goal of the Soviet Union, which was to allow the country to completely overcome the consequences of devastation of the period of the revolution and the Civil War, reach the cutting edge in economic development, and create a base for the military-industrial complex. However, it was possible to ensure an economic breakthrough in the conditions of world isolation and hostile attitude towards the Land of Soviets on the part of Western states only at the expense of internal resources.

As part of the implementation of the modernization policy, Ukraine was chosen as a key region of the Soviet Union. Here in the late 1930s a powerful industrial base was created.

However, an economic breakthrough based on the mobilization and concentration of all the resources of society for the development of industry, and mistakes in accelerated collectivization, as well as other reasons described below, led to the fact that in 1932–1933 a number of regions of the Soviet Union (including Ukraine) were overtaken by a large-scale famine that claimed the lives of millions of Soviet citizens.

Among the affected regions were not only Ukraine, but also the Voronezh, Kursk, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Ob-Irtysh regions, the Azov-Chernomorsky and Northern Territories, the Volga region, the North Caucasus, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

At the same time, the figures of population losses in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the affected regions of the RSFSR were comparable. Total demographic losses of the USSR from famine, according to modern estimates, range from 5 to 7 million people. The demographic loss of the population of the RSFSR (excluding Kazakhstan) was at least 2.5 million people, Kazakhstan — about 1 million people, Ukraine — from 3 to 3.5 million people

According to the Civil Registry Office, in 1931, i. e. before the start of the famine, 514.7 thousand people died in Ukraine, in 1932 668.2

thousand people, and in 1933 1850.3 thousand people. Thus, the official data of the Civil Registry Office provided an “excessive” mortality in 1932–1933, which we can primarily attribute to the consequences of the famine, of 1489.1 thousand people.

Losses among the rural population of Ukraine during the famine in 1932–1933 of 12 million people, provided by Ukrainian authors, is an exaggeration. We are talking about the general decline in the population, the main part of which was the mass migration of peasants to the cities in the conditions of industrialization and the ever-increasing need for workers and the flight of peasants to the cities in search of a better life during the famine.

According to the historian V. V. Kondrashin, “at least four regions of the then RSFSR — the Saratov region, the Volga German ASSR, the Azov-Chernomorsk Territory, the Chelyabinsk region — suffered more than Ukraine. As for Ukraine, its rural population decreased by 20.4 %, which is a lot, but the total population did not decrease as much — only by 1.9 %”.

Approximately equivalent consequences are also evidenced by the data of a comparative analysis of the population censuses in the USSR in 1926 and 1937. According to the census data in the regions affected by the famine of 1932–1933, in Kazakhstan a decrease of the rural population amounted to 30.9 %, in the Volga region — 23 %, in Ukraine — 20.5 %, in the North Caucasus — 20.4 %¹.

According to V. V. Kondrashin, “in 1932–1933, the famine struck not only Ukraine, but all the main grain regions of the USSR, areas of complete collectivization. A careful study of the sources points to a basically single mechanism for creating a famine situation in the country’s grain regions. Everywhere it is forced collectivization, forced grain procurement and state deliveries of other agricultural products, dispossession, suppression of peasant resistance, and destruction of the traditional system of survival of peasants in the conditions of famine (liquidation of the kulaks, struggle against beggary, spontaneous migration, etc.)”.

¹ *Borisyonok E. Yu.* Concepts of “Ukrainization” and their implementation in national policy in the states of the Eastern European region (1918–1941): dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Historical Sciences. M., 2015. P. 751–752.

By October 1929, at the beginning of collectivization, in the Ukrainian SSR, the number of peasants who joined collective farms was only 5.6 % of the total peasant mass. By the spring of 1930, 34 % of peasant households were part of collective farms, and by the end of 1932 this figure amounted to already 70 % of peasant households. Collectivized farms accounted for 80 % of all cultivated areas. By these indicators, Ukraine was ahead of other Soviet republics in collectivization. In the USSR by this time a little more than 60 % of the peasants were in the collective farms.

At the same time, an active stage of the fight against the kulaks occurred. By the end of 1930, 70.4 thousand households were dispossessed in Ukraine, 146.2 thousand people were evicted. In the USSR, these figures amounted to 337.6 thousand households and 550.6 thousand people, respectively.

In 1930 the plan for grain procurements doubled compared to 1928. In the main grain regions, procurements amounted to 35–40 % of the harvest.

Already at that time, the first instances of food shortages were noted. In June 1930, the SPA (State Political Administration) of Ukraine reported: “In some villages in various regions of Starobelsky, Izyumsky, Krivoy Rog, Nikolaev and Kherson districts, food supply problems take on acute forms of hunger strikes”.

In 1932–1933 measures to withdraw grain coincided with adverse weather conditions that caused a yield decrease. On average, it amounted to eight hundredweights per hectare in 1928, and seven hundredweights in 1932. At the same time, procurements more than doubled: from 11.5 million tons of grain in 1928 to 26 million tons in 1935.

This resulted in a big drop in the grain stocks of the peasants, from 50 million tons in 1928 to 33 million tons in 1931.

Hunger, lack of grain, animal traction and the displacement of a significant part of the rural population to the city saw a large-scale reduction in the cultivation areas. If in 1930 15.9 million hectares were cultivated in Ukraine, in 1931 — only 12.3 million, and in 1932–8 million hectares. This aggravated an already critical situation and caused a serious reduction in yields in 1933.

A significant factor that influenced the famine situation was crop losses ranging from 20 % to a third of all grown grains.

The leadership of the USSR, realizing the scale of the crisis, tried to provide assistance to the rural population in general in the USSR, and in Ukraine in particular. In 1932 planned indicators for grain procurement were reduced by 13%, from 22.4 million tons to 18.1 million tons. In 1933 procurements were reduced by another 15%, to 15.5 million tons. Assistance was provided to Ukraine in the form of seed and food loans. In 1932, 55,000 tons of grain were allocated to the republic, including 30,000 tons intended for export. In 1933, the Ukrainian SSR received 501 thousand tons of grain as aid.

On 27 June 1933 the Secretary of the USSR (b) U, Mendel Khatayevich, sent a telegram to Stalin stating the following: “Continuous rains that have continued for the past 10 days have greatly delayed ripening of the grain and harvesting. On the collective farms in a number of districts all the bread we allot is completely eaten up, and is being eaten, the food situation has become very aggravated, which is especially dangerous in the last days before harvesting. I’m begging you, if possible, to give us another 50,000 poods of food.” There is a resolution of J. Stalin on the document: “It is necessary to give”.

According to the resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the AUCP (b) (All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 1 June 1933 “On the distribution of tractors produced in June – July and half of August 1933” out of 12,100 tractors planned for delivery to the regions of the USSR, Ukraine would receive 5,500 tractors, the North Caucasus – 2500, the Lower Volga – 1800, the Central Executive Committee – 1250, Central Asia – 550, the RSFSR – 150, Crimea – 200, South Kazakhstan – 150. Thus, the Russian regions, taken together, received 5,700 tractors (47%), and Ukraine alone – 5,500 (45.4%).

The decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the AUCP (b) of 20 December 1933 to purchase of 16 thousand working horses for Ukraine in the BSSR and the Western region should be considered in the same vein. Given the real situation in the USSR in 1933, including the spread of famine to the territory of Belarus and the Western region, it can be assumed that Ukraine received an undoubted benefit in this part compared to other regions of the country. The decisions of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of 23 December 1933 and 20 January 1934 on the

deployment of individual gardening, which was extremely necessary in the conditions of permanent famine that began in the USSR in the 1930s also looked “pro-Ukrainian”. “To meet the wishes of the workers to acquire small gardens to work on them with their own labor in their free time from work in production,” the Central Committee of the AUCP (b) decided in 1934 to allow 1.5 million workers to cultivate their own individual gardens.

The following sizes were outlined for deployment of individual workers’ vegetable gardens by regions for 1934: Ukraine — 500 thousand people; Moscow region — 250 thousand people; Ivanovo region — 150 thousand people; Western Siberia — 100 thousand people; Eastern Siberia — 60 thousand people; Gorky Territory — 50 thousand people; Far Eastern Territory — 50 thousand people; Kazakhstan — 50 thousand people; Leningrad — 50 thousand people; Northern Territory — 40 thousand people. Thus, the “Ukrainian share” of workers in the USSR permitted to cultivate individual gardens was about 33.3% of the all-Union total.

Taking into account the facts described above, the claims that the Holodomor was a policy planned and implemented by the Soviet government, aiming at the extermination of the Ukrainian people, may be qualified as anti-historical and propagandistic. This claim has become part of a broader propaganda suggestion that it was the “freedom-loving Ukrainians” who were the special, targeted victims of Stalin’s mass repressions. For example, the authors of one of the Ukrainian school history textbooks of the 10th grade state the following: “One of the most brutal crimes of Stalinism against the Ukrainian people was the Holodomor of 1932–1933. Its direct cause was forcible seizure of the grain from peasants. However, in reality, it was caused by an entire combination of national-political and social-economic factors: 1. The need to destroy the Ukrainian peasants as a conscious national stratum that threatened the imperial interests of Moscow... The exact figure of human losses from the famine of 1932–1933 is impossible to determine. Researchers name the data from 3.5 to 12 million people “.

This anti-historical claim has also been broadcast for many years by the nationalist Ukrainian politicians. Thus, the former President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko proclaimed: “Holodomor

is not just a pain and a wound. This is a black hole of our history, which could irrevocably absorb not only Ukraine, but also any slightest hope for life... The crimes of Bolshevism and Stalinism are identical to the crimes of Nazism and Hitlerism. Their nature is the same: antihumanism. To all the current apologists of Stalinism, I'm saying directly and firmly – your attempts are doomed, there is no excuse and there will not be. Confess your sin! This is your moral responsibility to the country and nation. Our tragedy is a warning to all the nations of the world.”

However, the objective historical facts, some of which were cited above, clearly show that the famine of 1932–1933 was the result of both the errors of the USSR leadership and other factors that were the same for a number of territories of the country, many of which suffered much more than Ukraine.

The efforts of the central leadership of the USSR sought a transformation of Ukraine in the 1930s into one of the most industrially developed territories of the Soviet Union. The foundation of this process was laid back in the pre-revolutionary period, in the conditions of formation of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog industrial region. However, by the end of the Civil War, Ukraine, with an exception of Donbass and the Black Sea ports, remained a predominantly agrarian country. It was the industrialization of the 1930s that turned most of the territory of the republic, with the exception of its western regions, into an advanced industrial region.

In 1929, the Soviet leadership began to implement the first five-year plan. During the first five-year plan, from 1929 to 1933, the investments in fixed assets of the industry of Ukraine increased 3.5 times, from 415 million rubles to 1,478 million rubles. The Ukrainian SSR received 20 % of all investments.

By 1930 alone, 498 factories were built and 421 enterprises were reconstructed in the Soviet Ukraine. Among the enterprises built or reconstructed during the five-year plan in the Soviet Union, 35 production giants stood out, each worth more than 100 million rubles. More than a third of them, 12, were located on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

Among the enterprises built in Ukraine as symbols of Soviet industrialization were the Dnepr Hydroelectric Power Plant, three

flagship metallurgical plants, Zaporizhstal, Kryvorizhstal, Azovstal, the Kharkov Tractor Plant, the Kramatorsk Heavy Engineering Plant, and an aluminum plant in Dnepropetrovsk. 53 large mines were also developed in the Donbass.

Construction of the Dnepr Hydroelectric Power Plant was unique in its scale and technological solutions. At that time, there was no experience in construction of the large-scale hydrotechnical projects either in the USSR or in Europe. Only the USA had an experience. However, the Americans have never used the innovative technologies used by the builders of the Dnepr Hydroelectric Power Plant. In particular, at the suggestion of the Soviet engineer Alexander Vinter, the Dneprostroy project of academician Aleksandrov and the project for implementation of works proposed by Cooper, the American consulting company were finalized and modified. Instead of building in two stages and installing turbines with a capacity of 30 thousand kW, Vinter, based on accurate calculations, proposed to build a power plant in one stage, reducing the number of hydroelectric units from thirteen to nine and using the turbines of 60 thousand kW. The total capacity of the HPP increased to 540,000 kW.

The colossal construction was completed in record time, five years passed from the moment of the first workers' arrival to the start-up. On October 10, 1932, the power plant was opened. According to Viktor Vesnin, the author of architectural design of the plant, "in the Dnepr Hydroelectric Power Plant we managed to achieve the maximum combination of expediency and beauty. We have found the most convex architectural expression of the technical idea of Dneprostroy by constructing a building which beauty is not in glued moldings or piling columns. We have used building materials such as glass, marblite and others on a scale unknown to the foreign architecture so far. This allowed to expand the walls of the structure, reaching an extraordinary width and spaciousness in the room, which area is not wider than 20 meters, with a length of 250 meters".

As a result, the cost of a kilowatt-hour of electricity generated at the Dnepr Hydroelectric Power Plant turned out to be the cheapest in the world. The design cost of kWh was set at 0.6 kopecks, and in fact in 1934 it amounted to 0.44 kopecks. From 1932 to 1941, the plant gave the country 16 billion kWh of electric power.

During the years of the second five-year plan, 1933–1938, creation of an industrial base was completed. During the first two five-year plans, the gross industrial output of group A increased by 7.5 times, and of group B by 3.7 times. The share of group A increased from 51 % to 68 %. During the first two five-year plans (1929–1938), modernization made radical progress in the areas of energy, metallurgy, mechanical engineering, automobiles, aircraft construction, and electrical engineering. Creation of a modern military-industrial complex was of great importance in the conditions of the 1930s.

An important component of the economic miracle of the 1930s was the mass enthusiasm of workers, which was embodied in the zealous labour of the “shock workers of communist labor.” The key role was played by the “Stakhanovism” and its symbol — the Lugansk miner Alexey Stakhanov.

Alexey was born in the Oryol governorate into a poor peasant family. In 1927 he entered the Tsentralnoe-Irmino mine in Kadievka, the Lugansk region. On 30 August 1935 Stakhanov accomplished a labor feat by extracting 102 tons of coal and completing 14 daily norms. such a result was obtained for the first time in the world. subsequently, he repeatedly improved this figure. After 10 days he extracted 175 tons, and on 4 March 1936—324 tons¹.

The feat of Stakhanov became widely known, and Stakhanov himself became an initiator of the Stakhanov initiative. Stakhanovism unfolded in all branches of production. On 4 November 1935 the first All-Union Conference of the Stakhanovites of industry and transport was held.

The result of industrialization was a large-scale process of urbanization, the flow of population from rural areas to the cities. According to the data of the All-Union population censuses of 1926 and 1939, the urban population of Ukraine during this time increased by 18.5 million people, i. e. by 62.5 %. This increase occurred not only due to the rural residents of Ukraine, but also due to a huge number of residents of the RSFSR and other republics, primarily builders of industrial facilities that remained after completion of work on the

¹ Stakhanov Alexey Grigorievich [website]. URL: https://warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=10229 (access date: 23.02.2022).

territory of the republic. Thus, in 1932 alone, 90,000 workers were involved in the construction of the Dnepr Hydroelectric Power Plant.

Simultaneously with the economic transformations, significant changes took place in the area of education and culture. In 1930, the eradication of illiteracy was announced. The system of higher education developed rapidly. If by 1914 there were 19 higher educational institutions in Little Russia and New Russia, then by 1938 there were 129 of them.

Due to the efforts of central authorities of the USSR, Ukraine came to the end of 1930s changed beyond recognition. Large-scale changes in the social and economic sphere were continued by further reform of the political sphere. Following the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian SSR also adopted a new Constitution.

On 14 January 1937 the Extraordinary XIV Ukrainian Congress of Soviets approved the new Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR. The Constitution proclaimed the building of socialism. Article 1 declared that the Ukrainian SSR is a “socialist state of workers and peasants”. Article 4 declared the socialist nature of the economic system: “Economic basis of the USSR is the socialist system of economy and socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production, established as a result of liquidation of the capitalist system of economy, the abolition of private ownership of instruments and means of production, and the abolition of exploitation of man by man.

In the new Constitution, the republic retained the right of secession from the USSR: «Article 14. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic reserves the right of secession from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, an important addition was included in the text of the Constitution: «Article 15. Territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic cannot be changed without consent of the USSR”.

On 22 September 1937 a reform of the administrative and territorial division was carried out by disaggregation of a number of regions. Four new regions have been created: Zhytomyr (separated from the Kiev region), Kamenetz-Podolsk (from the Vinnitsa region), Poltava (from the Kharkov region) and Nikolaev (from the Odessa region). On 3 June 1938 the Donetsk region was divided into the Stalin and the Voroshilovgrad regions. On 10 January 1939 the Zaporozhye

region (from part of the Dnepropetrovsk region), Sumy region (from part of the Kharkov region) and Kirovograd region (from part of the Nikolaev region) were created. Thus, the number of regions doubled, from 7 to 15.

If Ukraine, as part of the Soviet Union, received political recognition and a powerful impetus for social, economic and cultural development, the fate of the territories of Galicia and Western Volyn occupied by Poland in 1920 was completely different.

The power of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth extended to Eastern Galicia (Galichina), formerly part of Austria-Hungary, as well as to the lands that were part of the Russian Empire: Western Volyn, Polesye, Podlyashye and Kholmshchyna. Total population of these lands ranged from 4 to 5 million people (according to unofficial data — up to 6 million).

The lands inhabited by Ukrainians, formerly parts of the Russian Empire, were divided between the Lutsk, Brest and Lublin provinces of Poland.

Małopolska Wschodnia (as the Eastern Galicia was called in Poland) was divided into three provinces: Lvov, Ternopol and Stanislav. On 22 September 1922 the Polish Sejm adopted a law “on the foundations of general province self-government and, in particular, the Lvov, Ternopol and Stanislav provinces”, which provided for local self-government and granted a number of rights to the Ukrainians. It was supposed to create local sejmiks, print documents, and publish the laws of the province both in Polish and in Ukrainian. However, this law was never signed by the Polish president and did not enter into force. The Ukrainian population of Galicia did not receive any rights — neither political nor cultural.

From the point of view of economic development, these territories remained a resource colony of backward agrarian lands, both during the time of the Polish kingdom, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and during the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. For comparison, we would like to report that in 1910 there were 448 industrial productions in Eastern Galicia with an eight million population, in 1939¹ — 534. Growth in almost 30 years amounted to only 17%. They employed

¹ In 1939, the population of Eastern Galicia amounted to 6 million people.

36,000 and 44,000 workers, respectively (an increase of 19%), which was negligible compared to the Soviet Ukraine. The level of oil production, which in the region before the First World War amounted to 4% of the world production, was never achieved during the interwar period.

Development of Volyn, Podlyashye and Polesye was even more pitiful. All regions accounted for only 8 thousand industrial workers and 11 thousand seasonal workers, mainly in the granite-basalt and woodworking industries.

An important negative factor was the resettlement of a significant number of ethnic Poles to the territory of Galicia and Volyn, primarily due to transfer of Ukrainian lands to the participants of the wars of 1918–1921 “for independence” of Poland. The number of Polish urban and rural population in Galicia grew in the 1930s by 40% and 21%, respectively, and in the “northern” Ukrainian lands (Volyn, Podlyashye, etc.) by 29% and 29%. The total number of Poles in these territories increased by 300 thousand people.

Difficult living conditions, lack of land (less than 5 hectares per family, which was not enough for survival), the destruction of a significant part of live stock breeding during the war — all this pushed the Galicians to look for a better life in other countries. According to some reports, during the period between the two world wars, about 150 thousand people left their homes. Most of the labor migrants went to Canada, Argentina and France. Thus, Warsaw carried out a creeping Polish ethnic assimilation of the Ukrainian territories.

One of the tasks of the Polish state was the assimilation of kresów (eastern territories). This is evidenced by the specific measures taken by Warsaw on the occupied territories. For example, in Galicia, the authorities closed the reading rooms of the Ukrainian society “Prosvita”. In Lvov, the school council of the region, which existed since 1867 with a Ukrainian representation, was abolished. All decisions in the area of education began to be adopted in Warsaw, and were implemented through representatives of the Center in the school regions. There were six of them: Lvov, Volyn, Polish, Krakow, Lublin and Belostotsk.

Promises about an opening of the Ukrainian University in Lvov in 1916, given by the government of Austria-Hungary, were ignored

by the Polish authorities. Warsaw canceled all existing Ukrainian-language departments at the Lvov University.

In May 1923 Evgeniy Petrushevich announced a dissolution of all state institutions of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic in exile, since the struggle for influence on the internal political situation was lost to the Polish government. Under these conditions, in Galicia, there was a separation of three social and political trends. The first one — economic — adhered to the tactics of creation, under the conditions of Polish domination, within the framework of observing the existing legal framework of its economic base, preservation of the national and cultural historical foundations and prevention of major political conflicts with the authorities.

The second trend was radically opposite to the first one. In this case, it was about active participation in the political life of the region — to achieve through legal political participation a real improvement in the situation of the autochthonous population of the region (education, healthcare, religion, etc.).

And finally, the third trend of the Ukrainian nationalists was aimed at an implacable and uncompromising armed struggle through paramilitary underground structures in order to inflict maximum damage on the Polish authorities and destabilize an internal situation in the society, creating an atmosphere of fear, regardless of the losses even among the civilian population.

Economic direction in the agrarian state of the region economy became a cooperative-credit movement by nature, which was actively developing in the years preceding the First World War. Cooperative movement united in the so-called reserve societies both in Galicia, and in Volyn and Polesye. Sensing the threat of losing their influence, the Polish authorities in 1934 passed a law obliging cooperatives outside Eastern Galicia to unite with Polish organizations of the corresponding profile.

Regarding the second political vector, it shall be noted that the Ukrainian social and political parties and movements in the interwar period were created for the reason.

After 1925, the Ukrainian National Democratic Association (UNDA), created in 1925 on the basis of the Ukrainian National Democratic Party (UNDP, founded in 1896), began to gain more

and more political influence. Its leaders set themselves the goal of fighting for an independent Ukrainian state in the Eastern Galicia. The movement emphasized legal methods, propagating its goals and objectives through the party newspaper *Svoboda* (1897–1939) and other publications, including the popular daily newspaper *Dilo* (1880–1939).

The left flank was occupied by the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party (USRP), which emerged from the Russian-Ukrainian Radical Party (RURP, 1890, becoming the Ukrainian Radical Party, URP). This political structure set the task of secularizing the life of society and building socialism, but not in the Marxist sense.

The extreme left political flank of the Ukrainian political forces in the Eastern Galicia belonged to the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU). Created in February 1919 in the city Stanislav as the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia (CPVG), it was later renamed the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU). Among its goals was an establishment of Soviet power in Galicia. In accordance with the decision of the Comintern, the KPZU joined the Communist Party of Poland as an autonomous branch. Since 1924, due to the persecution of the Polish authorities, it went underground. Due to internal disagreements between supporters of “national” and “international” communism, as well as conflicts with the leadership of the Polish Communist Party and accusations of the Galicians in “bourgeois-national deviationism” by the Russian Communists in 1938, it was dismissed by decision of the

Comintern.

Despite the brutal persecution and repression that fell upon the supporters of Russophilism, this movement was well represented in the political spectrum during the interwar period. We are talking about the Russian Rural Party (Russian Agrarian Party). In the 1930s it was very active, constantly getting the support of such authoritative Starorusinsky public structures as the Stavropegiysky Institute (1848) and the People’s House, the associations named after M. Kachkovsky (1874) and the Orthodox movement of Eastern Galicia. Some politically oriented Russophile groups collaborated with the cooperative movement. For example, with the “Selkhozsoyuz”, based in Volyn and Kholmshchyna. Some representatives of Russophilism

joined the KPZU, where they had an opportunity to convey their views on national identity.

The parties and movements listed above participated in the elections to the Polish parliament in 1928, 1930, 1935 and 1938. Of these, UNDA was most prominently represented, which opposed the policy of Polish resettlement to the traditional Ukrainian lands, and drew attention to the development of the Ukrainian language and school education. It particularly emphasized the position of the Greek Catholic and Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian regions and the intellectuals, which among the Galicians accounted for only 1% in the ocean of small town and homestead populations.

The Polish administration actively implemented the Polonization policy through education and languages. For example, in 1924 the government of V. Grabskiy adopted the “LexGrabski” law. It provided a rapid transition from monolingual Ukrainian schools to bilingual Polish-Ukrainian schools. As a result, from 1922 to 1938 the number of Ukrainian schools in Galicia, Volyn and Polesye decreased by eight times — from 2891 to 360. At the same time, Polish became the main language in bilingual schools.

The same processes were going on in Bukovina, occupied by Romania, where there was not a single Ukrainian school at all. At Chernovtsy University, about 80% of students were not Romanians, but the teaching was conducted only in Romanian.

In 1924 Poland passed a law abolishing the use of the Ukrainian language in government bodies, which caused an extremely negative attitude among many Ukrainians.

In order to strengthen its influence in the occupied territories through the church, Warsaw did not object to the opening in 1928 of the Greek Catholic Theological Academy, which became the basic higher institution of the Greek Catholics of the entire Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The concordat between Poland and the Vatican, signed in 1925, confirmed the jurisdiction of the Galician Greek Catholic Church (GGCC), consisting of three eparchies (Lvov, Peremyshl and Stanislav) with the center in Lvov. According to the document, the Uniate clergy of Galicia were transferred for the maintenance to the Polish state.

Its metropolitan, a Russophobe and a Pole by nationality, Andrey Sheptytskiy, who was awarded the Order of Leopold back in 1917 for his devotion to the Austrian crown, also relied on the support of the Polish ruling circles.

Here is an indicative opinion of the historian N. Ulyanov: "... An interesting document was published by V. L. Burtsev on 27 September 1917 in the newspaper "Common Cause" in Petrograd. It presents a note found among papers of the secret archive of the primate of the Uniate Church A. Sheptytskiy after occupation of Lvov by the Russian troops. The note was drawn up at the beginning of the First World War, in anticipation of the victorious entry of the Austro-Hungarian army into the territory of Russian Ukraine.

It contained several proposals to the Austrian government on the subject of development and divestiture of this region from Russia. A broad program of military, legal, and ecclesiastical activities was outlined, advice was given on the establishment of a hetmanate, the formation of separatist-minded elements among Ukrainians, giving local nationalism a Cossack form, and "possibly complete separation of the Ukrainian Church from the Russian."

The piquancy of the note is in its authorship. Andrey Sheptytskiy, by whose name it is signed, was a Polish count, the younger brother of the future Military Minister in the Pilsudskiy's government. Starting his career as an Austrian cavalry officer, he subsequently became a monk, became a Jesuit, and from 1901 to 1944 served as Metropolitan of Lvov. Throughout his tenure in this post, he tirelessly served the cause of Ukraine's separation from Russia under the guise of its national autonomy. His activity in this sense is one of the examples of the embodiment of the Polish program in the East."¹ In the future, it is Andrey Sheptytsky who will become one of the famous Ukrainian figures who were accomplices of Germany's Nazi troops.

In 1931, he created the Ukrainian Catholic Union, which came up with an idea of a Polish-Ukrainian agreement on the basis of the national-territorial autonomy of Ukrainian lands. With the support of Pope Pius XI, on 7 May 1933 in Lvov, with the direct participation of

¹ *Ulyanov Nikolai*. Origins of Ukrainian Separatism. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2017. P. 12

A. Sheptytskiy, a creation of the Catholic Action of Ukrainian Youth (60,000 members) was declared.

A different attitude of the Polish authorities was towards the Orthodox Church and its 2 million adherents, who lived in Volyn, Kholmshchyna and Polesse. It was pushed towards autocephaly from the Russian Orthodox Church to a change of the language of teaching from Russian to Ukrainian. At the end of the 1920s the authorities began to close and destroy Orthodox churches, 111 and 59, respectively, between 1929 and 1930. 150 Orthodox churches were transferred to the Roman Catholic churches.

As the futility of searching for mutually acceptable political and economic compromises between representatives of the Ukrainian population of the occupied territories and the Polish authorities became more obvious, armed nationalist resistance gained more and more weight.

Back in August 1914, at the very beginning of the First World War, in Lvov, the leaders of Ukrainian nationalists created the Union for Liberation of Ukraine (ULU), which moved to Vienna after the advance of the Russian army. By that time, the capital city of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had become a refuge for emigrants from the greater Ukraine.

The ULU considered its main task to be nationalist propaganda work to “Ukrainize” prisoners of war from Little Russia, who were in camps on the territory of Austria, Germany and Hungary for their subsequent use as their supporters in the fight against the Russian Empire. At the request of the Union, captive Little Russians were concentrated in separate camps. About 50 thousand soldiers were in Germany and 30 thousand in Austria. ULU already in those years, together with the German General Headquarters, was organizing sabotage groups, sending them to the back areas of the combating Russian troops. Each member of such a team received from 100 to 500 rubles. The first detachment began operating in February 1916.

In the early 1920s extreme terrorist activities were carried out by the Ukrainian military organization (UMO), created in Vienna in 1920 from the former militaries of ZUNR. It was headed by Evgeniy Konovalts, a killer known for atrocities in Ukraine. The most notorious terrorist attacks of this structure include a failed assassination attempt on the Head of State of Poland J. Pilsudskiy in 1921 and a series of sabotages in 1922.

The terrorist tactics of savage reprisals with political opponents practiced by the UMO, arrangement of blowing up state institutions, railways and telegraph lines became more and more unacceptable for a significant part of the Galician-Ukrainian society, especially after the recognition in 1923 by the Entente of Polish rights to Eastern Galicia. Immediately after this decision, Evgeniy Konovalts moved to Berlin and began to work under the control of the Germans.

He was not the only applicant for German aid. Around 1924, Ivan Poltavets-Ostryanitsa, a former colonel of the Ukrainian state, who called himself a hetman, appeared in Munich with the same goal. However, Germany relied on Evgeniy Konovalts. By 1930 he had established strong ties with German political and military circles.

At the end of the 1920s, the leaders of the UMO decided to create a new organization built on strict discipline and based on a radical Ukrainian nationalist ideological foundation, attractive to the lumpen part of Galician society, and especially to unemployed youth.

Ukrainian nationalism in its extreme radical form, which was a variety of fascism identical to the German National Socialism, emerged in the 1920s. Moreover, initially it was closely associated with German Nazism and focused on supporting Hitler's policies.

In 1929, in Vienna, at a meeting of representatives of the Western Ukrainian nationalist emigrants, a decision was made to create the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Evgeniy Konovalts, head of the UMO, was elected its leader (guide).

The ideologist of the movement was Dmitro Dontsov, known for his Nazi ideology of "integral nationalism". He persistently drew the attention of his adherents to the fact that the "strong" leaders of the fascist regimes of the 1930s in Europe — Mussolini, Hitler, Franco — "felt" the wish of their people for a powerful state, and the Ukrainian national movement must follow such a fascist path. It was emphasized that the nation should become the absolute value of every Ukrainian and permeate all aspects of his/her life — through school, family, work, etc. Other nations should be assimilated. Related movements of this ideology are "Hitlerism" and Italian fascism¹.

¹ The land blames // Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. M., 1991. P. 27.

The foundations of Ukrainian Nazism were outlined in Dmytro Dontsov's book "Nationalism" published in Lvov in 1926, which became the basis of the ideology of Ukrainian Nazism.

Key tenets of ideology of the Ukrainian Nazis were:

"The law of nature is the right of power. Expansion is not only the self-affirmation of one's own will to live, but its denial in others".

"Enmity is inevitable, for the will exists only for itself, as a force different and opposite to others."

"The morality I am talking about denies the morality that prohibited harming others, that valued life above all else, that hated predatory instincts."

"The entire struggle for existence is devoid of the moral concept of justice."

It was this ideology that suited the OUN, because it allowed it to fight anyone who stood on its way.

The Ukrainian nation, according to Dontsov, should be built according to the hierarchical principle — the leader should be at the head. The leadership elite was supposed to be an "initiative minority", which Dontsov called "elite", "order" (in relation to the rest of the people, called by Dontsov "mass" and "plebs") and which carries out "creative violence".

The following ideological principles should be the driving forces of "integral nationalism":

- the will, which should be the denial of reason, hence the voluntarism in Ukrainian nationalism;

- strength, and physical strength, as a denial of the strength of science, economics, culture, etc.;

- violence of the strong over the weak;

- territorial expansion — as a result of interethnic politics;

- racism, according to which the Ukrainian nation consists of different racial elements; among them, the Nordic racial element is the best, and it is the most adapted to the management of the state;

- fanaticism;

- ruthlessness towards the enemy, and the enemies of the Ukrainian nation are all non-Ukrainians or Ukrainians who do not share the ideas of integral nationalism;

- hatred for everything alien;

— immorality, according to the statement: “Everything is right which is useful for the nation.” What exactly is “right” is determined by the “leader” and the “initiative minority,” i. e., OUN.

The goal of the Ukrainian Nazi movement is the creation of a fascist Ukrainian Cathedral Independent State (state), USSD, which would occupy

1,200,000 sq. km — from Krakow in Poland to the shores of the Caspian Sea in the neighborhood of Chechnya. The Ukrainian people do not need such a state, but the OUN plans to take the place of Russia in the Eastern Europe, to create a Ukrainian empire.

The book “Nationalism” had a great success in the nationalist circles. When in 1941 the Banderites were preparing the proclamation of the Ukrainian state, Stepan Bandera offered Dontsov the post of its president.

In 1929, one of the members of the OUN, Stepan Lenkavskiy, developed the “Decalogue of the Ukrainian Nationalist” (ten “commandments”, by analogy with the ten Christian commandments). These included, for example:

- “7. Without hesitation commit the most heinous crime;
- 8. With hatred you will receive the enemies of your nation;
- <...> 10. You will fight for expansion of the strength, glory, wealth and space of the Ukrainian state, even by enslaving strangers.”

Another founder of the OUN, Mykola Stsiborskiy, wrote about what should happen in Ukraine during the national revolution:

— “In choosing the means of liberating the Ukrainian Nation, nationalism does not limit itself to any “universal” instructions of “justice, mercy and humanism”;

— “This alien parasitic growth on our national organism will be uprooted <...>, most of these <...> newcomers will be materially and physically exterminated already at the beginning of the revolution”;

— “The dictatorship of fascism is based on sound foundations of social culture and morality.”

The organization of Ukrainian nationalists rather quickly created branches in all Ukrainian migration centers in Europe, as well as in Galicia, Transcarpathia and Bukovina. In 1932 the remnants of the UMO entered the Galician organization of the OUN, thereby ending its separate existence.

The goal of the OUN was to destroy by terrorist methods the Polish, Romanian and Soviet authorities in the Ukrainian lands, and at the same time their supporters among the native population.

Acts of sabotage, “expropriation” of state property were committed everywhere. In total, more than 60 terrorist attacks were organized. Among the most famous, which caused great public excitement, was the murder of a supporter of the Polish-Ukrainian compromise, the Pole T. Goluvko (1931), Police Commissioner of Lvov E. Chekhovsky (1932), Polish Minister of the Interior Affairs B. Peratsky (1934), a famous Ukrainian teacher, professor of philology of the Lvov University I. Babiy and student Y. Bachinskiy.

Demonstrating their hatred for the USSR, in 1933 the Ukrainian nationalists killed A. Maylov, an employee of the Soviet consulate in Lvov (the attack had been prepared since 1930).

The OUN did not limit itself to individual terror. In 1931, the Regional Executive of the OUN published an agitation and propaganda brochure “How and for what we are fighting the Poles”, excerpts from which were subsequently published in other publications of the Regional Executive¹.

The pamphlet “How and for what we are fighting the Poles” put the blame for “the plight of the Ukrainian people in the western Ukrainian lands” on Poland as a state and Poles as a nation. The brochure stated that “the Polish people want to establish themselves in these Ukrainian lands from time immemorial and therefore want to destroy the Ukrainians”; that in the past, “by flooding Ukraine with a sea of blood and tears, the Poles divided the Ukrainian lands among themselves and grew rich on them”; that at present the Poles are dividing by right the lands belonging to the Ukrainian villagers between the Polish “invaders-colonists”. The extremely negative and hostile image of Polish people formed by the author of the pamphlet justified the use of the most brutal “retaliatory” measures against them. “The Ukrainian people do not stop fighting the Poles, believing that the hour will come when they will take a bloody revenge on the oppressors,” the brochure noted; a few paragraphs later, it was stated that “the Ukrainian people

¹ The land blames // Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. M., 1991. P. 27. P. 8.

will only get their rights when, with weapons in their hands, they oppose the invader Poles and drive them out from their lands.” The coming armed uprising against the Poles was connected by the regional executive of the OUN with the “imminent war”, but for now it called on its supporters for an economic boycott of the Polish colonists and “reciprocal” violent actions.

Since the official publications of the OUN were of a programmatic nature and it was they who should have guided the grassroots of the organization in their activities, there is no doubt that the brochure “How and for what we are fighting the Poles” directly influenced the inculcation of hatred towards the Poles. It was this national hatred that guided the members of the OUN during the so-called “anti-colonization” campaign in the second half of the 1930s. As part of this campaign in the spring of 1937, the Poles of the colony next to Dmitrov were ordered under threat of death to leave their homes. After the frightened people fled, their houses were burned down. It was a prototype of the future Volyn massacre; it is significant that an initiator of these actions was the regional leader of the OUN Ivan Klimov (pseudonym Legend), who subsequently made a significant contribution to the struggle of the OUN against the “national enemies” — Jews and Poles.

Inciting hatred towards Jews was also one of the main activities of the OUN in Poland. In 1929 the official magazine of the OUN “Nation Building” published a program article “Jews, Zionism and Ukraine”, which stated that “whether with the Poles, with the Muscovites, with the Bolsheviks or with the Germans, it’s all the same, the Jews have always stood or hid on the other side of the barricade, always fought against Ukrainians... In addition to a number of external enemies, Ukraine also has its own enemy inside — the Jews”. Further, the article pointed out that during the creation of an independent Ukrainian national state, the struggle against “Jewishness” would “inevitably” unfold and that the Jews, understanding this, in every possible way prevented creation of an independent Ukraine. The article ended as follows: “In the fight against the Jews, hostile to us in all respects, we must create our own system and the most beneficial forms of solving the Jewish issue for us. The problem is difficult and, thanks to the neglect of it by the Ukrainian side, rather obscure. However, it must be resolved.”

The appearance of Milyanich's article recorded the fact of the hostile attitude of the OUN towards the Jews; anti-Semitism became one of the ideological foundations of the organization. One should not be surprised by the fact that anti-Semitic stereotypes continued to spread on the pages of the OUN press, primarily about the "Moscow and Jewish government". "Out of provocations, violence and death, a system was created, controlled by a Moscow bully, who is served by a sadistic Jew," wrote the illegal magazine "Surma". Similar theses appeared on the pages of "Nation Building". All these publications did not go unnoticed; according to the Polish police, the propaganda of the image of a communist Jew by Ukrainian nationalists caused an increase in anti-Semitism in Western Ukraine¹.

In the eyes of the nationalists, it was the Jews, along with the Poles, who were responsible for the pitiful situation of the Ukrainians. Under the leadership of the OUN, first in one village, then in another, boycott actions against Jewish shops were carried out, unknown persons broke windows in the Jewish houses. "Don't let the Jews rob you," said a leaflet distributed by the OUN in the village of Korostov, Zdolbunovsky district. – Do not buy from a Jew. Kick the Jew out of the village. Let our slogan be — the Jews

go away". In 1935 members of the OUN held a campaign in the villages of Zhydachivskiy, Kaluskiy, Stanislavskiy and Stryckiyy counties, during which the windows were broken in the houses of Jews. An even larger action was carried out in the summer of 1936 in the Kostopol region. It was preceded by a meeting of the leadership of the local branch of the OUN, at which it was decided that "Jews are harmful to the Ukrainian nation, it is necessary to get rid of them, and the best way that will lead to this will be arson of Jewish houses, shops, etc." As a result of the subsequent massive arson, about a hundred Jewish families lost their homes².

The terrorist activities of the OUN provoked a response from the Polish government — the so-called pacification (appeasement)

¹ *Gon M. M.* Українські праворадикали та євреї Західної України (друга половина 1930-х років) // Проблеми історії України: факти, судження, пошуки. К., 2006. Issue 15. P. 376.

² *Ibid.*

campaign. Carried out by excessively cruel methods, it nevertheless did not give serious results — by the beginning of the Second World War, the OUN remained a powerful organization that had the support of the German special services.

Being confident in the support of Nazi Germany, already in the middle of 1938, the leadership of the OUN prepared a normative document called the Military Doctrine of Ukrainian Nationalists. The author of “Military Doctrine” was a member of the Regional Executive of the OUN, military training referent Mikhail Kolodzinskiy, who wrote this voluminous work (about 200 typewritten pages) at the request of the ideology referent Yaroslav Stetsko for publication in one of the official magazines of the organization¹.

“The military doctrine of Ukrainian nationalists” is striking in its outright bloodthirstiness and Machiavellianism. The following is emphasized in the work: “In the uprising, cruelty and hatred come to the first place ... Our enemies throughout history have treated us very cruelly. We will only have a moral superiority over them when we show even greater cruelty against them. The mass strives for revenge for its victims, and it is not necessary to bother it during the execution of this revenge with the commandments of love to one’s neighbor ... Such cruelty must be shown against the hostile persons during the uprising, so that after ten generations they were afraid not only to go to war with Ukraine, but even to look in its direction. Cruelty and hatred should be the same both in relation to historical enemies and to our own, who oppose the uprising or try to implement some other ideology or political concept other than nationalist. With the beginning of the uprising, all political parties must be dismissed, everything and everyone should be subordinated to the insurrectionary nationalist power ... An idea in the name of which the uprising is performed justifies and sanctifies both extreme vandalism and the most disgusting cruelties ”².

¹ *Zaytsev O.* Воєнна доктрина Михайла Колодзінського // Україна модерна. 2013. No. 20. P. 248.

² *Колодзінський М.* Націоналістичне повстання (розділ із праці «Воєнна доктрина українських націоналістів»). Публікація та коментарі О. Зайцева // Україна модерна. 2013. No. 20. P. 257–295.

One of the goals of the uprising, according to the “Military Doctrine”, was to become an organization of bloody ethnic cleansing — the destruction and expulsion of “hostile” minorities. “Our uprising has as its task not only a change in the political system. It must clean out from Ukraine foreign hostile persons and the bad native ones. Only during the uprising will it be possible to sweep literally to the last Pole from the W. U. L. [Western Ukrainian lands] and, in this way, put an end to the Polish claims to the Polish nature of these lands. The Poles, which will offer resistance, must lie down in the struggle, and the rest must be terrorized and forced to flee across the Visla. Therefore, it must not be allowed that after receiving the W. U. L., the Poles could live here next to the Ukrainians. The W. U. L. of the future Ukrainian state must be clean from a nationality point of view”. The author provided implementation of the massacres not only of the Poles, but also of the Jews: “There is no doubt that the anger of the Ukrainian people towards the Jews will be especially terrible. We do not need to suppress this anger, on the contrary, [should] increase it, because the more Jews will die during the uprising, the better it will be for the Ukrainian state, because the Jews will be the only minority that we will not be able to embrace with our denationalization policy. All other minorities that will emerge alive from the uprising will be denationalized.”¹.

The fight against the Polish population was considered by M. Kolodzinskiy not only as a way to make the Ukrainian lands “clean from a nationality point of view”, but also as a way of nationalist mobilization of the Ukrainian population.

“It is difficult to push the people to resistance, but once they decide, they turn into a terrible force... Therefore, it is important to link people with the uprising at the very beginning of the uprising, so that they will later be forced to resist the enemy. In short, the people must be driven into a blind street during an uprising, where they would have a choice: victory or death in the struggle ... A nationalist uprising must be a volcano in which everything hostile, the dead and alive, will burn down ”.

Subsequently, the “Military Doctrine of Ukrainian Nationalists” by M. Kolodzinskiy was partially published; there is no doubt that the

¹ Ibid.

entire management of the OUN got acquainted with it. It appears that the work of Kolodzinskiy was also known to the Nazi secret services that supported the OUN — that is why the OUN was entrusted with playing a significant role in Hitler's aggression against Poland.

Polish counterintelligence began to receive threatening reports about this as early as the spring of 1939, shortly after Hitler approved the Weiss plan. "In Poland, Ukrainian nationalists must cause an uprising, as well as expand sabotage activities," the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs reported at the end of April. In connection with the expected Polish-German war on the territory of Germany, Ukrainians conducted military exercises that had the nature of military training, which were held legally. Members of the OUN received training unofficially, with the support of military Germans.

By mid-May, Polish intelligence agencies received even more disturbing information: "The government of the Reich should recently double the subsidies for the OUN. The money should be intended for the development of broader coup activities of a sabotage nature on the territory of Eastern Poland and Volyn — this campaign was designed to undermine the Polish state from within"¹.

Internal documents of the German intelligence (Abwehr) published in 2007 by employees of the Bundesarchiv confirm that the Polish special services received information that corresponds to the reality. By June 1939, representatives of the OUN and the Abwehr were more than actively preparing for an armed uprising of the OUN in Poland.

At a meeting held on June 13 between the head of the Second (sabotage) department of the Abwehr, Colonel Erwin von Lahousen and OUN representative Roman Sushko, a preparation and use of 1,300 officers and 12,000 ordinary Ukrainians in the event of an attack on Poland was discussed. On July 3, Colonel Lahousen explained that "the preparation of organization of the Ukrainian rebellion was carried out in accordance with the directives of the Abwehr II"².

¹ *Колодзінський М.* Націоналістичне повстання (розділ із праці «Воєнна доктрина українських націоналістів»). Публікація та коментарі О. Зайцева // *Україна модерна*. 2013. No. 20. P. 75.

² *Ibid.*

In a report dated July 15, Lahousen noted that, in preparation for Operation Weiss, the Abwehr was training a special sabotage unit composed of the Ukrainian nationalists, code-named *Bergbauernhilfe* (“Help to the Mountaineer Peasants”)¹; by mid-August 1939, its number was about 600 people, and the already mentioned Roman Sushko was the head.

Simultaneously with the unit of the *Bergbauernhilfe*, OUN structures in Poland were also preparing for an anti-Polish uprising. Back in July, on the orders of Vladimir Tymchey (Lopatinskiy), the OUN regional guide in Western Ukraine, members of the organization began to undergo military training in special conspiratorial camps in Polessye and the Carpathians. According to Ukrainian historians, by the end of August, about a thousand militants were trained, who were supposed to form the backbone of the anti-Polish rebel groups.

The task of the combat units of the OUN was not only sabotage, but also a seizure of the state power. Modern Ukrainian historian Ivan Patrylyak directly writes about this: “According to the plan of “Lopatinskiy”, the partisan units were supposed to come out of their hiding places and, having seized power on the ground, proclaim the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty, and create their own administration”².

Meanwhile, the sabotage department of the Abwehr was solving logistical problems. It was not enough to prepare sabotage units to ensure the rapid growth of their quantity, it was necessary to deliver weapons, ammunition and explosives to them. On August 18, a noteworthy entry appeared in Lahousen’s work diary: “Training of the members of the *Bergbauernhilfe* shall be continued. Sending will take place presumably around 22.8. <...> Through Major Stolze, the Ukrainian military headquarters receives instructions, according to which the leader of the Ukrainians, Melnik, must be ready to participate in military activities if the situation in Poland will require so “

On 22 August 1939 the OUN intruders from the *Bergbauernhilfe* had to go to the Polish border. Like another Abwehr detachment —

¹ Ibid.

² *Патриляк І. Перемога або смерть: український визвольний рух у 1939–1960 році.* Львів, 2012. Р. 24.

a special unit of the Ebbinghaus, prepared for operations in Polish Silesia¹, they had to become the basis of an anti-Polish uprising. However, great power politics interfered with these plans.

On 23 August 1939 a Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty was signed in Moscow².

It is interesting to note that Germany broke the Non-Agression Treaty with Poland on 28 April 1939, after the latter refused to create the so-called Polish Corridor, an extraterritorial highway to Königsberg. Poland continued to consider the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany to be valid until the very beginning of the war.

Prior to the refusal to create a Polish Corridor, Germany's relations with Poland were friendly, and Adolf Hitler planned to invite it to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. In October 1938 Germany and Poland attacked Czechoslovakia simultaneously, and according to a preliminary agreement, where the latter occupied the Teszyn region. It is interesting to note that one of the first orders of the Polish occupation authorities in Teszyn was a transition to the Polish language only: "1. <...> the official language of all public authorities and institutions of public law is exclusively Polish. 2. The names of streets, squares, parks, etc., as well as the names of firms, institutions, enterprises, etc., regardless of the nature of ownership, must have an exclusively Polish sound". This Polish method has subsequently been repeatedly used by Ukrainian nationalists. It is interesting to note that the process of establishing Polish power was accompanied by persecution of the Czech population. So, in one of the settlements of the region, "a punitive detachment that arrived from Poland captured 13 people. Execution of the sentence was brutal. For example, an old man who had never manifested himself politically before, was beaten because he did not want to leave. The rest were tied with a Czechoslovak flag around the head and beaten through it." According to the memoirs of the Czech general A. Veherek, the Poles "persecuted and terrorized

¹ For details on the circumstances of creation of this unit, its composition and combat path, see: *Bębnik G.* Sokoły kapitana Ebbinghaus. Sonderformation Ebbinghaus w działaniach wojennych na Górnym Śląsku w 1939 r. Katowice; Kraków, 2014.

² For more details see: *Dyukov A. R.* "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" in questions and answers. M., 2009.

the Czech population, firing them from work, driving them out of their homes, taking property. Everything Czech was destroyed. Czech language and greetings were banned”.

Despite friendly relations between Germany and Poland, refusal of the latter to create the Polish Corridor led to the German attack on Poland on 1 September 1939. Poland turned out to be unprepared for a war with Germany, as it was preparing more for a conflict with the USSR (30 major units of the Polish army were concentrated on the Soviet-Polish border, only 22 on the German-Polish border). On 16 September the Polish government, headed by Marshal Rydz-Smigly, fled the country to Romania, and the fate of the country was determined. Only at this stage did units of the Red Army cross the Polish border and take under its protection the population and territory of Western Ukraine, occupied by the Poles since 1921. Actions of the Soviet Union were aimed at returning the territories illegally seized and occupied by Poland. The USSR provided assistance to the Ukrainian and Belarusian population, who were discriminated in Poland on ethnic grounds.

In view of the foregoing, the association of the outbreak of World War II is associated with signing of the Non-Aggression Pact by Germany and the USSR in 1939 should be qualified as a propaganda theory. The Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Poland from 1934 and the 1938 Munich Agreement, signed by German Chancellor Adolf Hitler and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, which actually transferred Czechoslovakia to Germany with significant stocks of weapons and military industry should be remembered. Despite these undoubted historical developments, proceeding from the idea of giving the Soviet Union, the most affected country, responsibility along with Nazi Germany for the outbreak of the Second World War, on 3 June 2008 the deputies of the European Parliament declared: “World War II, the most destructive war in European history, was launched as a direct result of the infamous Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.”

“This Pact, concluded with Moscow will one day turn out to be a threat to National Socialism,” Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg wrote in his diary on 25 August: “If we also have to leave the territory of Polish Ukraine to the Soviet Union, then after Carpathians-Ukraine

this will be the second blow from our side against the most powerful anti-Muscovite group.”¹.

By “the most powerful anti-Muscovite group” Rosenberg meant the OUN. His prediction was accurate: as soon as the message came from Moscow about the signing of the Soviet-German agreement, the Abwehr was prohibited from using Ukrainian intruders. “In my apartment, I received a call from Secretary of State Keppler, he said that instructions had come from Fuschl Castle (residence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs), according to which the “action” should not be started,” Lahousen wrote in his diary.

Meanwhile, the OUN underground in Poland, in accordance with previously agreed plans, continued the preparation for an armed uprising. On 28 August, mobilization of the OUN supporters was scheduled — they were supposed to go into the forest and be distributed by the combat units.

On 1 September, German troops invaded Poland. However, contrary to the plans, there were no OUN intruders at the forefront of the invasion — they were forced to look at the war from the outside.

On 11 September, the Abwehr again tried to get a decision to use the Bergbauernhilfe to support the anti-Polish Ukrainian uprising, but this initiative was blocked again. Despite this, the OUN units in Western Ukraine had already attacked representatives of the Polish authorities, police and even small military units. The Polish civilian population also became victims of the nationalists. In the village of Slovyatin, local Ukrainian nationalists killed most of the Poles living in the village, and 129 Polish residents were slaughtered in nine nearby settlements. It is significant that these killings took place exactly where the OUN succeeded in creating underground armed units.

The Total number of OUN militants operating in Western Ukraine was at least 3 thousand². It is significant that in the Stryshchyna, the OUN units operated in villages located near the railway leading to the

¹ Political Diary of Alfred Rosenberg, 1934–1944 / translation from German by S. Vizgina, I. Petrov; comments of I. Petrova with the participation of S. Vizgina, A. Dyukov, V. Simindey; foreword by A. Dyukov; accompanying article by I. Petrov. M., 2015. P. 195–196.

² *Патриляк І. Перемога або смерть: український визвольний рух у 1939–1960 році.* Львів, 2012. P. 26–28.

Beskydskiy Pass¹. The rebels were clearly acting in the interests of the German troops.

Meanwhile, Berlin realized that the war in Poland had been won. Polish troops retreated under an onslaught of the German units. This gave rise to a real euphoria, in the wake of which Hitler abandoned caution and decided to create a puppet Ukrainian state on the ruins of Poland. This was a violation of the Soviet-German agreements of 23 August: according to secret protocols, Western Ukraine was a Soviet area of influence.

The Abwehr leadership was informed of the decision on 12 September. Lahousen's diary for that day contains an extremely concise entry: "Departure with the head of department through Breslau to Oppeln. Purpose: discussion of the Ukrainian issue"². Lahousen spoke in more detail about the decision made in his testimony at the Nuremberg trial: "Meaning of the order was as follows: it was necessary to contact the Ukrainian nationalists, with whom the intelligence service already had an appropriate military contact, in order to provoke rebel movement in Poland, which would have resulted in extermination of Poles and Jews in Poland. Ribbentrop told about this to Canaris personally. When they said "Poles", they meant the intellectuals and those circles that acted as carriers of national resistance ..." The decision, about which Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop informed the leadership of the Abwehr, was agreed by Hitler.

Thus, the Abwehr received permission to use the Bergbauernhilfe unit and support the anti-Polish armed uprising of the OUN. Another task of the Ukrainian nationalists had to be an elimination of "the non-loyal persons."

On 15 September, the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, and Lahousen met in Vienna with the OUN leader, Melnik. Melnik was informed of the possibility of creation of a pro-German Western ("Galician") Ukraine. After that, Melnik was ordered to prepare "a coalition government" for Galicia. Lahousen, in turn, began to take concrete steps to use the Ukrainian units. An entry appeared in his diary: "The Ukrainian military headquarters is immediately

¹ Ibid. P. 28.

² Hoover Institution Archives. Collection XX 677. Box 1. P. 16.

transferred to the command of the 14th Army (Demel). Notify the Army Group “South” through the Abwehr-II department ... Melnik must be constantly at the disposal of the head of department ... The Abwehr-II must provide a replacement for the Bergbauernhilfe.”

However, these plans were disrupted on 17 September. On this day, the Soviet troops entered the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. According to the testimony of Walter Warlimont, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht Operational Command, General Alfred Jodl, having received a message that the Red Army troops were entering Poland, asked with horror: “Against whom?” An attempt to implement the project approved by Hitler to create a Ukrainian state meant for Germany a war with the USSR in the most unfavorable conditions. Hence Berlin abruptly backed down.

Lahousen writes in his diary: “At 04:00 (Central European Time) the Russians crossed the Polish border along the Kamenetz-Podolskiy-Polotsk line in order to occupy the territory east of the Lemberg-Brest-Litovsk-Belostok line. Thus the situation as it was as of 16.9 has changed...”

Members of the Bergbauernhilfe will not be sent to the area of Russian interests, but to the Ukrainian settlements as the Ukrainian police. Yaryi should be watched; isolation is the best.

18.9 he should arrive to Berlin for a conversation with the head of the division “ In the following weeks, Canaris, Lahousen, and one of the OUN leaders, Rikhard Yaryi, worked to save “what was possible” by organizing a withdrawal of the OUN members to German-controlled Poland and Hungary¹..

Although in 1939 it was not possible to start a campaign for creation of “the Great Ukraine”, the OUN did not lose the Nazis’ support. After victory in the Polish campaign, the Bergbauernhilfe unit was dismissed, and its personnel were partially transferred for formation of the police units in the eastern regions of occupied Poland. The OUN received legal status, and its members entered the service of the Werkschutz units (protection of industrial facilities). The Ukrainian population of the “General governorate” created by the Nazis received a number of privileges; in particular, houses and shops confiscated from the Jews

¹ Hoover Institution Archives. Collection XX 677. Box 1. P. 18.

could be transferred to the Ukrainians. such an approach, of course, impressed Ukrainian nationalists.

In 1940, the organization of an uprising on the territory of Western Ukraine, which became part of the USSR, was put on the agenda of the OUN. On 7 July 1940 Andrey Melnik appealed to Adolf Hitler: “The Ukrainian people, which, like other nations, fought for its will for centuries, takes to heart an idea of creation of a New Europe. The task of all Ukrainian people is still bringing this ideal to life. We, the old freedom fighters of 1918–1921, are asking for the honor for us and our youth to take part in the crusade against the Bolsheviks’ barbarism. Together with the legions of Europe, we would like to go shoulder to shoulder with our liberator, the German Wehrmacht, and be able to create a Ukrainian armed group for this purpose.”

Development of the plan for an uprising in Western Ukraine, called “Unified Master Plan of the OUN rebel headquarters”, became the responsibility of one of the OUN leaders, the former general of the Ukrainian Galician army Viktor Kurmanovich¹. The plan set out in detail the tasks of the anti-Soviet armed uprising and described the actions that should be taken during the uprising.

By the time “the Unified Master Plan” was created, a split between the groups of Andrey Melnik and Stepan Bandera was developing in the OUN. The old leader of the nationalists, Melnik, was mainly supported by the OUN leaders, and the young and radical Bandera was supported by the activists operating in Western Ukraine. However, in the spring of 1940, the final break between the two groups did not yet occur. Despite the fact that the author of “the Unified Master Plan” Kurmanovich was a supporter of Melnik, the document developed by him was adopted by the Krakow Regional Executive of the OUN headed by Bandera.

According to “the Unified Master Plan”, one of the tasks of the rebels was an elimination of persons hostile for the nationalists. The “Performances” section stated: “The first night’s performance is important. It determines everything... It is necessary to kill all those blacklisted on the same night in order to deprive the enemy of human reserves (informers, organizers of enemy sabotage, etc.). And deepen

¹ GDA SBU. F. 9. D. 19. L. 104–116.

the panic.” And in the section “Main tasks to the headquarters of the units”, the need was noted to organize “panic, decomposition among enemies (general executions of the enemies)”. “This is one of the conditions for our won victory,” the document emphasized.

Leaders of the OUN underground organizations in Western Ukraine, who received these instructions, noted their lack of clarity. For example, it was not clear who should be blacklisted for subsequent killing. In the fall of 1940 Ivan Maksimov, a member of the Lvov regional OUN who was arrested by the Soviet state security agencies, wrote: “So far, such lists have not yet been prepared, taking into account the fact that it was not known exactly who was “a saboteur for the OUN” from the local population,”¹ However, during subsequent interrogations, Maksimov explained that the “black lists” were nevertheless compiled on the spots, and the “black lists” began to include not only representatives and supporters of the Soviet regime, but also “national minorities hostile to the uprising”.

“The Unified Master Plan” was never implemented. During 1940 the NKVD inflicted a series of heavy blows on the Ukrainian nationalist underground in Western Ukraine. An attack on the Soviet Union by Turkey or Germany also did not happen — despite the hopes of the OUN leadership.

The failure to implement the plan deepened the split between the Melnik and Bandera groups of the OUN. Melnik’s supporters wrote about the “Bandera group”: “During 1940, those criminal wreckers of revolutionary work irresponsibly threw into region people unmasked in exile, who overloaded the organizational network and failed it many times.”. In response, the Bandera followers called the Melnik followers “traitors” and “opportunists” who did not understand the meaning of the revolutionary struggle.

Contradictions within the OUN reached their culmination in April 1941 when the Bandera group declared non-recognition of the decisions of the II Great Congress of the OUN convened by A. Melnik in Rome and held its own

congress in Krakow. Resolutions of this Congress were promptly translated into German and sent to the leadership of the Third Reich¹.

¹ УПА в світлі німецьких документів. V. 1. P. 29–33.

In May 1941 the OUN of Bandera prepared a new regulatory document regarding an uprising on the territory of Western Ukraine, “Struggle and Activities of the OUN”.

Unlike “the Military Doctrine of Ukrainian Nationalists”, the instruction “Struggle and Activities of the OUN” was widely known not only to the top leadership of the OUN, but also to the middle-level leaders who carried out underground work on the territory of Western Ukraine. On the eve of the German attack on the Soviet Union, the OUN considered it necessary to develop a document containing instructions on how to organize an uprising in the back areas of the Soviet troops and how to create “Ukrainian statehood” on the occupied territory. Issues of combating “hostile” national minorities were also not ignored.

According to Clause 16 of the Section “Instructions for the first days of arrangement of the state life”, the principles of the OUN policy towards national minorities were as follows: “National minorities are subdivided into:

- a) friendly to us, that is, members of all enslaved peoples;
- b) hostile to us, Muscovites, Poles, Jews.

a) They have the same rights as the Ukrainians, they can return to their homeland.

b) Killed in the struggle, except for those who defend the regime: resettlement to their lands, the intellectuals shall be killed first, they should not be allowed to enter any government institutions, and generally make it impossible for the intellectuals to secure access to schools, etc. For example, the so-called Polish villagers must be assimilated, making them aware, especially in this turbulent, fanatic time, that they are Ukrainians, only of the Latin rite, forcibly assimilated. The heads shall be killed. Isolate the Jews, remove them from government institutions in order to avoid sabotage, especially Muscovites and Poles. If there was an overwhelming necessity to leave a Jew in the economic apparatus, put our policeman above him and kill him for the slightest offense.

The leaders of certain areas of life can only be Ukrainians, and not newcomers-enemies. Assimilation of the Jews is excluded.”

The next, clause 17 of the section explained: “Our government shall be terrible for its enemies. Terror for foreign enemies and own traitors.”

Terror against the opponents of the OUN was supposed to begin immediately after the armed uprising. In the military section of the instruction, there was a special paragraph about “clearing the territory of hostile persons”: “In a time of chaos and confusion, one can allow himself to eliminate unwanted Polish, Muscovite and Jewish activists, especially supporters of the Bolshevik-Moscow imperialism”. The clause on “clearing the territory from hostile persons” was further developed in the section “Arrangement of the Security Service”:

“It should be remembered that there are activists who, as the main support of the NKVD and Soviet power in Ukraine, must be rendered harmless when creating a new revolutionary order in Ukraine. These activists are:

Muscovites sent to the Ukrainian lands to consolidate Moscow power in Ukraine;

Jews, individually and as a national group.

Newcomers, mostly different Asians, with whom Moscow colonizes Ukraine with an intention of creating a national striped pattern in Ukraine.

Poles in the Western Ukrainian lands who did not give up the dream of Greater Poland...”

In general, the OUN security service and the Ukrainian police were required to “strangle at its birth any attempt by a foreign person in Ukraine to act in any organized way”¹. “This is the time of the national revolution,” the instruction noted, “and therefore there should be no tolerance towards early newcomers”

The anti-Jewish plans of the nationalists were, of course, known to the Nazi leadership and welcomed by them. For the first time, an idea of engaging the OUN militants in the destruction of “hostile persons” — Jews and representatives of the Polish intellectuals — arose among the Nazi leadership as early as September 1939. By the summer of 1941, extermination of the Jews by others seemed like a good idea to the head of the RSHA, Heydrich, helping to by-pass existing moral constraints related to mass murder on a national basis. The leadership of the Einsatzgruppen was instructed to organize the extermination of Jews by anti-Soviet nationalists. The order signed by Heydrich shortly

¹ OUN in 1941. Part 1. P. 152.

after the invasion of the USSR noted the following: “The desire for self-purification of anti-communist or anti-Jewish circles in the newly occupied areas should not be hindered in any way. On the contrary, they should — of course, unnoticeably — be called out, strengthened if necessary, and directed along the right path, but in such a way that these local “self-defense circles” could not later refer to orders or political guarantees given to them. such actions, for obvious reasons, are possible only during the first period of occupation.”

If in the office of the Reichsführer SS, the Ukrainian nationalists were perceived only as the performers of a dirty work — massacres — then the high-ranking Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg placed a much greater stake on the Ukrainians.

The fight against the Soviet Union was for Rosenberg not only a struggle against “Jewish Bolshevism”, but also a struggle against “Moscow imperialism” capable of resurrecting after the defeat of the USSR. The Russian people were perceived by Rosenberg as sick, and “Moscovia” as the core and symbol of “Russian-Mongolian backwardness”¹. Therefore, in the opinion of the Nazi ideologist, representatives of various separatist movements became natural allies in the fight against «Jewish Bolshevism» and «Moscovia».

On 27 March 1941, during a meeting with the Führer, Rosenberg announced his vision of the political future in the East after the defeat of the Red Army: “The Baltic states are the protectorate, Ukraine is independent, in alliance with us”. He gave a detailed presentation of his plans in a memorandum dated 2 April 1941. On the territory of the USSR, he identified seven main geographical units: “Great Russia”, Belarus, the Baltic states, Ukraine, the Don region, the Caucasus and Turkestan. Rosenberg advocated “encouraging national independence up to the potential creation of its own statehood” of Ukraine, and spoke about a possibility of creating separate states in Belarus and the Don region. The Baltic states had to be Germanized and subsequently annexed to the Reich; the fate of the Caucasus and Turkmenistan remained uncertain. But “Great Russia”, aka “Moscovia”, had to be weakened as much as possible: the state apparatus should be completely

¹ *Dallin A. German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies. Boulder (Colorado), 1981. P. 47.*

destroyed, significant territories should be torn away and transferred to Belarus, Ukraine and the Don region, and the rest should be subjected to cruel economic exploitation.

In addition, it was to Moscovia where the “hostile” and “undesirable” persons from other occupied territories of the USSR had to be deported, including representatives of the national intellectuals from the Baltic states. Apparently, “Moscovia” was supposed to become a place for deportation of Jews from Europe, planned by the office of the Reichsführer SS as part of the territorial “final resolution of the Jewish issue”; Rosenberg was aware of this development.

Despite the fact that Rosenberg’s plans did not quite coincide with Hitler’s vision (during a speech before the leadership of the German army on 30 March 1939 the Fuhrer announced that protectorates would be created not only in the Baltic states, but also in Ukraine and Belarus), the memorandum apparently made a deep impression. On the same day, Rosenberg was appointed commissioner for the centralized processing of issues in the Eastern European territory, i. e. responsible for political transformations in the East. “Rosenberg, now is your turn!” – Hitler said, announcing the appointment¹.

Over the next few weeks, Rosenberg’s staff finalized plans for eastern policy. In an instruction dated 7 May 1941 to the Reichskommissar of Ukraine, two priorities of Nazi policy were emphasized: “The purpose of work of the German Reichskommissar of Ukraine is, first of all, to provide the German Empire with food and raw materials in order to strengthen the German military leadership, and then to create a free Ukrainian state in close alliance with the Great German Empire”. On the territory of “Moscovia”, on the contrary, it was planned to introduce the toughest possible occupation regime. “This occupation should be of a completely different character than that in the Baltic provinces, in Ukraine and in the Caucasus. It should be aimed at suppressing any Russian and Bolshevik resistance and therefore needs people who are impervious, both in the military representative office

¹ Political Diary of Alfred Rosenberg, 1934–1944 / translation from German by S. Vizgina, I. Petrov; comments of I. Petrova with the participation of S. Vizgina, A. Dyukov, V. Simindey; foreword by A. Dyukov; accompanying article by I. Petrov. M., 2015. P. 290.

and potentially in the political governing bodies. There is no need to list the tasks arising from this yet,” Rosenberg wrote in an appendix to a memorandum dated 7 April 1941.

The result of the Liberation Campaign of the Red Army on September 17 — October 5, 1939 was a significant expansion of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

On 22 October 1939 in Lvov, by a general vote in which 4.4 million people took part (almost 93% of the voters), the People’s Assembly (PA) was elected, which appealed to join the Soviet Union. Its members were 1451 people — 415 workers, 766 peasants and 270 intellectuals. A declaration was adopted which announced the establishment of Soviet power on the territory of Eastern Galicia, the confiscation of landowners’ lands and their transfer without redemption to the peasants, the nationalization of banks and large-scale industry, as well as reunification with the Ukrainian SSR. These were precisely the decisions for which more than one generation of Galicians fought and died for many decades.

Based on the appeal of the People’s Assembly of Western Ukraine, the 5th extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 1 November 1939 adopted a law on the inclusion of Western Ukraine into the USSR and its reunification with the Ukrainian SSR. On the new territories annexed to the Soviet Union, six regions were formed: Volyn, Drohobych, Lvov, Rovno, Stanislav and Ternopol.

2.7 million hectares of land were nationalized. Of these, 1.1 million hectares were transferred to the peasants who had no more than 5 hectares of land. The remaining 1.6 million hectares were given to organize collective farms and state farms (about 3 thousand by the summer of 1940)¹. Church land ownership and the income of the church itself were limited. Religious control over schools was prohibited and church symbols within them were reduced. Bilingual Polish-Ukrainian schools were Ukrainianized. The Polish University in Lvov was renamed the University named after Ivan Franko and switched to the Ukrainian language of teaching.

After an inclusion of Western Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR, significant efforts were made aimed at the economic development of

¹ *Magochiy P. R.* Україна. Історія земель та народів. Uzhgorod, 2012. P. 607.

the region, overcoming the backlog from Soviet Ukraine. In January 1940, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the AUCP (b), and a month later, the CC CP (b) U and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR approved the state plan for the development of the national economy of the western regions of Ukraine for 1940. The plan provided for the industrialization of the region, creation of new industries and reconstruction of existing enterprises. It was planned to develop the machine-building, electrical, mining, light and other industries, the use of advanced equipment and production technologies. Particular attention was paid to the industrial potential of Lvov, where it was planned to build a network of factories — glass, electric lamps, electrical appliances, several machine-building, as well as a knitwear factory and food industry enterprises.

Special commissioners were appointed to all banks in the region, which provided loans to industrial enterprises and other economic entities.

In total, more than 2 billion rubles were allocated for the development of the economy, social and cultural areas of the region, of which 700 million were for the needs of industry. In 1940, the construction of thermal power plants and a shoe factory in Stanislav, an agricultural machinery plant, furniture and paper factories in Kolomye began. In February 1941, the construction of the Dashava-Kiev gas pipeline was completed, which supplied 100 thousand cubic meters of the Carpathian gas to the capital city of the republic. By the spring of 1941, urban power plants were reconstructed in Drohobych, Kovel, Lutsk, Lvov, Rovno, Strya, Ternopol, Chortkov, and a number of regional power plants were put into operation¹.

On 26 June 1940 the government of the USSR applied to Romania with a demand to return the northern part of Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR. The King of Romania, Carol II, accepted the note of the Soviet party and transferred Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR. The operation for occupation of the territory inhabited by the Ukrainians by Soviet troops was bloodless and lasted six days.

¹ RGASPI (Russian Government-owned Archive of the Social and Political History) D. 1019. L. 1, 2; Оп. 162. D. 27. L. 1; Возз'єднання західноукраїнських земель з Радянською Україною. К., 1989. Р. 324.

In August 1940, the VII session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a law on inclusion of Northern Bukovina, Khotyn, Akkerman and Izmail counties of Bessarabia into the Ukrainian SSR. Two new regions were established here: Chernovtsy and Akkerman. At the same time, the Moldavian ASSR was separated from the Ukrainian SSR, which together with most of the territory of Bessarabia formed a new subject of the USSR — the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Thus, in the 1920s-1930s Ukraine not only received political recognition within the Soviet Union, but also significantly expanded its borders, including through historical Russian territories where ethnic Ukrainians did not make up a majority of the population. The Ukrainian SSR became the second republic of the USSR after the RSFSR in terms of population, size of the economy, educational and scientific potential.

Chapter 11

UKRAINE DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union. The Great Patriotic War began. A coalition, including armed units from many European countries, invaded the territory of the USSR. Besides the German army, these were the troops of Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, Finland, as well as military formations from countries that officially adhered to neutrality: Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, Norway, France, Croatia.

Preparations for aggression were carried out for several months. As early as on 18 December 1940 the Barbarossa plan (Directive No. 21) was adopted, which contained a strategy for war with the USSR. The Barbarossa plan as the immediate goal of Germany proclaimed war against the USSR: “The German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia in a short campaign even before the war against England is over”¹. Thus, a blitzkrieg was intended. Germany expected to defeat the Red Army in one “border battle”, to defeat the Soviet Union within a few weeks.

One of the main areas of invasion was the territory of Ukraine. Encirclement and defeat of the Soviet army at the border, the drive of German troops to the Dnieper and take over of Kiev were planned as the first goal: “The armies operating south of the Pripjat swamps must, even west of the Dnieper, in the course of a district

¹ Directive No. 21. The Barbarossa plan, December 18, 1940 [website]. URL: https://www.1000dokumente.de/?c=dokument_de&dokument=0009_bar&object=translation&l=ru (access date: 28.02.2022).

operation and with the help of strong flanks, completely defeat the Russian forces located in Ukraine. For this purpose, it was necessary to concentrate the main blow from the Lublin area in the general direction of Kiev, while the forces in Romania formed a defensive flank separated by a long distance across the Prut downstream. The Romanian army was given the task of immobilizing the Russian forces between them.”¹

On 31 January 1941 the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of Nazi Germany, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, adopted the Directive on strategic concentration and deployment of troops. The directive specified the goals and objectives of the military campaign.

In particular, for operations in Ukraine, the Army Group South was created. It included the 6th, 11th, 17th armies and the 1st tank group. The tasks of the army group were to defeat the main formations of the Red Army in the border battle within eight days and take over Lvov, and on the 20th day of the war enter Kiev: “Army Group South is advancing with its reinforced left flank in the general direction of Kiev, with moving units ahead. The overall goal is to destroy Soviet troops in Galicia and Western Ukraine west of the river Dnieper and seize crossings across the Dnieper in the Kiev region and to the south, thereby creating the prerequisites for continuing operations east of the Dnieper”².

The goal of the second phase of the war had to be an offensive from Ukraine to the northeast, with the take over of Moscow, and to the east, with the capture of Donbass. The Nazis attached no less importance to the latter than to the attack on the capital city, since the Donbass was a key industrial region of the Soviet Union: “At the end of the battles to the south and north of the Pripyat swamps, launch a pursuit of the enemy and ensure achievement of the following goals:

– in the south, to occupy the militarily and economically important Donetsk Basin in a timely manner,

¹ Directive No. 21. The Barbarossa plan, December 18, 1940 [website]. URL: https://www.1000dokumente.de/?c=dokument_de&dokument=0009_bar&object=translation&l=ru (access date: 28.02.2022).

² Directive OKH (Barbarossa). January 31, 1941 [website]. URL: <http://doc20vek.ru/node/2840> (access date: 28.02.2022).

– in the north quickly approach Moscow.”¹

The task of capturing Moscow and Donbass had to be completed by the 40th day of the war².

Due to the endurance and courage of the Soviet soldiers and officers, the blitzkrieg plan failed. However, the fascist aggression led to heavy losses and colossal casualties. Ukraine was one of the most affected republics during the war.

Military units of two fronts were deployed on the territory of the republic against the German offensive: the Southwest and Southern fronts. The Southwestern Front was created by order of the People’s Commissar of Defense on 22 June 1941 from parts of the Kiev Military District. The front included the 5th, 6th, 12th, 26th armies, four rifle corps of the front-line submission (31st, 36th, 49th, 55th), two mechanized corps (19th and 24th) and the 1st airborne corps.

The front was commanded by Colonel-General Mikhail Kirponos. General Kirponos was born into a poor peasant family in the Chernigov Governorate and fought in the Civil War in the Shchors detachment. In 1940 he received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for heroism shown in the Soviet-Finnish war. Aleksey Kirichenko, a member of a working-class family from the Kherson Governorate, in February 1941 was appointed a member of the Front military council and was a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) U for industry.

The Southern Front was created by the directive of the General Headquarters on 24 June 1941 on the basis of the Moscow Military District to counter the German and Romanian troops in the Carpathians and Moldova. The 9th and 18th armies, the 7th rifle corps and the 9th special rifle corps were the parts of the front. Army General Ivan Tyulenev, a participant of liberation of Western Ukraine in September 1939, commander of the Moscow Military District since August 1940, was appointed commander of the front. Soviet political

¹ Directive No. 21. The Barbarossa plan, December 18, 1940 [website]. URL: https://www.1000dokumente.de/?c=dokument_de&dokument=0009_bar&object=translation&l=ru (access date: 28.02.2022).

² *Ismailov R. A.* Barbarossa Operation — the crisis of the World War [website]. URL: http://www.igstab.ru/materials/Ismailov/Ism_Barbarossa.htm (access date: 28.02.2022).

worker Alexander Zaporozhets, a native of the Lugansk village of Tsarevka, became a member of the Military Council of the front.

Immediately after the attack of fascist Germany, mobilization activities began in the Soviet Ukraine. During the first year of the war, 3 million 185 thousand people were drafted into the Red Army in the Ukrainian SSR. The ranks of the militia were replenished by 1,300,000 volunteers. Most civilian enterprises were switched to the production of military equipment. The flagship of the Ukrainian industry, the Kharkov Tractor Plant, was switched to the production of tanks. On the territory of Ukraine, the civilian population of the republic built 4,000 km of defensive lines.

On 24 June 1941 the republican council for evacuation had already been created. It did tremendous work to save lives of the Soviet civilians and industrial potential. As a result, 3.5 million Soviet citizens were evacuated to the rear areas. 6.3 million heads of livestock were evacuated. It was possible to ensure the evacuation of many large enterprises, which soon resumed work in the rear areas. Thus, the Kiev plant Arsenal was taken to Votkinsk, the Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, where a month later it started to work, and the Kharkov Tractor Plant continued production of tanks in Chelyabinsk.

The Soviet troops, despite a suddenness of the attack and a superiority of the Germans in the main directions of attack, immediately tried to impose a strategic initiative on the enemy. On 23 June 1941 five Soviet mechanized corps — the 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd — near Dubno and Lutsk launched a counter attack on advancing German units of the Army Group South. The largest tank battle in history took place, in which the German 11th, 13th, 14th, 16th tank divisions were confronted by the Soviet tank crews.

The battle continued until 29 June. As a result, it was not possible to take the tank units of the Germans into pincers. The Soviet tank corps suffered heavy losses. However, the German blitzkrieg was thwarted. The offensive of the Wehrmacht slowed down. The main units of the Southwestern Front managed to retreat to Kiev. Nevertheless, on 8 August German troops managed to close the encirclement near Uman, in which the 6th, 12th and units of the 8th Army were caught.

On 22 July 1941 German bombing of Odessa began, which was defended by units of the Detached Coastal Army and the Black Sea

Fleet. On 5 August German-Romanian troops surrounded Odessa. Heroic defense of the city began, which lasted until 16 October 1941. All these days, Odessa remained in the deep rear and pulled over a significant part of the Wehrmacht and the Romanian army which it did not allow to gain control over the Black Sea. During the city defense, relatively small forces of Soviet soldiers and sailors managed to successfully repel the attacks of superior enemy forces. 18 divisions of German-Romanian troops with a total number of over 300 thousand soldiers were tied up.

This is what was written in the Pravda newspaper about these events: “The entire Soviet country, the entire world watched with admiration the courageous struggle of the defenders of Odessa. They left the city without dishonor, retaining their combat capability, ready for new battles with the fascist hordes. And on whatever front the defenders of Odessa fight, everywhere they will serve as an example of valor, courage, heroism¹.

On 16 October 1941 the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army, having fulfilled their duty, were evacuated by the ships of the Black Sea Fleet to the Crimea.

By the end of August, the Red Army had retreated beyond the Dnieper. On 31 August advanced German units crossed the Dnieper and created a bridgehead in the Left Bank near Kremenchug. However, Army Group South was unable to independently develop the offensive further. There was a threat that in the event of a further offensive by the Nazis on Moscow, the Soviet Southwestern Front, which retained its defensive positions near Kiev and ended up in the rear of the German Army Group Center, would be able to deliver a flank attack on the advancing units of Wehrmacht.

Therefore, despite the desire of Generals Germann Hoth and Heinz Guderian to continue the offensive against the capital of the Soviet Union, Hitler decided to stop the offensive and concentrate all forces against the Southwestern Front. On July 30, in the Moscow direction, the Wehrmacht took on the defensive.

¹ Defense of Odessa. How it was [website]. URL: <https://slovo.odessa.ua/main/29083-oborona-odessy-kak-eto-bylo-video.html> (access date: 01.03.2022).

At the same time, the forces of the Army Group Center began to develop an offensive against Chernigov with an aim of delivering a flank attack on the Southwestern Front and encircling its units in the Kiev region.

The Soviet command realized the impending threat. In order to prevent this, the Bryansk Front was created, which was supposed to stop the advancing units of the Wehrmacht with a counter strike. General Aleksey Eremenko, who was born into a poor peasant family in the Kharkov Governorate and began his military career in the Civil War in the First Cavalry Army of Budyonny, was appointed commander of the front. On 19 August Joseph Stalin wrote to Georgy Zhukov, Commander of the Reserve Front: “I think that your considerations about the probable advance of the Germans towards Chernigov-Konotop-Priluki are correct. Advance of the Germans in this direction will mean bypassing our Kiev group from the eastern bank of the Dnieper and encircling our Third and our 21st Army. As it is known, one enemy column has already crossed the Unecha and reached Starodub. In anticipation of such an undesirable incident and to prevent it, the Bryansk Front was created, headed by Eremenko. Other measures are taken, which I will report separately. We hope to stop an advance of the Germans”¹.

On 30 August the troops of the Bryansk Front began the Roslavl-Novozybkovsk operation, the purpose of which was to defeat the 2nd tank group of the Wehrmacht. The operation ended on 12 September. The Red Army moved forward in the Novozybkovsk direction, but it was not possible to stop an advance of the German troops in the rear of the Southwestern Front.

On 15 September 1941 Soviet troops near Kiev found themselves in a circle. The 5th, 21st, 26th and 37th armies, as well as the front headquarters, were surrounded. On 18 September Kiev was lost. On 20 September, while trying to break through, the front commander Mikhail Kirponos was killed.

The defeat of the Soviet army near Kiev and the death and capturing of a significant part of the encircled armies, was a heavy blow for the Red Army. However, thanks to the Kiev battle, the desperate resistance

¹ Diplomacy and lend-lease [website]. URL: <http://militera.lib.ru/memo/usa/stettinius/07.html> (access date: 28.02.2022).

of the already surrounded Soviet units finally buried Hitler's plans for a quick completion of the war. Soviet troops near Moscow received the necessary respite.

The defense of Kiev lasted more than two months, from 11 July to 19 September, while the defense of Warsaw lasted 20 days, and Paris was surrendered to the Nazis without a fight a month after the outbreak of hostilities.

Commander of the 2nd Tank Group of the Wehrmacht, Heinz Guderian, noted in his memoirs: "The battles for Kiev undoubtedly meant a major tactical success. However, the question of whether this tactical success was also of major strategic importance remained doubtful. Now everything depended on whether the Germans would be able to achieve decisive results before the onset of winter, perhaps even before the onset of the autumn thaw period. Although the planned offensive to squeeze Leningrad into a tighter circle was already suspended, the High Command of the Ground Forces expected that in the south the enemy would no longer be able to organize a strong and resistant defense against the troops of Army Group South; it wanted the Army Group South to capture the Donbass before onset of winter and reach the objective of the Don river.

However, the main blow had to be made by the reinforced Army Group Center in the direction of Moscow. Was there enough time left for this?"¹

In September-November 1941, the remnants of the Southwestern Front withdrew to the lines east of Kharkov and Izyum. After the tragic death of General Kirponos, the front was headed by the hero of the Civil War, Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, who came from a poor peasant family in the Bessarabian Governorate. On 17 September the Donbass was lost. Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, became a member of the Military Council of the front.

On 25 October Kharkov was captured. By November 1941, the front had stabilized. Almost all of Ukraine, with the exception of some settlements in the Donbass, was under the rule of the Nazis.

¹ *Guderian Heinz*. *Memoirs of the Soldier* [website]. URL: <https://tex-tarchive.ru/c-1564053-p19.html> (access date: 01.03.2022).

After the successful counter-attack of the Soviet troops near Moscow, it was decided to go on the offensive in other sectors of the front. In January-March 1942 the troops of the Southwestern Front carried out a successful operation in the area east of Kharkov, occupying the strategically important Barvenkovskiy bridgehead on the western bank of the Severskiy Donets, which opened up the opportunities for developing an offensive on Kharkov and Dnipropetrovsk. On 12 May the Red Army launched an operation to liberate Kharkov.

However, the offensive ended in a severe defeat of the Soviet troops. On 23 May a significant group of troops of the Southwestern Front was surrounded and suffered serious losses.

This is how the Chief of Staff of the South-Western Direction, Lieutenant-General Ivan Bagramyan, later recalled these events: “I remember well that on this alarming day for the troops of the South-Western direction, the acting chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General A. M. Vasilevskiy called me twice. Showing great concern, with undisguised anxiety and concern, he asked what our possibilities were for repelling Kleist’s offensive. I reported to Alexander Mikhailovich that we did not have the necessary reserves near Barvenkov to stop an advance of the enemy strike force by putting them into action. Later, we learned that General A. M. Vasilevskiy twice submitted to the Headquarters a proposal to immediately stop the attack on Kharkov and to engage all forces of the units of generals A. M. Gorodnyansky, L. V. Bobkin and K. P. Podlas for the elimination of the growing danger”¹.

Defeat near Kharkov allowed the Wehrmacht to regain the strategic initiative. On 28 June 1942, the German troops went on the offensive in the direction of the Don, the Volga and the Caucasus. On 22 July 1942 the last Ukrainian city was lost — Sverdlovsk of the Voroshilovgrad region. Thus, an occupation of Ukraine by Nazi Germany took more than a year. The heroic defense of Ukrainian cities and villages made it possible to thwart the Barbarossa plan. On the battlefields in the first period of the war in Ukraine, in Belarus, near Moscow and Leningrad, the best and most combat effective units of the Wehrmacht perished.

¹ *Bagramyan I. Kh. Thus We Approached Victory.* Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1977.

A new order in the occupied territories in Germany began to be planned long before the invasion. As early as 17 October 1939 Heinrich Himmler, Minister of the Interior Affairs, Chief of the German Police and Hitler's closest associate, was appointed Reichskommissar of the Consolidation of the German Nation. The position was introduced to implement the racial resettlement policy of Nazi Germany. In 1940, at the initiative of Himmler, the development of the General Plan Ost began. The work was completed in 1942 when several detailed documents were created.

The plan was created on the basis of racial doctrine and the concept of "living space" and provided for the forced eviction from the territory of Poland and the occupied part of the Soviet Union of most of the population (from 75 to 85%), the partial elimination of the non-Aryan population, the "Germanization" and "racial renewal" of the Nordic type population, and large-scale migration to the liberated territories of the German population, including those who had previously emigrated to Latin America.

The plan particularly stated: "The Eastern Regions, which had remained disputed for centuries, were finally annexed to the Reich by the force of German arms. From now on, the Reich's fundamental task was to turn these territories into full-fledged Reichsgau (imperial districts) in the shortest possible time. The first prerequisite for this was colonization of the countryside and creation of a healthy peasantry."¹

A separate resettlement policy was also provided for the urban population: "Engagement of a German person for the Germanization and improvement of cities in the East assumes the creation of attractive living conditions and development opportunities for him ...

1. In the cities, too, a Reich monopoly on land should be established to eliminate all land speculations and to ensure freedom of planning. First of all, this applies to settlement marks.

2. Persons of alien nationalities cannot be the owners of urban land plots"².

¹ General Plan OST [website]. URL: <https://liewar.ru/dokumenty/265-generalnyj-plan-ost.html?start=1> (access date: 01.03.2022).

² Ibid.

The Ost plan provided for the creation of three special regions in the occupied territories, “marks”, with a predominantly German population, one of which, Gotengau, had to be created in the settlement area of the early Middle Ages of the Goth tribe and included the territories of the Crimea and the southern part of Ukraine, from Kherson and Nikolaev to Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev.

At the same time, on the territory of Western and Central Ukraine, from Lvov and Rovno to Bila Tserkva, located between individual German marks, strongholds had to be created — urban settlements with a predominantly German population.

It was assumed that 14 million Slavs, Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians had to remain in the German settlement areas, and 4 million German settlers had to exercise control over them: “The following population should be considered necessary for Germanization: about 1.8 million in rural areas and about 2.2 million people in urban areas”¹.

Ukrainians had to be resettled in Western Siberia: “According to the plan of the main department of imperial security, Western Ukrainians should also be resettled in Siberia. This provides for the resettlement of 65% of the population”².”

The end point of the process of Germanization of the Slavic lands was defined in the plan as follows: “The task of Germanization will be considered completed if, firstly, the land completely passes into German hands, and secondly, when the owners of their own business, officials, employees, skilled workers and their families will be German”³. It was provided to carry out the Germanization of the rural areas within five years, the urban areas within 10 years, and total completion of the process of Germanization of marks and strongholds was supposed to be completed in 25 years.

General Plan Ost was designed for a long period. In the conditions of the initial period of occupation, the fate of the Ukrainian territories

¹ General Plan OST [website]. URL: <https://liewar.ru/dokumenty/265-generalnyj-plan-ost.html?start=1> (access date: 01.03.2022).

² Comments and proposals of the Eastern Ministry on the General Plan Ost [website]. URL: https://scepsis.net/library/id_703.html (access date: 01.03.2022).

³ General Plan OST [website]. URL: <https://liewar.ru/dokumenty/265-generalnyj-plan-ost.html?start=1> (access date: 01.03.2022).




Fig. 1. Settled areas and strongholds in the Eastern space according to the General Plan OST¹

¹ General Plan OST [website]. URL: <https://liewar.ru/dokumenty/265-generalnyj-plan-ost.html?start=1> (access date: 01.03.2022).

was different. Western Ukraine on 1 August 1941 was included in the Polish General Government, the German occupation administration for the governance of Poland.

On 20 August Reichskommissariat Ukraine was created to govern Ukraine, with its center in Rovno. Erich Koch, a major Nazi party leader, who had previously governed the occupation administration of Belostok, was appointed as Reichskommissar.

The territory of the Reichskommissariat consisted of six general districts: Wolhynian-Podolian (part of Volyn centered in Rovno), Ost-Wolhynian (right-bank Ukraine centered in Zhytomyr), Greuthungland (mostly Nikolaev region centered in Nikolaev), Gotenland (Kherson region and Crimea), Oberdneper (central regions of Ukraine with the center in Kiev), Niederdneper (territories of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporozhye regions with the center in Dnipropetrovsk). It was also planned to create seven more districts with centers in Chernigov, Kharkov, Stalino (Yuzovka), Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don, Stalingrad and Saratov.

The territory of the Reichskommissariat expanded as the front moved east. At the same time, the front line was under the jurisdiction of the military commandant's offices.

Part of Southwestern Ukraine was transferred to the control of Romania. On the territory between the Dnestr and the Southern Bug, a Romanian occupation zone was created — the “Governorship of Transnistria” with the center first in Tiraspol. In October 1941, after the fall of Odessa, the center of Transnistria was transferred there. A high-level Romanian official, Professor Gheorghe Alexeanu, was appointed governor of Transnistria, who until 1938 governed the Suceava cinut (later the Chernovtsy region as part of Ukraine).

The Romanian occupation administration prohibited the use of the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian songs, and began the forced Romanization of the population of the governorate. An integral part of the policy of the Romanian occupation authorities were repressions and ethnic cleansing. In total, over 200 thousand people were executed during the Romanian occupation in Transnistria.

However, the scale of the Romanian crimes against humanity is much inferior to the German ones. In Ukraine, 250 concentration camps and ghettos were created. The largest concentration camps were

Uman Pit, Khorolsk Pit, Citadel in Lvov, Bogunia near Zhytomyr, Darnytsk and Syretsk camps in Kiev, and Gross-Lazaret in Slavuta.

Prisoners of war were held in the open area, deprived of food and water, and tortured and humiliated. For example, tens of thousands of Soviet prisoners of war, who were surrounded near Uman in August 1941 were kept in the so-called Uman pit — a pit that arose as a result of clay mining near the Uman clay factory.

The German attitude towards Soviet prisoners of war was much worse than to the prisoners of war of other countries in German camps. Thus, by the order of the High Command of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces of 8 October 1941 Soviet prisoners of war used in hard work were supposed to have 9 kg of bread, 900 g of sugar, 800 g of meat and 250 g of fat for 28 days. The norms for meat and fat were half of the norms for prisoners of war of other countries. For the Soviet prisoners of war employed in less significant work, 6 kg of bread, 600 g of sugar, and 440 g of fat were provided. These norms ranged from 66 to 42 % of the norms for prisoners of war of other countries. Meat was not provided at all¹.

During the occupation period, 1.5 million Soviet prisoners of war died in concentration camps on the territory of Ukraine alone.

This cruel and anti-human attitude extended not only to prisoners, partisans and underground members, but also to the civilians. During the occupation in Ukraine, more than 3 million civilians died. Most of the people killed were Russians and Ukrainians. Among them, 900 thousand Jews and 200 thousand Gypsies were killed.

Symbolic of the war crimes of the Nazis and their accomplices, Ukrainian collaborators, were the executions in the Babiy Yar tract near Kiev, which began shortly after the capture of the city, on 29 September 1941. According to the report of Hauptmann Hans Koch, authorized by the Eastern Ministry for the Army Group South: “As punishment for the obvious sabotage, on September 29 and 30, the Jews of the city were eliminated, in total (according to the information of the SS operational team) about 35 thousand people, half of whom

¹ *Veremeev Yu.* Red Army and World War II. Nutritional norms for the Soviet Prisoners of War in 1941 [website]. URL: <http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/paek-sov-plennyx.shtml> (access date: 03.03.2022).

were women”¹. The Jewish population of Kiev was forcibly gathered in the hole. Before death, they all were ordered to undress. Not only adults, but also children were shot.

Evidence of the criminals and accomplices of this crime was preserved. Here are the words of Kurt Werner, private of Sonderkommando 4a of Einsatzgruppe C, who was put on trial at one of the Small Nuremberg Trials:

“Jews had to lie face down on the ground near the walls of the ravine. There were three groups of shooters in the ravine. Jews were brought to these groups from above all the time. Subsequent Jews had to lie down on the corpses of previously executed Jews. The shooters stood behind the Jews and killed them with shots in the back of the head. I still remember today how horrified the Jews were when from above, from the edge of the ravine, for the first time they could look down at the corpses. Many Jews screamed all the time in fear. It is impossible to even imagine what nerves it took to do the work under these circumstances².”

Babi Yar became a place of execution not only for the Jews, but also for representatives of other nationalities living in Ukraine, as well as Soviet prisoners of war. Executions continued throughout the entire period of occupation of Kiev. In total, more than 100 thousand people were shot in the hole.

The occupation regime practiced not only mass executions, but also total destruction of settlements as a measure to combat partisans and underground members. In total, during the occupation, about 250 villages and villages were eliminated, of which 50 were eliminated together with the residents.

Thus, in December 1942, during a punitive operation, the Nazis pushed into one room and burned 300 peasants of the village of Ilinty near Vinnitsa. In the same month, 11 villages were burned in the

¹ *Kruglov A.* The tragedy of Babi Yar in German documents. Dnipropetrovsk. “Tkuma.” 2011 [website]. URL: https://netzulim.org/R/OrgR/Library/Kruglov/3_4_Kruglov_Babiy_Yar.pdf (access date: 04.03.2022).

² Babi Yar: the children were left with their mothers and shot together with them [website]. URL: <https://www.miloserdie.ru/article/babiy-yar-detejostavlyali-s-materyami-i-rasstrelivali-vmeste-s-nimi/> (access date: 08.03.2022).

Slovehansk district of the Zhytomyr region. On 3 March 1943 1,300 residents of the village of Khmilniki were killed; on April 2–2,300 residents of the village of Ternovka in the Vinnitsa region.

In September 1943, the village of Kozary in the Chernigov region was eliminated together with its residents. This is what eyewitnesses said about it: “On 11 September 1943 at about six o’clock in the morning ... they surrounded the village and began savage reprisal against women, elderly, children. Like animals, they broke into the houses, shot residents with submachine guns, set the houses on fire ... threw grenades into the basements. Inhuman screams were heard over the village... That day there was a service in the church... The Germans took 270 praying people out of the church, brought them into the village club and burned them. 150 people were also burned alive in a collective farm barn. Of the 4.7 thousand residents of the village, only 432 people survived ... An intolerable stench from smoke and corpses was in the air. In the sites of fire there were burnt skulls, next to small children’s bones laid the bones of adults... The village has turned into a cemetery”¹.

In addition to repressions against civilians, an important component of the occupation policy was shipment of food, industrial equipment and labor — Ostarbeiters — from Ukraine to Germany. As well as during the World War I, Germany sought to use the resources of Ukraine for its own purposes.

As part of the German trading company Ost, for this purpose, an office for Ukraine was created with a center in Rovno. By 1943, 2.8 million tons of food were exported to Germany through the office, including 900 thousand tons of grain. Also, 1.6 million heads of cattle were sent to Germany.

The Germans were also interested in the industrial base of the republic. 125 thousand electric motors and 80 thousand machine tools were shipped out.

The natural resources of Ukraine were also important for Germany. About 1 million tons of coal, 380 thousand tons of iron ore, 600 thousand tons of oil, and 1,005 thousand tons of smelted steel and cast iron were sent to Germany.

¹ History of the Ukrainian SSR: in 10 volumes. Volume Eight [website]. URL: <https://history.wikireading.ru/373127> (access date: 04.03.2022).

The German economy in the conditions of war also needed workers. The Nazis actively practiced slave labor. More than 3 million people were sent from Ukraine to forced labor in Germany. 450 thousand of them died.

In addition to the territory of Germany itself, in accordance with the General Plan Ost, German farms with forced labor were also created in Ukraine. During occupation, 2215 public and private German farms were formed, receiving a total of 6.3 million hectares of land.

On 5 August 1941 the Minister of the Eastern Territories A. Rosenberg work was punished with fines and arrests. Flight from important industrial facilities was punishable up to the death penalty¹.

The repressive policy of the Nazis, the crimes against humanity committed by them and their accomplices from the Ukrainian nationalists caused a powerful wave of resistance in the occupied territory. Tens of thousands of residents of Ukraine went into the forests to join partisan detachments or joined the ranks of underground groups operating in the cities and villages. Detachments of partisans and underground members were also replenished by Soviet spies, prisoners of war and soldiers who were encircled.

On 9 June 1941 the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine created a task force to organize a network of underground party bodies, partisan formations, select and train personnel for the organizers of the people's struggle behind enemy lines.

For underground work and leadership of the partisan movement, from June to September 1941, 23 regional committees, 685 district committees and city committees, and 4316 underground party cells were formed².

In August 1941, by a decision of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, a special school of training personnel for the partisan movement was established in Kiev, and then such schools were created in Kharkov, Poltava, Lysichansk. For several months, about 4.5 thousand organizers of the underground and partisan movement were trained in them.

¹ *Danilevskiy I., Tairova T., Shubin A., Mironenko V.* History of Ukraine. 2nd Ed., revised and amended, St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 425.

² Partisan Movement in Ukraine [website]. URL: <https://revolucia.ru/partizansukr.htm> (access date: 04.03.2022).

By the autumn of 1941, two partisan regiments, 883 detachments, and 1,700 sabotage groups were operating in the occupied territory of Ukraine. The total number of partisans was 35 thousand people¹.

One of the main methods of fighting the partisans was sabotage on the railways, which caused significant damage to the enemy's transport communications, primarily to the front supply. In 1941 Ukrainian partisans destroyed 23 enemy trains. In 1942–10 times more, 232 trains. During the Battle of Kursk and an offensive of the Soviet troops on Kiev, from 3 August to 19 September 1943, the partisans carried out Operation Concert. The result of the operation was a decrease of the railways capacity by 35–40 %, which significantly encumbered the regrouping of the German troops during an offensive of the Red Army. Between 1941–1942, partisans killed 42 thousand soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, as well as 3,700 Ukrainian collaborators².

In total, during the entire period of the Great Patriotic War, the partisans of Ukraine disabled about 500 thousand Germans and their accomplices, defeated 467 military posts, commandant's offices, headquarters, police departments, derailed about 5 thousand military echelons, undermined over 1500 tanks, 200 aircrafts, 600 railway bridges, and destroyed over 900 warehouses³.

The main base of the partisan movement was the forest areas of the Sumy and Chernigov regions adjacent to Belarus and the Bryansk region, as well as the forests of the Cherkassy region.

A wide network of the partisan units was created in the Dnipropetrovsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Nikolaev, Odessa, Poltava, Stalin, Sumy, Kharkov and Chernigov regions.

In the Sumy region, 35 units were formed with over 1450 fighters. The Spadshchansky forest was the center of a concentration of partisan forces in the Sumy region. The combat activities of the Sumy partisan unit (commander Sidor Kovpak) played an

¹ *Danilevskiy I., Tairova T., Shubin A., Mironenko V.* History of Ukraine. 2nd Ed., revised and amended, St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 436–437.

² *Ibid.* P. 439.

³ Partisan Movement in Ukraine [website]. URL: <https://revolucia.ru/partizansukr.htm> (access date: 04.03.2022).

outstanding role in the development of the partisan movement in Ukraine.

By the end of 1941, partisan detachments were formed in all districts of the Chernigov region. After merging with the regional partisan detachment of four district detachments, one of the largest partisan formations in Ukraine was created (commander of the formation Aleksey Fedorov).

A great deal of work on the formation of partisan forces was carried out by the Stalin Regional Committee of the CP (b) U, which organized 180 partisan detachments and groups in 37 districts of the region, numbering over 4 thousand people. Under the leadership of the Kiev City Party Committee, 11 partisan detachments and 2 partisan regiments were created, numbering over 4 thousand fighters. 24 detachments were formed in the Kiev region¹.

One of the largest partisan detachments was created by Sidor Kovpak. A native of a poor peasant family in the Akhtyrsky district of the Kharkov Governorate, Kovpak fought on the Southwestern Front during the World War I, was a member of the Brusilov offensive, and then led a partisan detachment fighting against the White Guards during the Civil War. In 1941 he was already 54 years old. In the initial period of the war, Kovpak headed the Putivl City Executive Committee of the Sumy region.

Kovpak began preparation for the partisan struggle even before arrival of the Germans, sending his comrades-in-arms into the forest and creating a detachment base there. Immediately after takeover of Putivl by Germans, Kovpak created a partisan detachment. Sidor Kovpak himself described its creation as follows:

“By 22 September when I announced composition of the detachment in the Order No. 1, there were about four dozen fighters in it. They allocated intelligence officers, mine specialists, and the rest were divided into two combat groups. In one — residents of Putivl, civilians and mostly middle-aged, Soviet and party workers, collective farm activists. This was a core of the detachment. In another group, there were military people whom

¹ Partisan Movement in Ukraine [website]. URL: <https://revolucia.ru/partizansukr.htm> (access date: 04.03.2022).

I met in the forest when I was looking for my comrades. There were military guys”¹.

Kovpak’s detachment began with sabotage on the roads, and the destruction of rural commandant’s offices and small units of soldiers and policemen. In December, under pressure from superior enemy forces, Kovpak retreated to the Bryansk forests. Here a real partisan region uncontrolled by the Germans arose, and a connection was established with the mainland.

On 15 May 1942 the partisan detachment, which by that time already numbered 750 people, left the Bryansk forests and set off on a raid on the Left-Bank Ukraine. In two months, 4,000 German soldiers and policemen were killed. By July 1942 the detachment already had 1,300 fighters.

On 18 May 1942, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kovpak, as well as the commanders of other large Ukrainian partisan detachments Alexander Saburov, Ivan Kopenkin and Aleksey Fedorov, “who particularly distinguished themselves in the partisan struggle in the rear against the German invaders”, were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

On 30 May 1942 when the Soviet troops suffered a major defeat near Kharkov, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was created, headed by the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus Panteleymon Ponomarenko. One of three members of the Central Headquarters was appointed People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Vasiliy Sergienko. The Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement was also created, which was headed by the Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Tymofey Strokach.

On 1 September 1942 the partisan detachments of Kovpak and Saburov received a task of carrying out a raid on the Right-Bank Ukraine. The raid took place from November 1942 to June 1943. The partisans managed to create a partisan region, which included 14 regions of Ukraine and Belarus.

¹ *Kovpak S.A.* From Putivl to the Carpathians [website]. URL: <https://libking.ru/books/prose-/prose-military/269382-2-sidor-kovpak-ot-putivlya-do-karpat.html#book> (access date: 04.03.2022).

In June 1943, a new partisan campaign began. Now his goal was the Carpathians. Here, Kovpak's detachment entered into clashes with German troops, as well as with the units of nationalists from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA). The raid ended with a blow on the oil-bearing region of Drogobych. 40 oil derricks, 13 oil storage facilities and three oil refineries were destroyed. By this time, under the command of Kovpak, there was already an entire partisan division. On February 23, 1944, Kovpak's detachment was transformed into the First Ukrainian Insurgent Division named after S. A. Kovpak. The division was headed by his deputy Petr Vershigora.

The division operated behind the enemy lines until August 1944, after which it joined the ranks of the Red Army.

Sidor Kovpak described the end of the partisan struggle as follows: "Our new strike was directed at the communications of the German group in the Korosten area. After the capturing of Zhytomyr by the Red Army, the enemy had only one way to retreat from Korosten — to Olevska, Sarny. Our reconnaissance established that the Korosten-Sarny railway is jammed with German trains with military equipment and various valuables stolen by the Germans in Ukraine. The decision was made to disable the road. We reported our plan by the radio to Comrade Khrushchev and the next day received a response radiogram approving our decision ... More than 300 wagons with bombs, gunpowder and fuel stood on the railway tracks of the Olevska station. You can imagine what happened when the tanks with fuel pierced by incendiary bullets flared up and wagons with gunpowder levitated. For half an hour on the railway tracks continuously, dozens at a time, aviation bombs exploded. The partisan companies had to move away from the station at a fair distance in order to protect themselves from a shower of fragments and crumbling wagons falling on their heads. In half an hour, about a thousand tons of aviation bombs exploded at the station. The Snovidovichi station was also completely disabled. Thus we completed the campaign at the Carpathians. A new period of fight has begun"¹.

During the raid, the partisans constantly faced the atrocities of the Ukrainian nationalists. In his memoirs, commander of the partisan division, Pyotr Vershigora, cited the following episode:

¹ Ibid.

“The boy, who was looking at us with the eyes wide open until now, suddenly spoke:

– They entered the house and immediately began to twist our father’s hands... “Speak, Mazurian scum, where is the gold?...”

– And the daddy’s bones are cracking, and we are crying... — said the girl.

– Then one took an axe and chopped off his head.

– Yeah, and then they started beating everyone, and torturing, and chopping.

– And the rest strangled granny on the stove...

In the first house we entered, there were seven corpses. The front door was open. In the shade, leaning over a high threshold with a flexible girlish figure, a girl laid with her face up, about fifteen years old, in one nightgown. The torso was in the room, and the head hung down to the shade floor. A sunbeam gilded her flowing light brown hair, and blue eyes were open and looked out into the street, at the world on which the bright sun was playfully shining. From her open lips, a trickle of blood, already hardened by the morning frost, flowed down her cheek. Adults and children laid side by side in the house. Some had their skulls shattered and their faces were impossible to see, while others had their necks slashed. On the furnace there was a very old woman, completely black and without traces of blood, with the traces of a rope around her neck. The rope wrapped around the rocker laid right there. As I hurriedly left the house, which was a family coffin, I saw a bunch of long hair on the latch of the external door. They got entangled in the handle and fluttered under the breath of the pre-spring wind towards the sun. The same picture was seen in other houses.

It was all too terrible for me to understand. One thing is obvious: driven by some kind of passion for destruction and murder, people lost their human character and aimlessly, like a wolf breaking into a sheepfold, drawn by the rage alone, by the thirst for blood alone, death and blood, committed this massacre.”¹

¹ Vershigora Petr Petrovich. People with Clear Conscience [website]. URL: <https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=44465&p=1> (access date: 13.03.2022).

In total, about 200 thousand people participated in the partisan movement in Ukraine. 95 Ukrainian partisans received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In total, 60 partisan formations and about 2 thousand partisan detachments and reconnaissance and sabotage groups that were not part of the formations operated in the occupied territory of Ukraine.

Practically in all occupied Ukrainian cities, with the exception of some cities in Western Ukraine, the Soviet underground was organized. A total of 4136 underground cells were created.

The underground Komsomol organization of the city of Krasnodon, the Young Guard, became widely known. On 20 July 1942 Krasnodon was captured by German troops. Shortly thereafter, in September 1942, several dozen young residents of the city created an underground organization.

During four months of its existence, the Komsomol organization, the Young Guard, did a lot. By the beginning of December 1942, the Young Guard members managed to collect a real arsenal, which they intended to put into action as the Red Army approached: 15 submachine guns, 80 rifles, 10 guns and about 15,000 bullets for these weapons, as well as 300 grenades and 65 kilograms of explosives. On account of the Young Guard there were several risky successful operations, including destruction of the documents of two thousand fellow countrymen who were going to be sent for compulsory labor to Germany, and a release of several dozen prisoners of war. While printing and posting leaflets with information about the situation on the fronts and reports from the Soviet Information Bureau were, so to speak, routine work, with which, in fact, the Young Guard began. The most striking demonstration of the fact that Soviet people still live in the occupied city was the hanging on 7 November 1942 on the 25th anniversary of the October Revolution, of eight red flags on the highest buildings of Krasnodon.

All these activities were conducted by more than seventy young people of the city of Krasnodon, the youngest of whom was barely fourteen years old, and most of them were eighteen years old. At first, underground youth groups in the city formed spontaneously, but in September 1942 they were able to unite. On 30 September at the suggestion of one of the most active underground workers, Sergey Tyulenin, this united underground Komsomol organization was

named the Young Guard. The underground members were headed by the headquarters, which included four people: headquarters commander Ivan Zemnukhov, as well as Vasilii Levashov, Georgiy Arutyunyants and Sergey Tyulenin as members of the headquarters, and Viktor Tretyakevich became the commissar of the Young Guard. A little later, Ulyana Gromova, Oleg Koshevoy, Ivan Turkenich and Lyubov Shevtsova also became members of the headquarters.

However, the Germans were able to expose the underground. Arrests of the Young Guards began on 1 January 1943. On January 16, 1943, 49 members of the underground organization Young Guard, which was operating since September 1942, and another 22 members of the party underground were thrown into the pit of mine No. 5. This execution was not the last: the same ones took place the next day and 31 on January. Of all the young guards, only thirteen people survived a defeat of the organization and only ten survived to the Victory¹. In total, 60 thousand Ukrainian partisans and members of the underground died during the years of war.

The vast majority of the population of Ukraine supported the fight against the invaders. However, there were traitors of the motherland among the Ukrainians. They were followers of the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism, who, long before the start of the Great Patriotic War, embarked on the path of cooperation with the Nazis.

The largest organizations of Ukrainian nationalists were the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera (OUN(b)) and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Andrey Melnik (OUN(m)). Both organizations wanted to get leadership in the nationalist camp, and were in a state of irreconcilable hostility. But in one respect, the supporters of Bandera and Melnik occupied similar positions — both of them actively cooperated with the Germans and hoped to establish control over the territory of Soviet Ukraine with their help.

It was beneficial for the Nazis to control both structures, encouraging an “interspecies” struggle between them. Despite the rivalry, both

¹ *Trofimov A.* Young Guard: Real Feat of Literary Characters [website]. URL: <https://histrf.ru/read/articles/molodaia-ghvardiia-realnyi-podvigh-litieraturnykh-ghieroiiev> (access date: 04.03.2022).

groups of nationalists — Bandera's and Melnik's supporters — actively worked with the German intelligence services.

After Hitler made a decision to prepare an attack on the USSR, contacts with the OUN intensified sharply. As part of the special forces unit of the Abwehr Brandenburg, two legions (teams) were formed — Roland (Melnik's supporters) and Nachtigal (Bandera's supporters). The Nazis set the following tasks for them (the Austrians did the same in the World War I): to organize sabotage in the rear of the Red Army, destroy the groups of Red Army soldiers leaving the encirclement, attack the road trains, destroy communications, etc. A particularly important task was the compilation of "the black lists of the pro-Soviet intellectuals in Western Ukraine, as well as Poles and Jews. Both battalions, Nachtigal and Roland, together with the German army reached Vinnitsa, however, in the second echelon, where along the way they participated in the executions of the Soviet Ukrainian citizens.

On 18 June 1941 dressed in the uniform of the Nazi Wehrmacht with a single mark — a small blue-yellow ribbon on shoulder straps, the Nachtigal members were transferred to the Soviet border. There, on the cross and the Gospel, they swore "loyalty to blood" to the Fuhrer.

Already on 30 June following the Nazi soldiers, they entered Lvov. This is where the "black lists" reappeared. Addresses of the sentenced were clarified using the telephone directory, then Nachtigal started to do their "business." The militants began to go around the streets of the city, catching their victims and dragging them to execution. Dozens of innocent people were shot, hanged, buried alive in the ground on Mount Vuletskaya. Among the Lvov victims were the rector of the Lvov University Roman Remskoy, former Prime Minister of Poland, professor, honorary member of many academies of the world Kazimir Bartel and many others. The Nazis deliberately left Lvov to the nationalists for seven days in order to distance themselves from the atrocities of the Nachtigal.

In August 1941 the Roland and Nachtigal battalions were transformed into the 201st Schutzmannschaft (security police) battalion, which was sent to fight the Belarusian partisans.

With the arrival of the Germans in Galicia, the primate of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, Metropolitan Andrey

Sheptytskoy embarked on a path of cooperation with the occupation authorities of the Third Reich. Already, on 1 July 1941, the day after an occupation of Lvov by the German authorities, he addressed the flock with a message of congratulations on this occasion. On 23 September 1941 after the capture of Kiev, Sheptytskiy sent a letter to Hitler, in which he greeted him as “an invincible commander of the incomparable and glorious German army.”

Together with the German troops, there were military columns of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) numbering 10 thousand people, assisting the Germans. As early as on 27 June Bandera tried to take over Lvov, but he failed. After the occupation of Lvov on 30 June along with the Germans, OUN military detachments and the Nachtigal battalion entered the city. Jewish massacres began immediately, initiated by the Ukrainian nationalists.

In his post-war testimonies, Abram Rosen, a resident of Lvov, testified: “On 3 July 1941 German SS detachments, police and Ukrainian nationalists walked around the city, led by Sagatyi, Antonyak, Vanne, Voronkevich, Alishkevich and others, who rounded up and brought people to prison under the guise of sending them to work. When people were gathered on the square near the prison, all people who were able to work were ordered to dig pits. Then, when the pits were ready, an order followed for everyone present, including me, to lie close to each other in the pit. After that, the German butchers began to shoot people lying in the pit by submachine guns and machine guns, and also threw hand grenades into the pit. About 3,500 civilians were killed using this method on the square near the prison. I remained alive due to the fact that I was lying under the people and was only wounded in the leg. Due to the heavy rain, the pits were not immediately buried. I laid in the pit until dark, and then ran and hid all the time in the basements¹.”

In Lvov, Bandera’s supporters planned to create their own government. Knowing about Rosenberg’s plans to create a “Ukrainian state”, the leaders of the OUN (b) wanted to stake out the leadership

¹ Radio Liberty: «Відповідальність за насильство в Києві лежить на владі – голова МЗС Польщі», 20.01.2014 [website]. URL: <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/25235580.html>

positions in this puppet organization. On June 30, they solemnly proclaimed creation of the Ukrainian independent synodical state.

The Act of the Restoration of the Ukrainian State stated:

“1. By the will of the Ukrainian people, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera proclaims restoration of the Ukrainian state, for which the entire generations of the best sons of Ukraine sacrificed their lives...

3. The restored Ukrainian state will closely cooperate with the National Socialist Great Germany, which, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, creates a new order in Europe and the world and helps the Ukrainian people to free themselves from the Moscow occupation.

The Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army, which will be created on Ukrainian soil, will continue to fight together with the allied German army against the Moscow occupation for the Sovereign Synodical Ukrainian State and a new order throughout the world.

Long live the Sovereign Synodical Ukrainian State, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and long live the Conductor of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists Stepan Bandera!”¹

The Ukrainian Sovereign Board was formed, headed by the closest associate of Stepan Bandera, Yaroslav Stetsko.

It is interesting to note that a number of Ukrainian politicians — active participants of Euromaidan — insist that modern Ukraine is the legal successor of that “independent state”, which, in their opinion, was proclaimed by the above-mentioned Act. We also would like to note that an integral part of this Act was Cl. 3, which proclaimed “close cooperation with the National Socialist Great Germany, under the leadership of its Leader Adolf Hitler” and the readiness to “fight further together with the Allied German Army against the Moscow occupation.”

Thus, Ukrainian nationalists, proclaiming “restoration” of the state, emphasized its subordinate position in relation to Germany and the full support of Hitler.

However, Bandera’s false start with creation of a “Ukrainian state” — even if completely pro-Nazi — did not please the Nazi

¹ Act of Proclamation of the Independent Ukrainian State. June 30, 1941 [website]. URL: <http://doc20vek.ru/node/2568> (access date: 05.03.2022).

leadership. OUN(b) leaders Stepan Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko were detained. They were explained that there could not be any “independent Ukraine”, that Ukraine should become a German colony. Yaroslav Stetsko was even briefly arrested. He was detained on 9 July and released on 16 July¹. In August 1941 the Abwehr decided to stop supporting the OUN(b). Bandera was informed about this by Erwin Stolze, an employee of the Abwehr-II sabotage department who supervised him. “When at a meeting with Bandera I announced to him the termination of communication with him, he reacted very painfully to this, since he believed that his connection with us was seen as recognition of him as the leader of the nationalist movement,” Stolze later said².

Nevertheless, the OUN(b) continued to declare support for the Nazi authorities. On 1 August 1941 Yaroslav Stetsko appealed to the Ukrainians to help the German army everywhere to defeat Moscow and Bolshevism.”³ A similar appeal was issued by him on August 6⁴.

Stetsko’s decision was fully supported by the leadership of the OUN(b) in Western Ukraine. In August, the regional conductor of the OUN (b) I. Klimov (“Legend”) issued instruction No. 6, which, in particular, ordered:

“On all houses, walls, fences, etc., put the inscriptions: “Glory to the Ukrainian independent Synodical state. Glory to Yaroslav Stetsko! Release Bandera! Release Stetsko! We do not want Polish and Jewish landlords and bankers to return to Ukraine! Death to Muscovites, Poles, Jews and other enemies of Ukraine. Glory to Adolf Hitler! Glory to the German army! Glory to our Ortskomendant!”⁵

Members of the OUN, with the consent of the German occupation administration, headed a number of regional and city administrations. Vasiliy Okhrimovich, a regional conductor of the OUN, became the head of the Ternopol regional council, and Andrey Marchenko became the head of the Volyn regional council.

¹ *Berkhoff K. C., Carynnyk M.* The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists... P. 161; CDAVOV. F. 3833. Op. 3. D. 7. L. 4.

² CA FSB. D. N-20944. V. 1. L. 27.

³ CDAVOV F. 3833. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.* L. 3.

⁵ *Ibid.* D. 46. L. 36–37.

In the official appeal of the OUN(b) to the activists of the organization in August 1941, the following was noted: “The organization of Ukrainian nationalists will not embark on an underground struggle against Germany, and no traitors or enemies will push it to this path.”¹

Similar materials appeared in the press controlled by Bandera. “Ukrainian people know that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera is engaged an unbending heroic struggle for its freedom and independence, for land and power for it, for its free, happy, state life without collective farms and landowners, without Muscovites, Jews, Poles, commissars and their terror,” said one of the August issues of the newspaper Kremenets News. — The Ukrainian people also know that the German army helped them to free themselves from the Moscow-Jewish yoke. It crushes the red Moscow invaders — and that is why the OUN cooperates with the German army and helps it and appeals to all Ukrainians to do this².”

It is easy to see that the statements of the OUN(b) about its support for the invaders are full of anti-Jewish rhetoric. This is not surprising: in the summer of 1941, Ukrainian nationalists fully supported murders of the Jews by the Nazis and took an active part in it. In total, according to the estimates of the Ukrainian historian A. Kruglov, anti-Jewish massacres took place in at least 143 settlements in Western Ukraine³; in most cases, the OUN activists were the driving force behind these massacres.

In addition to Bandera, the Melnik’s supporters (OUN (m)) and supporters of the Government of the UPR in Exile also launched active operations in the occupied territory. On 22 June 1941 they created the Ukrainian National Committee, headed by Melnik’s follower, Professor Vladimir Kubiyovych. Activities of the Committee were aimed at interaction with the occupation administration.

¹ CDAVOV F. 3833. Op. 1. D. 46. L. 36–37.

² Українське державотворення. Акт 30 червня 1941. Р. 394.

³ *Kruglov A.* Massacres in Eastern Galicia in the Summer of 1941, P. 335–340.

Bandera's followers were not included in the Committee. Between Bandera's and Melnik's followers a fierce struggle unfolded for control over the Ukrainian nationalist movement.

On 21 September 1941 the occupation administration appointed historian Alexander Ogloblin, a professor of the Kiev University, as a mayor of Kiev. Ogloblin and his deputy and successor in the position since 25 October 25 1941 Vladimir Bagaziy contributed to the punitive policy of the Nazis.

On 5 October 1941 the Ukrainian National Rada was established in Kiev, headed by Nikolay Velichkovskiy, a professor of the Kiev Polytechnic Institute, who was close to the OUN(m). The Rada declared its support for Germany's actions.

Nevertheless, the Germans reacted to its activities with distrust. On 26 November 1941 the activity of the Rada was suspended. In a letter dated 10 January 1942 to the Reichskommissar of Ukraine, Erich Koch, Professor Velichkovskiy asked for a resumption of the work of the Rada and declared the unity of goals of the Ukrainian and German peoples:

“On behalf of the Fuhrer and Chancellor of the German State, you took the post of Reichskommissar of Ukraine. We are appealing to you with confidence and present the actual situation in Ukraine with deep confidence that you will pay due attention to the issues raised and eliminate misunderstandings. German and Ukrainian cooperation in the political and cultural areas of activities in the history of both peoples can be witnessed from time immemorial. Then this cooperation turned into a friendship. This cooperation and friendship deepened and expanded over the past two decades. It can be boldly emphasized that this cooperation and friendliness was and is a completely natural and therefore organic phenomenon. The cooperation and friendship of these two peoples were forced by their common interests, both political and economic.

Ukrainian people have paid and continue to pay great attention to this cooperation and friendship. Therefore, the Ukrainian people were looking forward to the moment when, together with the German people and shoulder to shoulder with the German soldiers, they would go on a campaign against the common enemy — Poland and the enemy of humanity and European culture — Bolshevism. With

this campaign, the Ukrainian people linked and continue to link their hopes for restoration of their own state, destroyed by the same Poles and Bolsheviks in the war of 1917–1920¹.”

After an invasion of the Soviet Union and occupation of Ukraine, the German command began to actively exploit the nationalist sentiments of a part of the Ukrainian population. A recruitment was organized into national military units that operated under the auspices of the SS.

In 1942–1944 on the territory of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Legion of Self-Defense (until May 1944 — a corps) operated against the partisans, numbering up to 180 thousand people, which ceased to exist in the fall of 1944. Until November 1944, the Ukrainian police also existed, when it was disbanded by order of the head of the SS and police Reich Commissariat of Ukraine Hans Adolf Prutzmann. Part of the Ukrainian police joined the ranks of the 14th (“Galicia”) and 30th German SS divisions.

10,000 Ukrainians in 1943 became the members of the SS Death Heads units, intended for protection of concentration camps, including Buchenwald and Auschwitz.

Materials of both the Nuremberg and other trials recorded detailed testimonies about actions of Ukrainian nationalists, both Bandera’s — OUN (b), and Melnik’s — OUN (m) followers, committed “shoulder to shoulder” with Nazi Germany.

For example, a former Abwehr employee A. Paulus said: “The Brandenburg-800 Special Purpose Regiment was a special unit subordinate to the Abwehr-2 Directorate of the General Headquarters of the German Armed Forces. The regiment was intended to operate behind the enemy lines. In May 1941 I was transferred to the Abwehr post in the city of Krakow, in subgroup II (sabotage, uprisings and terror). I, upon arrival at the Abwehr post of the city of Krakow, was enrolled in subgroup II. The tasks of this subgroup were: 1) preparation for the performance of tasks by residents of Western Ukraine; 2) the

¹ Letter from the Chairman of the Ukrainian National Rada prof. N. Veli-chkovskiy to the Reichskommissar of Ukraine Erich Koch on the need to resume the activities of the Rada [website]. URL: <https://istmat.org/node/39252> (access date: 05.03.2022).

use of Melnik's and Bandera's supporters; 3) corrupt propaganda in the rear areas of the Russians... 7) sending agents to Russian territory and organizing uprisings of the Ukrainian population; 8) the use of the Ukrainian church on behalf of Germany.

The head of subgroup II was Lieutenant Colonel Akern, to whom I was subordinate ...

Bandera himself was in Berlin at the General Headquarters of the armed forces. I saw him once in Krakow at a meeting, and then accompanied him when he was transferred to Berlin, where I handed him over to the Colonel of Abwehr II of the East — in August 1941, Lieutenant Colonel Ernst Eikern told me later that Bandera was arrested by the SD, but then he was released and sent to OKV for further joint work. At the same time with Bandera, I also brought his deputy Stetsko to Berlin ...

When the German units entered Lvov, Bandera took an opportunity and at the open meeting proclaimed Western Ukraine free, and Stepan Bandera as a ruler. Stetsko was appointed president. Both Bandera and Stetsko were present. The Abwehr was represented by Lieutenant Colonel Eikern and his collaborator Professor Dr. Koch, a native of Galicia, who spoke Ukrainian perfectly. At the end of the meeting, Dr. Koch delivered a speech in Ukrainian... In addition to the Bandera and Melnik groups, the Abwehr military post also used the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church were also trained in the training camps of the General Governorate, and they participated in assignments together with other Ukrainians. This was done with consent of the church. Lieutenant Colonel Akern told me once that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is on the side of the Ukrainian nationalists and adheres to their political line.

Upon arrival to Lvov with team 202-B (Subgroup II), Lieutenant Colonel Akern established contact with the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Metropolitan Count Sheptytskiy, as Eikern told me, was pro-German and provided his house at Eikern's disposal for the team 202, although this house was not confiscated by the German military authorities. Residence of the metropolitan was in a monastery in Lvov. The entire team was supplied from the reserves of the monastery. I was in the monastery for a short time in order to talk on business matters with Professor Koch. Professor Koch told

me at the same time that Eikern and the Metropolitan consulted each other daily, and he was present at these meetings as an interpreter. The Metropolitan usually dined with Eikern and his closest associates¹.

The officer of Abwehr team-202 Z. Muller, during interrogation on 19 September 1946 spoke about the work of Ukrainian nationalists for Gestapo:

“... In 1940, while I was working in the 4th Department (Gestapo) of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of Germany, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists, Melnik, visited the head of the 4th Department, Schroider, in his office of the Gestapo, where he received the necessary instructions on work. I myself often saw Melnik within the walls of Gestapo, and from the words of Schroider I knew that he proposed to Melnik to create a Directorate of Ukrainian Affairs in Berlin, which activities would be governed by German intelligence. From that same Schroider I knew that the Gestapo tried to consolidate the Ukrainian nationalist movement through the creation of the Directorate of Ukrainian Affairs in Berlin and put it under their constant control through Melnik.

Question: Did Melnik agree to become a head of the Directorate of Ukrainian Affairs?

Answer: Yes, and such a Directorate in Berlin was created with the participation of only Melnik’s supporters. However, at the end of 1940, i. e., after negotiations between Melnik and Schroider, I went to work in the Abwehr, in connection with which I knew the composition and practical work of the Directorate of Ukrainian Affairs.

Question: What was the relationship between Melnik and Bandera in the Directorate of Ukrainian Affairs?

Answer: I recall that during Melnik’s conversation with Schroider, the latter suggested to Melnik to negotiate with Bandera about his participation in the work of the Directorate of Ukrainian Affairs. Schroider said that Germany would need staff of Ukrainian nationalists to use them in the East, under general supervision of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of Germany for work with the Ukrainian population.

¹ Ukrainian nationalist organizations during the World War II: documents: in 2 volumes V.2. 1944–1945. P. 768–782.

In November 1940 I went to work in the Abwehr, where I learned that Melnik, in addition to his connection with the Gestapo, was working in German military intelligence. He was a resident of Abwehrstelle-Berlin. I know about this, because I myself worked as an intelligence assistant against the USSR in Abwehrstelle-Berlin.

Question: How did you find out about this?

Answer: I worked in the 1st intelligence department of Abwehrstelle-Berlin as a referent for intelligence against the USSR. Together with me, Captain Pulyui worked in the same office, with whom Melnik was in personal contact, and provided him with intelligence data about the Soviet Union. Melnik received all espionage information about the USSR from his supporters — Ukrainian nationalists on the territory of Western Ukraine, as well as from the residency in the city of New Zol (Czechoslovakia). In Pulyui's files, I saw Melnik's personal commitment to cooperate with Abwehrstelle-Berlin with his photo attached ...

In 1944, when I was transferred from the Abwehr team-304 to the Abwehr team-202, I again learned about the sabotage work against the USSR by the Ukrainian nationalists, only not Melnik's, but Bandera's supporters. In Abwehr team-202 I personally had to supervise the work of German intelligence agencies with Ukrainian nationalists.

Question: From whom did you receive the task to contact the Ukrainian nationalists?

Answer: In October 1944, I was seconded from the Abwehr team-304 to disposal of the infantry school in the city of Libau. Not wanting to go to this job, I took advantage of my short vacation to travel to Berlin, where I met with known officers of the General Headquarters of the German army. At my request, Captain Lamerau canceled my assignment to Libau and sent me to the Abwehr team-202, located at that time in the city of Krakow. In the 1-C Department of the General Headquarters of the German Army, I received full information about the military situation in the sector of the Central Group of Forces of the German Army and the ongoing negotiations between our intelligence and Ukrainian nationalists on a joint fight against the Red Army.

Question: What instructions did you receive in the Department 1-C?

Answer: Captain Lamerau, Deputy Head of the 1st Department of the General Staff for Intelligence Affairs, and Captain Stolze informed me that in October 1944 the head of the Abwehr team-202, Captain Kirn, established contact with the southern headquarters of the UIA and was negotiating with Ukrainian nationalists to involve UIA rebel detachments in conducting a sabotage work in the rear areas of the Red Army under governance of the Abwehr team-202. Upon arrival, I had to help Captain Kirn in this work and take advantage of the opportunities provided to us to recruit staff from Ukrainian nationalists for sabotage work in the rear areas of the Red Army. Lamerau and Stolze had high hopes for the help of Ukrainian nationalists in carrying out sabotage work against the USSR and believed that with good organization and leadership of the UIA units, it would be possible to disrupt the plans of the Soviet command during offensive operations.

Question: When did you arrive to Abwehr team-202?

Answer: I arrived for work to the Abwehr team-202 on 1 December 1944 and began to perform my official duties. During a meeting with Captain Kirn, the latter told me that in October 1944 he had a meeting with contacts of the southern headquarters of the UIA, with whom he crossed the front line in the sector of the Abwehr detachment-206 and negotiated with the southern headquarters of the UIA.

Question: Where was the southern headquarters of the UIA located then?

Answer: As Captain Kirn told me, the southern headquarters of the UIA was located in the forests of a mountainous area, not far from the city of Lvov. He did not tell me the personal composition of the UIA headquarters, but he conveyed a content of the negotiations in details.

Question: What do you know about a content of Captain Kirn's negotiations at the southern headquarters of the UIA?

Answer: Command of the UIA gave Captain Kirn consent in principle to joint work with German intelligence in the rear areas of the Red Army, but for its part set up the following conditions: the German authorities must release Stepan Bandera from house arrest and all Ukrainian nationalists from German camps; Germany guarantees creation of an "independent Ukrainian state"; German army provides the insurgent detachments of Ukrainian nationalists with uniforms, weapons, communications equipment, medicines and money.

As for the practical work of organizing sabotage in the rear areas of the Red Army, the Ukrainian nationalists set the following conditions: German intelligence agencies must create sabotage schools for Ukrainian nationalists on the territory occupied by Germans and train nationalists allocated by the UIA in radio communications and military training; sabotage groups of Ukrainian nationalists will be operationally subordinate to the Abwehr team-202, but otherwise they will be subordinate and remain under the jurisdiction of the UIA headquarters.

Having the appropriate powers of the General Staff of the German army, Kirn accepted conditions of the Ukrainian nationalists and, on his part, set up the conditions of the German command to the UIA. They were as follows: the southern headquarters of the UIA shall provide at the disposal of the Abwehr team-202 such a number of spies as the command of the Abwehr team-202 considers necessary; Abwehr team-202 reserves the right to recruit sabotage groups with these persons, determines the place and objects of sabotage.

In addition, the headquarters of the UIA must provide the Abwehr team-202 with all the espionage information it has about the Red Army, as well as information about the general activities of Ukrainian nationalists in the rear areas of the Red Army, in the sector of the southern group of troops of the German army, i. e., in the sector from Warsaw to Romanian border.

The southern headquarters of the UIA agreed to these conditions, and it was decided to exchange representatives for communication between the Abwehr team-202 and the southern headquarters of the UIA. Kirn offered me the post of communications officer from the Abwehr team-202 in the southern headquarters of the UIA.

Question: Which of the Ukrainian nationalists was sent to communicate with the Abwehr team-202?

Answer: At the end of 1944, Professor Danyliv, nicknamed “Eagle”, was appointed representative of the southern headquarters of the UIA in Abwehr team-202. He was about 43 years old, medium height, strong-built, dark-haired, fluent in German, French, English, previously worked as a professor of philosophy in Lvov university. He had the officer rank of the UIA — Colonel.

Question: What kind of subversive work against the Soviet Union did Danyliv carry out together with the Germans?

Answer: He assisted the command of the Abwehr team-202 in recruiting, training and staffing of the sabotage groups from Ukrainian nationalists and transferring them to the rear areas of the Red Army to carry out sabotage. In December 1944, the main department of imperial security released Stepan Bandera from prison. He received a country house near Berlin from the 4-D department of Gestapo. Bandera from that time was under personal supervision and worked at the direction of the newly appointed head of the 4-D department, Obersturmbannfuehrer Wolf. In the same month, Stepan Bandera arrived at the disposal of the Abwehr team-202 in the city of Krakow and personally instructed Danyliv, as well as agents trained by us, sent for communication to the UIA headquarters. Thus, the sabotage work that Ukrainian nationalists carried out in the rear areas of the Red Army was sanctioned by Stepan Bandera and was carried out under the leadership of German intelligence.

Question: Did you personally meet with Bandera in the course of intelligence activities?

Answer: Yes. On the occasion of Bandera's arrival at the Abwehr team-202,

Captain Kirn arranged a banquet at the villa of our team, which was located at 1 Gartenstrasse (near the Krakow stadium), at which Bandera, Captain Kirn and Professor Danyliv delivered speeches. There I met Bandera, and then a few days later I met him on a regular basis. On 27 December 1944 I prepared a group of spies to transfer them to the rear area of the Red Army on a special mission. This group consisted of three Ukrainian nationalists — Lopatinskiy, "Demed" and one radio operator, whose name I do not remember. Stepan Bandera, in my presence, personally instructed these agents and transmitted through them to the headquarters of the UIA an order to intensify subversive work in the rear of the Red Army and establish regular radio communications with the Abwehr team-202. I was introduced to the group as an officer of the Abwehr team-202, appointed to the post of communications officer at the headquarters of the UIA, so that when I arrived at the headquarters of the UIA, they could recognize me as a representative of the Abwehr team-202. The entire group of

Lopatinskiy, which I transferred to the rear area of the Red Army by a German plane from the Krakow airfield to the area of the city of Lvov, had 1 million rubles, medicines, uniforms, explosives and a radio station for transfer to the headquarters of the UIA.

Question: Was radio communication established between the Abwehr team-202 and the headquarters of the UIA?

Answer: Radio communication between the Abwehr team-202 and the headquarters of the UIA had existed since October 1944, but this communication was carried out using a forty-watt radio station with the call signal "Vera." Considering a 40-watt radio station to be very powerful, which could lead to listening at a great distance and its decoding, we sent a three-watt radio station with Lopatinskiy's group, which could operate safely for a long time. As far as I know, the Lopatinskiy group did not arrive at the headquarters of the UIA, and we believed that it was liquidated during the landing by the counterintelligence of the Red Army.

Question: What kind of subversive work in the rear area of the Red Army was carried out by the Abwehr team-202 together with the Ukrainian nationalists?

Answer: Of the five sabotage schools that were at the disposal of the Abwehr team-202, one, the Moltke school which I headed, until April 1945 trained spies only out of Ukrainian nationalists. The recruitment of spies was carried out by the staff of Professor Danyliv with the officers of the Abwehr team-202. In addition, the Abwehr detachment-206, which was part of the Abwehr team-202, had direct contact across the front line with the rebel detachments of the UIA in the Carpathian mountains. We drew sabotage staff from these detachments, trained them in our short-term schools, and then used them for sabotage work in the rear areas of the Red Army.

Question: What groups of Ukrainian nationalists were transferred to the rear of the Red Army with sabotage missions?

Answer: In the last months before the surrender of Germany, 45 spies from among Ukrainian nationalists were trained in my Moltke sabotage school. Some of them in the amount of 25 people were sent to school by the headquarters of the UIA from the territory occupied by the Red Army, and the rest were recruited in the prisoners of war camps. The first group of spies, called Paul-2, in the amount of 8

people, I transferred on 7 April 1945 in the area of the city of Sarny with the task of restoring contact with the headquarters of the Volyn UIA group and launching sabotage work on the railway line in the area of the city of Sarny ... The second group Paul-3, which also consisted of 8 people, was transferred by me on 13 April 1945 from the Prague airfield to the area of Vladimir-Volynskiy. All members of the group were natives of the rural area of Vladimir-Volynskiy ... The group Paul-3 had the task of carrying out sabotage on communications of the Red Army in the area of the city of Vladimir-Volynskiy.

The third sabotage group, which was called Paul-1, was transferred by me on 20 April 1945 from the Prague airfield to the area of the city of Kovel in the amount of 9 people. All members of the group were natives of the Kovel region. In connection with the approaching final defeat of Germany, having carried out a transfer of the last group, on 21 April 1945 I went underground in Prague and did not appear again in the Abwehr team-202. I know nothing about the fate and further actions of the Kirn group.

I know that the Ukrainian nationalists have taken steps to establish contact with the command of the British-American troops. Danyliv and Burlay were instructed by the UIA headquarters to cross the front line to the British-American troops, to inform them of the desire of Ukrainian nationalists to coordinate their subversive activities on the territory of Ukraine with the command of the British-American troops. Part of the group was supposed to accompany Burlay to the Americans. Danyliv intended to flee to the allies together with Bandera ...

In early April 1945 Bandera was instructed by the Main Directorate of Imperial Security to gather all Ukrainian nationalists in the Berlin area and defend the city from the advancing units of the Red Army. Bandera created detachments of Ukrainian nationalists who acted as part of the Volkssturm, while he fled. He left the country house of the 4-D department and fled to the city of Weimar. Burlay told me that Bandera agreed with Danyliv on a joint transfer to the side of the Americans ... ”¹

In the very first month of war, the OUN killed several thousand Poles, Jews and Ukrainians in Lvov. Thus, on 3–4 July 1941 according

¹ CDAVOV F. 57. Op. 4. D. 338. L. 268–279.

to the lists compiled by Ukrainian students of Lvov University, 26 Polish professors were shot: dentist professor Antonyi Tseshinskiy, professor-physician Jan Grek, professor-surgeon Heinrich Gilyarovich, law professor Roman Longshamo-deBere with three sons, professor of mathematics Anthony Lomnitskiy, professor-geologist Stanislav Pilyat, professor of forensic medicine, rector of the university Vladimir Sieradzskiy, professor-surgeon Tadeusz Ostrovsky with his wife, doctor of law, refugee from Gdansk Tadeusz Tapkowskiy, professor-therapist Roman Rentskiy, academician, writer Tadeusz Boy-Zhelenskiy, retired professor Adam Solovey with his wife and grandson, professor, dean Vitold Novitskiy with his son, professor Roman Vitkevich, professor Vladimir Krukovskiy, professor Vladimir Stozhek with two sons, doctor of technical sciences Kazimir Vetuljani, doctor Kaspar Weigel with his son, associate professor Vladislav Dobrzhanetskiy, ophthalmologist Jerzy-Yury Gzhendelskiy, associate professor of the Veterinary Institute Edmund Hamerskiy, gynecologist, professor Stanislav Monchevskiy, pediatrician Stanislav Progulskiy with his son, hospital intern Stanislav Ruff with his wife and son. Also, professor Casimir Bartel was arrested. On the same two days, more than 3,000 Lvov Jews were executed. Atrocities continued throughout the entire period of the German occupation of Galicia. In total, about 120 thousand people were tortured to death in Lvov and its suburbs.

Ukrainian nationalists took a most active part in murders of the civilian population of Ukraine at Babiy Yar. Out of them, the Ukrainian police force in Kiev was formed. The police command issued the famous Order No. 5, obliging all commandants of houses to report Jews, communists and NKVD officers living in their houses within 24 hours.

The order was signed by Orlik, the commandant of the Ukrainian police in Kiev. According to historian Alexander Dyukov, this is none other than Dmitro Miron-Orlik, a prominent member of the Bandera faction of the OUN.

The Ukrainians were also involved as direct performers of the murders. According to Mikhail Sydko, they sometimes demonstrated even greater cruelty than the Germans:

“We were walking. The column was narrowed, there was no way back. They specially created a loud noise to dampen the screams and

shots. Grisha and I were torn away from mother and pushed to a group of children. Clara saw me, raised her hands: “Misha, I want up!” She ran to us. The policeman catches up with her — bang on the head from above, she fell. With his heel — bam her on the chest — crushed her! Mother saw this — she fainted. The child fell out, the child screams, and he comes at the child with a boot! And he shot my mother before my very eyes... All the two and a half years that I lived in occupied Kiev I was not afraid of the Germans as much as I was afraid of the policemen¹.”

Cooperation between Ukrainian nationalists and Nazis was strengthened on 28 April 1943 when the Waffen Galicia SS division (14th Galician SS Volunteer Division) was created in Lvov. The division was created at the request of Ukrainian nationalists. To facilitate formation of a division in the district of Galicia, a Military Directorate was created, headed by Melnik’s supporter Vladimir Kubiyovich. Thus, the Ukrainian nationalist organizations took a direct part in creation of the division. The division was formed on a volunteer basis. As of 1 June 1943 more than 80 thousand volunteers signed up to the division.

One of the organizers of the division was Mikhail Omelyanovich-Pavlenkoko. During the Civil War, he served first Petlyura, then Hetman Skoropadskiy, and then Petlyura again. In the 30s the former Petlyura follower turned to Adolf Hitler with a proposal to create Ukrainian units under the patronage of Nazi Germany. In 1942 he headed the military unit “Ukrainian Free Cossacks” and was occupied with the formation of security battalions that participated in the massacres of Jews and punitive actions against civilians in the occupied territories. In 2016 a street in Kiev was named after this Nazi criminal, formerly named after Alexander Suvorov².

The text of the oath of soldiers of the Galicia SS division was as follows: “I serve you, Adolf Hitler, as Fuhrer and Chancellor of the

¹ Babiy Yar: the children were left with their mothers and shot together with them [website]. URL: <https://www.miloserdie.ru/article/babiy-yar-detej-ostavlyali-s-materyami-i-rasstrelivali-vmeste-s-nimi/> (access date: 08.03.2022).

² *Grigoryev M. S., Sablin D. V.* Ordinary Fascism: Ukrainian War Crimes and Human Rights Violations (2017–2020). Moscow: International Relations, 2021. P. 198.

German Reich, with loyalty and courage. I swear to you and I will submit to death. May God help me¹.”

In the modern Ukrainian historiography, an idea of a high degree of effectiveness of the division in comparison with the Red Army is widespread. Thus, the former head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory Vladimir Vyatrovich stated: “The Galicia SS division, in which Ukrainian volunteers fought on the side of Nazi Germany was fighting better than the Red Army ... Those mobilized in the Galicia division were trained for a year before they were thrown into battle, and recruits of the Red Army were often thrown into a fierce battle immediately.”²

However, the reality was different. The division proved itself ingloriously as a military unit. On 15 July 1944 the Galicia SS division for the first time participated in hostilities in Galicia, near the city of Brody, against the advancing 1st Ukrainian Front. In the first and last clash with the Soviet army, the division suffered a crushing defeat, losing 4,000 killed and 3,000 wounded. After that, the Galicia SS division did not participate in the hostilities in Ukraine. After roundup, it was transferred to the Balkans to fight the Yugoslav partisans. In April 1945 the division was declared a part of the Ukrainian National Army. In May 1945 parts of the division surrendered to the Americans and the British.

In 1944, together with the German troops, the Siegling police brigade recruited from Ukrainians, named after the commander, retreated. The 30th SS division Weisruthenia was formed from it (in German documents and literature it is referred to as either 1st Belarusian or 2nd Russian), which in August 1944 participated in suppression of the French resistance movement in the Belfort area. In November of the same year, the division was withdrawn to Germany and disbanded. Its personnel joined the ranks of the Vlasov Russian Liberation Army and the German 25th and 38th SS divisions.

In addition to the divisions of the SS Galicia and the SS Weisruteniya, the German occupation administration formed from the

¹ Ukrainian Historian Magazine. NY; Toronto; Munich, 1981. No. 1. P. 163.

² Kiev announced that the Galicia SS division was better than the Red Army // RIA Novosti. 29.04.2021.

Ukrainian collaborators created numerous security units that fought against partisans and underground members and carried out a punitive and repressive policy against the population of Ukraine. About 250,000 Ukrainian collaborators served in security units (“kurens”).

On 22 March 1943 Ukrainian collaborators participated in the murder of the residents of the Belarusian village of Khatyn. The population of the village was burned alive and shot in response to the murder of several German soldiers by partisans. A total of 149 villagers died.

The population of Khatyn was killed by the 118th battalion of the Schutzmannschaft, which consisted mainly of Ukrainian policemen. The battalion was commanded by the former Polish major Konstantin Smovskiy, who previously served as a colonel in the army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. The chief of headquarters was the former senior lieutenant of the Red Army Grigoriy Vasyura. The unit commander was the former lieutenant of the Red Army Vasily Meleshko. The German “chief” of the 118th auxiliary battalion was Police Major Erich Kerner¹.

The punitive operation was headed by Grigoriy Vasyura, a native of the city of Chigirin, the Cherkassy region who on 28 June 1941 voluntarily surrendered and went over to the Nazis side. After the end of war, Vasyura managed to hide from justice for a long time. He led a life of an ordinary Soviet citizen, was the director of economic part of the Velikodymerskiy state farm in the Kiev region, and was even awarded the Veteran of Labor medal. As an accomplice of the Nazis, Vasyura was convicted on 26 December 1986. On 2 October 1987 Vasyura was shot.

In the spring of 1943, the Bandera organization of the OUN created the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA), which the main function of which was to fight against Soviet partisans and underground members, as well as against the Polish underground. Basically, the activities of the UIA were carried out on the territory of Galicia (UIA — West), Volyn (UIA — North) and Podolye (UIA — South).

¹ Truth about Khatyn [website]. URL: <https://pomnisvoih.ru/kak-eto-by-lo/pravda-o-hatyni-istoriya-tragedii-22-marta-1943-goda.html> (access date: 08.03.2022).

From January 1944, Roman Shukhevych, one of Bandera's prominent associates, who served previously a head of the 201st battalion of the Schutzmannschaft, became commander of the UIA.

In Ukrainian historiography, a pseudo-historical myth has spread about the alleged struggle of Ukrainian nationalists from the OUN and UIA for independence of Ukraine against the USSR and Nazi Germany, on the basis of which OUN and UIA figures are even included in the anti-Hitler coalition.

Thus, for example, the activities of nationalists are presented by the Ukrainian historians A. I. Strukevich, I. M. Romanyuk, S. I. Drovozyuk: "Active development of the resistance movement was facilitated by the underground networks of OUN and communists, two currents of the anti-Nazi movement were created in Ukraine: the Soviet underground and the partisan movement, as well as the movement headed by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)¹." Thus, Soviet partisans and OUN members were brought into one line. The OUN was classified as a resistance movement. This does not correspond to historical truth. The OUN and UIA fought against the Red Army and collaborated with the Nazis.

There is a widespread assertion that, as part of the Red Army, the Ukrainians made a main contribution to the defeat of the troops of Nazi Germany and its allies, hoping that after the end of World War II, their historical homeland would be able to throw off both the German and Soviet yoke. Developing this idea, the same authors suggest: "Fighting in the Red Army, UIA, the Armies of Canada, the United States, in the French Foreign Legion, detachments of the Resistance movement of many European peoples, showing selflessness and heroism, Ukrainian soldiers brought closer victory over Nazism in World War II²." In this case, the Ukrainians who fought the Nazis in the ranks of the Red Army and the UIA militants were brought into line. UIA is not a part of the anti-Hitler coalition. Moreover, the UIA collaborated with the Nazis.

The well-known Canadian historian of Ukrainian origin Orest Subtelnyi goes even further, arguing that the OUN and the UIA fought

¹ *Strukevich A. I., Romanyuk I. M., Drovozyuk S. I.* History of Ukraine: textbook for the 11th grade. K.: Gramota, 2011. P. 41.

² *Ibid.* P. 71.

against two imperialist powers — Nazi Germany and the USSR: “At the end of 1942, the leaders of the OUN(b) decided to form large partisan forces and thus lay the foundation for a regular Ukrainian army, which, in their deep conviction, was needed at the end of the Nazi-Soviet war. There were also more urgent reasons: firstly, German repressions against the local population intensified, and the peasants demanded from the OUN to protect them; secondly, at the end of 1942, Soviet partisan detachments from Belarus began to penetrate into the north-west of Ukraine. Therefore, the OUN had to take on the role of the “people’s army” until the Soviets did this ... In 1943, the OUN congress (b) “fights against imperialism and empires” and therefore “fights against the USSR and against the new German Europe”...”¹

In this obvious falsification, the name of the Great Patriotic War is blasphemously distorted, apparently in order to equalize a responsibility for its unleashing between Germany and the USSR. Massive support by Ukrainians for the “patriots” from the OUN-UIA is contrived, although these organizations, even at the peak of their activities, could rely only on a minority of the population. And, finally, an attempt was made to completely devalue the nature of the acts of heroism of the Ukrainian partisans and underground members, although they deserved nationwide fame and recognition of Ukraine.

This is how the head of the regional headquarters of leadership of the partisan movement of the Rovno region V. A. Begma characterizes the fight of Ukrainian nationalists in April 1944: “Against the general background of the unfolding partisan struggle, the traitors and betrayers of the Ukrainian people, the nationalists of the OUN, raised their heads and began an armed action. Continuing to cooperate with the Germans in the robbery of Ukraine and seeing that the broad masses of the population lean towards the partisan movement to fight for expulsion of the invaders, the German lackeys from the OUN organization dressed up as national liberators. Deciding to destroy the popular partisan movement by the people themselves, to set the Ukrainian population against the Russian and Polish, in order to disunite the unity, directed against the Germans, they, under a dictation of Germans, created a new organization from the former participants of the Polessky Sich

¹ *Subtelnyi O.* History of Ukraine. K.: Lybid, 1994. P. 593–594.

allegedly driven underground — the UIA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) and developed a falsified program for it, refuted by the actions of the German-Ukrainian nationalists themselves ... In its action program, the UIA allegedly put the struggle for an independent Ukrainian state against the Soviet Union, Poland and the Germans.

In their press “For Free Ukraine,” the nationalists say that they are fighting for the freedom of all peoples, that the Polish nation is not their enemy, but the government is harmful, that the Soviet Union is a sworn enemy, but the Russian people is not their enemy.

In tactical settings and features of struggle, the nationalists declare their opposition to the Germans in the mobilization of finished products and raw materials, destruction of warehouses and enterprises working for the war, destruction of German transport and communication centers, as well as disorganization of the administrative and economic apparatus of the Germans. But if we consider the actions of the Ukrainian-German nationalists, in them we will not find a single completed item from the program of combating the Germans. There have not yet been cases when the leading circles of nationalist rascals carried out an action somewhere against their German masters. However, speculating on the national feelings of the Ukrainian people, the OUN managed to find supporters among a certain part of the population, especially the southern rich agricultural regions of the region, which had a strong influence on the part of the Galician nationalists¹.”

A resolute rebuff to modern Ukrainian falsifiers of the history of World War II has been given by P. P. Tolochko: “... The attitude to the Great Patriotic War, as well as to the events that preceded it and followed it, looks especially immoral in the new textbooks ... The victim and its executioner are equalized in liability. The war was declared as not ours. The heroes-liberators, who received recognition and respect from all of Europe they saved from the fascist plague, are humiliated by

¹ From report of the secretary of the underground regional committee of the CP(b)U and the head of the regional headquarters of leadership of the partisan movement of the Rovno region V. A. Begma about the partisan movement in the Rovno region in 1941 — March 1944 [website]. URL: <https://istmat.org/node/40195> (access date: 08.03.2022).

rehabilitation and glorification of Western Ukrainian nationalists who collaborated with the Germans... The nationalist movement in Western Ukraine during the World War II is now reflected in a completely new way. It turns out that it, and not the Soviet army and Soviet partisans, was the true liberator of Ukraine ...»¹.

In March-April 1943 systematic attacks were launched against the Polish population in Volyn, in which members of the UIA and OUN participated. The head of the UIA, Dmitriy Klyachkivsky (from January 1944 — a subordinate of Shukhevych, the head of the UIA — the North) described the reasons for attacks on the Poles and the goals of Ukrainian nationalists as follows: “We must carry out a major action to eliminate the Polish element. At the withdrawal of German troops, this favorable moment will be used to eliminate the entire male population aged 16 to 60 years ... forest villages and villages near forests shall disappear from the face of the earth².”

Murders of the Polish population were called the Volyn massacre and continued until 29 April 1945 when two nationalist organizations, the UIA and the Polish Craiova Army, agreed to cease hostilities and jointly fight the Red Army. The Volyn massacre peaked in August 1943. In 1944, massacres of the Polish population unleashed in the neighboring territories, in particular Galicia (The Galician massacre). In total, about 50–60 thousand representatives of the Polish population of Western Ukraine were killed. From 2 to 3 thousand Ukrainians were killed in the course of retaliatory punitive actions of the Craiova Army.

In modern Ukrainian historiography, it is customary to keep silent about the massacre of the Polish civilian population by Ukrainian nationalists, or to present these events as “encounter battles.” Thus, the Ukrainian historians A. I. Strukevich, I. M. Romanyuk, S. I. Drovozyuk describe the events of the Volyn massacre as follows: “Ukrainian rebels were forced to fight on the third front as well — against the Polish Army Craiova (AC). Its leaders tried to take control of the lands lost by Poland in 1939. Hostility in Western Ukraine was

¹ History of Ukraine. VI–XXI / P. P. Tolochko P. P. et al. Kiev; Moscow: Kievan Rus: Kuchkovo Pole, 2018. P. 12.

² *Danilevskiy I., Tairova T., Shubin A., Mironenko V.* History of Ukraine. 2nd Ed., revised and amended, St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 432.

spread by both the leaders of the AK and the leadership of the OUN and the UIA. Both sides considered themselves defenders of state interests on Western Ukrainian lands. The hostility was also fueled by the occupying authorities, who recruited Poles into the auxiliary police units to carry out punitive actions against the Ukrainian civilian population. Therefore, mutual terrorist attacks began in Volyn and Galicia, the victims of which were not only military rebels, but also more than 100 thousand civilians, both Poles and Ukrainians¹.”

Thus, the authors of the textbook tried to present the Volyn massacre as an encounter battle between Polish and Ukrainian rebels, in which both Poles and Ukrainians suffered equally. The reality was completely different. Of course, there were also casualties among the Ukrainian militants. However, the Volyn massacre is, first of all, a targeted massacre of Polish civilians on the territory of Western Ukraine.

Crimes of the OUN are evidenced by the “Act on the atrocities of Ukrainian nationalists-Bandera supporters committed against peaceful Soviet citizens of Polish and Ukrainian nationality, captured Red Army soldiers in the village of Mogilnitsy, Budanovsky district, Tarnopol region,” sent by the head of the political department of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant General S. Shatilov. The document contains the following facts: “We, the undersigned inspectors of the Political Department of the 74th Corps, Major Shklyaver B. G., Captain Karamin N. V., Doctor — Captain of the Medical Service Weizman M. N., Captain Sokha, Chairman of the Mogilnitsky Village Council Comrade Perlitsky Mikhail Onufrievich, citizens of the village of Mogilnitsy Kashtalina Magda Knatovna, Knatyshin Teodor Pavlovich, drew up a real act that on 25 April 1944 4 pits with 34 human corpses were found in the forest near the village of Mogilnitsy, 2 pits with 12 human corpses were found in the village of Mogilnitsy, one pit with 11 human corpses was found in the horse cemetery and one pit with 38 human corpses in the forest of the village of Mogilnitsy. In all the pits there are up to 100 corpses of men, women and children, brutally tortured citizens of the village.

¹ *Strukevich A. I., Romanyuk I. M., Drovozyuk S. I.* History of Ukraine: textbook for the 11th grade. K.: Gramota, 2011. P. 49.

It has been established that during the period of German occupation of the Mogilnitsy village on the night of 17–18 March 1944 a gang of Ukrainian-German nationalists committed a mass murder and robbery of citizens of the Mogilnitsy village, mainly of the Polish population.

A gang of murderers broke down doors and windows, broke into apartments, shot, cut and killed people with an axe and knives, including young children, old men and women, after which the corpses were loaded onto carts and taken away and buried in pits. In order to hide their atrocities, some families were burned in sheds, and the charred corpses were buried in pits. All these terrible atrocities were accompanied by massive robberies of property owned by the families tortured to death...

Among the corpses, two captured Red Army soldiers were also found, whose names were not established. The corpses bear traces of stab wounds, showing that they were stabbed with knives.

All recovered corpses testify to barbaric, purely brutal methods of killing, such as:

Kashtarina Bronya is a half-burned corpse, but there are signs of severe beatings on it: the skull in the crown area was broken by a blunt object, there are traces of knife blows on the neck, the right thigh is broken. Kashtarin Zbeshko — a child 6 months old, on the spine of the corpse in the lumbar region one can clearly see a mark of blow with a chopping weapon such as an axe. The corpse of a 6-month-old baby with a chopped spine was folded in half and thrown into a pit.

Zelenskiy Anton, 39 years old, — the fingers of the right hand of the corpse were chopped off. The thigh bones of the right leg were broken and many more knife wounds — cut and stab wounds.

Orkush Vladislav, 67 years old, and Orkush Osip, 75 years old. The skulls of both corpses were cut with a chopping weapon such as an axe. In the wounds there are traces of feathers from pillows. A bucket of blood was found in the pits near the corpses. This indicates that the gang members, in order to cover their tracks, collected human blood, which flowed from the corpses. About which we have drawn up this act.”¹

¹ Archival Service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. F. 32. Op. 11302. D. 196. L. 200–203. Quoted in: Historical and Documentary Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia [website]. URL: http://www.idd.mid.ru/inf/inf_01.html (access date: 15.09.2022).

The Volyn massacre was carried out with the connivance and support of the German occupation administration. commander of the First Ukrainian Partisan Division Petr Vershigora recalled:

“Before we approached Sarny from across the Dnieper, and after, when we made the Sarny Cross, a son of the Vladimir priest named Sashko worked in the Gestapo. He was young, handsome and cruel. At first he worked as an interpreter, and then, having distinguished himself by his cruel and captious attitude towards the population, by shooting Jews, he became something of an investigator and executioner.

But ... soon after the “Sarny Cross” Sashko was dismissed from the Gestapo. Not kicked out, not arrested, but dismissed. Obviously, this fact was an important event, since the Sarny Gestapo hastened to notify the population of the town and surrounding villages about this. A special order was issued, printed and pasted on the fences on dismissal of employee Sashko, while the Gestapo usually kicked out lackeys who did not please them. What seemed strange next was that, when firing Sashko, the Gestapo “forgot” to take away his weapons: a dirk, an automatic pistol, a submachine gun.

And when, a month later, Sashko appeared at the head of a gang of fifty or sixty people, of which half were also “dismissed” from the police, and the other half were recruited from criminals, a gang that declared a fight for “independent Ukraine”, allegedly against the Germans, and that actually started the massacre of the Polish population, the things began to clear up. As we learned later, this provocation was not a single occurrence. In the same days, many nationalists left Rovno, Lutsk, Vladimir-Volynsk, Dubno and other centers of Western Ukraine at the signal of their leadership, who had until then faithfully served the Germans in the Gestapo, police, and gendarmerie. They went into the forests, declaring their wish to beat the Germans to the whole world. They beat the Germans verbally and in declarations, in leaflets, one of them even had a visa of a German printing house in Lutsk. And in fact, they were engaged in the massacre of peaceful Poles¹.”

After the liberation of Ukraine by the Red Army, the nationalists from the UIA and OUN continued their armed struggle against the

¹ Vershigora Petr Petrovich. People with Clear Conscience [website]. URL: <https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=44465&p=1> (access date: 13.03.2022).

Soviets. The victims of their attacks were leaders and employees of the Soviet state institutions, communists, military personnel, as well as ordinary residents of Ukraine, Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Jews, and representatives of other peoples of the USSR. The terrorist underground was liquidated in 1953.

Liberation of the territory of Ukraine by the Soviet army began at the end of 1942. On 18 December during the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, the advanced units of the Red Army began to liberate the Voroshilovgrad region. In January 1943, the troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of General Nikolay Vatutin reached the Severskiy Donets. On 29 January the offensive operation Leap began. The operation resulted in the liberation of Voroshilovgrad on 14 February 1943. After that, the front line stabilized, and the Soviet troops went on the defensive.

A new phase of the offensive began in the summer of 1943. The Red Army defeated the Wehrmacht in the key battle of the Great Patriotic War, the Battle of Kursk. This was followed by a liberation of a significant part of the Donbass and Left-bank Ukraine.

On 23 August 1943 Soviet troops liberated Kharkov during the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk. On 13 August the troops of the Southwestern Front went on the offensive in the Donbass. The Donbass operation began. Since March 1943 the Southwestern Front was headed by General of the Army Rodion Malinovskiy, a native of Odessa. On 18 August the Southern Front under the command of General Fyodor Tolbukhin went on the offensive. By September 1943 Donbass was liberated.

Troops of the Southwestern, Southern and Steppe fronts continued to develop the offensive and by the end of 1943 they liberated all Southeastern Ukraine. During the Nizhnedneprovsk offensive operation, from 26 September to 20 December 1943 the German 6th Army was defeated, the 17th Army was surrounded in the Crimea, and a strategic Krivoy Rog bridgehead was created on the right bank of the Dnieper.

On 26 August 1943 the troops of the Central Front under the command of General Konstantin Rokossovsky went on the offensive, broke through the defenses near Konotop, and on 21 September reached the Dnieper. On 15 September 1943 the 60th Army, under the command

of a native of the Uman district of the Kiev Governorate, General Ivan Chernyakhovskiy, liberated Nizhyn. This was a serious blow to the positions of Wehrmacht. There was a real threat of encirclement of a significant part of Army Group South. On the same day, the general retreat of Army Group South began across the Dnieper.

Hitler had earlier issued Order No. 10 for the construction of the East Wall (Panther Line). The East Wall was supposed to extend from the Black Sea through the Dnieper to Vitebsk and further to the Baltic Sea¹. The Dnieper had to become a key element of defense. The leader of Nazi Germany hoped to turn the East Wall into an unassailable fortress.

Territory in front of the Panther line was to be “gnawed” and turned into a desert — that was the order. “No animal shall be left alive on the territory of the enemy”, the remaining stocks of grain and hay must be liquidated. “This action should be carried out massively and without any fiscal barriers,” that was the “scorched earth tactic.” About 1 million people were “evacuated”, i. e. moved to the west as slave labor.

“The Panther line must be held. We can’t retreat any further. This idea must be conveyed to every soldier. Preparations for battle must be carried out to the last moment.” The order was kept in the documents of the 7th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht, which, as part of the Army Group Center, was heading to the Dnieper².

On 9 September 1943 the Voronezh Front went on the offensive. On 21 September on the right bank of the Dnieper, the Bukrinskiy bridgehead was created, south of Kiev. However, an attempt on 25 September to expand the bridgehead was unsuccessful.

On 14 October 1943 during an offensive of the Southwestern Front, Zaporozhye was liberated. Rapid advance of the Soviet troops saved the DnieperGES from complete destruction, which the Nazis planned to blow up. The order to blow up the Dnieper dam was given by the commander of the 1st Panzer Army of Wehrmacht, Eberhard von Mackensen. For blasting it was planned to use 300 tons of explosives. However, Soviet de-miners and intelligence officers managed to damage part of the wires and save the DnieperGES.

¹ *Zeewald Berchtold*. East Wall: Too Late and Senseless [website]. URL: <https://inosmi.ru/20131003/213520165.html> (access date: 08.03.2022).

² *Ibid*.

On 29 October 1943 during an offensive in Ukraine, the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Nikolay Vatutin was renamed the 1st Ukrainian Front. The steppe front under the command of Army General Ivan Konev was named the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the South-Western Front under the command of Army General Rodion Malinovskiy — the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the Southern Front under the command of Army General Fyodor Tolbukhin — the 4th Ukrainian Front.

On 25 October the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front liberated Dnipropetrovsk and Dnieperodzerzhinsk.

The battle for Dnieper (24 August — 23 December 1943) became one of the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War. The East Wall did not help the Nazis. The Wehrmacht was defeated. The last stage of the battle for the Dnieper, the Kiev offensive operation, began after a regrouping of the Soviet troops on 3 November 1943. Kiev was liberated on November 6, and Zhytomyr on 13 November.

In modern Ukrainian society, a pseudo-historical myth about the gigantic and unjustified losses of the ethnic Ukrainian population during the battle for Dnieper and the liberation of Kiev in 1943 has spread. President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelenskiy spoke on this topic, saying: “The liberation of Kiev is a story of boundless indifference and cruelty of the “great” leaders and boundless feat of the great fighters who liberated the city from the Nazis. We will never forget them! We are forever grateful to them! According to the official figures, 417 thousand people died in the battle for Dnieper, but, according to the studies and calculations by a number of historians, in reality this number is twice as high. The battles for Kiev claimed the lives of 240 thousand soldiers and officers ... According to the memoirs of director Alexander Dovzhenko, many citizens mobilized in Ukraine who fought in home clothes and without any preparation died then... Mobilized through the field military commissariats, taken on military registration, in order not to worsen the statistics of losses, not even dressed in uniform and extremely poorly armed, hundreds of thousands of our ancestors were thrown into the battle for liberation of Kiev. For certain death...”¹

¹ Zelenskiy called the liberation of Kiev in 1943 a “history of cruelty” // Vedomosti Ru. 08.11.2021.

These statements can be considered speculative, since the battle for Dnieper really turned out to be one of the largest and bloodiest wars. In total, over 4 million soldiers from both sides were involved in the battles, and the total losses exceeded 2 million people. Parts of five fronts participated in the battle for Dnieper, and the 1st Ukrainian (former Voronezh) Front participated in the liberation of Kiev. It is categorically wrong to confuse the name of the front and its ethnic composition. Thus, more than 17,500 soldiers and officers of thirty nationalities from the 1st Ukrainian Front were awarded orders and medals. For the assault-crossing of the Dnieper and the liberation of Kiev, 2438 soldiers and officers became Heroes of the Soviet Union. The soldiers of the 1st Czechoslovak brigade, who also participated in these hostilities, were honored.

The famous Soviet film director Alexander Dovzhenko, who made the documentary “The Battle for Soviet Ukraine”, in his memoirs focused on sufferings of the people of Kiev during the Nazi regime. It is necessary to take into account the victims during the occupation of Kiev, which lasted 778 days. During this time, the Nazis and their accomplices from among the local nationalists killed over 195,000 civilians of the city. More than 100,000 Kiev residents were deported to hard labor in Germany.

By the beginning of 1944, Ukraine was the main arena of the battle. 40 % of the infantry and 70 % of the tank and motorized divisions of the enemy’s Eastern Front and 42 % of the rifle and 80 % of the tank and mechanized divisions of the Soviet front were concentrated here. About 4 million people participated in the battle on both sides¹.

On 24 December 1943 the Dnieper-Carpathian strategic offensive operation began. Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front repulsed the Wehrmacht’s attempt to launch a counteroffensive near Kiev and continued their offensive to the west. On 8 January 1944 the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front liberated Kirovograd. However, German troops still held the lines near the Dnieper.

On 24 January 1944 the Korsun-Shevchenko operation began. As a result, the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts managed to get to

¹ *Danilevskiy I., Tairova T., Shubin A., Mironenko V.* History of Ukraine. 2nd Ed., revised and amended, St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 443.

the Germans' rear. On 31 January six German divisions totaling up to 80 thousand people were surrounded.

On 30 January 1944 the troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts began the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog operation. As a result, it was possible to eliminate the Nikopol bridgehead of Army Group South, which posed a threat to the flank of the advancing Red Army. On 6 February Nikopol was liberated, on 22 February Krivoy Rog. On 29 February 1944, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, General Nikolay Vatutin, was ambushed by the UIA militants in the area of Rovno, already liberated from the Nazis, and was seriously wounded. It was not possible to save the general; on April 15, he died in the hospital from sepsis.

On 4 March the Proskurov-Chernovtsy offensive operation of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts began. The offensive developed successfully. A significant part of the Right-Bank Ukraine was liberated. Chernovtsy was liberated on 17 March, Zhmerynka on 18 March, and Kamenetz-Podolskiy on 26 March. On 31 March 1944 a 200,000-strong Wehrmacht group was surrounded. With great difficulty, the German troops managed to break out of the encirclement and retreat to Lvov.

On 25 March troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front reached the Romanian border in the area of the Prut River.

On 6 March 1944 the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front went on the offensive against the German and Romanian units in the area of Dnieper and the Southern Bug. On 26 March a successful landing operation was carried out in Nikolaev. On 28 March the marines connected with the advancing units of the front. The city was liberated.

On 10 April 1944 during the Odessa offensive operation, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front under the command of Rodion Malinovskiy liberated Odessa during heavy fighting with the German-Romanian units.

On 6 May Soviet troops on the territory of Ukraine completed offensive operations and went on the defensive to consolidate their positions. By this time, almost the entire territory of Ukraine was liberated, with an exception of Galicia and Transcarpathia.

On 13 July 1944 the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Ivan Konev launched the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive

operation. On 18 July a part of the German troops, together with the Galicia SS division, was surrounded near Brody and almost all were eliminated. Only a few hundred collaborators escaped from the encirclement. On 27 July after a tough battle, Lvov was liberated. On July 23, the Soviet units crossed the San River.

In August 1944, more than three years after an invasion of German troops, the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR was liberated.

In the autumn of 1944, the Soviet army launched an offensive in Transcarpathia. Khust was liberated on 24 October and Mukachevo on 26 October. The liberation of Transcarpathia was completed on 28 October 1944. In the battles for the Right Bank, the Germans and their allies lost 30 divisions and 6 brigades, 1 million soldiers and 20 thousand guns and mortars, 8400 tanks and about 5 thousand aircrafts. The Soviet army lost 1194 thousand people, of which 288 thousand were irrevocable losses. And another 327 thousand (93 thousand irrevocably) — in the Lvov-Sandomir and East Carpathian operations¹. About 4 thousand soldiers, representatives of 43 nationalities — were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for courage and bravery in battles on the territory of Ukraine.

The population of Ukraine took the most active part in the offensive phase of the Great Patriotic War. In 1943–1944 on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, 3.7 million people were mobilized into the Red Army, and in total for the entire period of the war about 6 million people.

Out of 15 fronts that operated during the Great Patriotic War, more than half were headed by marshals and generals of the Ukrainian origin. Among them: Army General Iosif Apanasenko, Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos, Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Timoshenko, Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrey Eremenko, Army General Ivan Chernyakhovskiy, Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Malinovskiy, Lieutenant General Fyodor Kostenko, Colonel General Yakov Cherevichenko. About 2.5 million Ukrainian soldiers were awarded orders and medals. 2021 Ukrainians were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Out of 115 twice Heroes of the

¹ *Danilevskiy I., Tairova T., Shubin A., Mironenko V.* History of Ukraine. 2nd Ed., revised and amended, St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 448.

Soviet Union, 32 were Ukrainians or natives of Ukraine. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded three times to Ivan Kozhedub. Out of four Heroes of the Soviet Union and at the same time Full Cavaliers of the Order of Glory, two were Ukrainians. Ukrainian soldiers were the liberators of the peoples of Europe, they stormed Berlin, and the commander of the 756th Infantry Regiment Fyodor Zinchenko, Hero of the Soviet Union, was the first commandant of Reichstag¹.

¹ Heroes of Ukraine — Real and Pretense [website]. URL: https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2019-01-18/6_1030_ukraine.html (access date: 08.03.2022).

Chapter 12

UKRAINE IN 1945–1991

In the first post-war decade, further expansion of the borders of the Ukrainian SSR took place. Transfer of the territories of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina and part of Bessarabia from Poland and Romania to the republic was confirmed.

Fundamental decision on the border between the USSR and Poland was made at the Yalta Conference. On 16 August 1945, the Soviet-Polish border treaty was signed, which was based on the Curzon Line with minor concessions to the Polish side. In particular, the city of Przemyśl of the Drohobych region and a number of rural settlements (Bieszczady, Lesko, etc.) were ceded to Poland.

In text of the treaty, particularly, the following was noted:

«Article 1. To establish, in accordance with the decision of the Crimean Conference, the state border between the USSR and the Republic of Poland along the “Curzon Line” with a retreat from it in favor of Poland in some areas from 5 to 8 kilometers ...

Article 2. In accordance with the state border between the USSR and the Republic of Poland, as specified in Article 1, the state border runs along the following line: from a point located approximately 0.6 kilometers southwest of the source of the San river, northeast to the source of the San river and further down the middle the course of the San river to the point south of the settlement of Solina, further east of Peremyshl, west of Rava-Russkaya to the Solokiya river, from here along the Solokiya river and the Western Bug river to Nemirov-Yalovka, leaving on the side of Poland the part of the territory of

Belovezhskaya Pushcha indicated in the first article, and from here to the junction of the borders of the Lithuanian SSR, the Polish Republic and East Prussia, leaving Grodno on the side of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”.

In 1946, the Soviet-Polish commission demarcated the border. In 1951, the process of territorial demarcation with Poland was completed. The Soviet Union transferred the Ustrikovskiy district of the Drogobych region to Poland, receiving in return Kristopol (Chervonograd), which became a part of the Lvov region.

In accordance with the Paris Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947, Romania recognized the border with the Soviet Union established in 1940: «Article 1. The borders of Romania shown on the map attached to this Treaty (Appendix 1) will be as they were on 1 January 1941, with an exception of the Romanian-Hungarian border, which is determined by Article 2 of this Treaty. The Soviet-Romanian border is established in this case in accordance with the Soviet-Romanian Agreement of 28 June 1940”. The territories transferred to the USSR in 1940 were divided between the Moldavian SSR (most of Bessarabia) and the Ukrainian SSR (Northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia).

In accordance with the annex to the Treaty between the USSR and Romania on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 4 February 1948, Serpent’s Island (Sherpilor) passed from Romania to the Ukrainian SSR. In 1949, the demarcation of the Soviet-Romanian border was completed. In accordance with the Treaty of 29 June 1945 between the USSR and Czechoslovakia, the so-called Transcarpathian Ukraine was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. The text of the Treaty stated the following: «Article 1. Transcarpathian Ukraine (bearing, according to the Czechoslovak Constitution, the name Subcarpathian Rus), which, on the basis of the Treaty of 10 September 1919, concluded in Saint-Germain-en-Lai, entered as an autonomous unit within the framework of the Czechoslovak Republic, is reunited, in accordance with the will manifested by the population of Transcarpathian Ukraine, and on the basis of an amicable agreement of both High Contracting Parties, with its original homeland — Ukraine and is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The borders between Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine, which existed on 29 September 1938 become, as amended, the borders between the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic according to the attached map.

It is noteworthy that in Czechoslovakia this territory was called differently: Subcarpathian Rus. The term “Transcarpathian Ukraine” was thus artificially constructed and entered into an official document at the time of transfer of Transcarpathia. Moreover, in accordance with the text of the treaty, Ukraine is called the “original homeland” of Transcarpathia. This does not correspond to objective historical facts. Transcarpathian Rus was part of a single ancient Russian state, but back in the 11th century, turned out to be torn away from Russian lands, was part of Hungary, the Austrian Empire and Czechoslovakia and has nothing to do with Little Russia, which became the core of the future Ukraine, or with Galicia, on whose lands political Ukrainianism was formed. A separate sub-ethnic community of Rusyns has developed here, which has identified itself with greater Russia, and not with Ukraine. In fact, leaders of the Soviet Union “gave” the Subcarpathian Rus to Ukraine, recognizing the Rusyns as part of the Ukrainians. After an accession, the process of intensive Ukrainization of Transcarpathia began.

Another “gift” was the Crimea, which had nothing to do with Ukraine and was part of the RSFSR after the revolution, first as a republic, and then as a region. Even during the period of emergence of the Ukrainian People’s Republic with exorbitant territorial ambitions of Ukrainian nationalists, Crimea, unlike the Kuban or the territories of the Voronezh and Kursk Governorates, was not considered by Ukrainian politicians as Ukrainian land.

Nevertheless, after the former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Nikita Khrushchev came to power in the USSR, a decision was made to transfer the peninsula to the Ukrainian SSR.

A new stage in the history of the Crimean region was associated with 1954, when the new party leader at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee took the initiative to transfer the region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. The question why it was N. S. Khrushchev who initiated transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR has not yet been fully clarified. The son of former leader of the country, Sergey Khrushchev, believes that the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR

was caused by purely economic reasons, in particular, the urgent need to build the North Crimean irrigation canal. At the same time, the well-known Russian historian A. V. Pyzhikov argues that the “Crimean epic” was connected with the fact that in the upcoming struggle for sole power, N. S. Khrushchev, who in 1938–1949 was the actual head of the Ukrainian SSR, really expected to receive support from the influential Ukrainian party and economic nomenklatura, which after the war dramatically increased its representation in both the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

On 16 January 1954, N. S. Khrushchev achieved the resignation of the first secretary of the Crimean regional party committee P. I. Titov, who objected to the transfer of the Crimean region to the Ukrainian SSR, and appointed in his place an active supporter of the transfer — the second secretary of the regional party committee D. S. Polyanskiy. Moreover, in three years, D. S. Polyanskiy would make a tremendous career and become a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, and then First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

On 25 January 1954, under the chairmanship of the head of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, M. Malenkov, a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee was held. Under the number XL of this Protocol, entitled “On Transfer of the Crimean Region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR”, there were two clauses: 1) to approve, with the amendments adopted at the meeting, the attached draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR; and 2) to consider it expedient to hold a special meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, at which to consider joint proposal of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR on transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR.

On 5 February 1954, a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR was held. As a result of this meeting, a decision was made “On transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR”, which stated that, “taking into account the common economy, territorial proximity and close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean region and the Ukrainian SSR, the

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR decides: to transfer the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR.” and submits this Resolution for approval by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

On 13 February 1954, under chairmanship of the head of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR D. S. Korotchenko, a similar meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR was held in Kiev, at which the Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR “On submission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on the issue of transfer of the Crimean region to the Ukrainian SSR” was adopted, which said: “Having discussed submission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR on the issue of transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR, submitted for consideration by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, on its part, considers that transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR, given the unity of their economies, territorial proximity and close economic and cultural ties, is quite expedient and is evidence of the boundless trust of the great Russian people

in the Ukrainian people. According to the proposal of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR resolves: to ask the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of the SSR to transfer the Crimean region from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR.”

On 26 April 1954, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by the law “On Transfer of the Crimean Region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR” approved the decree of its Presidium and made appropriate changes to Articles 22 and 23 of the Constitution of the USSR. Then, on 2 June 1954, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR unanimously adopted the law “On Amendments and Additions to Article 14 of the Constitution of the RSFSR”, according to which the Crimean region was excluded from the RSFSR. And two weeks later, on 17 June 1954, a clause was introduced into Article 18 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR on the inclusion of the Crimean region into the Ukrainian SSR.

Thus, in the period from 1939 to 1954, the territory of the Ukrainian SSR increased by almost 10%. The republic acquired lands that had

never before represented a single territorial-political community, with a different composition of the population, traditions, culture, religion, language, historical past, not connected by common economic ties, with a wide variety of economic structures. At the same time, the Ukrainian SSR became the largest union republic after the RSFSR in terms of such indicators as population, economic volume and industrial potential, and in terms of area of the territory. The Ukrainian SSR therefore significantly exceeded all countries of Western, Central and Eastern Europe. Transformation of the Ukrainian SSR into such a significant territorial and political entity was solely the merit of leadership of the Soviet Union, which, due to various political and economic reasons, significantly increased the initially small territory of the republic.

Another “gift” was the special international legal status of the Ukrainian SSR, which distinguished this republic, along with the Belorussian SSR, from other union republics. On 4 March 1944, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR was formed. As a result of the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR were included among the founding countries of the United Nations. In April-June 1945, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR, headed by Foreign Minister Dmitriy Manuilskiy, participated in the founding conference of the UN in San Francisco. The Ukrainian minister, along with representatives of the USSR and the Belorussian SSR, signed the UN Charter.

Of course, the leadership of the Soviet Union did not consider the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR as sovereign states, but their representatives in the UN as independent delegates. The Ukrainian SSR did not have international legal capacity, did not have an opportunity to conduct an independent foreign policy or sign certain international agreements. This decision was supposed to strengthen position of the USSR in the international organization created. However, as a result, a legal conflict arose, according to which representatives of two union republics of the Soviet Union sat in the main international organization, in which exclusively sovereign states were represented.

A serious problem in the development of post-war Ukraine was the nationalist underground. The end of the Great Patriotic War did not lead to an establishment of peace in the republic. There was only a

change of vector — instead of focusing on Nazi Germany, Ukrainian nationalists began to obey the intelligence agencies of a number of Western countries, primarily the United States and Great Britain.

An interesting assessment of this period of activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA) and the leader of Ukrainian nationalists Stepan Bandera, was given by the famous Soviet intelligence officer Kim Philby: “Even before the war, the SIS maintained contacts with Stepan Bandera, a pro-fascist Ukrainian nationalist. After the war, this cooperation was developed further. But the trouble was that, although Bandera was a big “authority” in exile, his claims that he had many supporters in the Soviet Union were never seriously checked; there were only negative examples, i. e., showing that there were no such supporters. The first group of agents, supplied by the British with a radio transmitter and other covert means of communication, was sent to Ukraine in 1949 and disappeared. The next year two more groups were sent, but there was nothing known about them either. Meanwhile, the Americans began to seriously doubt the usefulness of Bandera to the West. Failures of the groups sent by the British, of course, did not dispel these doubts. The American attacks on cooperation between Bandera and the SIS became especially harsh in 1950, and while working in the USA I spent a lot of time sending scathing messages from Washington to London and back about comparative merits of various little known emigrant groups. His extreme nationalism with fascist overtones was an obstacle preventing the West from undermining the Soviet Union using people of other nationalities, such as Russians. To overcome the British-American differences over Ukraine, the CIA pushed for a broad conference with the SIS. This conference took place in London in April 1951. To my surprise, the British side took a firm stand and categorically refused to throw Bandera overboard.”

After the retreat of the German troops from the territory of Ukraine, the Ukrainian accomplices of the Nazis continued to fight against the Soviet army. Leading positions among the nationalists were taken by the Bandera wing of the OUN and the UIA led by Roman Shukhevych. At the same time, Stepan Bandera was abroad during the entire post-war period in Bavaria and in the American zone of occupation. Anti-Soviet activities in Western Ukraine were managed

by Roman Shukhevich. The main territory of hostilities became the regions of Western Ukraine, and the methods were sabotage and terrorist attacks against Soviet military personnel, NKVD officers, party and Soviet employees, communists, supporters of Soviet power among local residents, as well as against Russians, Jews, Poles and representatives of other ethnic groups.

In total in 1944–1953. UIA-OUN carried out 14,424 actions (including 5,099 terrorist attacks and sabotage, 457 attacks on extermination battalions and law enforcement groups, and 1,004 arson attacks on collective farms, state farms, MTS, village councils, schools, clubs). 30 thousand party and Soviet workers, specialists, civilians were killed, including 329 chairmen of village councils, 231 collective farm chairmen, 436 workers of district party committees, employees of regional organizations and activists, as well as 50 priests.

More than 25 thousand employees of the state security and internal affairs bodies, soldiers and officers of the Soviet army were killed. From 1944 to 1952, more than 153 thousand OUN members were killed and more than 1 million 434 thousand people were arrested.

Evidence of the cruelty of the Bandera supporters to the soldiers of the Red Army is indicative. Here is the text of Report No. 02978 dated 29 September 1945 of Acting Colonel Kuryatov, the Head of political department of the 38th Army, to the Colonel-General Lev Mekhlis, member of the Military Council of the Carpathian Military District and Major General Leonid Brezhnev, head of the political department of the district:

“In the areas where army troops are located, there has recently been a significant increase of the actions of Bandera gangs. According to the operational department of the Army Headquarters and the political agencies of the formations, the presence of the gang groups was established in the following areas of: Chertezhne up to 1500 people; Petrovce – Jankovce – Lukanovce up to 1500 people; Logging up to 200 people; Chrebtovatke – Hed up to 500 people; Kamenice – Lipany up to 85 people; Russka – Mokra up to 200 people; Dubov up to 200 people; Loza – Siniy Bar up to 200 people; Olshany up to 200 people, as well as in the area of deployment of units of the 140th division and villages adjacent to the city of Stanislav (Tysmenitsa, Ugoreiki). The bandits are armed with carbines, rifles, submachine guns, and machine guns.

Also they have explosives and grenades. Bandera's followers act in groups and attack single soldiers or those travelling in small groups (3–4 people), single moving carts and vehicles. On 23 September, near the village of Tysmenitsa, 7–8 km from the city of Stanislav, Bandera followers mortally wounded the deputy head of the Political Department of the 38th Army, comrade Golubev and lightly wounded the head of the auto department of the army, lieutenant colonel comrade Khartsiev. On the night of 17–18 September, in the village of Yablunivka, Bandera supporters abducted the junior sergeant of the 871st separate anti-aircraft division Popov. On the night of 19–20 September, in the village of Glubochek, soldiers of the 167th division, Privates Kozin and Kotin, were captured by Bandera supporters. The captured underwent painful tortures, for example, the bandits tore off the left ear of the Red Army soldier Kozin, gouged out his eyes, chopped his jaw and neck with an axe and burned his legs and arms with fire. Terrorist attacks are also committed against civilians. On 7 September, in the village of Cherny Potok, a group of Bandera supporters fired at workers of the district council who were there. On 12 September, in the village of Nizhniy Verbish, the Bandera supporters prohibited the peasants to export grain on account of state deliveries. On 14 September, in the same village, a girl and her teenage brother were killed for refusing to cooperate with Bandera followers, and her mother was heavily wounded. On 17 September, in the village of Sonovo, Bandera supporters took away 5,000 rubles of money from the financial agent.

On 18 September, in the village of Upper Verbish, Bandera followers hanged two residents of the village. In the same village, they distributed leaflets demanding the donation of bread for the needs of the UIA. In the village of Kornich, 4 kilometers from Kolomyia, the director of the mill was killed, in the village of Isnosy on 16 September, a district policeman was wounded, and in the village of Motanovtsy, they destroyed a threshing machine and an engine belonging to MTS; in the village of Grushev, a cooperative was plundered, in the village of Motyletsy a police worker was killed”.

Here are the data on the victims of the OUN terror according to recently published reports of the commanders of military units

and units of the Carpathian and Lvov military districts and military commissariats of the Lvov region:

“In May 1946, in the village of Milsk, Rozhishchi district, Volyn region, 7 bandits dressed in Red Army uniforms tortured the chairman of the village council Romanyuk and the district policeman Stolyarchuk. The bandits gouged out their eyes, stabbed them with daggers, applied red-hot iron to their bodies, beat them with ramrods...”.

On the night of 5–6 July 1948, the bandits killed the leader of the collective farm of Lesya Ukrainka (the Lvov region) Regeta Maria Antonovna, born in 1918, a deputy of the village council. After murder of the chairman of the collective farm by Bandera followers in 1947, she performed his duties. The bandits repeatedly warned to stop her activities and leave the collective farm. On the night of 5–6 July, knocking on her house and calling themselves representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, they caught her with a loop and, pulling her out into the garden, shot her. But the peace that came to Western Ukraine in the mid-1950s did not end the long-term war between Ukrainian nationalists and the Soviet government, since the leaders of the OUN who were in the West continued their anti-Soviet and terrorist activities as before. In Ukraine itself in 1954–1959 156 terrorist attacks and attempts were carried out. The KGB liquidated 183 nationalist groups and 14 open trials took place in the Rovno, Stanislav, Volyn and Ternopol regions (51 defendants, 24 people were sentenced to death).

Destroying such an organization was extremely difficult. Each time, destroying this or that gang, the employees of the Soviet intelligence agencies were convinced that a new one appeared in its place. In this regard, Moscow very soon came to the conclusion that it was necessary to eliminate, first of all, leaders of the OUN-UIA on the territory of the USSR and Poland. Who were these people, where were they hiding and how they were caught, is best described by the following document:

“Top Secret

To the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR

Lieutenant General comrade Strokach

8 October 1946

No. 1/13948

The plan developed by the UBB of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR for the “Den” undercover case for August-October

of this year. It was provided to carry out a number of active agent-operational measures in places where they were likely to hide. Thus:

In Berezhany and Kozovsky districts, Ternopol region, on the search for OUN conductor Shukhevych Roman and “SB” assistant “Mikhailo”, who have been hiding in these areas for a long time and have a significant collaborating base there;

In the Rohatinsky district, Stanislav region, on the search for a member of the central wire and OUN conductor of the so-called “Western Ukrainian lands” (“ZUZ”) “Petro”, also known as “Panas”; in the Striysky district, Drohobych region, on the search for members of the central wire of the head of the headquarters of the UIA “Lytsar”;

In the Podgaetsky district, Ternopol region, on the search for the organizer of the central wire “Lemish”, etc.

The preliminary results of implementation of the plan show that the operational group of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, sent to the Ternopol region, due to its small number, launched work only on liquidation of the organization of the central wire, headed by “Lemish”. No positive results were achieved on the search for other members of the OUN, although the places where they were likely to hide were known.

This gives reason to believe that in conditions where the leaders of the OUN and their subordinate referents are carefully concealed and hiding in various places, the search for them must be carried out not by one, but simultaneously by several operational groups, deploying them in the areas where the OUN leaders are likely to hide.

In spite of the results achieved (arrest of “Arsen” and “Dovbna”, etc.), the development by the operational group of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR of the central wire connection was not actively carried out.

During the month, the UBB did not get detailed testimonies from “Arsen” and “Dovbna” about the hiding places of “Lemish” and other members of the central wire.

“To date, it has not been precisely established whether the “Arsen” radio center worked and with whom [he] kept in touch.

Insufficient attention is paid to the acquisition of target agents from among the revealed connections of “Lemish” and “Arsen” for the development of the leading underground of the OUN.

A number of public arrests were carried out through the connections of “Arsen”, in particular, the owner of underground radio workshop Timkevich and others, which could be successfully used for penetration into the OUN underground.

In order to resolutely intensify work to uncover and liquidate the leading underground of the OUN, I SUGGEST:

1. Form additionally four operational groups, headed by experienced operational workers. Each operational group will be given a mobile detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops of 50–70 people and a special group.

2. Send formed groups to the search and liquidation of the OUN conductor Shukhevych Roman, the referent of the “SB” “Mikhailo” and the OUN conductor of the “Western Ukrainian lands” (“ZUZ”) “Petro” and the chief of staff of the UIA “Lytsar”.

Previously created operational groups should be used for further development and liquidation of the organizational structure headed by “Lemish”.

Places of deployment of the operational groups will be established depending on the materials obtained recently about the places of shelter of members of the central wire.

3. Management of work of the operational groups in contacting the activities they carry out shall be entrusted to the head of the UBB of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR.

4. During the development of members of the central wire of the OUN, the seizure of persons passing communication with them should be carried out after it has been established that they cannot be used for operational purposes.

5. To intensify investigative measures in the case of “Arsen” and other arrested persons from his group, consider the expediency of recruiting “Grabar” and “Chekhovich” as persons of operational interest.

6. Plans for agent-operational measures for the development and elimination of OUN leaders should be developed monthly in the context of referents and submitted to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs by the 10th day of each month.

By the same date, submit a memorandum on the results of implementation of the plan for the past month. Report upon

fulfilment“...” in October 1946. Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Lieutenant-General V. Ryasnoy.

Fulfilling this plan, the Soviet secret services launched a systematic hunt for the underground leaders of the OUN-UIA operating on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. By June 1945, there were 175 residents, 11,906 agents and 9,843 informants on the records of the NKVD bodies of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR. The scale of similar work of the NKGB was even greater. Only in the Stanislav region by June 1946, the agent network amounted to 6405 people. It was there that the UIA acted very actively and boldly. In 1946 they conducted 279 actions. Near the village of Maidan, 18 km from Stanislav, fighters of the Hundred “Revengeurs” fired at the car of the commander of the 38th Army, Colonel-General (future Marshal) Kirill Moskalenko, in which there was also a member of the military council of the army, Major General Aleksey Epishev (future Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR for personnel and long-term Head of Glavpur of the Armed Forces of the USSR). At the same time, the driver and two guards were injured. Later, the deputy head of the political department of the same army, Colonel Golubev, was killed by the Yura militant¹. The OUN members were also successful in other areas. On 5 January 1946, in the village of Buryakovtsy of the Tovstensky district of the Ternopol region in an ambush the operational group of the NKVD regional department (23 people), headed by Major Sleptsov, was killed.

According to archival data, only in 1944–1945. 57,405 people died in battles with Soviet troops, 50,941 were arrested, 15,990 people voluntarily surrendered. At the same time, 82 officers and 1295 soldiers of the NKVD troops, 46 fighters of the destruction battalions were killed. In 1945–1946 about 35 thousand fighters of the internal troops of the NKVD, 24 thousand fighters of destruction battalions and 24 thousand fighters of armed assistance groups were involved against the OUN (party and Komsomol activists). By December 1948 there were 6343 of them in all western regions, with B total number of 85 thousand people, with 50 thousand firearms), 140 NKGB operational officers, 760 NKVD operational officers, 260 cadets of NKVD schools

¹ Kiev journalists D. Vedenev and S. Shevchenko recently spoke about these actions.

were sent. In addition, the border and convoy troops of the NKVD, troops for protection of railway structures and industrial facilities and parts of the Lvov and Carpathian military districts (52nd and 13th armies) were also engaged. The work of the NKVD officers was already awarded in October 1944. The Order of Kutuzov 2nd degree was given to four people, including Beria's Deputy S. N. Kruglov, People's Commissars of the State Security and Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR S. R. Savchenko and V. S. Ryasnoy, and the Order of Bogdan Khmelnytsky 2nd degree was awarded to 12 people, including Generals Burmak and Leontiev, and the Order of the Red Banner was awarded to 42 people — a total of 889 orders and medals.

The fight against the OUN-UIA in the central office in Moscow was carried out by the Main Directorate for Combating Banditry (headed by Major General V. S. Proshin), in 1950 transferred to the MGB and renamed the Main Directorate of Operational Investigation, and the MGB — department "DR" (sabotage), which will be discussed later.

In May 1946, through the central apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, operational groups were sent to Western Ukraine, headed by authorized representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: Lvov region — Lieutenant General A. M. Leontyev, Stanislav region — Lieutenant General P. V. Burmak, Ternopol region — Major General V. S. Proshin, Drogobych region — Major General Kalinin, Rovno region — Major General I. I. Nikitinsky, Volyn region — Colonel Prokofiev. They prepared a plan of liquidation of the underground, approved in July by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Colonel General S. N. Kruglov.

The fight against the OUN-UPA, despite serious resistance from the nationalists, achieved its results. Gradually, the underground was liquidated.

In June 1945, a member of the OUN wire Petr Duzhyy ("Marko", "Vitaliy") was taken prisoner.

On 4 July 1945, brothers Mikola and Petro Dyuzhyi were smoked out of their shelter. Nikolay Dyuzhyi ("Virovy") — UIA commander of one hundred soldiers, secretary of the Presidium of the UGVR, was sentenced to 20 years and was released only in 1955. Petro Dyuzhyi ("Arsen"), the propaganda officer of the OUN wire, a member of the OUN wire, was sentenced to 25 years and released in 1960.

On July 19, 1945, in the village of Kleshchevka, Rohatinsky district, Ivano-Frankovsk region, UIA Major Vasil Brylevsky (“Borovy”, head of staff of the UIA Zapad) was killed in a battle with a special group of the NKVD. In August, the OUN regional conductor in Transcarpathia Klempush (“Shovel”) died.

On 15 September 1945, Yakov Busel (“Galina”), head of the political education department of the UIA General Staff, died in a battle with a unit of the internal troops of NKVD in the village of Bishki, Kozivsky district, Ternopol region.

On 19 December 1945, during his crossing of the Czechoslovak-German border, UIA Major Dmitro Gritsai (“Perebiynos”), head of the UIA headquarters, was captured by the Czech border guards. He committed suicide in the Prague prison on 22 December 1945. Dmitro Mayevsky (“Taras”), who was with him, deputy head of the OUN Wire Bureau and political assistant of the Wire Bureau, shot himself during arrest.

On the same day, in the village of Besidy, Zhovkovsky district, Lvov region, Dmitro Slyuzar (“Zolotar”), a regional conductor of the OUN in the Lvov region, died in a battle with a special detachment of the NKVD.

In 1946, Omelyan Polevy (“Ochered”), a UIA lieutenant, commander of the 3rd military district of the UIA-West “Lisonia”, an employee of the regional headquarters of the UIA-West, was captured alive by the MGB officers. He was sentenced to 25 years and was released only in 1971.

On 15 January 1946, in a battle with a special group of NKVD, acting under the guise of a group of the UIA fighters, UIA lieutenant Fyodor Vorobets (“Vereshchaka”), commander of the UIA-North military district “444” and regional conductor of the Eastern Territory “Odessa” was wounded and captured alive. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison and died in 1959 in the Irkutsk region.

On 17 February 1946, in a battle with a unit of the internal troops of NKVD in the village of Molotnichi, Zhydachevsky district, Lvov region, Petro Oleynik (“Eney”), conductor of the OUN of the Eastern Territory “Odessa”, was killed.

In March 1946, in the forest of the Berezhany district of the Ternopol region, together with his wife, Ivan Shanaida (“Danilo”), a

regional conductor of the Podolsk region, died in battle with a unit of the internal troops of NKVD.

On 30 October 1946 Yaroslav Melnik (“Robert”), a regional conductor of the OUN of the Carpathian region died together with his wife, headquarters and guards in a shootout with a special group of Major Arsentiy Kostenko near the village of Lipy. His shelter was indicated to the Chekists by Dmytro Rebrik (Liman), an investigator of the referent of the Security Service of the Karpaty-West wire, who was arrested by them.

On 18 December 1946, Vasil Levkovich (“Voroniy”), UIA colonel, commander of the 2nd UIA-West “Bug” military district, was caught alive by the MGB officers. He was sentenced to 25 years and released in 1961.

In June 1947, the OUN district conductor in the Stanislav region, Mikhailo Khmel-Vsevolod, and the Security Council assistant in Podolia, Miroslav Vovk, died in battle.

On 17 July 1947, the UIA major Vladimir Yakubovsky (“Bondarenko”), commander of the 3rd military district of the UIA-West “Lisonya”, was killed in a battle with a company of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, breaking through from encirclement in the Kozlovsky district of the Ternopol region.

In August 1947, UIA commander of one hundred soldiers Ivan Beleilovich (“Dzvinchuk”), the head of a group of couriers, was captured on the territory of Czechoslovakia. Later he was transferred to the Ministry of State Security of the USSR.

On 3 August 1947, in the village of Telyachye, Podgaetsky district, Ternopol region, Osip Bepalko (“Ostap”), regional conductor of the OUN of the Podolsk Territory and a commander of the 3rd military district of the UIAZapad “Lisonia”, died in a shelter after an hour-long battle with a special group of NKVD.

On 17 September 1947, near the town of Dukhna in Lyubachevshchyna (Poland), surrounded by a special detachment of Polish state security, Yaroslav Starukh (“Styag”), a member of the OUN wire and a conductor of the Zakerzonsky region (Poland), exploded in a bunker.

On the same day, Petro Fedoriv (“Dalnich”), a regional referent of the Security Service of the Zakerzon Territory, was captured. He was shot in 1950 in Warsaw.

On 2 March 1948, Polish state security agencies in Wroclaw arrested Mirosław Onyshkevich (“Orest”), UIA major, commander of the 6th military district of the UIA-West “San”. He was shot on 6 July 1950.

On 12 August 1948, in the Dolinsky district of the Ivano-Frankovsk region, Stepan Yanishevsky (“Dalekiy”), regional conductor of the Eastern Territory “Odessa”, surrendered, encircled by the MGB operational group. He was convicted in Rovno and shot.

On 4 November 1948, in a battle with a special detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the territory of the Lvov region, Zinovi Tershakovets (“Fedir”) died, the regional conductor of the OUN of the Lvov region, commander of the 2nd military district of the UIA-West “Bug”. At the same time, in the Lvov region, the referents of the Security Council, Colonel Yaroslav Dyakon and Stepan Prokopiv, were killed in battle.

On 8 February 1949, in a battle with a special group of the MGB near the village of Petushki, Ostrog district, Rovno region, UIA major Nikolay Kozak (“Smok”), deputy regional conductor of the OUN in the North-Western Ukrainian lands, committed suicide. An underground printing house of the regional wire of the OUN was also seized there (90 thousand pages of printed materials).

On 14 April 1949, Vasil Sidor (“Shelest”, “Rostislav”, “Vyshytiy”, “Lesovik”), regional commander of the UIA-West, member of the OUN wire, regional conductor of the OUN of the Carpathian region and general judge of the OUN died in a battle with a special group of the MGB (14 people) in a shelter near the village of Pereginskoe, the Ivano-Frankovsk region.

In August a member of the headquarters of the UIA-West, Major Vasil Mizerny-Ren, died in a battle with the MGB troops in the Drogobych region. In September, the district conductor of the OUN in the Stanislav region, Mikhailo Mikityuk, died.

On 9 November 1949, Stepan Stebelsky (“Khrin”), commander of the Drogobych tactical section of the Makivka UIA, died in a shootout with the Czechoslovak gendarmes. At one time, he commanded a unit of one hundred soldiers Udarniki-5 of UIA, which on 28 March 1947 killed the Deputy Minister of Defense of Poland, General Karol Swierczewski.

In December, the SS referent in the Carpathian region, Mytar died. In the spring of 1950, Grigory Golyash (“Bey”), head of the special communications of the OUN wire and leadership of the UIA in Lvov, was captured by the MGB operational group in special shelter (a secret meeting place was in the pub). During his arrest, he tried to shoot himself. In the spring of 1951, he committed suicide by jumping out of the window on the 4th floor of the Lvov prison.

On 5 March 1950, Commander-in-Chief of the UIA Roman Shukhevych was killed in battle by a special group of the MGB in his underground apartment.

Shukhevych was born on 30 June 1907. From the sixth grade of the gymnasium, he became an underground member of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UMO). In 1926, by decision of the UMO, he killed the Polish school curator Sobinskiy, who pursued a policy of Polonization of Ukrainian gymnasiums. In 1932 he graduated from the Lvov Polytechnic Institute. In 1929 he joined the OUN, in 1933–1934 he was a referent of the Regional Executive of the OUN. In 1933, he organized an attack on the USSR consulate in Lvov, during which Consul Andrey Maylov was killed. For that he was imprisoned by the Poles in 1934. He was amnestied in 1938. In 1938–1939 he was a foreman at the headquarters of the Carpathian Sich, and in 1939–1941 in the OUN wire he was responsible for organizing an underground network in Western Ukrainian lands. In 1941, as a commander of the Ukrainian Legion, he participated in the capture of Lvov. In August 1943, he was elected Chairman of the Bureau of the Central Wire of the OUN. Since the autumn of 1943, he was a commander of the UIA. In June 1944, at the underground 1st “Great Assembly” of the UTVR, he was elected chairman of the General Secretariat of the UGVR. He was actively engaged in skiing and football.

After the war, Shukhevych, unlike his comrades-in-arms, did not have hopes for a war between the United States and England against the USSR, and developed the Dazhbog scheme (saving personnel and deep secrecy), Orlyk (creating positions in Eastern Ukraine) and Oleg “(training of the youth reserve of the underground).

In just 6 years, from 1944 to 1950, Shukhevych changed at least 15 headquarters. From the autumn of 1944 to the spring of 1945 he lived in the village of Avgustovka in the Berezhany district of the Ternopol

region, then until August of that year he was hiding in the village of Rai in the same area in the house of Antonina Gladchuk. At the end of August, the security officers got on the trail of the commander-in-chief of the UIA, but in the village of Rai they only managed to capture Shukhevych's adjutant "Artem" ("Nazar"), who unsuccessfully tried to shoot himself. The district conductor Legeta, who was with him in the hut, poisoned herself. Shukhevych hid in the village of Pukov, Rogatinsky district, Stanislav region. From October 1946 to September 1947, Shukhevych was hiding in the village of Knyaginichi in the same district, from where he moved to the village of Grimnoye, near the town of Komarno of the Lvov region, but after 10 days he left for Lvov, where he spent the winter in a mansion on Krivaya Street. In Lvov, from January to March 1948, he lived on Mariupolskaya Street at the underground worker Grigoriy Golyash. The Chekists also came to this apartment late, on 27 April, when Shukhevych was already living in the village of Belgoroshcha. Golyash was arrested but committed suicide in the prison of the Lvov Department of the MSS by jumping out of the window.

In March 1950, Shukhevych's contact Daria Gusyak, whom he trusted, was arrested in Lvov (she traveled to Moscow to establish contact with the US Embassy, to Kiev to organize the planned explosion of the monument of Lenin and to Poltava with the same purpose in relation to the monument of Peter I) Information about the whereabouts of Shukhevych was obtained from her.

The "Plan of the Chekist-Military Operation to Capture or Eliminate the "Wolf"" was developed. Forces of the operational reserves of the 62nd rifle division of the internal troops of MGB, headquarters of the Ukrainian border district of the Lvov police department, blocked the village of Belgoroshcha, neighboring farms, the western outskirts of the village of Levanduvka and a forest. The operation was led by the operational headquarters consisting of the Deputy Minister of the State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, Major General Viktor Drozdov, the head of the "DR" department of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Lieutenant General Pavel Sudoplatov, the head of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of State Security of the Ukrainian District, Major General Fadeev, and the head of the UMGB of the Lvov region, Colonel Maystruk.

On 5 March 1950, the 8th company of the 10th rifle regiment of the 62nd division blocked several houses where Shukhevych could be. Danilo, son of Natalia, who jumped out of her house, shouting “Roman, run!”, was detained and interrogated by a group headed by Captain Pickman. The boy showed them in the center of the village a house of his sister Anna Konyushek, whose housekeeper, according to appearance, was similar to Galina Didyk. A group of soldiers and operational officers of Directorate 2-n and UMGB went to this house, the door was opened by a woman who identified herself as Stefania Kulik. She was identified as Didyk. She was asked to give away Shukhevych, but she refused. During the search, her gun was taken away, but she managed to take strychnine and was brought to the intensive care. Shukhevych, who was in a wooden box covered with a carpet (there was a radio transmitter, a typewriter and weapons in the house, his guards, 11 people headed by Mikhail Zayets — “Vlodok” he released to the Carpathians the day before), tried to escape from the house and started shooting, killing a head of the department of the 2nd MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Major Revenko. Sergeant Polishchuk, who ran up, shot Shukhevych with a burst from a submachine gun (a fatal wound to the head).

Galina Didyk (“Anna”), head of the Ukrainian Red Cross in the Western Ukrainian lands and Shukhevych’s closest assistant, was sentenced to 25 years in prison, was released in 1971 and died in 1979.

On 28 November 1950, in the vicinity of the village of Velikopole, Yavorovsky district, Lvov region, Osip Dyakiv (“Gornovyi”, “Naum”), a conductor of the Lvov region, member of the OUN wire, deputy head of the UGVR, was killed in a battle with a special group of the MGB.

On 13 December 1951, near the village of Svarichev, Rozhnyatovsky district, Ivano-Frankovsk region, UIA commander of one hundred soldiers Yaroslav Kosarchin (“Bayrak”) died, at the time of his death he was a regional conductor of the OUN of the Carpathian region.

On 22 December 1951, together with the regional conductor of the OUN of the Lvov region and organizational referent of the OUN “Petr”, Roman Kravchuk-Stepov, in a bunker near the village of Bukachevtsy, Rohatinsky district, Ivano-Frankovsk region, Petro Fedun (“Petro Poltava”, “Sever”), head of the Information Bureau

of the UGVR, member of the UGVR, and deputy head of the general Secretariat of the UGVR and a member of the OUN wire, died.

On 19 January 1952, Ivan Litvinchuk (“Oak”), OUN conductor of the Western Territory “Moscow” (“Dnipro”), commander of the UIA-North with the rank of major, deputy OUN conductor in the North Western Ukrainian lands, was killed in a battle, surrounded in a cache by a special group of the MGB.

On 22 January 1952, Evgen Prishlyak (“Yarema”), the regional conductor of the OUN in the Lvov region, was arrested. He was sentenced to 25 years, released in 1977.

In February 1952, publicist and poet Mikhailo Dyachenko died in battle. In March, an underground painter, Nil Khasevich, was killed in battle (both leading figures of the OUN at PZUZ).

In May 1952, in the village of Chernikhov, Zborovsky district, Ternopol region, Vasil Bey (“Ulas”), an OUN conductor in the Middle Eastern Ukrainian lands (OSUZ), and a member of the OUN wire, died. Before that, on 8 February 1951 he was arrested in Vinnitsa together with the over-district conductor Demchuk during the KGB operation. Returning to the underground, he continued his gang activity.

On 5 October 1952, Vasil Okhrimovich (“Georgian”), OUN conductor of the Carpathian region was captured in an ambush by the MGB officers. He was sentenced to be shot by a military tribunal on 19 May 1954.

On 11 June 1953, in the Kremenets forests, a special group of the NKVD captured Vasyl Galasa (“Orlan”), an OUN conductor in the Northwestern Ukrainian lands, a member of the OUN wire. The plan for his elimination was developed by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR in March-June 1953, Pavel Meshik, who also planned to legalize the Uniate Church and create a legal center for the OUN, headed by the former deputy chairman of the Central Rada, Nikolay Shrag, who returned to Ukraine in 1924, in 1931 was convicted and then amnestied, becoming a professor of economics in Lvov. Galasa was convicted and released in 1960. In the same year, a member of the UIA-West team, commander of one hundred soldiers Khmara, died.

On 19 May 1954, Nikolay Tverdokhlib (“Grim”), commander of the 4th military district of the UIA-West “Hoverla”, head of the

Security Council of the Carpathian Territory, OUN conductor in the Western Ukrainian lands, died in the Nadvirnyansky district in the Carpathians, in his cache on Mount Berezovichka, southeast of the village of Zeleny.

On 24 May 1954 Vasil Kuk, the last member of the OUN central wire in Ukraine, was arrested. Kuk was born in the Lvov region in January 1913 and became a lawyer at the University of Lublin, where he met the future head of the OUN, Stepan Bandera. He was in Polish prisons from April 1941 and was a head of the central headquarters of trekking groups, commander of the UIA-South in the Rovno region, deputy Shukhevych, the last commander of the UIA.

Thus, by the mid-1950s the OUN underground on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR was completely destroyed. If in April 1952 in Western Ukraine there were 71 OUN wires (160 people), 84 combat groups (252 people) and individual militants (647 people), then by November 1953, there were respectively, 15 wires (40 people), 32 underground groups (164 people), and 106 individual militants. In 1954, the OUN carried out only 13 actions, including seven terrorist attacks. By March 1955, in Western Ukraine there were 11 combat groups (32 people), 17 individual militants and 500 illegal immigrants were wanted.

In 1959, the end was put to the Bandera's movement. On 15 October 1959 Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera was assassinated by the KGB agent Bogdan Stashinskiy. From the second half of the 1940s Bandera had lived in Munich and collaborated with the American and British intelligence, leading the so-called wire of the foreign parts of the OUN.

Later, after completion of the defeat of Bandera, the Soviet government took steps to rehabilitate the Ukrainian nationalists. Nikita Khrushchev played a key role in this. On his initiative, on 17 September 1955, "Soviet citizens who collaborated with the occupants during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945" were rehabilitated. Due to this decree, about 100 thousand Ukrainian nationalists were released from prison. The same quantity who fled to the countries of the West returned to the Soviet Union without a fear of punishment. The overwhelming majority of the rehabilitated nationalists settled on the territory of Western Ukraine.

These measures were controversial. On the one hand, rehabilitation contributed to the establishment of peace in the Western Ukrainian lands. On the other hand, the return of hundreds of thousands of Bandera's followers to the territory of Western Ukraine created an opportunity for preservation and reproduction of the ideology of nationalism in the Ukrainian society.

In addition to the fight against the armed Nazi underground, the Republic's primary task was to restore the economy, which was destroyed during the Great Patriotic War.

During the war years, Ukraine lost 8 million people, which amounted to 20 % of the population. The invaders destroyed 714 cities and towns, more than 28 thousand villages. More than 16 thousand enterprises, about 33 thousand collective farms, state farms and MTS were destroyed. 10 million people in Ukraine were left homeless.

Zaporizhstal, Azovstal, DneproGES, Mariupol Metallurgical Plant, machine-building enterprises in Kiev and Kharkov, and Donbass mines laid in ruins. Only 19% of industrial enterprises remained intact. The total losses amounted to an astronomical amount of 1.2 trillion rubles.

The losses associated with the war and the occupation were exacerbated by adverse weather conditions, a winter with little snow and a drought in 1946. The grain harvest in Ukraine in 1946 was three times lower than in the pre-war 1940. The result was a Ukraine famine of 1946–1947, spreading to several regions of the USSR.

In 1946, the process of economic recovery began within the framework of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. In March 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the law "On the Five-Year Plan for the Restoration and Development of the National Economy." In August 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted a similar law. In accordance with it, the task was set to bring the gross volume of industrial output by 1950 to 113% compared to 1940. Priority goals were the restoration of heavy industry, transport, energy, as well as construction of new factories.

At the same time, unlike the countries of Western Europe where economic recovery was carried out as part of the Marshall Plan, the Soviet Union could only rely on its own forces and resources. The recovery period took place in the conditions of the beginning of

the Cold War, a large-scale confrontation with the West, requiring significant efforts to develop military potential.

Nevertheless, due to the selfless work of millions of workers, peasants, scientists, engineers and technicians, the tasks of an economic restoration were solved in record time.

During 1946–1950, industrial enterprises, mines, and power plants destroyed during the years of war were restored. Among the restored enterprises were the Kharkov tractor and turbogenerator plants, the Kiev Bolshevik plant, the Voroshilovgrad locomotive building plant, and the Novokramatorsk machine-building plant.

Main sectors of the economy of the Ukrainian SSR — metallurgy and energy — were completely restored. Enterprises and industries that produced military products during the years of war were transferred to production of the machine tools, equipment and other civil products. The volume of industrial production grew in comparison with the pre-war level. In 1950, the volume of industrial production exceeded the pre-war level of 1940 by 15 %, which was more than planned. Industrial output increased 4.4 times over the years of the Five-Year Plan which provided for accelerated development of mechanical engineering and the electric power industry. As a result, impressive success was achieved. If in 1945 the production of machine-building was 29 % of the pre-war level, then by the end of the Five-Year Plan, in 1950, it amounted to 144 %.

At the beginning of 1947, the first turbine of the DneproGES was restored. By June 1950, the flagship of the Soviet energy industry was completely restored. It was possible to significantly exceed the pre-war level. In 1940, electricity generation was 12.7 billion kWh. By 1950, this figure increased up to 14.7 billion kWh. New branches of industry were created — radio engineering, instrument making, automotive industry, etc. During the years of the fourth Five-Year Plan, new large plants were built — the Kiev Aviation Plant, the Odessa Automobile Assembly Plant, the Kharkov Bearing Plant, the Zaporozhye Transformer Plant, the Lvov Instrumental Plant, and others. Production of the cars and aircrafts started for the first time in Ukraine. From 1948 production of the AN-2 aircraft began at the Kiev Aviation Plant.

The famous “biplane” would become the most widespread aircraft of the Soviet era and would play an important role in the development

of transport communications in the Soviet Union, linking remote villages and towns with regional centers. If before the war in the Ukrainian SSR there was no car production at all, during the years of the fourth Five-Year Plan 18 thousand trucks were produced.

Development of new deposits of oil, gas, coal, and sulfur began in the Ukrainian SSR. In 1946–1949 large gas fields were discovered in the Drogobych region: Uherskoye, Bilche-Volynskoye and Rudkovskoye. The Dashava-Kiev gas pipeline was put into operation, which became the largest at that time not only in the USSR, but also in Europe.

During the years of the fourth Five-Year Plan it was possible to restore the railway network, which was almost completely destroyed during the war period. Moreover, by 1950 the freight turnover of the Ukrainian railways exceeded the pre-war level by 17 %.

It should be noted that during this period, many high-tech industries were created. In 1946, the first experimental nuclear reactor was launched. In 1948–1951 the first computer was made. The technology of automatic metal welding was proposed, which was used in the construction of the first in the USSR main gas pipeline Dashava — Kiev and the bridge across the Dnepr.

In December 1947, due to the growth in agricultural production, ration cards were canceled and the threat of famine disappeared. Ukraine again became the granary and livestock base of the USSR. Prior to 1950, the pre-war level of agricultural production was reached.

Restoration of the Ukrainian economy was achieved due to the efforts of all republics of the Soviet Union. Hundreds of thousands of residents of the RSFSR and other republics recreated the industrial and agricultural potential of the Ukrainian SSR. Thus, the number of workers in the mines of Donbass in 1945 was only 10 % of the pre-war figure. By 1950, the quantity amounted to 119 % of the pre-war level. Out of 100,000 workers who arrived in the Donbass during this time, 90,000 came from the RSFSR.

An important task was to restore the standard of living of the population. A large-scale housing construction program was launched. By 1950, 46 million square meters of housing had been built. In December 1947, the food distribution rationing system was abolished. An 8-hour working day was introduced, overtime work was cancelled and vacations were restored.

In less than three years, the pre-war network of schools was restored in the Republic. In 1948 there were already more than 29,000 schools with 6.1 million students. During the years of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946–1950), 2,400 schools were built using the method of public construction and 1,000 schools at the expense of government subsidies. In the 1948/1949 academic year, transition to a universal seven-year education began, and in major cities — to a ten-year education. In the 1951/1952 academic year, the number of schools for working youth increased from 10 to 1203, in which working youth could study in the evening.

As a result of the recovery period, Ukraine returned to the status of one of the key industrial and agricultural regions of the USSR. In terms of industrial development, it was ahead of many European countries. In 1950, the Ukrainian SSR produced 54.2 % of coke, 47.8 % of cast iron, 38.4 % of metallurgical equipment, 30.6 % of steel, 29.9 % of coal, and 16.1 % of the electricity of the USSR. At the same time, the specific weight of the Ukrainian economy in the all-Union economy decreased. This was due to creation of new industrial centers in Siberia and the Far East. These changes were the result of the experience of the Great Patriotic War, when the western territories of the country were the first to be attacked by Nazi Germany.

In the 1950s after completion of the main phase of the recovery period, a number of measures were taken to improve the standard of living of the population. In March 1956, duration of the working day was reduced by two hours on the day before the holidays and weekends. Duration of maternity leave was extended. The working day for teenagers was reduced to six hours. In July 1956 the minimum pension was increased up to 300 rubles. In September 1956 the minimum wage was raised by a third. Tuition fees were abolished in high school, technical schools and universities.

By the beginning of the 1960s, a transition was made to a five-day work week and a 7-hour work day. Pensions were doubled.

In July 1957, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted the Decree “On Development of Housing Construction in the USSR.” Mass housing construction began in all cities of the Soviet Union. If for the period from 1918 to 1940 in the Ukrainian SSR 78.5 thousand square meters were built, then for the period from 1956 to 1960 —

more than two times more, 183 thousand square meters were built. Almost 18 million residents of the republic received new housing and improved their living conditions.

In the 1950s-1960s, development of the industrial and scientific potential of Ukraine continued. The Republic became one of the leaders in the scientific and technological development of the Soviet Union. In 1957, the Computing Center of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR was established. In 1960, a nuclear reactor was put into operation at the Republican Institute of Physics. In 1961, artificial diamonds were synthesized for the first time. In 1962, the Institute of Cybernetics was established. In 1964, the first electron accelerator was created at the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology.

New machine-building enterprises were created in Dnepropetrovsk, Kremenchug, Nikolaev, Kherson, Zaporozhye, Lvov. A powerful shipbuilding center was formed in Nikolaev, one of the largest in the USSR. The Kiev, Kremenchug and Dneprodzerzhinsk hydroelectric power military posts were built, which led to a significant increase in the role of the Republic in the energy system of the Soviet Union.

Significant progress was made in the creation of transport communications. In 1962, the first stage of the Druzhba oil pipeline was put into operation, which became the main pipeline project of the Soviet Union and provided a supply of Soviet oil to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Development of the aircraft industry received a serious impetus. Here the Ukrainian SSR also occupied key positions. At the Kharkov Aircraft Building Plant, production of the TU-104 passenger turbojet aircraft and then another model, the TU-124, began. The production of the AN-24 turboprop aircraft was mastered at the Kiev Aircraft Building Plant.

Dnepropetrovsk became the flagship of the development of Soviet civilian and military rocket science. It was here, at the Southern Machine-Building Plant, where the first artificial Earth satellite was produced in 1957 and the first manned spacecraft in 1961. Yuriy Gagarin's flight into the space, which became a symbol of the scientific and technical power of the Soviet Union, was implemented due to the efforts of the workers and engineers of Yuzhmash. The Chief Designer of the first Soviet ballistic missiles and spacecraft, including the first

manned spacecraft Vostok-1, academician Sergey Korolev was the great son of the Ukrainian land, born in the family of a Zhytomyr teacher of Russian literature.

In the 1950s-1970s there was a significant strengthening of the position of the political leadership of Ukraine. A number of representatives of the Ukrainian party and Soviet nomenklatura occupied dominant positions in the governing bodies of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the share and significance of representatives of the Ukrainian SSR in the Soviet elite in these years significantly exceeded the positions of representatives of other union republics.

From 1953 to 1964 Nikita Khrushchev was the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (in 1958–1964, also Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR). A significant part of Nikita Sergeevich's career was related to Ukraine. In 1938 he became the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Then, during the Great Patriotic War, he was a member of the military councils of the fronts that fought also on the territory of Ukraine: Southwestern, Stalingrad, Southern, Voronezh, and the 1st Ukrainian fronts. In the post-war period, he worked as the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR (1944–1947) and again as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (1947–1949).

The next leader of the Soviet Union, after the removal of Khrushchev, was Leonid Brezhnev, also directly related to Ukraine. Leonid Ilyich was born in the village of Kamenskoye, Ekaterinoslav Governorate, into a family of a hereditary worker. In 1939–1941 he worked as Secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Committee of the Communist Party (b)U. After the war, he returned to party work in Ukraine. In 1946–1947 he served as First Secretary of the Zaporozhye Regional Committee of the Communist Party (b)U. He supervised restoration of the DneproGES. In 1948–1950 he headed the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Party Committee. Then he worked in Moldova and Kazakhstan. From 1957 he was a Member of the Presidium (since 1966 — Politburo) of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

On 14 October 1964 Leonid Brezhnev was declared First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. From 1966 to 1982 he was

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. From 1977 he also combined the positions of party leader and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Important party and state positions were also occupied by Ukrainians Aleksey Kirichenko, Nikolay Podgornyi, Dmitriy Polyanskiy and Vladimir Shcherbytskiy.

A native of the Kherson Governorate, Aleksey Kirichenko was the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U from in 1953–1957. From 1952 he was a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Due to the support of Nikita Khrushchev, in 1954 he was elected a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and in 1955 a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In 1958–1959 he served as Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and chaired meetings of the Central Committee of the CPSU. That meant a special degree of trust on the part of the leader of the party and state, Nikita Khrushchev. In 1960, due to disagreements with Khrushchev, he was removed from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and lost his position in the Central Committee of the CPSU.

An even more sky-rocketing career was made by a native of the Poltava Governorate, Nikolay Podgornyi. In 1950–1953 Podgornyi was the First Secretary of the Kharkov Regional Party Committee. In 1957, he replaced Aleksey Kirichenko as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U and held this position until 1963. In 1963, he took the position of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The following year, he supported Leonid Brezhnev in actions aimed at removing Nikita Khrushchev from power. The result was an actual split of power with Brezhnev. If Leonid Ilyich assumed the position of party leader, Podgornyi got the position of “President of the Soviet Union” — Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Nikolay Viktorovich was in this position from 1965 to 1977, when he ceded it to Brezhnev.

Native of the city of Slavyanoserbbsk, Ekaterinoslav Governorate, the same age as the revolution, Dmitriy Polyanskiy in 1952–1954 served as chairman of the Crimean regional executive committee. In 1954, he supported Nikita Khrushchev’s idea of transferring Crimea to Ukraine and was appointed First Secretary of the Crimean Regional

Party Committee. He occupied this position from 1954–1955. In 1957, Polyanskiy actively supported Khrushchev during his fight against the “anti-party group”. In 1958 he was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. In 1960 he was elected a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. From 1966 to 1976 he was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In 1962–1965 he served as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In 1964, he supported Brezhnev when Khrushchev was removed from power. In 1965–1973 he served as the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In 1973–1976 he headed the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR.

Vladimir Shcherbitskiy was born in Verkhnedneprovsk, Ekaterinoslav Governorate. In the second half of the 1940s he served as the Second Secretary of the Dneprodzerzhinsk City Party Committee. At the same time, the head of the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Committee was Leonid Brezhnev. Emergence of friendly relations between the two party leaders occurred in this period. In 1955–1957 Shcherbitskiy served as first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk regional party committee and was dismissed due to his participation in the “anti-party group” — a coalition of party leaders led by Georgiy Malenkov, who was trying to remove Khrushchev. Nevertheless, in 1961, Shcherbitskiy was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, and soon became a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, in 1963, another resignation of Shcherbitskiy took place, caused by a negative evaluation of his activities by Nikita Khrushchev. Nevertheless, in 1963–1965, Shcherbitskiy again assumed the position of head of the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Party Committee.

After Brezhnev came to power, Vladimir Shcherbitskiy was also promoted. In 1972 he took the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Shcherbitskiy remained the leader of the Ukrainian Communists almost until the end of existence of the Soviet Union, leaving the position in 1989. Vladimir Shcherbitskiy was part of Brezhnev’s inner circle and after his death was considered one of the likely leaders of the Soviet Union.

Presence in the leadership of the Soviet Union of a significant group of people from Ukraine was supplemented by the special status of the Communist Party of Ukraine in comparison with the

party organizations of other union republics. An important feature the Ukrainian SSR was a presence of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. None of the republics, except Ukraine, had its own Politburo.

In addition to party and Soviet positions, people from Ukraine were in the leadership of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. A native of Odessa, Marshal Rodion Malinovskiy served as the Minister of Defense of the USSR between 1957–1967, combining leadership of the army with the position of Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. He was replaced by another Ukrainian, Marshal Andrey Grechko, who was the Minister of Defense from 1967 to 1976. Grechko also served from 1961–1976 as a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and from 1973–1976 as a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. A native of the Ekaterinoslav Governorate, Marshal Kirill Moskalenko from 1960 to 1985 served as a Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and headed the Strategic Missile Forces. Between 1956–1985 he was a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Omnipotent in the 1960s-1970s Minister of the Interior of the USSR Nikolay Shchelokov was also a native of Ukraine, a native of the Ekaterinoslav Governorate, and an ally of Leonid Brezhnev. In 1966–1968 Shchelokov served as the Minister of Public Order of the USSR, then from 1968 to 1982 as the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and from 1968 as a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Representative of the Ukrainian nomenklatura was also the head of the KGB of the Soviet Union, a native of the Ekaterinoslav Governorate, Vladimir Semichastnyi. In 1946–1950 Semichastnyi headed the Ukrainian Komsomol. Then he continued his career as a Komsomol leader already at the union level, becoming in 1950 secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, and in 1958–1959 First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League. In 1961–1967 Semichastnyi served as Chairman of the KGB. Despite the fact that he owed much of his rise to Khrushchev, in 1964 Semichastnyi played an important role in the removal of Nikita Sergeevich and the transfer of power to another native of the Ekaterinoslav Governorate, Leonid Brezhnev.

Nevertheless, for a new leader of the country, Vladimir Semichastnyi was an inconvenient figure. In 1967, the decline of his career began. He moved to the formally prestigious, but significantly less prominent position of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and then, in 1981, took the position of chairman of the board of a public organization — the All-Union Society “Knowledge”. Nevertheless, until 1988, Semichastnyi retained his association with the highest Soviet nomenclature.

Thus, the post-war period of development of the Soviet Union is characterized by a significant strengthening of representatives of Ukraine in the leadership of the country, who occupied in the 1950s-1980s a number of key positions in the party, Soviet structures, the army, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In the 1950s a new stage of Ukrainianization began. It was based on actions aimed at expanding the use of the Ukrainian language, spreading Ukrainian culture, and supporting Ukrainian education and science. The Ministry of Higher Education of the Ukrainian SSR, the Union of Journalists of the Ukrainian SSR and the Union of Cinematographers of the Ukrainian SSR were created.

There was an interest in study of the history of Ukraine. In 1957, the Ukrainian Historical Journal began to be published. In 1959, preparation of the multi-volume Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia began. In total, in the period up to 1965, 17 volumes were published containing 45,000 articles. About 5 thousand authors were involved in the work on encyclopedia.

In 1955, measures were taken to increase a share of teaching in higher educational institutions in the Ukrainian language. However, higher education institutions still mainly used the Russian language. The exception was the western regions of the republic. Therefore, in 1965, the Minister of Higher and Secondary Education of the Ukrainian SSR sent out a letter of instruction demanding a gradual transition to teaching in the Ukrainian language.

The number of periodical editions in Ukrainian language increased. In 1958, 64 publications were published in the Republic. Of these, 47, i. e. almost three quarters, were in Ukrainian. In 1962, the republican Shevchenko Prize was established in the area of literature, journalism, art and architecture.

In the 1960s and 1970s the growth of the economy of the Ukrainian SSR continued. The VIII Five-Year Plan was especially successful. Electrification of the territory of the Republic was completed. Industrial production in 1966–1970 increased by 50 %, labor productivity in industry by 28 %, and national income by 30 %. At the same time, agricultural production also increased, but only by 16.6 %.

Subsequently, there was a downward trend in the economic growth indicators. However, until the mid-1980s the economy of the Republic showed growth. Thus, in the years of the VIII Five-Year Plan, the average annual growth of the national income amounted to 6.8 %; through the years of the IX Five-Year Plan (1971–1975) 4.6 %; through the X Five-Year Plan (1976–1980) 3.4 % and during the years of the XI Five-Year Plan (1981–1985) 3.7 %. The average annual increase of labor productivity over the same period amounted to, respectively, 6.1 % in 1966–1970; 4.1 % in 1971–1975; 3.0 % in 1976–1980; 3.8 % in 1981–1985.

The Republic produced more than half of the all-Union volume of iron ore production, more than a third of the production of cast iron, steel and rolled products.

The living standards of the Republic's population continued to rise. In the 1970s a transition to the universal secondary education was completed. Over the 20-year period from 1965 to 1985, production of consumer goods almost doubled. Mass construction of the housing stock continued at an intensive rate. During this period, 7.3 million apartments were built. By 1985 the problem of resettlement of barracks and basements was generally resolved. Between 1960 and 1980 the average monthly wage doubled. During 1965–1985 the number of specialists with higher education tripled from 900,000 to 2.7 million people.

On 20 April 1978, following an adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR, the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR was adopted, which remained in effect after the collapse of the Soviet Union, until 1995.

In accordance with the Constitution, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed a “socialist state of all people” (Article 1). The Republic retained “the right to freely secede from the USSR” (Article 69). At the same time, a specific procedure for secession was not established. Absence of a constitutional and legal secession

mechanism made it possible to consider this norm as a declarative one that had no real political force.

Just as in the Constitution of the USSR, the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR established the monopoly of the Communist Party on power. Article 6 of the Constitution stated the following: “The leading and guiding force of the Soviet society, the core of its political system, state and public organizations is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people. Armed with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the Communist Party determines the general perspective of the development of society, the line of domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, directs the great creative activities of the Soviet people, imparts a systematic, scientifically substantiated nature to its struggle for the victory of communism. All party organizations operate within the framework of the Constitution of the USSR”.

The Constitution established the administrative and territorial division of the Ukrainian SSR. The Republic consisted of 25 regions, including the following regions: Vinnitsa, Volyn, Voroshilovgrad, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Transcarpathia, Zaporozhye, Ivano-Frankovsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Crimea, Lvov, Nikolaev, Odessa, Poltava, Rovno, Sumy, Ternopol, Kharkov, Kherson, Khmelnytskiy, Cherkassy, Chernovtsy and Chernigov. The special status of the cities of Kiev and Sevastopol as cities of republican importance was also determined.

In the mid 1980s the negative trends begin to appear in the social and economic area. There was an increase in prices. Shortage of goods, primarily in relation to consumer goods, became a significant problem.

An accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on 26 April 1986, as well as the policy of hushing up the consequences of the accident on the part of the authorities, had a serious negative effect. As a result of fire and explosion, the fourth power unit of the plant was destroyed. A significant amount of radioactive substances was released into the environment. However, a few days later, despite the danger of radioactive contamination, a traditional May Day demonstration took place in Kiev. Residents of the capital city of Ukraine learned about the consequences of the accident only 10 days after it. This was the reason for formation of a negative attitude towards the actions of government officials in a critical situation.

Explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was the largest accident in the nuclear industry on a global scale. 31 people died directly from acute radiation injury and burns. Another 134 people were ill with acute radiation sickness. Radioactive substances released from the destroyed reactor turned the territories of Ukraine, Belarus and the RSFSR, located near the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, into unsuitable ones for life and economic activities. More than 115 thousand people were forced to leave the 30-kilometer exclusion zone around the station.

500 thousand people representing all republics of the Soviet Union participated in the liquidation of the consequences of the accident. The accident became an important event in the social and political life of the late Soviet Union and intensified negative views, superimposed on social and economic problems.

In the second half of the 1980s in all republics of the USSR there was an activation in the social and political area. Nationalist ideas and separatist tendencies becoming popular.

In 1988, Ukrainian dissident Vyacheslav Chernovol created the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, the first opposition organization to the CPSU on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. In 1989, the mass movement People's Rukh of Ukraine for Perestroika arose, uniting representatives of a part of the Ukrainian intellectuals, headed by the poet Ivan Drach. Vyacheslav Chernovol also joined the leadership of the organization.

The Draft Program and Charter of the "People's Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika" was published by the newspaper of the Union of Writers "Literaturnaya Ukraina" on 16 February 1989. The purpose of the organization was to promote democratization and conclude a new Union Treaty between the republics of the USSR.

Creation of the organization and publication of its policy documents were impossible without the assistance of the leadership of the Ukrainian communists and personally the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine for Ideology Leonid Kravchuk.

On 8 September 1989, the Congress of the People's Rukh opened in Kiev, in which 1109 delegates participated. 20% of the congress participants were members of the CPSU.

At this stage the Soviet political system entered a period of acute crisis. On 26 March 1989 elections of the people's deputies were held in the USSR. For the first time since the revolutionary period, they were of an alternative nature and led to formation of an opposition faction — the Interregional Deputy Group. Centrifugal tendencies intensified in the Union republics. Preparations for the elections of republican deputies began.

On 27 October 1989 the law of the Ukrainian SSR on the election of deputies was adopted and amendments were made to the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR. The possibility of holding alternative elections with an unlimited number of candidates was provided: "Any number of candidates can be included on ballots".

The monopoly of the Communist Party was abolished, it became possible for independent candidates to participate in elections through their nomination by meetings of voters at the place of residence: "The right to nominate candidates for people's deputies belongs to labor collectives, public organizations, collectives of secondary specialized and higher educational institutions, meetings of voters at the place of residence and military personnel in military units".

The elections of people's deputies were held in two rounds, on 4 and 18 March 1990. The main competitors during an election campaign were the Communists and a number of opposition parties and movements, united in the Democratic Bloc coalition. It included the People's Rukh of Ukraine for Perestroika, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, the Green Party of Ukraine and smaller organizations. According to the results of the elections, the communists won, having received an absolute majority, 331 out of 500 parliamentary seats. 111 deputies were elected from the Democratic Bloc.

Vladimir Ivashko, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, who resigned as head of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

By this time, the process of disintegration of the Soviet Union had accelerated. A catalyst of the process was a conflict between the Soviet leadership, headed by the USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, and the leadership of the RSFSR, headed by Boris Yeltsin. On 12 June 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR adopted the Declaration on

State Sovereignty. This decision accelerated the growth of separatist views in the union republics, primarily in Ukraine.

On 16 July, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR also adopted the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine. Ukraine was proclaimed an independent sovereign state:

“The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, expressing a will of the people of Ukraine, striving to create a democratic society, proceeding from the needs of comprehensive provision of the human rights and freedoms, respecting the national rights of all peoples, caring for the full political, economic, social and spiritual development of the people of Ukraine, recognizing the need to build a state governed by the rule of law, aiming to establish the sovereignty and self-government of the people of Ukraine, proclaims: the state sovereignty of Ukraine as the supremacy, independence, completeness and indivisibility of the power of the Republic within its territory and independence and equality in external relations”.

The Declaration defined Ukraine as a subject of international law, entering into equal relations with other sovereign states and participating in the “pan-European process”: “The Ukrainian SSR, as a subject of international law, maintains direct relations with other states, concludes treaties with them, exchanges diplomatic, consular, trade missions, takes part in the activities of international organizations to the extent necessary to effectively provide for national interests of the Republic in the political, economic, environmental, information, scientific, technical, cultural and sports areas.

The Ukrainian SSR acts as an equal participant in international communication, actively contributes to strengthening of common peace and international security, and directly participates in the pan-European process and European structures.”

At the same time, the Declaration secured the neutral, non-bloc and non-nuclear status of Ukraine: “The Ukrainian SSR solemnly proclaims its intention to become in the future a permanently neutral state that does not take part in military blocs and adheres to three non-nuclear principles: do not accept, do not produce or acquire nuclear weapons”.

However, adoption of the Declaration did not yet mean secession from the USSR. Rather, it was about a beginning of the secession

process. The Ukrainian SSR was still a part of the Soviet Union. The Union leadership tried to slow down a development of separatist tendencies and win over the leadership of the Ukrainian SSR to its side. On 11 July 1990, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR received the position of Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and resigned as speaker. On 18 July, Leonid Kravchuk was transferred to the position of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

The future first president of Ukraine was born in the Volyn region of Poland. From 1958 he was engaged in teaching activities, and from 1970 he switched to party work. In June 1990, he took the post of Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Kravchuk played a key role in the process of disintegration and collapse of the Soviet Union.

Transfer of the head of the Ukrainian SSR to Moscow did not stop the development of separatist tendencies in Ukraine, but rather accelerated this process. Supporters of independence received an important ally in the new chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

On 17 October 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted a resolution according to which it refused to discuss a new union treaty until an adoption of the new Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR.

On 19 November 1990, in Kiev, Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin signed the so-called Treaty of Solidarity between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR. The parties agreed to act jointly to uphold state sovereignty: "The High Contracting Parties recognize each other as sovereign states and undertake to refrain from actions that may damage the state sovereignty of the other Party".

Conclusion of the treaty meant a unification of the efforts of political leadership of the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR in the fight against the Union leadership headed by Mikhail Gorbachev. The Treaty led to an acceleration of disintegration processes.

An attempt to save the Soviet Union was the All-Union referendum held on 17 March 1991. The following question was submitted to the referendum: "Do you consider it necessary to preserve the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of a person of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?” 77.85 % of the voters of the Soviet Union voted for preservation of the USSR. The population of Ukraine also supported preservation of the USSR. 70.2 % of voters voted for this. This figure was only slightly less than in the RSFSR (71.3 %). Nevertheless, the referendum did not become an obstacle to actions aimed at collapse of the unified state. The opinion of the people of the USSR was subsequently neglected. The next step along the path of collapse of the USSR was the creation on 19 August 1991 of the State Committee on the State of Emergency of the USSR. On 24 August 1991, after the report of Leonid Kravchuk the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. The document provided for the secession of Ukraine from the USSR and a supremacy on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR:

“Based on the mortal danger impending over Ukraine in connection with the uprising in the USSR on 19 August 1991,

- continuing the thousand-year tradition of creating a state in Ukraine,
- based on the right to self-determination provided by the UN Charter and other international legal documents,
- implementing the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine,

The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic solemnly proclaims the independence of Ukraine and creation of an independent Ukrainian state — Ukraine. The territory of Ukraine is indivisible and inviolable. From now on, only the Constitution and laws of Ukraine operate on the territory of Ukraine. This act enters into force from the moment of its approval”.

On 4 September 1991, in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, a new state flag was raised over the building of the Supreme Soviet, replacing the flag of Soviet Ukraine — the yellow and blue flag of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. On 8 October, the law “On Citizenship of Ukraine” was adopted. 7 November — the law “On the State Border”.

On 1 December 1991 a referendum on independence was held on the territory of Ukraine. The ballot paper contained the following question: “Do you confirm the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine?” 84.18 % of Ukrainian voters participated in the referendum. 90.32 % of voters who participated in the referendum supported the Act of Declaration of Independence.

At the same time, the first presidential elections were held in Ukraine. The main struggle unfolded between Leonid Kravchuk, who participated in the elections as an independent candidate, and Vyacheslav Chernovol, a representative of the People’s Rukh. Kravchuk won in the first round, receiving 61.59 % of the votes. His opponent scored much less — 23.27 %.

On 8 December 1991, at the initiative of Leonid Kravchuk, the presidents of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus signed an Agreement on liquidation of the USSR and a creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The preamble of the Treaty contained the following provision: “We, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation (RSFSR), Ukraine, as the founding states of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics that signed the Union Treaty of 1922, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties, state that the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality ceases to exist”.

On 21 December 1991, the Alma-Ata Declaration on establishment of the CIS was adopted. On 25 December, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as the President of the USSR. The Soviet Union ceased to exist. It was precisely the Ukrainian president who initiated a collapse of the USSR. This is how he spoke about it in an interview:

“– <...> Italian journalist and political scientist Giulietto Kieza in his book “Good bye, Russia!” expressed an opinion that it was you who became the main initiator of collapse of the USSR. Do you agree with this evaluation?

– <...> I was not the main initiator of collapse of the USSR, it was the Ukrainian people. I implemented its will. On 1 December 1991, an all-Ukrainian referendum was held in Ukraine. 91 % of citizens of Ukraine in all regions voted for creation of an independent Ukrainian state, in fact, for secession from the Soviet Union. This is the direct expression of the people’s will. And I arrived to Belovezhye and said

frankly to my interlocutors: “Friends, comrades, as you wish, now I don’t decide for myself whether I want it or not, people voted for independence, elected me president on that day and said: “Leonid Makarovich, fulfil our will.” This is the direct expression of the people’s will. And I cannot change the point of view of my people.”

That is, Mr. Journalist is right in the sense that Ukraine played a decisive role, and I fulfilled its will”.

Independence of Ukraine was immediately recognized by the Western countries, who were interested in collapse of the USSR and hoped to establish control over the republic in the future. Poland and Canada were the first to recognize Ukraine. It occurred on 2 December 1991.

And this despite the fact that the Belovezhsky Agreements were signed only six days after that, and the Soviet Union ceased to exist on 26 December 1991. The day before, on 25 December, Ukraine was recognized by the United States.

At the time of collapse of the USSR, Ukraine was one of the leading union republics, not inferior, but in many ways superior to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. High-quality education, high scientific and technical potential, developed agriculture, a powerful military and industrial complex and industrial base.

For 30 years, from 1961 to 1990, the economic potential of the Ukrainian SSR grew almost four times. The volume of industrial production increased five times. The electric power industry grew six times, mechanical engineering 12 times, agriculture two times. During this period, the population of the republic increased by 9 million people.

The Ukrainian SSR was a highly developed industrial-agrarian economy with a complex set of heavy, food, light industries and diversified agriculture. In total, the economy of the Ukrainian SSR had 300 industries. Ukraine accounted for 100% of the production of bucket-wheel excavators, corn and beet harvesters of the Soviet Union, 95.4% of coal cleaning combines, 76.7% of coal mining, 61.9% of sugar production, 47% of power transformers, 46.6% of salt production, 40.5% of blast furnace and steelmaking equipment, 35.7% of finished steel, 34.1% of steel pipes, 32.8% of vegetable oil, 24% of large electrical machines, 23.9% of crop protection chemicals, 22.6%

of leather footwear production, 21.9 % of meat production, 21.3 % of confectionery production, 18.7 % of natural gas production, over 17 % of electricity production, 17.4 % of knitwear production, 15.5 % of mineral fertilizers production.

Aircraft manufacturer of the Ukrainian SSR annually produced about 250 aircrafts, the Yuzhnoye production association created the most powerful missiles in the world, and the world's largest shipping company, the Black Sea Shipping Company, owned in 1991 234 cargo and passenger ships with a total tonnage of 4 million 167 thousand tons.

Ukraine ranked 17th in the world in terms of GDP in 1990, ahead of such countries as Australia, Argentina, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa. In terms of GDP per capita, Ukraine ranked 48th in the world, ahead of many countries in Europe and Asia. For example, the per capita GDP of neighboring Poland in 1990 was USD6,179, while the per capita GDP of Ukraine amounted to USD7,305. Among the republics of the Soviet Union in terms of GDP per capita, the Ukrainian SSR ranked third after the RSFSR and Kazakhstan.

The Ukrainian SSR had a developed scientific infrastructure. 313,079 scientists worked in scientific institutes and laboratories.

In 1991, Ukraine did not have an external debt, since the Russian Federation assumed all the debt obligations of the Soviet Union. 51.5 million people lived in Ukraine, i. e. it was one of the largest states in Europe.

Chapter 13

UKRAINE IN 1992–2014

The independent Ukrainian state that emerged in December 1991 was created within the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR, including all territories acquired in 1939–1954 with a predominantly non-Ukrainian population. The state functioned on the basis of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR adopted back in the Soviet times. In general, with some changes, the Soviet system of government was preserved. Despite the 1991 ban on the Communist Party, former communist Leonid Kravchuk was the President. Other government positions were also held by representatives of the former party and Soviet nomenklatura.

However, the newly created state immediately set a course for a radical break with the Soviet past and an orientation towards a nationalist idea as the basis of state ideology. This, first of all, was expressed in the issue of the succession of Ukraine. In March 1992, the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic in Exile acting on the territory of Canada decided to transfer powers to the new Ukrainian government. On August 22, 1992, in Kiev, the official transfer of the state regalia of the UPR and a letter stating that Ukraine is the legal successor of the Ukrainian People's Republic was carried out by the President of the UPR in exile, Nikolay Plavyuk, to the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk.

Thus, new Ukraine connected its past not with the Soviet Republic, its achievements in the development of industry, science, education and culture, the heroic past during the Great Patriotic War, but with

the Ukrainian People's Republic, which stained itself with cooperation with German and Polish interventionists during the civil war and Nazi Germany during World War II. During the Cold War, the UPR Government in Exile was an ideological tool of the US struggle against the Soviet Union.

Nikolay Plavyuk during the Great Patriotic War was an activist in the Plast scouting movement, which was the youth wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and then emigrated to Canada, where he became an active member of the Ukrainian diaspora. In 1967, he was one of the organizers of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, the largest organization of the diaspora, the core of which was made up of supporters of the OUN(m) collaborator leader Andrey Melnik. In 1967–1969 Plavyuk was the general secretary of the organization, and in 1978–1981 — its president. In 1981, he took the position of the head of the OUN. Plavyuk was the leader of the organization until his death in 2012. In 1989, he headed the Ukrainian People's Republic in exile.

The act of succession of the UPR determined a further vector of development of the Ukrainian statehood, aimed at confrontation with Russia and a desire to become part of the Western community. At the same time, a radical form of Ukrainian nationalism became the ideological pillar of the state.

In Ukraine, nationalist manifestations grew more and more, and there was no resistance at all. This was especially evident in the western regions of the country, where again the main heroes of recent Ukrainian history were Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych and similar figures. One of the indicators of the anti-Russian orientation of actions of the Ukrainian leadership was a large-scale campaign, designated as the conscious (by the Soviet authorities) murders of the Ukrainian people in the early 1930s. This historical propaganda campaign is known as the Holodomor. It started back in the early 1990s. This is evidenced by the international scientific conference dedicated to the 60th anniversary of famine and initiated by Ukrainian historians in Kiev in the autumn of 1993. President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk and the leaders of the People's Rukh spoke at the conference. From them the words about the famine in Ukraine, “organized by foreign people”, were heard.

The course towards building a mono-ethnic state and “European integration” was laid in the early 1990s. The nomenclature workers, who suddenly became the leaders of the state, initiated a forced Ukrainization along the lines of the Soviet indigenization of the 1920s. According to the censuses, the number of residents who called themselves Russians began to decline steadily. On the one hand, it was socially disapproved behavior to talk about their Russian identity, on the other hand, migration to the Russian Federation and the ethnopolitics of Kiev played an important role.

The transition of paperwork and education to the Ukrainian language and the ideologization of the education system have become important tools for nation-building. A ban on dual citizenship is also worthy mentioning, and it was very important for Russians to maintain family and cultural ties with Russia.

Industrial regions and megapolises were populated predominantly by the Russian-speaking residents. In conditions of the economic crisis, they were caught in the most difficult situation. Wage arrears have grown sharply. The economy switched to barter exchange, and the citizens to subsistence farming. Despite this, the eastern regions were the main donor of the budget, and the western regions received the maximum subsidies. This territorial disproportion was also preserved in terms of attracting investments, as well as exporting finished products.

The development of industry in the east of Ukraine did not lead to an increase in wages and an increase in living standards. The privatization process made the citizens even poorer and allowed a number of industrial and financial groups to seize control over entire sectors of the economy. Monopolization of the economy was accompanied by a fusion of oligarchic clans with the state institutions. This led to the formation of a unique system of informal connections between regional political elites and a massive increase in corruption at all levels of the government vertical.

Western political and financial institutions, under the pretext of building democracy and protecting human rights, actively used this situation to their advantage. The Soros Foundation and organizations close to it (the Renaissance Foundation, etc.), as well as Canadian organizations of Ukrainian emigrants, lobbied for the necessary

political reforms. They promoted the ideas of Ukrainian national exceptionalism, integrating them into the system of secondary and higher education. With the help of a system of specialized educational and military sports centers, tens of thousands of young people were trained. In the future, due to this, politicians and the civil servants received a necessary impetus for career growth. This was presented as exposure to the “advanced European” experience. In fact, Western professional psychologists filled children’s minds with popular images of the European “future” and taught hatred for Russia.

Not all Ukrainians were ready to give up their Soviet past and ties with Russia. In the first half of the 1990s in Ukrainian society, there has been a demarcation into the center and west of the country, which population was inclined towards building a pro-Western and mono-ethnic Ukrainian state, and south and east, in which residents advocated the development of political, economic and cultural contacts with Russia. Here, the majority of the population were Russians and Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine. It was here that the main industrial centers of the country were located. The positions of supporters of an alliance with Russia were especially strong in the Crimea and in the industrial Donbass.

Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk acted as the flagship in protecting the rights and freedoms of Russian-speaking citizens throughout Ukraine. As early as on November 12, 1990, the Crimean Regional Council adopted a resolution on holding a referendum in the Crimean Region on the re-establishment of the Crimean Autonomous Republic as a subject of the USSR. The referendum was held on January 20, 1991. The following question was put on the ballot: “Are you for the re-establishment of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a subject of the USSR and a participant in the Union Treaty?” 1,777,841 Crimean voters had the right to vote. 1,441,019 people (83.3 %) participated in the referendum. Of these, 1,343,855 (93.2 %) voters answered positively. At the same time, 97 % of the voters of the city of Sevastopol spoke in favor of the status of Sevastopol as a city of Union-Republican subordination and the main base of the Black Sea Fleet.

However, according to the results of the Belovezhsky Agreement, Crimea and Sevastopol remained the parts of the Ukrainian SSR.

Based on the results of the referendum of February 12, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the Law “On Restoration of the Crimean Autonomous Republic” within the territory of the Crimean Region as part of the Ukrainian SSR (Article 1 of the law)¹.

On 27 March 1994 a referendum was held in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions on the basis of an advisory poll. The initiator of the referendum was the International Movement of Donbass, a social and political organization established in 1990. The majority of residents spoke in favor of the national-state autonomy of Donbass and granting Russian language the status of a second state language. The following questions were submitted to the referendum: “Do you agree that the Constitution of Ukraine should record the federal-land structure of Ukraine?”; “Do you agree that the Constitution of Ukraine should record the functioning of the Russian language as the state language of Ukraine together with the Ukrainian state language?”; “Do you agree that on the territory of the Donetsk (Lugansk) region, the language of work, paperwork and documentation, as well as education and science, should be Russian together with Ukrainian?”

The first question was submitted to a referendum only in the Donetsk region. 79.69 % of voters supported the federal structure. 87.16 % voted for giving the Russian language the status of the state language in the Donetsk region; in the Lugansk region — 90.38 %. On the third question, 88.98 % of voters of the Donetsk region and 90.91 % of voters of the Lugansk region voted positively.

Thus, the vast majority of the Donbass residents expressed their support for federalization of Ukraine, giving the regions the rights of subjects of the federation and defining the Russian language as the second state language.

Destruction of economic ties, changes in trade conditions, outdated equipment, territorial and sectoral disproportions led to a severe economic crisis. According to statistics, the demographic losses in the first 10 years of “independence” amounted to more than 3 million people. A significant part of the migrants consisted of representatives

¹ Are the Crimean referendums the way to independence? [website]. URL: <https://proza.ru/2016/09/11/462?> (access date: 06.04.2022).

of the intellectual elite who received education in the best Soviet higher education institutions.

A gap between the incomes of the majority of citizens and a narrow group of oligarchs was accompanied by the growth of the protest movement. The problem was also that the oligarchs transferred most of their capital offshore, and taxes did not fill the budget. Increase of the wage arrears was accompanied by inflation. In June 1993, mass miners' strikes and demonstrations took place in the Donbass. They demanded not only economic autonomy, but presented some political demands, in particular, "a resignation of the Supreme Soviet, since the current one is not the will of the people." Demands were also put forward to hold a referendum on confidence in the Soviets at all levels and in the President.

In June 1993, a restoration congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine was held in Donetsk. The Communists achieved cancellation of the decision to ban the party. Petr Simonenko, former secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of Ukraine, was elected Chairman of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Political crisis led to early presidential and Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) elections. Elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held on March 27, 1994. The winner-take-all system was applied. 5,833 candidates applied for 450 parliamentary seats. Success accompanied the representatives of the left forces. The CPU received 86 parliamentary seats. Two more left-wing parties, the Peasant Party of Ukraine and the Socialist Party of Ukraine, respectively, 19 and 14 parliamentary seats. The People's Rukh of Ukraine received 20 parliamentary seats. The rest of the parties had much worse results. 168 parliamentary seats were received by the independent candidates. The Socialist leader Alexander Moroz, who until 1989 was Secretary of the Kiev Regional Council of Trade Unions, was elected Speaker of the Parliament.

The elections showed significant geographic differentiation. In the south and east, the supporters of the left power won, while the west gave its votes to the nationalist parties. For the first time, the party of radical nationalists UNA-UkrSD, which inherited an ideology of Bandera and Shukhevych, participated in the elections. Back in June 1990, a dissident Yuriy Shukhevych, the son of Roman Shukhevych, created an organization Ukrainian Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. In

September 1991, it was renamed the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA). At the same time, the military wing of the organization, the Ukrainian Self-Defense (UkrSD), arose. In 1992, the UkrSD organized a number of actions against pro-Russian activists, including the so-called “Friendship Train”, which was sent to Odessa and Kherson, where the organization’s activists held a series of forceful actions. The Friendship Train was also heading to Crimea, but the Crimean authorities were able to block its arrival. In 1994, UNA-UkrSD managed to get three parliamentary seats.

On 26 June and 7 July 1994 presidential elections were held, in which seven candidates participated. The main struggle unfolded between the current president Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma. A native of the Chernigov region, Kuchma in 1986–1992 served as General Director of the Southern Machine-Building Plant, and in 1992–1993 was the Prime Minister of Ukraine.

The victory was won by Kuchma, who relied on the Russian-speaking regions. He was supported by the Chernigov, Sumy, Poltava, Kharkov, Donetsk, Lugansk, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Kirovograd, Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa regions, Crimea and Sevastopol. At the same time, the greatest support was in Sevastopol (92.0%) and Crimea (89.7%). The current president was supported by the voters of Kiev, Cherkassy, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsa, Chernovtsy, Khmelnytsky, Ternopol, Ivano-Frankovsk, Lvov, Volyn, Rovno, Transcarpathian regions and Kiev. The greatest support was in the Ternopol region (94.8%) and in the Ivano-Frankovsk region (94.5%). In general, in the second round, Kuchma received 52.15% of the votes, Kravchuk — 38.36%. The elections demonstrated growing polarization of Ukrainian society, not so much under party-ideological (right-left) as under geopolitical (West-Russia) principles. In the future, until 2014, the split of Ukrainian society into supporters of a mono-ethnic Ukrainian state striving to become a part of the West (“Ukraine is Europe”), and supporters of rapprochement with Russia and protection of the Russian language and the Russian-speaking population would continue.

On 28 June 1996 the Verkhovna Rada adopted a new Constitution of Ukraine. Until that time, the country lived according to the Soviet Constitution of 1978, in which over 200 amendments were introduced.

According to the Constitution of 1996, Ukraine was proclaimed a sovereign, democratic, social and legal state (Article 1). Article 2 of the Constitution declared that “Ukraine is a unitary state.” Thus, the ideas of a federal structure were rejected. Only one state language was approved — Ukrainian. And this despite the fact that for a significant number of Ukrainians, Russian was their native language. Although the text of the Constitution contained a provision on protection of the Russian language as the language of one of the national minorities: “The state ensures a comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all areas of public life throughout Ukraine. In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian and other languages of the national minorities of Ukraine is guaranteed“ (Article 10). The Text of the Constitution also contained a provision on the national character of the Ukrainian state: “Article 11. The state promotes the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness, traditions and culture, as well as the development of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine”¹.

Thus, the constitution created a legal basis for further transformation of Ukraine into a mono-ethnic state, a strengthening of nationalist principles in public service, education, science and culture, and a displacement of the Russian language and Russian culture.

At the same time, developing relations with the West and cultivating Ukrainian nationalism, Ukraine in the 1990s sought to cooperate with Russia, balancing between the West and Russia within the framework of a multi-vector policy. This was due to the high degree of economic dependence of Ukraine on the Russian market and Russian exports (primarily in the gas sector).

On 31 May 1997 the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine (the so-called “Big Treaty”) was signed in Kiev. Russia and Ukraine emphasized the importance of the treaty for the European security system: “The High Contracting Parties proceed from the fact that good-neighborliness and cooperation between them are important factors in enhancing stability

¹ Constitution of Ukraine [website]. URL: https://yurist-online.org/laws/Constitution/ru/constituciya_na_russkom.pdf (access date: 06.04.2022).

and safety in Europe and throughout the world. They cooperate closely with an aim of strengthening international peace and safety (Art. 4).”

The Treaty established a high degree of coordination of the actions of countries in the international arena, including regulation of regular meetings at the highest level: “The High Contracting Parties are holding regular consultations to ensure further deepening of bilateral relations and exchange of views on multilateral problems of mutual interest. When necessary, they coordinate their positions to carry out agreed actions. For these purposes, as agreed by the Parties, regular high-level meetings are held. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Parties meet at least twice a year (Art. 5).”

The parties assumed obligations not to enter into relations with third countries directed against one of the parties of the Treaty: “Each of the High Contracting Parties refrains from participating in or supporting any action whatsoever directed against the other High Contracting Party and undertakes not to conclude any treaties with third countries directed against the other Party. Neither Party will allow its territory to be used to the detriment of safety of the other Party (Art. 6)”¹

The signing of the “Big Treaty” was a confirmation of the general course of Ukraine in the 1990s, based on attempts to balance between the West and Russia. On the one hand, Ukraine was increasingly trying to integrate into the Western community. On 8 February 1994 it became a member of the NATO Partnership for Peace program, created for gradual inclusion of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the former republics of the Soviet Union, into the orbit of the military-political union. On 9 November 1995 Ukraine joined the Council of Europe, one of the main structures of European integration.

At the same time, cooperation with Russia and the CIS countries continued within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and in 2002 Ukraine became an observer state of the Eurasian Economic Community, an organization whose activities were aimed at developing economic integration in the post-Soviet space, the leading

¹ Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine [website]. URL: <https://normativ.kontur.ru/document?moduleId=1&documentId=155239&> (access date: 07.04.2022).

participant of which was the Russian Federation. The result of the first decade of existence of independent Ukraine was a sharp drop of the living standards, an economic collapse of the entire industries, an impoverishment of a significant part of the population and a formation of an oligarchic model of capitalism with a concentration of basic resources in the hands of a narrow layer of super-rich citizens. All small enterprises and 80 % of all medium and large enterprises were privatized.

The economic recession reached its peak by 1995. The economic decline lasted nine years, from 1991 to 1999 inclusive.

Ukraine's GDP more than halved and in 2000 amounted to USD32.4 billion. It was only 40.8 % compared to 1990. If in 1990 Ukraine ranked 17th in the world in terms of GDP, by 2000 it dropped to the 58th place. If in 1990 Ukraine was ahead of Australia, Argentina and Poland, now it was on the same level with Vietnam and Cuba. GDP per capita (PPP) amounted to USD4,152 in 2000. According to this indicator, compared with 1992, there was a drop of 35 %¹.

Industrial production almost halved, amounting to 58 % in 2000 of the 1990 level.

The situation in agriculture was even worse, where the output per hectare decreased 2.5 times. State investments in agricultural production decreased 60 times².

On March 29, 1998, the elections were held for deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. For the first time, elections were held on the basis of a mixed electoral system, in which half of the deputies (225 out of 450 deputies) were elected on the basis of a majoritarian system of relative majority, and the other half on the basis of a proportional electoral system with a three percent electoral threshold.

Elections did not significantly change the balance of power. Again, the communists won with a significant margin. The CPU received 24.65 % of the votes and almost a third of the parliamentary seats (121 parliamentary seats). The Communists were followed by the Supreme Rukh of Ukraine

¹ GDP per capita in Ukraine [website]. URL: <https://svspb.net/danmark/vvp-na-dushu.php?l=ukraina&> (access date: 07.04.2022).

² *Danilevskiy I., Tairova T., Shubin A., Mironenko V.* History of Ukraine. 2nd Ed., revised and amended, St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2020. P. 560.

(9.4% of the votes, 46 parliamentary seats), the Electoral Bloc of the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Peasant Party of Ukraine (8.55% of the votes and 34 parliamentary seats). In addition, the Green Party of Ukraine, the People's Democratic Party, the Gromada association, the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united), the Agrarian Party of Ukraine, as well as the Reforms and Order and Labor Ukraine associations entered the parliament.

The Communists won in most Ukrainian regions, with an exception of the regions of Western Ukraine, where the nationalists from People's Rukh dominated, and the Dnepropetrovsk region, where the Gromada bloc, created by the well-known local politician and former Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko, won the first place.

On 31 October and 14 November 1999 the regular presidential elections were held. This time, the main struggle was between President Leonid Kuchma and the leader of the Communists, Petr Simonenko. Kuchma won with 56.25% of the votes in the second round. 37.8% of voters voted for the leader of the CPU.

In the first half of the 2000s there was a noticeable improvement in the economic situation. Economic growth continued for nine years from 2000 to 2008. In 2000, GDP growth amounted to 5.9%. In 2001, 9.2%. Record growth rate was reached in 2004, 11.8%. In 2001–2004 economic growth averaged more than 7%, investment growth also exceeded 7%. The economic development of this period is characterized by a low budget deficit, low inflation and an improving balance of payments.

Improvement of the situation in the country's economy affected the results of the parliamentary elections. The positions of left-wing parties noticeably weakened. The Communists lost first place for the first time. Leading positions passed to the Our Ukraine electoral bloc, which received 23.57% of the votes and 112 parliamentary seats. The bloc united a number of nationalist and liberal parties, including the People's Rukh of Ukraine and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, a radical party founded in 1992 and headed by the wife of Bandera's ally Yaroslav Stetsko, Slava. The leader of the electoral bloc was former Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, who was dismissed by the president in 2001 and went into opposition to him.

The Our Ukraine bloc won in the western and central regions of Ukraine, including the Lvov, Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankovsk,

Khmelnytskyi, Rovno, Volyn, Chernovtsy, Vinnitsa, Zhytomyr, Kiev, Cherkassy, Chernigov and Sumy regions.

The Communists took second place, receiving 19.98% of the votes and 65 parliamentary seats. They won in most regions of southern and eastern Ukraine. The third place was taken by the pro-presidential bloc For United Ukraine with 11.77%. However, taking into account the results in majoritarian districts, the bloc was significantly ahead of the Communists and received 101 parliamentary seats. Fourth place went to Yushchenko's allies — Yulia Tymoshenko's Bloc (7.26% of the votes and 22 parliamentary seats). The leader of the bloc served as vice-premier for the fuel and energy complex in the Yushchenko government.

In the early 2000s an idea of deepening integration of the post-Soviet republics arose. The initiative came from Russia. In September 2003 a meeting of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan was held in Yalta. A proposal was submitted to create the Common Economic Space. On 19 September 2003 the Agreement on Formation of the Common Economic Space was signed by four countries. The participants of the Agreement declared the following:

“In order to create conditions for the stable and effective development of the economies of the Parties and improve living standards of the population, the Parties are starting the process of forming the CES.

The Common Economic Space is understood by the Parties as an economic space that unites the customs

territories of the Parties, where economic regulation mechanisms operate based on common principles that ensure the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor and a single and coordinated foreign trade, to the extent and in the volume necessary to ensure equal competition and maintain macroeconomic stability, tax, currency and monetary policy”¹.

The agreement provided for the creation of a free trade zone, unification of technical regulations and standards, creation of conditions for the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor, and creation of the uniform principles for regulating the activities of natural monopolies.

¹ Agreement on the Formation of the Common Economic Space [website]. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/1715> (access date: 09.04.2022).

It was assumed that the founding countries would immediately sign a set of priority documents that would come into force simultaneously in all states.

It seemed that process of rapprochement between the four largest republics of the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, would lead to the formation of a major integration union headed by Russia.

However, such a future for Russia and Ukraine did not suit the Western community. Immediately after signing of the Agreement on Creation of the Common Economic Space in Ukraine, an implementation of the “color revolution” scenario began, which resulted in the coming to power of pro-Western politicians headed by Yushchenko and a significant deterioration of relations with Russia. The strategy of creation the Common Economic Space turned out to be unrealized.

During the 2004 presidential election, electoral preferences were divided between two candidates. Viktor Yushchenko was supported by 90 % of the voters in three western regions. Viktor Yanukovich received an absolute majority of votes in the southern and eastern regions. This picture is typical for the states prone to federalization, but the opinion of Russians in Ukraine was ignored again. Result of the crisis was a congress in Severodonetsk of deputies of all levels on 287 November 2004. More than three thousand people participated in the congress, and they demanded to cancel revision of the voting results.

The candidate of the pro-Western opposition was Viktor Yushchenko, former chairman of the National Bank and head of government, who was well known among the population. Yushchenko adopted the national topic, supported by nationalist parties and organizations that had support in the Western Ukraine. The spouse of Viktor Yushchenko was once a staff member of the US State Department. US government agencies have officially confirmed that USD63 million of financing supported Viktor Yushchenko’s election campaign. According to the BBC, the real amount was about USD945 million, but most likely the amount of financing was even greater¹.

¹ What you need to know about “color revolutions”: a textbook for the students of higher education institutions / edited by A. B. Ananchenko. M.: Moscow Pedagogical State University. Institute of History and Politics, 2018. P. 65.

Before the elections, the opposition leaders were cordially welcomed to the USA and the EU. The Ukrainian population was made to understand that a way was opening for them to enter the civilized world, to “well-fed and prosperous Europe.” This path could be passed only by supporting the opposition. The opposition contenders actively exploited an image of a “European politician” bringing a “European lifestyle”. At the same time, the “European project” was deliberately opposed in the minds of the population to the less attractive “Russian project” of integration in the post-Soviet space, which actually offered more realistic promises of benefits in the economic development and growth of welfare of the citizens.

A necessary element of the technology of “color revolutions” is the creation of network youth movements “contaminated with an idea of revolution and change of power”. Firstly, all mass actions with an involvement of the population were carried out with the help of young people, mostly students. Secondly, the youth organizations which took to the streets comprised tens of thousands of people who were able to resist the power units. Thirdly, it was the mass participation of young people that created an aura of “genuine revolutionary spirit” around the events that took place, and made it possible to pass off the movement as a nationwide phenomenon.

Before the elections in Ukraine, the activists of the local youth movement Pora went to the Serbian Novisad for instructions, a trip which was paid for by the British Westminster Foundation. After foreign seminars, Pora was armed with a strategy of actions and structures to apply throughout the country. In early August 2004, a few months before the active phase of election campaign, 320 young Ukrainians, representing 72 regional divisions of the Pora organization, went to a summer camp in Evpatoriya for a week. The costs were covered by the American Freedom House Foundation. Here, the activists met people with combat experience: Serbs, Georgians, as well as representatives of the American foundations. In a camp where activists slept in the tents right on the beach, options of event developments were worked out daily. The organizers set the task of forming a group of 35,000 members who would organize an orange march to Kyiv in order to “change the corrupt government.” In the future, the organizational structure of “Pora” was built according to a standard scheme: active supporters

were divided into dozens headed by a commander of a dozen soldiers. These dozens were in turn united into hundreds led by a commander of one hundred soldiers. The hundreds amounted to a thousand under the leadership of a commander of one thousand soldiers. A system of identification marks and passwords was developed.

At seminars, usually held in the country camps, the activist mentors organized rehearsals of police raids. Some acted as police, others as demonstrators. At the seminars, they learned to answer evasively, never show aggression and smiling. A strategy also developed to support comrades thrown in jail.

During preparation of the “color revolution” the current government was deliberately discredited and the social situation was systematically aggravated. Before the elections, groundwork was done for unfolding an information campaign to denounce the authorities. Scandalous revelations that arose around the heads of state and / or their close circle became a means of discrediting the elites. At the same time, scandalous situations could arise both as a result of the real actions of representatives of the highest elite, and the result of blatant lies, stagings and provocations. Negative information in the right interpretation through some media, as well as informal channels of communication, could be brought to the attention of the population. An image of a criminal government corrupted to the core, a “bad president” “to blame for everything” could be created in the minds of voters. Political myth could thereby be imposed on people as a reality, creating an illusion of clarity. Usually, constructing such a myth, political strategists draw an image of the struggle between the “forces of good” and the “forces of evil.” The leaders of the “color revolutions” position themselves as a progressive force, as a movement into the future, in contrast to the movement into the “dark past” of their opponents.

In Ukraine, the power of President Leonid Kuchma was undermined by a series of such political campaigns, the most notable of which were “Ukraine without Kuchma” (winter 2001), “Arise, Ukraine!” (September 2002), utilizing scandals related to allegations of the murder of a journalist, corruption, and the creation of an oligarchic regime. The idea was persistently introduced into the mass consciousness: the population lives hard because the country is

headed by a criminal government used by oligarchs and criminals. One of the main contenders for the presidential post, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who had the support of Leonid Kuchma at the beginning of the election campaign, was exposed as a protege of a gang clan. The label “Bandyukovich” was prepared for V. Yanukovych, as the facts of his criminal records in early youth were exposed. One of the main slogans of the opposition was a demand “the convict will not be the president of Ukraine!” Meanwhile, all these events had the format of intertwining hard and soft methods. In confirmation of this, we will refer to the preparation of the “orange coup” in the regions of Western Ukraine. It is known that on the territory of the five western regions there were militant training camps, which were considered as a potential force component of the so-called “orange revolution”.

Viktor Yushchenko and his entourage were presented as fighters against the criminals’ coming to power. At the same time, Yushchenko himself formed his image as the moral and political leader of the nation, the “People’s President.” As an axiom, the thesis was brought that Yushchenko would certainly win, unless the government falsified the elections. In this case, people had the right to take to the streets and overthrow the criminal government.

Mass actions were used as a tool of manipulation in the political struggle. They became the most effective elements of the election campaign of Viktor Yushchenko, leader of the People’s Power opposition coalition. Mass protests, united by the common slogan “Ukraine without Kuchma” became a kind of rehearsal for the campaign. An official part of it began with the nomination of a “people’s candidate” at a rally of thousands in Kiev on the Pevcheskoe field and ended with an impressive spectacle on Maidan (Independence Square) that did not stop for several weeks after the second round of elections. Prolonged mass actions of Yushchenko’s supporters were designed to create an impression of his nationwide support.

The opposition protest at the Maidan grew into a grand manifestation. For most of those who gathered on the Maidan, the event looked spontaneous. But to anyone who watched the events in December 2004, the numerous signs of careful preparation were striking — tents and camp kitchens, an ongoing concert, professional

television footage, and an orange colour which became the total brand of the entire opposition campaign.

From the experience of previous actions, opposition representatives developed effective ways to mobilize people for mass actions. The leaflets themselves were not capable of gathering a large-scale demonstration. FM radio stations, with frequent announcements throughout the week were able to attract thousands of young people. But before that, an organizing group had to be created. Initially, the Maidan relied on young people from the western regions of Ukraine. organizers of the action brought over 35,000 people from Western Ukraine, who, together with Kiev activists, amounted to about 100,000 people. The organizers were able to engage up to 700,000–800,000 residents of Kiev and other settlements in a large-scale action at the Maidan in various ways¹.

The Maidan phenomenon testifies to the effectiveness of mass mobilization technologies. In this case, we are dealing with a very skillful use and channeling of the energy of mass discontent to achieve interests and goals that directly contradict the interests of that very society.

Engagement in the public moods largely determined the scale of mass actions. organizers of the action achieved a necessary psychological effect. Among many activists and ordinary residents there was a feeling that a historical, epoch-making event was taking place, in which they became the direct participants. This feeling was created consciously and persistently, as the Maidan actively exploited an emotional component, since all the speakers appealed to feelings. Viktor Yushchenko's television advertisement also appealed to vote from the heart, using the following slogans: "We are together", "There are millions of us", "Ukraine can make everything", "Ukraine is us". Often at the rallies, speakers addressed the audience in a pathetic way, demanding their approval or condemnation in order to give the actions the meaning of expression of the people's will. The task to win the collective space and imagination, even as an evident minority

¹ What you need to know about "color revolutions": a textbook for the students of higher education institutions / edited by A. B. Ananchenko. M.: Moscow Pedagogical State University. Institute of History and Politics, 2018. P. 81.

at the beginning, in order to shock majority of the citizens, was completed.

Maidan combined two forms of action: protest and entertainment. Non-stop concerts were organized at the main square. It became the main point of a huge ongoing manifestation, which, according to the organizers, should attract the attention of residents of the capital city. The entire action was originally planned to be broadcast on TV, which would attract an audience throughout the country and create enough material for international news releases. A requirement of modern times is that a mass action shall be spectacular. Tent camps were set up in the square, large enough so that the authorities could not remove it without using force. In this case, there was a real “revolution of the twenty-first century”, a mixture of student “sit-down strikes” and the rock festival Live Aid, broadcast all over the world. Any forceful actions that the authorities might take could immediately be seen live in the world TV channels.

Maidan, as the center of mass protest, was the center of events and the main newsmaker. The central square was occupied all the time, although the opposition signed agreements on several occasions that required people to clear it and to unblock the administrative buildings. However, each time there was a reason why this should not be done.

The quantitative factor in a political campaign becomes the most important, since it is the number of people that determines whether the troops can be used against them. Attracting the army to one’s side has become one of the most subtle and secret aspects of the Orange Revolution. A year and a half before it began, a special team was formed which was engaged in clarifying the moods of the commanders of military units, their plans and trying to convince them to remain neutral. The arithmetic turned out to be quite simple: since the Kiev military command had only 15 thousand soldiers, the army would not interfere if there were at least 50 thousand people on the square. Thus, the opposition task was to keep enough demonstrators together in and around the square in order to prevent an attack.

The organization of an 18-day rally, the arrival in Kyiv of tens of thousands of protesters, mainly from the western and central regions of Ukraine, the establishment of the tent camp and much more could not be carried out without organizational preparation. Behind the

appearance of a mass action, it is important to see, in addition to the structure of the activists, a well-functioning economic organization. Activists of the Pora movement built a whole city out of 1546 tents. Here we refer to one of the organizers of the mass action at the Maidan: “It’s important to understand that not only all the beautiful things that you were shown on TV were made on the square. There were about three hundred toilets that had to be cleaned every day. People had to be fed. We brought five tons of cereals and ten thousand loaves of bread a day. People needed to be warmed up. Every day it took us two hundred gas cylinders. Each tent had one or two heaters, plus foam mats and sleeping bags. At the same time, every day we removed eleven trucks of garbage from the square”¹. The financial costs of the opposition amounted to a huge figure. New expensive tents on the Maidan, boots worth USD150 with an average weekly salary in the country of USD100, fees to participants for staying at the Maidan, etc. This is only the visible part.

Initially, the main organizational function at the Maidan was performed by the Pora youth movement. Preparatory work and campaign setting allowed the Pora activists to involve an increasing number of young people in the political campaign. Young people coming in large numbers from the regions under the leadership of “self-appointed” atamans, were arranged in “hundreds” and marched through the streets of the city in protest.

Another way to engage young people was for small groups of 10–15 people to block the entrance to large universities in Kiev and not allow anyone into the building. Armed with a megaphone, they appealed to join the strike. A small group thus managed to take away 2–3 thousand students. According to some reports, these groups gathered more than 10 thousand people a day and in total there were more than 20 thousand Kiev students at the Maidan.

However, with an influx of people, the technological methods of management in a huge mass of people no longer worked so effectively. There was no point in leading the “disrupted” students to the central

¹ *Wolf D.* Revolution of the 21st century // *The Guardian*. May 13, 2005 [website]. URL: <http://www.inosmi.ru/stories/01/06/22/3006/219582.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

square to “dissolve” in orange color. When the Maidan was full, targeted actions began — mass picketing of universities, the rectors of which refused to let the students go for duration of the demonstration. Pickets were held, usually with incredible success — officials, obeying active mass moods, were forced to make concessions and cooperate. Later, permanent pickets were organized near the building of the Prosecutor General’s Office, and “drummers” were placed opposite the blocked government house, using the iron barrels as their instruments. In fact, a long-term mass action paralyzed the work of government bodies as officials were not allowed to reach their jobs. Pora was engaged in the expulsion of opponents from the railway stations and in the organization of temporary headquarters, seizing administrative buildings and cultural institutions for accommodation of the visitors coming from the regions and tracking the movement of law enforcement units to put pressure on the riot police, concentrated at the presidential administration. The girls stuck flowers into the shields, the music suitable for this situation sounded (“A smile will make the world brighter for everyone!”).

Detention of activists by the police was not considered a cost but rather was one of the goals of the action in accordance with the provisions of the theory of non-violent revolution — it is necessary to provoke the authorities to use violence. Leaders of the Pora movement used an imprisonment of their people as an excuse to disrupt classes at the higher education institutions where the detainees studied¹.

The first round of elections, held on October 31, 2004, did not reveal a winner, since no one, according to the electoral law, received more than half of the votes of the voters who participated in them. Opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko was only half a percentage point ahead of Viktor Yanukovych. 39.9 % of voters voted for Yushchenko, 39.26 % voted for Yanukovych. The third place was taken, far behind the leaders, by the socialist Alexander Moroz (5.82 %), the fourth by the communist Petr Simonenko (4.97 %). However, preliminary results of the second round, which took place on November 24, 2004, were not in favor of the opposition candidate. Viktor Yanukovych won with 49.46 % of the votes, Viktor Yushchenko with 46.61 %.

¹ *Pyrya R. Organizing Political Campaign. M.: SI HSE, 2007.*

On the day of the second round of voting, the opposition headquarters was doing everything to direct the indignation of the street into the direction of political struggle for a revision of the election results. Yushchenko had no legal basis for his actions, but had thousands of demonstrators behind him. Without waiting for the announcement of the official election data, he took the presidential oath in a half-empty hall of parliament. Demonstrators took all main government buildings into a tough blockade. Regional councils of the regions of Western Ukraine proclaimed Yushchenko as the president on their territory. The leaders of Western countries were sending greetings to him and expressing their support. In this situation, the CEC officially declared Viktor Yanukovich the winner. On the same day, the decision was appealed to the Supreme Court.

Under pressure from the Maidan and organized street manifestations, the Verkhovna Rada made an unconstitutional decision in favor of the opposition to organize a second round of the vote under the new law and with the new composition of the CEC. In this situation, it was quite legal to postpone the elections for a new deadline. In world practice, holding a third round of elections had become a legal nonsense. The development of the situation therefore clearly benefited the opposition candidate¹. The third round took place on December 26, 2004. Viktor Yushchenko received 51.99% of the votes, Viktor Yanukovich 44.2%. The goal was achieved. The Orange Revolution ended with a victory of the pro-Western candidate.

From the first days of his work, the protege of the West began to pursue an openly Russophobic policy. Russia was required to admit guilt in the Golodomor of Ukrainians in the 1930s. Undisguised glorification of the Nazi accomplices and collaborators Bandera and Shukhevych began. The Russian language was withdrawn from legal proceedings, and its active marginalization began.

However, just a year after the Orange Revolution, pro-Western politicians began to lose popularity. The results of elections to the Verkhovna Rada held on March 26, 2006 brought victory to the Party of Regions, headed by Viktor Yanukovich. Elections were held for the first time under a pure proportional electoral system.

¹ *Pyrra R. Organizing Political Campaign. M.: SI HSE, 2007.*

The Party of Regions received 32.14 %, which provided the party with 186 parliamentary seats. Thus, the party was able to form the largest faction in parliament. The second place was taken by the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, which received 22.29 % of the votes (129 parliamentary seats). The party of current President Viktor Yushchenko Our Ukraine took the third place with 13.95 % of the votes (81 parliamentary seats). Two more parties entered parliament: the Socialist Party of Ukraine (5.7 % of the votes, 33 parliamentary seats) and the Communist Party of Ukraine (3.67 % of the votes, 21 parliamentary seats).

The elections demonstrated a growing split between the South-East of Ukraine, on the one hand, and the central and western regions of the country. In the South-East, the Party of Regions won an unconditional victory. The party took first place in the Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Donetsk, Lugansk and Kharkov regions, in the Crimea and in Sevastopol. In the far west, in the Transcarpathian, Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, Chernovtsy and Ternopol regions, the victory went to the president's party, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc took first place in Volyn and in the central regions of Ukraine. At the same time, there was a further polarization of Ukrainian voters. Thus, in Ivano-Frankovsk, the Party of Regions received only 1 % of the votes. The pro-presidential Our Ukraine party had the same result in Donetsk.

The results of the parliamentary elections demonstrated the fiasco of the "Orange Coalition". Ukrainian voters were turning away from pro-Western politicians. As a result of the elections, a government headed by Viktor Yanukovich was formed. The government, in addition to the Party of Regions, was supported by socialists and communists. The Anti-Crisis Coalition was formed. On September 21, 2006, Viktor Yanukovich visited Moscow, where he held negotiations with Vladimir Putin. The process of normalization of the relations with Russia began.

In the spring of 2007, Viktor Yushchenko tried to seize the initiative. On 2 April 2007 he issued a decree "On early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada." Extraordinary elections were held on 30 September 2007. However, they did not bring significant changes to the balance of power. The President's hopes to strengthen his positions did

not come true. The Party of Regions retained the first place (34.37 % of the votes, 175 parliamentary seats). Second place was kept by the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, which somewhat strengthened its position (30.71 % of the votes, 156 parliamentary seats), and the third place went to the President's party, which strengthened its coalition with a number of other pro-Western movements and was called Bloc Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defense“ (14.2 % of the votes, 72 parliamentary seats). Fourth place was taken by the Communist Party of Ukraine, which received 5.39 % of the votes (27 parliamentary seats). The Socialists lost a representation. Their place was taken by the Litvin Bloc (3.96 % of the votes, 20 parliamentary seats).

On 18 December 2007 Viktor Yanukovich resigned. Yulia Tymoshenko was appointed Prime Minister. However, this did not lead to stabilization of the political situation and strengthening of the position of the President. The conflict between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, economic and social miscalculations led to a political crisis.

On 16 September Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada Arseniy Yatsenyuk, representing the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, announced the collapse of the ruling Orange Coalition, consisting of the BYuT and the Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense bloc.

On 9 October 2008 the president tried once again to dissolve the parliament by issuing a decree “On early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the VI convocation and an appointment of extraordinary elections.” However, the decree was challenged by the court and did not enter into force. Political crisis led to the final loss of confidence in the current president and a disappointment of the broad masses of Ukrainians with the policy of creators of the “orange revolution”.

Ukraine entered the second decade of the XXI century as an independent unitary state with a republican form of government. The domestic policy of the country was characterized by a progressive economic crisis, a demographic decline, an ethnic and cultural split of the population, a number of unresolved political problems related to the geopolitical choice, and the disunity of the country's population on the national, linguistic, worldview, religious, and cultural grounds. Ukraine of this period can be characterized as a complex,

heterogeneous state formation with polar political interests of various regions and oligarchic elites.

Ethnic, cultural, social, economic and political contradictions within the country had formed for a long time, but they manifested themselves most clearly in the 1920s of XXI century. It is these contradictions that laid the foundation for the aggravation of crisis in the society, an urgent search for ways to solve pending political and social and economic problems.

Thus, in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine, Ukrainian was recognized as the only state language, while the proportion of citizens for whom Russian was their native language, according to the population census in 2001, amounted to 29.6%. The Russian-speaking population predominated in the South-East of Ukraine. In this situation, the state-supported policy of domination of the Ukrainian language in all areas of public life was perceived by the residents of Donbass as a forced Ukrainization. According to territorial and ethnic and cultural characteristics, Ukraine was divided into two civil and public associations — western and eastern. The residents of these regions adhered to diametrically opposed cultural values and religious traditions, assessed historical facts and events in different ways, and had divergent views on geopolitical prospects and goals of the country's development. At the same time, the state authorities of Ukraine consistently supported Western Ukrainian views and sentiments and pursued a policy of removal of everything Russian from public life.

In economic terms, the eastern part of Ukraine had a significant production potential and was the most industrialized part of the country. The standard of living in the Donbass was higher than in the entire country, but lower than in the capital city region. At the same time, an idea of unfair redistribution of the financial resources of Donbass by the central authorities was widespread in the public consciousness of citizens.

During this period in Ukraine, and especially in the Donbass, there were acute issues of violation of civil rights, advocacy of social guarantees and influence of the oligarchy on power. Ukrainians were outraged by abuses of the state officials from among the elite, an uncontrolled enrichment of the oligarchic elites, large-scale corruption in government, and an arbitrariness of officials and law

enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, there was no single and generally accepted understanding of how to build the social and economic system of the state. It was clear to Ukrainians that the social system of the state should be more just, which, according to the active part of the southeastern region, could be achieved by reunification with Russia.

Under these conditions, on 17 January 2010 the first round of presidential elections took place. 18 candidates participated in the elections. The first place was taken by Viktor Yanukovich, who received the support of 35.32 % of voters. Second place went to Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko with 25.05 % of the votes. Current President Viktor Yushchenko was only fifth (5.45 %), also behind Sergey Tigipko (13.06 %) and Arseniy Yatsenyuk (6.96 %). In the second round, held on February 7, Viktor Yanukovich won.

Elections to the Verkhovna Rada held on October 28, 2012 consolidated the existing balance of power. Elections were again held under a mixed electoral system. The first place was retained by the Party of Regions, which received 30.0 % of the votes and a total of 186 parliamentary seats from the party list and majoritarian districts. The second place was taken by the Batkivshchyna party, which replaced the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (25.54 % of the vote, 101 parliamentary seats). The UDAR party of Vitaliy Klichko (13.96 % of the votes, 40 parliamentary seats), the Communist Party of Ukraine (13.18 % of the votes, 32 parliamentary seats) and the radical nationalist Svoboda party of Oleg Tyagnibok (10.44 % of votes, 37 parliamentary seats).

After the presidential elections, Ukraine's foreign policy became more balanced. Viktor Yanukovich, in the first months of his tenure in power, tried to revise the one-sided pro-Western course of Ukraine, which was affirming during this historical period, and to build a multi-vector foreign policy. He strived to give Russian-Ukrainian relations the character of a strategic partnership, but at the same time, an official priority for the authorities was an integration of Ukraine into the structures of the European Union.

There was a certain normalization of relations with Russia. On 21 April 2010 an Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the issues of presence of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine was signed in Kharkov.

In accordance with Article 1 of the Agreement, the period of presence of the Black Sea Fleet was extended from 2017 to 2042: “The Parties extend validity of the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the status and conditions of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine of 28 May 1997 the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the parameters of division of the Black Sea Fleet dated 28 May 1997 and the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and Government of the Russian Federation on mutual settlements related to division of the Black Sea Fleet and a presence of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine dated 28 May 28 for twenty-five years from 28 May 2017 with subsequent automatic extension for the next five-year periods, if neither of the Parties notify the other Party in writing of their termination no later than one year before an expiration of the period of validity”¹.

At the same time, the Agreement provided for a significant 30 % reduction of the price of Russian gas for Ukraine. At the same time, the payment of gas contracts was linked to the payment of rent for the presence of the Russian fleet in Crimea:

“Article 2. The lease payment for presence of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, starting from 28 May 2017, consists of payments by the Russian Federation to Ukraine in the amount of 100 million US dollars per year, as well as additional funds received by reducing the price from the date of entry into force of this Agreement in the amount of up to one hundred US dollars from the amount established by the current contract between Naftogaz NJSC of Ukraine and Gazprom OJSC, for each thousand cubic meters of gas supplied to Ukraine, based on the preferential agreed volume of supplies provided by the said contract, according to the following formula: at a price three hundred thirty-three US dollars and more than a thousand cubic meters of gas, the reduction will be one hundred US dollars, at a price below three hundred thirty-three US dollars, the reduction will amount to

¹ Full text of the 2010 Agreement on the Black Sea Fleet [website]. URL: <http://русскоедвижение.рф/index.php/архив/483-polnyitekst-soglasheniya-2010-po-chf> (access date: 21.04.2022).

30 % of such a price. These additional funds shall be accounted for at the end of each calendar year during which the specified reduction is applied, on a cumulative basis and recognized as obligations of Ukraine, which shall be repaid by fulfilling the provisions of Article 1 of this Agreement”¹.

There were positive developments in the area of economic cooperation between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The countries started joint implementation of a number of projects in the nuclear power industry, aircraft building, rocket building. In 2011, Prime Minister of Ukraine Nikolay Azarov signed with seven countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States the Treaty on a free trade zone within the Commonwealth.

Significant changes took place in the policy in terms of the Russian language and the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine.

On 8 August 2012 the President signed the law “On Fundamentals of the State Language Policy”. The law guaranteed the use in Ukraine of the so-called “regional languages”, i. e. languages that, according to the census, are considered native by more than 10 % of the population of the corresponding region. At the same time, the region was understood as an area, as well as less significant administrative and territorial units (district) or individual settlements: a city, a town, a village. Within the region, the regional language could be used equally with the state Ukrainian language.

The law contained universal norms that were equally valid throughout the territory of Ukraine. The state refused to regulate the use of languages in the area of television and radio broadcasting. In particular, the “language” column was abolished in the licenses of broadcasting companies. Students of all secondary educational institutions were guaranteed to study at least one regional or minority language in Ukraine.

Another part of the norms of law applied exclusively in certain territories of Ukraine, where one or another regional language is widely spread. Decisions on application of the law in their territory were made by local councils.

¹ Full text of the 2010 Agreement on the Black Sea Fleet [website]. URL: <http://рускоедвижение.рф/index.php/архив/483-polnyitekst-soglasheniya-2010-po-chf> (access date: 21.04.2022).

The law expressed the interests of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, as well as representatives of other national minorities, primarily the Hungarian and Romanian communities. Adoption of the law played an important role in protecting interests of the Russian-speaking population, harmonizing interethnic relations in Ukraine.

Based on adoption of the law, the Russian language received the status of a regional language in the Kharkov, Donetsk, Lugansk, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa regions, as well as in Sevastopol. Status of a regional language was also given to the Romanian and Hungarian languages in a number of settlements in the Chernovtsy and Transcarpathian regions.

At the same time, Viktor Yanukovich continued the course of former Ukrainian presidents towards European integration and support for the Ukrainian nationalism as the dominant ideological and intellectual idea.

On March 30, 2012, Ukraine and the European Union initialed the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, which was to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, which had been in force since 1994. Signing of the Association Agreement was planned for 2013.

At the same time, a simultaneous discussion of the idea of creating a Common Economic Space, including the Russian Federation, Ukraine and a number of other CIS states, began.

Ukraine faced an important choice between orientation to the West and integration with Russia. Consequences of the decision were of the geo-economic, geopolitical, military-strategic and civilizational nature for Ukraine.

Experts from the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine stated that the main advantage of joining the Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan for Ukraine lay in a development of cooperation and an implementation of joint projects, which in 2014 could give up to USD1.1 billion, or an increase in 0.5 % of GDP, and in just the first five years, production growth was expected due to this factor by USD13 billion. An analytical note entitled “Integration Risks of Ukraine”, prepared for the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine by the leading economic institutions of the National Academy of Sciences of

Ukraine, became a reason for the government's order to suspend the process of preparation for signing of the Agreement with the EU¹.

On 21 November 2013 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine decided to suspend signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union. Note that this is not about cancellation, but about the suspension of entry. Let us quote a fragment of the text of this statement: "The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine at a meeting on November 21, 2013 adopted a Decree "Issue of conclusion of an Association Agreement between Ukraine, on the one hand, and the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, on the other hand," according to which, on behalf of national security of Ukraine, the process of preparation for conclusion of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU was suspended.

The Decree was adopted in order to study in more detail and work out a set of measures that Ukraine might take to restore the lost production volumes and areas of trade and economic relations with the Russian Federation and other CIS member states, formation of an appropriate level of the domestic market, which would ensure parity relations between Ukraine and the EU member countries, which is the basic principle of international law and the basis of the country's economic security.

According to the order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Industrial Policy, it was proposed to the European Union and the Russian Federation to form a commission on a tripartite basis"². At the same time, the press service of the President of Ukraine reported that, speaking at the Ukrainian-Austrian business forum in Vienna,

¹ Internet Edition Today: Why the Cabinet of Ministers "slowed down" movement to the EU: Document with numbers. 26.11.2013 [website]. URL: <http://www.segodnya.ua/politics/pnews/pochemu-kabmin-pritormozil-dvizhenie-v-esdokument-s-ciframi-477454.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

² Правітельство України: Правітельство прийняло распоряженіе о приостановленіи процесса подготовки к заключенію Соглашенія об ассоциациі с ЕС. 21.11.2013 [website]. URL: http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/ru/publish/article?art_id=246865421&cat_id=244843950 (access date: 23.03.2022).

V. Yanykovich said: “Temporary difficulties on the path of European integration will not force Kiev to turn off the chosen path.”

The statement of the Party of Regions faction also spoke about “the desire to bring Ukraine closer to Europe” and only a “temporary postponement” of signing of the agreement¹.

Despite the statement of the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich and the Party of Regions about only a temporary suspension of the process, the leader of the *Batkivshchyna* faction Arseniy Yatsenyuk accused the President and Prime Minister Nikolay Azarov of treason, and the European Commissioner for the Issues of Expansion and Neighborhood Policy Sh. Fule canceled the visit to Ukraine².

Soon the journalist and one of the creators of one of the main Euromaidan channels *Hromadske. tv* Mustafa Nayem wrote on his Facebook: “On Sunday, 24 November 2013 at 12 noon, I will come to the monument to T. G. Shevchenko for a rally in support of signing of the Association Agreement with the EU with the users *France Communauté Ukrainienne and Borys Gudziak*”³. The main sponsor of Mustafa Nayem’s channel was the Embassy of the United States of America. According to the channel’s own statements, three months before the Euromaidan, in August 2013, it allocated 359,685 hryvnias to him⁴. G. Soros through the International Foundation Revival

¹ Партія Регіонів: Заявлення фракції Партії Регіонів. 21.11.2013 [website]. URL: <http://partyofregions.ua/news/528e3575c4ca42cd7a-00001a>

² ІА “Преступності. НЕТ”: Оппозиція хочет послушать в Раде объяснения Януковича і Азарова по поводу государственной измены. 21.11.2013 [website]. URL: <https://news.pn/ru/politics/91771>

³ The parents of Boris Gudziak, a US citizen, were the emigrants from the Lvov region. In 1993 he came to Ukraine and organized the Institute of Church History, worked on restoration of the Lvov Theological Academy and creation of the Ukrainian Catholic University, which is now headed by him. In 1998 he was ordained as a priest. Since 2000 — Rector of the UCU. Since 2013 — 1st Bishop of the Diocese of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Paris. Later, in an interview to Ukraine’s Channel 5, Yan called the Maidan participants “pure people, not extremists” and appealed to the law enforcement officers “not to take on Cain’s sin.”

⁴ Media Nanny: Nayem and Roman Skrypin admitted who sponsored them. 06.12.2013 [website]. URL: <http://mediananny.com/novosti/2302505/> (access date: 23.03.2022).

allocated 88,000 hryvnias to him, and in 2013 he received 793,000 hryvnias from the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands¹. Another Euromaidan channel, GromTV, was financed by the former major of the Ukrainian security department, Nikolay Melnichenko², whose “Melnichenko tapes” became a significant contribution to weakening of the Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. In 2000, he was taken to the United States by the embassy staff, and then received political refuge there.

With the beginning of the Euromaidan, another television channel, *espresso. tv*, began to work “accidentally”. The future Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Arsen Avakov, wrote about him on 24 November 2013 on his Facebook: “Together with him and other guys from the *Batkivshchyna*, we managed to defend everything. By the way, correspondents and cameras of the new Ukrainian channel *espresso. tv* were already at the scene. The channel is just starting to broadcast from the rally on the 24th!” This “independent” channel was financed by the *Batkivshchyna* party through its deputy N. Knyazhitskiy, and his wife Larissa was recorded as the owner³.

On the evening of November 21, Inna Nerodik, a journalist from Channel 5, appealed to come out to the Maidan. This channel became one of the main instruments of the Euromaidan and was owned by Petr Poroshenko, its active participant and a main recipient of political dividends from the anti-constitutional coup. Inna Nerodik wrote on her Facebook: “I went to the revolution. Nobody was there. A lone Christmas tree and a builders’ booth... I went to drink coffee. #euromaidan. @. A booth could also be a reliable tent for the protesters, just the headquarters of the commandant”⁴.

¹ Forbes: How to make money on Internet TV in Ukraine. 16.01.2013 [website]. URL: <http://forbes.ua/business/1363442-kakmozhno-zarabotat-na-internet-televidenii-v-ukraine> (access date: 23.03.2022).

² Media Leaks: Maidan TV. How new media won on Grushevskiy. 10.02.2014 [website]. URL: <http://medialeaks.ru/features/majdan-tv-kakie-media-pobedili-na-grushevskogo/> (access date: 23.03.2022).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Facebook. 21.11.2013 [website]. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=637390266311337&set=a.395853460465020.108283.100001211080225&type=1> (access date: 23.03.2022).

Precisely the journalists of the channels financed by the US Government, P. Poroshenko and the Batkivshchyna party became the first initiators of the Euromaidan, and only then other political figures joined them. Almost immediately after them, the future head of the Euromaidan militant group, its commandant Andriy Parubiy, wrote on *Facebook*¹: “I’m going to the Maidan! Already! Now! There are days that determine the future of the state. Today is such a day. If we are indifferent, how then can we explain to our children that we have betrayed their future? Nine years ago that evening I went to the Maidan. And I’m going now. There is no specific action plan. There I will meet with my brothers and make a decision. See you!”

The future Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, another “commandant of the Maidan” Arsen Avakov wrote on Facebook: “22 h 30 min. We are going with the guys to the Maidan. See you there!”²

After suspension of conclusion of the Association Agreement with the European Union in Kiev, on Independence Square (Ukrainian Maidan Nezalezhnosti; the colloquial version of the name of the square is Maidan), mass rallies of supporters of European integration, opposed to the president and the government, began. On 21 November 2013 about a thousand people occupied the Maidan, where they set up a stage and a tent camp. A protest rally began with a demand to sign an Agreement with the European Union. The main slogans of the protesters were: “We want to Europe!”, “Yanukovich, sign!”

Protests were supported by the USA and its Western European allies. Support for the Maidan participants was provided by politicians from the United States and Europe: the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy K. Ashton, the official representative of the European Commission of the European Union O. Bailly, the US Permanent Representative to the UN S. Power, the US Deputy Secretary of State for European and

¹ Ibid. [website]. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/andriy.parubiy> (access date: 23.03.2022).

² Ibid.

Eurasian Affairs V. Nuland, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania L. Linkevicius, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden K. Bildt, the US Ambassador to Ukraine D. Pyatt, the US Senator D. McCain and others.

Protests were supported by the USA and its Western European allies. Well-known politicians from the United States and the European Union spoke at the Maidan, expressing their support for the protesters. The West provided financial assistance to the Euromaidan and provided informational support on the international arena. And although they declared statements about their desire to reform and democratize Ukraine, the main idea was to establish Western control over Ukraine.

On 24 November 2013 up to 50,000 people took part in mass actions on European Square and Maidan. The rally was organized by the opposition parties UDAR and Batkivshchyna, which, in order to exacerbate the situation, attracted provocateurs from among the right-wing radical youth, youth groups and associations.

Leaders of the rally, among whom were the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Y. Tymoshenko, Y. Lutsenko, A. Parubiy, as well as the head of the faction of the UDAR party V. Klichko, called on the participants to maintain an indefinite protest. A. Parubiy headed the headquarters of the tent camp, the construction of which began at the Maidan. The protesters demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister N. Azarov. Their slogans were becoming more and more uncompromising:

“Yanukovych, go away!”, “Revolution!”

There were clashes with the law enforcement forces using tear gas. The first protesters from various regions of Ukraine began to arrive. EU Ambassador to Ukraine Jan Tombinski noted a massive mobilization of Ukrainian citizens in support of signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union¹. After the rally on the European Square, representatives of the opposition parties went to Bankovaya, the building of the Cabinet of Ministers, where a fight

¹ Details: The EU Ambassador noted massive mobilization of Ukrainians in support of the Association. 24.11.2013 [website]. URL: <http://podrobnosti.ua/power/2013/11/24/944152.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

began with the participation of representatives of the opposition and the Berkut special police unit¹.

On 25 November 2013 the press service of the President of Ukraine published Viktor Yanukovich's appeal to the Ukrainian people, made after the start of the protest actions:

“Dear compatriots!

In the near future I will give a wide interview on television and answer all questions. And today I would like to emphasize that there is no alternative to building a society of European standards in Ukraine. And my policy on this path has always been and remains consistent. Reforms that we are implementing are the confirmation that we are following the European path. We are building a state in which human rights, equality of all before the law, the right to choose, social protection are the highest values for everyone, no matter what region you live in and what Maidan you come to. And as the President I would like to assure the citizens of Ukraine, that I will develop and strengthen these indisputable foundations of our life. No one will steal our dream of Ukraine of equal opportunities, of the European Ukraine. Just as no one will push us from the righteous path leading to this dream. We have come a long way, and we still have a lot to go. The economic problems were, are and always will be the most difficult on this path. But I would be dishonest and unfair if I did not take care of the most disadvantaged and vulnerable, who may bear the main burden of the transition period. To put it mildly, I would be wrong if I did not do everything that needs to be done so that people do not lose their jobs, so that they receive wages and pensions, scholarships. I want peace and tranquility in our large Ukrainian family. Just as a father cannot leave a family without bread, so I have no right to leave people to fend for themselves with the problems that may arise if, under the pressure that we feel, production will stop and millions of citizens will be thrown to the streets.

Therefore I have to come to difficult decisions. Thus I sometimes risk being misunderstood. And that is why I ask our people today

¹ IA “Crime. NET»: A fight broke out near the Cabinet of Ministers, Berkut used the tear gas. 24.11.2013. <https://news.pn/ru/politics/91962> (access date: 23.03.2022).

to carefully listen to me personally. I will never take a single step to the detriment of Ukraine and the people. The will of the citizens of Ukraine was, is and will be crucial for every decision of mine...

We must never let anyone interfere with us. The prayers and dreams of millions rely on the Lord's decision"¹.

However, the President's appeal did not stop the protest actions. Protesters opposing the government's decision to suspend Ukraine's preparations for signing of the Association Agreement with the EU tried several times to storm the government building in the Kiev downtown and attacked members of the Berkut special police unit². Appeals for riots and images of Molotov cocktails began to appear on the Internet.

The chairman of the Batkivshchyna faction Arseniy Yatsenyuk appealed to the EU and the US to impose personal sanctions against officials who gave instructions to disperse "peaceful" rallies³.

On November 27, 2013, the Prime Minister of Ukraine Nikolay Azarov, during a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers, announced that Ukraine had a plan to resolve contradictions that arose during the negotiations regarding signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union: "The European Union has not given a practical answer to our repeated appeals regarding the search for compensators for Ukraine's losses from closure of the markets of the Customs Union. We have not received any confirmation regarding support from European and global financial institutions." According to him, literally on the eve of the signing of an agreement on a free trade zone with the European Union, the International Monetary Fund put forward absolutely unacceptable conditions for granting a loan to Ukraine.

¹ Press Service of the President of Ukraine. 25.11.2013 [website]. URL: <http://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/?cat=11>, at the time of preparation of the materials, text of the appeal was not available on the website of the President of Ukraine.

² Ukrainian Truth: Police say that the students who were beaten by Berkut came with the bricks themselves. 25.11.2013 [website]. URL: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2013/11/25/7003008/> (access date: 23.03.2022).

³ Ibid.: The opposition demands sanctions for those who beat people. 24.11.2013 [website]. URL: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2013/11/25/7002967/> (access date: 23.03.2022).

“It became obvious that under the current conditions, negotiations to resolve the acute problems faced by Ukraine should be continued,” Azarov emphasized. “We must work out the conditions under which our economy will avoid catastrophic losses, and people — a collapse of the European hopes and a massive deterioration of living standards. We have a conflict resolution plan. They arose, apparently, in the triangle of interests of Ukraine, the European Union and Russia. Therefore, it is logical and successful to solve them in a trilateral format. Whoever closes their eyes on this actually slows down the process of signing the Association Agreement.”

On 29 November 2013 the media reported that the Association Agreement was not signed. In the evening, appeals began to be heard on the Maidan for the removal of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich from the office and for organization of the mass protests in Ukraine. In the evening, there were minor clashes between protesters and police.

The US Ambassador to Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt, in an interview to the Ukrainian service of the Voice of America radio station, said: “We have made it very clear, both publicly and in person, that the demonstrations that took place this week are a positive fact that testifies to the strength of democracy in Ukraine and must be respected. I emphasize once again that we are convinced that the demonstrations of social activists, which have been taking place in Kiev and throughout the country for a week already, are a very positive sign for the future of Ukrainian democracy”¹.

The Leader of the Batkivshchyna faction Arseniy Yatsenyuk during his speech at the Maidan said: “On the way we have one big problem — this is V. Yanukovich. The opposition’s first task is to remove the Yanukovich regime. Another of our tasks — mass protests throughout Ukraine”².

¹ Ukrainian service of the radio station Voice of America: США застерігають українську владу від застосування сили проти мітингувальників у Києві. 29.11.2013 [website]. URL: <http://ukrainian.voanews.com/content/article/1800282.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

² Ukrainian Truth: Yatsenyuk: The opposition’s first task is to remove the Yanukovich regime. 29.11.2013 [website]. URL: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2013/11/29/7003647/> (access date: 23.03.2022).

According to media reports, a resolution was adopted at Euromaidan demanding a resignation of the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich:

“We, the citizens of Ukraine, who have united in support of the idea of European integration, declare today: we continue a struggle for the European Ukraine and will actively work so that our main demand — signing of the Association Agreement with the EU — is fulfilled...

We demand a resignation of the President V. Yanukovich.

We demand to stop the practice of political repressions against Euromaidan activists, students, public activists, opposition leaders.

We thank the Heads of State and Government of the EU Member States for all the efforts they have made to fulfil our European aspirations”¹.

On the night of 29–30 November the law enforcement agencies dispersed protesters at the Maidan. Opposition leaders accused V. Yanukovich of betrayal and treason, and appealed to Ukrainians to conduct mass demonstrations against the authorities. Several radical groups and political organizations, acting under the nationalist slogans, began to form the so-called Euromaidan Self-Defense. These included informal right-wing radical associations and the parties Right Sector, Trident, UNA-UPSD (Ukrainian National Assembly — Ukrainian People’s Self-Defense), etc. At the same time, the leaders of three Ukrainian opposition parties — Svoboda, UDAR and Batkivshchyna — formed the Headquarters of National Resistance, which acted as the main coordinating center of Maidan. It included the following opposition political leaders: A. Turchinov, V. Klichko, O. Tyagnibok, A. Yatsenyuk and several other people’s deputies-oppositionists.

The use of force drew the condemnation of European politicians. The US Embassy in Ukraine issued the following statement: “The United States condemn the violence against protesters at Independence Square at dawn this morning. We appeal to the Government of Ukraine to respect the rights of civil society and the principles of freedom of

¹ Ukrainian Truth: Euromaidan adopted a resolution demanding resignation of Yanukovich and Azarov. 29.11.2013 [website]. URL: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2013/11/29/7003660/> (access date: 23.03.2022).

speech and freedom of assembly, which are fundamental to democratic values and the cornerstone of our strategic partnership”¹.

The first deputy chairman of the Batkivshchyna party Alexander Turchinov called on supporters to come in mass scale to the rally on Sunday in Kiev. “We must carry out a full mobilization today. Today there are 10 thousand of us, and we need hundreds of thousands,” he said, speaking on the Mikhailovskaya Square in Kiev².

The official statement of the organizing committee of the Euromaidan, distributed on the Facebook page, stated the following: “All 9 days — from 22.11.2013 of existence of the Euromaidan, the protesters personally ensured safety and localized numerous provocations that the authorities did in order to simulate civil clashes.

We are convinced that by such actions the authorities delegitimized themselves, since they committed illegal and forceful actions against their own people. We are warning the authorities from further provocations and repressions against the protesters. Viktor Yanukovych personally bears full responsibility for this situation.

We appeal to the international community to evaluate the illegal actions of the Ukrainian government, which provokes a scenario of force in Ukraine, up to the application of individual sanctions against government officials who are responsible for violating the rights of the Ukrainian people”³.

Head of the political council of the Batkivshchyna party, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, said on Mikhailovskaya Square: “We are gathering not a thousand, not five and not ten. We are gathering 100 thousand, as we gathered last week. We are gathering 200 thousand. I ask that each of you call friends, acquaintances, family. This is a peaceful demonstration, and we are marching peacefully to the heart of the Ukrainian capital city — to the Maidan. On the Maidan we are holding

¹ Interfax: The US Embassy condemns the forceful dispersal of the Euromaidan in Kiev. 30.11.2013 [website]. URL: <http://www.interfax.ru/world/344294> (access date: 23.03.2022).

² Interfax: Ukraine’s opposition leaders are appealing to the supporters to carry out a full mobilization. 30.11.2013 [website]. URL: <http://www.interfax.ru/world/344317> (access date: 23.03.2022).

³ Facebook. 30.11.2013 [website]. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/EuroMaydan/posts/526798090749866> (access date: 23.03.2022).

a peaceful, I emphasize peaceful, action and we are holding a popular assembly. Then, we are not closing the assembly, no one shall leave. We have a clear requirement — to bring Azarov to justice, to bring Zakharchenko to justice. And until that moment, until this is done, no one shall leave.

Until the Verkhovna Rada will vote for resignation of the traitorous anti-Ukrainian government of Azarov, the parliament will not work. This is our demand.

The main culprit of this crime — V. Yanukovich — shall be impeached. Our demand is early presidential and parliamentary elections. We will win”¹.

Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorskiy and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt expressed their approval of Euromaidan. The following message appeared on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland: “As the initiators of the Eastern Partnership, we are very pleased that many Ukrainians, not afraid of the cold, protested against their president and expressed their decision not to refuse to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union”².

On 1 December a new anti-presidential demonstration began in Kiev. It was accompanied by the seizure of the buildings in downtown, including the Kiev City Administration and the House of Trade Unions. The action began in the afternoon with a gathering in the park named after Shevchenko, after which the demonstrators moved to the Independence Maidan. Mass actions at the Maidan on the night of 1 December were banned by the court. However, despite this, the protesters occupied it completely on Sunday. It was impossible to estimate the total number of protesters in downtown. However, according to the various sources, their number was much more than 100 thousand people.

Leader of the Third Ukrainian Republic movement, former head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Yuriy Lutsenko, speaking at

¹ Ukrainian Truth: Yatsenyuk believes that the assembly shall go by a “peaceful procession” to the Maidan. 20.11.2014 [website]. URL: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2013/11/30/7003902/> (access date: 23.03.2022).

² RBC-Ukraine “The Foreign Ministers of Poland and Sweden expressed admiration for the Euromaidan.” 01.12.2013 [website]. URL: <http://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/politics/glavy-midov-polshi-i-shvetsii-vyrazili-voshishchenieevromaydanom-01122013191200> (access date: 23.03.2022).

the Independence Maidan, said: “Our plan is clear: this is no longer a rally, nor an action. This is a revolution. The Ukrainian SSR is dying here today. This is its funeral. Today we are not changing the president, but the system of power in the country... We are changing Ukraine”¹.

The European Union announced its readiness to impose sanctions against “specific individuals guilty of the use of force in Kiev.” A diplomatic source in the mission of one of the European countries in Brussels said: “The situation in Ukraine is tense and alarming.” The ITAR-TASS diplomat said, “EU countries are watching the developments with concern. The authorities should not allow excessive use of force against the citizens who are expressing their opinion on the streets of the capital city”².

The White House said that they do not consider the peaceful protests that are taking place in Kiev an attempt of a coup. This was announced by Press Secretary J. Carney during a briefing at the White House, answering a question from a Russian journalist who suggested that the events in Ukraine had signs of the coup, and asked if the White House was interested in new “color” revolutions. “We clearly do not consider the peaceful protests as an attempted coup. Violence by government forces against peaceful demonstrators in Kiev since Saturday morning is unacceptable...While we know that police have largely exercised restraint since then, there were several new reports that journalists and other media workers became the targets of the special forces’ assaults, which is a matter of concern... We appeal to the Ukrainian leaders to respect the right of their citizens to freedom of speech and assembly. This is fundamental for a healthy democracy and respect of the universal values on which the US-Ukraine partnership depends,” he said. At that moment, Prime Minister Nikolay Azarov said that “Euromaidan has signs of a coup”³.

¹ Central Administration: Lutsenko said that this is no longer a rally, but a revolution. 01.12.2013 [website]. URL: <http://glavcom.ua/news/169450.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

² *Grigoriev M. S.* Euromaidan. M.: Kuchkovo Pole, 2014. P. 357.

³ RBC-Ukraine: Euromaidan: The United States do not believe that there are attempts of a coup in Ukraine. 03.12.2013 [website]. URL: <http://euromaidan.rbc.ua/rus/evromaydan-belyy-dom-ne-schitaet-protesty-v-ukraine-popytkoy-03122013001900> (access date: 23.03.2022).

The opposition attempted to pass a vote of non-confidence in Azarov's government. 186 People's Deputies voted for resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine with 226 required votes: 1 — Party of Regions, 90 — Batkivshchyna, 42 — UDAR, 36 — Svoboda, 17 — non-factional. The Communists did not vote for the draft resolution. Resignation did not take place¹.

After the failed voting in parliament, opposition leaders appealed to the protesters to go to the Presidential Administration and demand from the president to sign a decree on resignation of the government. "We are going to the Presidential Administration to demand a resignation of the government, as well as early presidential and parliamentary elections," said Arseniy Yatsenyuk, leader of the Batkivshchyna faction.

In turn, Vitaliy Klichko said that the Party of Regions and the Communists "took responsibility for the blood shed on the square. We have a clear position. If the government and parliament defiantly do not hear, do not want to hear the people, we will force them to hear the people"².

European leaders continued to actively intervene in the political crisis in Ukraine. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle began his two-day visit to Kyiv by participating in the OSCE Ministers Conference, meeting with the opposition leaders and talking to the demonstrators on Independence Maidan. The official reason for the German Foreign Minister's visit to Kyiv, which was stricken by demonstrations, was his participation in the 20th meeting of the OSCE foreign ministers. However, already on the first day of the visit, the head of the German Foreign Ministry held a meeting with Vitaliy Klichko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk.

Guido Westerwelle said that he came "as a European to the Europeans" and Germany "is absolutely not indifferent to the fate of Ukraine." He again assured that the doors of the European Union remain open for Ukraine. "Ukraine shall be on board of Europe. We

¹ Інформаційне агентство "ЛІГАБізнесІнформ": The Rada failed a resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Azarov. 03.12.2013 [website]. URL: http://news.liga.net/news/politics/935038-rada_provalila_otstavku_kabmina_azarova.htm (access date: 23.03.2022).

² Ukrainian Truth: Yatsenyuk calls everyone to the Bankovskaya. 03.12.2013. <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2013/12/3/7004595/> (access date: 23.03.2022).

are united by a common history, a common culture, common values. We want to continue to see you as our partners,” said Westerwelle.

In response, Vitaliy Klichko said that the Ukrainians showed their desire to affirm European values and resolve the current political crisis in a peaceful way. In turn, Arseniy Yatsenyuk also expressed satisfaction that the opposition “received confirmation from German friends” that the EU keeps the doors open for Ukraine¹.

The European Union called on the Ukrainian authorities not to use force against the participants of the Euromaidan. This was stated by the EU Ambassador in Ukraine Jan Tombinski: “We are watching today’s events in Kiev with great concern. We would like to remind the Ukrainian authorities that an unjustified use of force and special forces against peaceful demonstrators is unacceptable. We appeal to the Ukrainian government to respect freedom of opinion and assembly, which were confirmed by its international commitments. This crisis must be resolved through dialogue and other political means”².

As a result, the Ukrainian authorities and the opposition agreed to the plan of The Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjorn Jagland to investigate the forceful dispersal of Euromaidan in Kiev³.

President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich supported an initiative to hold a national round table to find a compromise in the current situation and invited representatives of both the government and the opposition to participate in it. The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, appealed to Viktor Yanukovich with such a proposal. “V. Yanukovich supported this initiative. He is convinced that such a round table can become a platform for understanding,” the press service said in a statement⁴.

¹ *Grigoriev M. S.* Euromaidan. M.: Kuchkovo Pole, 2014. P. 363–364.

² LB.ua: The EU urged Yanukovich not to use force against protesters. 09.12.2013 [website]. URL: http://lb.ua/news/2013/12/09/245484_es_prizval_yanukovicha_primenyat.html (access date: 23.03.2022).

³ Central Administration: Authorities and the opposition approved the EU plan to investigate dispersal of the Euromaidan. 06.12.2013 [website]. URL: <http://glavcom.ua/news/170868.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

⁴ Central Administration: Yanukovich agreed to sit down at the negotiating table with the opposition. 09.12.2013 [website]. URL: <http://glavcom.ua/news/171454.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

At the round table with ex-presidents of Ukraine, President Viktor Yanukovich said that he had a conversation with the US representative regarding the situation in Ukraine: “I asked: if the White House was blocked by barricades, what would you do? He says: “Well, firstly, we would not allow this, and secondly, if this, God forbid, would happen, the blockade would be removed in minutes.” V. Yanukovich added: “This is unacceptable — in no country in the world — such actions ... And calls for a revolution, a change of power, a constitutional order — all this poses a threat to the national security. This is also unacceptable.”

At the same time, the president called the protesters his “like-minded people.” “I believe that these are my like-minded people, most of whom came to peaceful actions. They had every right to come out, to express their points of view... And the provocations that were made, and everything that happened afterwards, all the offenses — this happened because the emotions were up. And, usually, when there is a large crowd of people, such events always occur ... unfortunate events ... But let this be such a lesson for all of us. I am not a supporter of harsh, relatively speaking, reaction or judgment of people. Both sides are guilty — and here we must find reconciliation. The country shall continue to live and develop,” Yanukovich said¹.

The President invited the opposition to participate in the round table: “Actions of all parties shall be performed exclusively within the framework of the laws and the Constitution of Ukraine. I invite representatives of all political forces, priests, members of the public to a nation-wide dialogue. I am personally ready to participate in such a round table. For the sake of reaching a compromise, I appeal to the opposition not to refuse, not to follow the path of confrontation and ultimatums”².

At the same time, Russian-Ukrainian contacts continued. On 17 December 2013 the President of Ukraine arrived in Moscow for a visit.

¹ *Grigoriev M. S.* Euromaidan. M.: Kuchkovo Pole, 2014. P. 375.

² RBC-Ukraine: Euromaidan: Yanukovich invited the opposition to participate in the round table. 11.12.2013 [website]. URL: <http://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/politics/yanukovich-priglasil-oppozitsiyu-k-uchastiyu-v-kruglomstole-11122013175500> (access date: 23.03.2022).

As a result of the visit, 14 documents were signed. They were adopted at the sixth meeting of the Russian-Ukrainian interstate commission. According to the signed documents, Russia promised to provide Ukraine with a USD15 billion loan and a significant gas discount.

On 22 December another people's assembly took place, at which the opposition leaders appealed to the protesters to create a public organization, the Maidan People's Association. Oleg Tyagnibok, Sergey Kvit, Vitaliy Klichko, Yuriy Lutsenko, Ruslana Lyzhychko, Yulia Tymoshenko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk became co-chairs of the Maidan Council¹.

Mass protests continued and on 16 January 2014 several laws were adopted: "On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges"" and procedural laws: the Law "On Additional Measures to Protect Safety of Citizens"; the law on amendments to the regulations of the Verkhovna Rada (concerning the simplification of the procedure for lifting the immunity of deputies); the law "On liability for administrative offenses in the area of road safety, recorded in automatic mode"; the law on liability for committing administrative offenses during football matches; the law amending the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding criminal proceedings in absentia. Punishments for wearing masks and helmets were toughened — up to 15 days of arrest. Movement in the motor vehicle convoys of more than five motor vehicles without the consent of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is punishable by a fine of 40 to 50 non-taxable minimum incomes of citizens or deprivation of the right to drive motor vehicles for 1–2 years with a withdrawal of the motor vehicle.

A new article was added to the Criminal Code on extremist activities. It referred to production, storage and distribution of extremist materials, including through the media. For this, they will now be fined in the amount of 200 to 800 non-taxable minimum incomes. In case of repeated actions — a fine from one to three thousand non-

¹ UNIAN: Maidan announced a composition of the Council of the new public association. 22.12.2013 [website]. URL: <http://www.unian.net/politics/866323-maydanu-obyyavili-sostav-soveta-novogo-obschestvenno-goobyedineniya.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

taxable minimum incomes or restriction or imprisonment for up to three years. For collection of the confidential information about law enforcement officials a large fine was introduced of 200 to 400 non-taxable minimum incomes, correctional labor for up to one year, or arrest for up to six months.

In addition, amendments were made to Article 345 of the Criminal Code “Threat or violence against a law enforcement officer”, according to which a threat to the life of a law enforcement officer, close relatives or members of his family is punishable by restriction of freedom for a term from three to seven years. Responsibility for group violation of public order is increasing. Actions that lead to a gross violation of public order or disruption of transport, enterprises, institutions or organizations, as well as active participation in such actions will be punished by a fine of 150 to 250 non-taxable minimum incomes, arrest for up to six months or imprisonment for up to two years. The concept of “foreign agent” was introduced to the legislation in relation to public organizations related to this definition. Foreign agents are required to submit monthly reports on the personnel of the governing bodies, as well as information on the amount of funds received from foreign sources, and indicate the purposes for which they are used.

For public appeals to block access to the citizens’ housing or buildings, it is possible to receive a restriction of freedom of up to five years or imprisonment from two to six years. Like the rules on law enforcement, collection of the information about a judge, his close relatives and family members, as well as dissemination of this information involves a fine of 300 to 500 non-taxable minimum incomes, correctional labor for up to two years, arrest for up to six months or imprisonment for up to two years¹.

Most of the proposed amendments were in line with the European and American practice. However, the opposition immediately declared a repressive nature of the new laws. On 19 January another people’s assembly began at the Maidan, after which the protesters went towards

¹ Інформаційне агентство “ЛІГАБізнесІнформ”: State of emergency in profile: 10 laws that change Ukraine. 16.01.2014 [website]. URL: http://news.liga.net/articles/politics/960446-chrezvychnoye_polozhenie_v_profil_10_zakonov_menyayushchikh_ukrainu.htm (access date: 23.03.2022).

the Verkhovna Rada along Grushevskiy street, where clashes occurred with police officers who did not let the protesters into the government quarter.

Actions of the protesters were vigorously supported by the European politicians. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkyavichus wrote on his Twitter page: “There can be no justification for the use of force and violence. The authorities should be aware of the consequences.”

From the Maidan stage, the deputy head of the Batkivshchyna party, Alexandr Turchinov, announced a beginning of the creation of parallel authorities: “A coup occurred in Ukraine aimed at overthrowing constitutional order in the state, destroying the foundations of democracy and parliamentarism. Mentioned so-called laws significantly restrict the rights of citizens of Ukraine to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly and in fact eliminate democracy in Ukraine. In this regard, we, the participants of the people’s assembly on Independence Maidan, decided:

1. We do not recognize the so-called laws adopted on 16 January 2014 as legally void and those that violate the Constitution of Ukraine.

2. To create the People’s Rada as an association of people’s deputies of Ukraine, members of the opposition factions of the VO Batkivshchyna, VO Svoboda, UDAR of V. Klichko and non-factional people’s deputies who remain in positions of defense of democracy, the constitutional order and parliamentarism.

According to Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine, to instruct the People’s Rada, after confirmation of its authority by the Ukrainian people, to form the entire vertical of power, starting with a government of people’s trust, which should receive support at the Maidan.

3. Hold an all-Ukrainian popular vote on the following issues:

– an expression of non-confidence to the President of Ukraine V. Yanukovich and ... non-confidence in those people’s deputies who voted for the so-called “dictatorship laws” on January 16, 2014;

– confirmation... by the people of Ukraine of the powers and legitimacy of the People’s Council;

– restoration of the constitutional order in the state, an impossibility of building totalitarianism and dictatorship and return to the Constitution of Ukraine, with amendments and additions made in 2004, which was unconstitutionally and illegally canceled.

4. Create the Constitutional Assembly as a body for drafting a new Constitution of Ukraine, which would reflect a new, qualitatively conscious social contract between the state and citizens in order to ensure democracy, public trust and the rule of law, restore balance between the branches of power, strengthen local self-government.

5. To hold popular democratic elections of the Kiev City Mayor and the Kiev City Council, ensuring their preparation and organization.

6. Appeal to local governments to create municipal police units and people's self-defense units (public associations for participation in protection of the public order) to ensure an implementation of the people's will.

Assign to these units the tasks of ensuring public safety, combating corruption, organized crime, drug trafficking, maintaining law and order during elections.

7. Release and ensure full legal rehabilitation of all political prisoners, including Yulia Tymoshenko”¹.

As a result of clashes, protesters burned six vehicles in the Kiev downtown. Among the damaged equipment were four service buses of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and two trucks. Police used water jets to put out flames on burning vehicles².

On the evening of 19 January 2014 President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich instructed Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Andrey Klyuev to create a working group with the participation of representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers and the presidential administration of Ukraine to consider issues to resolve political crisis and hold its meeting with representatives of the opposition³.

¹ ВО “Батьківщина”: План дій, затверджений Народним Віче 19 січня, на яке зібралося 500 тисяч людей. 19.01.2014 [website]. URL: <http://batkivshchyna.com.ua/news/18966.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

² Department of Public Relations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine: The protesters burned 6 vehicles in the Kiev downtown. 19.01.2014, <http://mvs.gov.ua/mvs/control/main/ru/publish/article/961288> (access date: 23.03.2022).

³ Kommersant: Yanukovich instructed the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine to create a working group to resolve the political crisis. 20.01.2014, <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2387913>

In response to this proposal, the opposition formulated five demands with which it will negotiate with the authorities:

1. Immediate early presidential and parliamentary elections.
2. Amendments to the law on presidential elections (the most painful norm — three members of the local commission can sign a protocol, and it becomes legitimate) and reformatting the CEC.
3. Resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Azarov and creation of a transitional government. Change of the Prosecutor General and Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada.
4. Punishment of Interior Minister V. Zakharchenko not only by resignation.
5. Abolition of all scandalous laws and a complete amnesty for all participants in the revolutionary confrontation¹.

In turn, the radical nationalist movement Right Sector issued an appeal to the Ukrainian people:

“War was declared to the Ukrainians! The voting of January 16, 2014 in the Verkhovna Rada put an end to the hopes of Ukrainians for a peaceful solution of the social and political crisis that began with the seizure and usurpation of power in Ukraine by a regional communist gang back in February 2010.

The brutal beating of students, the events on Bankovskaya, attempts to storm the Maidan, complete leveling of elections, dismantling of statehood, constant repressions, beatings, arson of activists’ property — this is the path that the Ukrainians went through over the past two months.

The millions-strong peaceful actions of the insurgent people at that moment did not help to solve any of those topical issues on the agenda. And if at the beginning of December of the last year, the regime of internal occupation was in fear and could not recover from the millions of free Ukrainians on the streets of the capital city, then at this time, having regrouped and armed with various political technologies, it launched a counteroffensive.

In connection with the foregoing, we, the Ukrainian nationalists, are appealing to opposition political parties, public organizations,

¹ LB.ua: Batkivshchyna decided not to send Yatsenyuk to negotiate with the authorities. 20.01.2014 [website]. URL: http://lb.ua/news/2014/01/20/252284_batkivshchina_reshila_otpravlyat.html (access date: 23.03.2022).

activists of Automaidan and Maidan self-defense, to all free people of Ukraine with an appeal to consider and accept for execution our proposals regarding further actions of the insurgent people... To the opposition deputies, with the support of the people, take control of the Verkhovna Rada, elect a new leadership and proclaim itself the National Assembly, which will assume the role of the people's parliament.

Prepare a draft decision on creation of a temporary revolutionary government and vote it at a popular assembly on Independence Maidan in Kiev. At this stage of the struggle, determine the building of the Kiev city administration, which is already under the control of the rebels, as the center of revolutionary government.

Create people's election commissions and hold elections for the Kiev city chairman and the City council. Revolution shall be able to defend and attack"¹.

In response to increased pressure from the opposition, the President appealed to the citizens:

"I was sympathetic to your participation in mass actions, expressed my readiness to listen to your position and jointly find ways to resolve existing contradictions, but now, when peaceful actions are developing into the riots, accompanied by pogroms and arson and the use of violence, I am convinced that such phenomena pose a threat not only to the residents of Kiev, but also to the entire Ukraine. I would like to note that I will make every effort to ensure public order, protect the rights of civilians, and I will use all legal and other methods provided by the laws of Ukraine to ensure public order and safety of all our compatriots. I am convinced that you will hear me and support me in my efforts to stop the confrontation, which is provoked by those who want to fight for power at the cost of human blood"².

The official authorities, seeking to prevent mass bloodshed, embarked on the path of compromises with the political opposition.

¹ *Grigoriev M. S.* Euromaidan. M.: Kuchkovo Pole, 2014. P. 389–390.

² UNN: Appeal of the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich regarding the events on Grushevskiy street. 21.01.2014 [website]. URL: <http://www.unn.com.ua/ru/news/1295266-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayiniviktora-yanukovicha-schodo-podiy-na-vulitsi-grushevskogo> (access date: 23.03.2022).

As a result of the negotiations, V. Yanukovich agreed to grant amnesty to the participants of the protests and riots in Kiev that took place in November-December 2013.

Within a few days, a wave of protests swept over Western Ukraine, where radical forces and nationalists seized the buildings of local administrations, police stations and other state authorities. The events on the Maidan once again demonstrated a deep split in the Ukrainian society.

The protests were most actively attended by the residents of Kiev and residents of the western regions of Ukraine, while the citizens of southeastern regions of the country supported the legitimate Kiev authorities.

Radicalization of the protests intensified. Euromaidan militants seized regional administrations in Lvov, Lutsk, Ivano-Frankovsk, Ternopol, Cherkassy and Rovno, and blocked administration buildings in Poltava, Vinnitsa, Zhytomyr and Nikolaev¹. On January 24, 2014, clashes began again in Kiev on Grushevskiy Street.

The President tried to maneuver and make concessions. On 25 January 2014 the opposition and the government held another round of negotiations. At the meeting, Arseniy Yatsenyuk was offered the position of Prime Minister of Ukraine and Vitaliy Klichko was offered the position of his deputy in exchange for stopping protests and vacating all occupied buildings both in Kiev and in the regions. The laws passed on 16 January 2014 were repealed. 361 deputies voted for this decision in the Verkhovna Rada, two voted against (Vadim Kolesnichenko and Oleg Tsarev). The Prime Minister of Ukraine Nikolay Azarov resigned and made the following statement:

“In order to create additional opportunities for social and political compromise, for the sake of a peaceful settlement of the conflict, I made a personal decision to ask the President of Ukraine to accept my resignation from the post of Prime Minister of Ukraine”².

¹ CENSOR. NET: Who controls regional state administrations“: activists across the country seize regional administrations. MAP. 23.01.2014 [website]. URL: <http://censor.net.ua/p267794> (access date: 23.03.2022).

² UNIAN: Azarov resigned. 28.01.2014 [website]. URL: <http://www.unian.net/politics/877378-azarov-podal-v-otstavku.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

However, such measures not only did not lead to a reduction in social and political tension in the country, but increased opposition lobbying for more radical demands: return of the parliamentary-presidential system of government, establishment of privileges for representatives of certain political forces. Opposition leaders did not make political compromises and did not seek a peaceful settlement of the confrontation, continued to defend their demands both in the Verkhovna Rada and at the Euromaidan.

Leader of the UDAR party, Vitaliy Klichko, refused the president's offer to become deputy prime minister for humanitarian affairs. The UDAR press service reported, "I don't see myself in the Yanukovich government... It makes no sense to even raise this issue," said Vitaliy Klichko¹.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk, chairman of the Batkivshchyna faction, also refused Yanukovich's proposal to head the Cabinet of Ministers².

Both opposition politicians, as well as Petr Poroshenko, were invited to the Munich Security Conference. At the conference, the US Secretary of State John Kerry said:

"We are in solidarity with the Ukrainian people. Russia and other countries should not view the European integration of the neighbors as a zero-sum game"³.

After opposition leaders spoke with the Western politicians, the Batkivshchyna, UDAR and Svoboda parties adopted a joint statement: "The opposition has the honor to represent the interests of Maidan before the authorities, but the credit of trust given to us by people is not unlimited, and its patience is not endless. Only a few hours remain before the tragic process becomes irreversible. Full responsibility for

¹ RBC-Ukraine: Klichko refused from the post of humanitarian vice-premier. 28.01.2014 [website]. URL: <http://euromaidan.rbc.ua/rus/klichkootkazalsya-ot-posta-gumanitarnogo-vitse-premera-28012014012300> (access date: 23.03.2022).

² Comments: Yatsenyuk refused from the post of prime minister. 28.01.2014 [website]. URL: <http://comments.ua/politics/449008yatsenyuk-otkazalsya-posta-premerministra.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

³ RIA News: Kerry: Ukraine's European integration should not be perceived as rivalry. 01.02.2014 [website]. URL: <http://ria.ru/world/20140201/992540875.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

the immediate cessation of the conflict escalation, for the way out of the deep political crisis rests personally with Viktor Yanukovich”¹.

Starting from 18 February 2014 riots organized by the Maidan supporters took place on the streets of Kiev. Anti-Maidan participants tried to resist them, appealing to stop the aggression and establish order in the capital city. The situation was aggravated by the regularly convened People’s Assemblies. Government forces tried to reverse the situation in the capital city and prevent the illegal actions of radical forces. But often these measures ended in failure. Buses with anti-Maidan participants were attacked, many of them barely managed to escape from the Ukrainian capital city and return home.

On 19 February 2014 the head of the SBU Alexander Yakimenko announced the start of an anti-terrorist operation: “Today, the Security Service and the Anti-Terrorist Center of Ukraine decided to launch an anti-terrorist operation on the territory of Ukraine... The events of the last 24 hours in Ukraine have shown a growing escalation of power confrontations and the massive use of weapons by the extremist groups... In many regions of the country, local authorities, structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, SBU, prosecutors, military units, ammunition depots... Courthouses are burning, vandals are destroying private apartments, killing civilians... In the last 24 hours alone, more than 1,500 firearms and 100,000 bullets ended up in the hands of criminals.”² Taking into account the decision on the operation, Yakymenko noted, the country “is introducing measures to strengthen the security of protecting public order and the state border ... I appeal to all citizens of Ukraine with a request to remain calm and comply with legislative requirements in their actions. I have already informed the President of the State about the decision to conduct an anti-terrorist operation”³.

¹ ВО “Батьківщина”: Ми зобов’язані зробити все можливе і навіть неможливе, щоб запобігти подальшому кровопролиттю“ – заява ВО ”Батьківщина“, партії УДАР та ВО ”Свобода“. 19.02.2014 [website]. URL: <http://batkivshchyna.com.ua/news/19325.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

² Grigoriev M. S. *Euromaidan*. М.: Kuchkovo Pole, 2014. P. 411–412.

³ Інформаційне агентство “ЛІГАБізнесІнформ”: The SBU starts an all-Ukrainian antiterrorist operation. 19.02.2014 [website]. URL: http://news.liga.net/news/politics/983797-sbu_nachinaet_vseukrainskuyu_operatsiyu_s_privilecheniem_minoborony.htm (access date: 23.03.2022).

On his Facebook page, the leader of the Right Sector organization Dmitriy Yarosh wrote: “I heard that Yakimenko (the head of the SBU) announced an “anti-terrorist operation”. In this regard, the “Right Sector” announces an action to force the regime guards to peace. Someone out there wants to stop the people’s uprising by proclaiming a fake reconciliation. I officially declare: The “Right Sector” did not sign any agreements and did not agree on anything with anyone, therefore the offensive of the insurgent people must continue”¹.

However, the Verkhovna Rada banned the antiterrorist operation of the SBU. 236 people’s deputies voted for the resolution “On condemnation of violence in Ukraine, which led to human casualties.” In accordance with the adopted resolution, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Security Service of Ukraine, and other paramilitary formations are ordered to immediately stop the use of force, the use of weapons and special equipment against the citizens of Ukraine. It is prohibited to conduct an anti-terrorist operation, a preparation for which was announced by the SBU on February 19, and the plan of the anti-terrorist operation itself is called inconsistent with the Constitution of Ukraine and aimed at illegally restricting the rights and freedoms of the citizens. The Ministry of Internal Affairs must immediately stop the blockade of transport communications, streets in Kiev and other settlements of Ukraine, and the military personnel must return to their places of permanent deployment. The Cabinet of Ministers was instructed to cancel its decision to restrict the entry of vehicles into Kyiv.

On 20 February 2014 a real massacre with the use of firearms began on the streets of Kiev. By the middle of the day, dozens of people were killed. Over the next three days, 77 protesters and 16 law enforcement officers were killed in armed clashes in downtown of the capital city.

In the media, the protesters officially declared killed during these days were called the “Heavenly Hundred”. Only those who were in the ranks of the protesters were included in the lists of the heroically killed.

¹ RBC-Ukraine: Right Sector announced the start of an action to force law enforcement officers to peace. 20.02.2014 [website]. URL: <http://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/accidents/-pravyy-sektor-obyavil-o-nachale-aktsiipo-prinuzhdeniyu-pravoohraniteley-20022014035400> (access date: 23.03.2022).

Representatives of the government opposition and Maidan immediately blamed law enforcement agencies and V. Yanukovich for their death. However, according to testimonies of the eyewitnesses, documented by various independent sources, the organizers of murders of the Maidan participants were representatives of pro-Western political forces (A. Yatsenyuk, A. Parubiy, S. Pashynskiy, A. Turchinov and others). Their goal was to create a myth about a “sacred sacrifice” that would justify the use of force by the Maidan participants to overthrow state power in Ukraine.

Representatives of the opposition preferred not to remember the killed employees of special forces. According to various estimates, during the confrontation at the Maidan, from 18 to 23 representatives of the law enforcement agencies died, 919 were considered injured, and 140 of them received gunshot wounds. Moreover, after the Maidan events, a number of law enforcement officials were accused of killing protesters and underwent criminal prosecution. In the central and western regions of Ukraine, law enforcement officers were condemned and humiliated. In the public opinion they were made criminals.

The Ukrainian government did not give an objective legal, political, historical assessment of the events of 18–21 February 2014 in Kiev. However, there is no doubt that they caused an acute political and social crisis in the country, which marked the beginning of an entire series of further historical processes.

President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich announced his readiness for extraordinary elections of the head of state, as well as the formation of a “government of national unity.” “I initiate a return to the 2004 Constitution with a redistribution of powers towards a parliamentary republic. I call for the beginning of a procedure for formation of a government of national confidence. As the President of Ukraine and the guarantor of the Constitution, today I am fulfilling my duty to the people, to Ukraine and to the Lord in the name of preserving the state, in the name of saving people’s lives, in the name of peace and tranquility in our land,” he said¹.

¹ Gordon: Yanukovich initiates early presidential elections. 21.02.2014 [website]. URL: <http://gordonua.com/news/politics/YANukovich-iniciiruuet-dosrochnye-vybory-prezidenta-10794.html> (access date: 23.03.2022).

On 21 February the Presidential Administration signed the Agreement on Resolving the Crisis in Ukraine. The agreement was signed by President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich, leader of the political council of Batkivshchyna Arseniy Yatsenyuk, leader of the UDAR party Vitaliy Klichko and leader of the VO Svoboda Oleg Tyagnibok. The Foreign Ministers of Germany and Poland, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Radoslaw Sikorski, as well as the head of the Department of Continental Europe of the French Foreign Ministry, Eric Fournier, witnessed signing of the agreement. In the presidential administration, the signing ceremony was attended by the ambassadors of the EU countries.

Here is the full text of the Agreement:

“Agreement on Resolving the Crisis in Ukraine.

Concerned about the tragic losses of life in Ukraine, in an effort to immediately stop the bloodshed, we, the signatories of the agreement, agreed on the following:

1. Within 48 hours after signing of this agreement, a special law will be adopted, signed and promulgated, which will renew the Constitution of Ukraine of 2004 with the changes made before that time. The signatories declare their intention to form a coalition and form a government of national unity within 10 days after that.

2. The constitutional reform, which will balance the powers of the president, government and parliament, will begin immediately and be completed by spring 2014.

3. Presidential elections will be held immediately after an adoption of the new Constitution of Ukraine, but no later than December 2014. New electoral legislation will be adopted, as well as a new composition of the Central Electoral Commission on the proportional system in accordance with the rules of the OSCE and the Venice Commission.

4. Investigation of the recent acts of violence will be carried out under close monitoring by the authorities, the opposition and the Council of Europe.

5. The government will not introduce a state of emergency. The government and the opposition will refrain from using force. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine will adopt the third law on exemption from liability, which will apply to the same offenses as the law of 17.02.2014. Both sides will make serious efforts to normalize life in the

cities and villages by vacating administrative and public buildings and unblocking streets, parks and squares. Illegal weapons shall be handed over to the authorities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs within 24 hours from the moment the above-mentioned special law comes into force (Cl. 1 of this Agreement). After this period, all cases of illegal possession and storage of the weapons will fall under the current legislation of Ukraine. Forces of the opposition and the authorities will step away from the confrontation. The authorities will use the forces of law and order exclusively for physical protection of the buildings of the authorities.

6. The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Poland and the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation call for an immediate end to all forms of violence and confrontation.

Kyiv, 21 February 2014”¹.

After signing of the agreement, the security forces left the Kiev downtown. However, on the evening of February 22, in violation of its clauses, the Euromaidan militants — the Right Sector and the Maidan self-defense occupied government buildings. Andriy Parubiy from the Maidan stage declared: “We have the entire government quarter under control”².

The next day, the Verkhovna Rada adopted an illegal decision to remove the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich. On 22 February 2014 there was no impeachment procedure at all, and the number of deputies who voted for it — 328, according to the Constitution of Ukraine, was not enough to make a decision, which requires 338 people.

On 23 February Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Alexander Turchinov signed a resolution on assuming the duties of the President. An anti-constitutional coup in Ukraine was carried out. Viktor Yanukovich tried to fly to Russia from the Donetsk airport, but the

¹ LB.ua: Opposition leaders signed “amicable agreement” with the authorities (document). 21.02.2014 [website]. URL: http://lb.ua/news/2014/02/21/256505_lideri_oppozitsii_podpisali.html (access date: 23.03.2022).

² LB.ua: Self-defense of the Maidan took control of the government quarter, — Parubiy. 22.02.2014 [website]. URL: http://society.lb.ua/life/2014/02/22/256584_samooborona_maydana_vzyala_pod.html (access date: 23.03.2022).

flight was blocked by the Ukrainian border guards. Because of the threat to his life, the President of Ukraine was evacuated to the territory of Russia.

Currently in Ukraine, an ideological cliché is introduced into the mass consciousness, proving that the events of 2014 turned out to be the people's "revolution of dignity" that overthrew the rotten dictatorship of Viktor Yanukovich that was kept under Russian control. This revolution opened the way for Ukraine to national democracy and European integration. O. O. Gisem and O. O. Martynyuk in their textbook presented the following version of the events of early 2014 with the corresponding conclusions: "On the evening of 21 February a crowded rally took place. After the speech of the opposition leaders, one of the militia commanders of the Maidan Self-Defense Vladimir Parasyuk, who said that the Maidan would not tolerate V. Yanukovich for another year, before the elections in December 2014, came to the podium. An ultimatum was declared: if V. Yanukovich does not resign by morning, the Maidan Self-Defense will be forced to start storming the building of the Presidential Administration. On the night of 21–22 February V. Yanukovich left for Kharkiv, where on 22 February a Congress of deputies of all levels of the southeastern regions of Ukraine, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol was to be held. However, not finding support in Kharkov, V. Yanukovich fled to Russia. Other representatives of his regime also left Ukraine. On 22 February the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted (328 votes) a decision to remove V. Yanukovich from the post of President of Ukraine, arguing this decision by his self-removal from performing his duties, and scheduled early presidential elections in Ukraine for 25 May 2014. Alexandr Turchinov became the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The next day, he was also entrusted with the execution of the powers of the President.

On 27 February 2014 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine appointed Alexander Yatsenyuk, leader of the *Batkivshchyna* party, to the post of Prime Minister of Ukraine. A new government was formed, supported by the Maidan. The events of November 2013 — February 2014 were called the Revolution of Dignity, and 107 heroes who died in the fight against the dictatorship were called the Heavenly

Hundred. All of them were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine”¹.

In fact, an illegal coup took place in Ukraine at that time in the format of not a popular, but a “color” revolution. During the coup, the inefficiency and instability of the regime of V. Yanukovych was manifested. According to all the rules of this genre, speculation on social and economic difficulties and populist political programs and the spiritual intervention of the West were used. According to modern data, the victims of the Maidan were not the work of the Berkut government special forces, but they died as a result of a provocation by the opposition.

The government embarked on a radical policy: attempts were made to abolish the Law on the Regional Status of the Russian Language, the need to revise the facts and events in the history of the USSR was declared, and their assessment changed. The ideas of radical nationalism were revived; personalities of the nationalist, pro-fascist movements were heroized; with the silent consent of the authorities, monuments of V. Lenin and other Soviet statesmen were demolished, the graves of participants of the Great Patriotic War were desecrated.

Russian and the Russian-speaking population of the South-East of Ukraine regarded the ongoing events as a clear orientation of the new government towards deepening the policy of European integration and forced Ukrainization. As a result, in late February — early March 2014, numerous protest rallies and demonstrations began in the southeastern regions of Ukraine.

Thus, the events that began in Kiev in November 2013 and lasted until March 2014 led to further destabilization of the political situation in Ukraine. As a result, an unconstitutional coup took place in the country, which meant a strengthening of the policy of Ukrainization, nationalism, Russophobia, and radicalism. The tragic consequence of the events of this period was the death of civilians and law enforcement officers. All this led to the activation of the political self-consciousness of the residents of the South-East of Ukraine and the emergence of a social and political anti-government movement in these territories, establishing a foundation for events of the Russian Spring in the Donbass.

¹ *Гісем О. В., Мартинюк О. О.* Історія України (профільний рівень): підруч. для 11 кл. закл. загал. серед. освіти. Харків: Ранок, 2019. Р. 209–210.

Chapter 14

UKRAINE IN 2014–2022

New authorities, with their first decision at the legislative level, recorded discrimination on the basis of the language principle. The Kiev regime, with the support of neo-Nazis, acted very aggressively, denying any possibility of dialogue and compromise. From that moment on, aggressive Russophobia started to fully determine the state policy in Ukraine. The Ukrainian authorities by one of the first decisions eliminated a regional status of the Russian language, and then consistently destroyed any ties with Russia. A law on education was adopted, which crossed out the Russian language from the educational process, a law on “indigenous peoples”, depriving Russians of the right to be considered as the indigenous people and have education in their own language.

Ideologies are introduced into the public consciousness of the Ukrainians that the Russian cultural code is a mortal danger for the independent spiritual development of Ukraine, the formation of its special national values. Thus, the head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory Vladimir Viatrovich said: “... The “Russian world” has dangerous tentacles. Some are disgusting — like “the Soviet Union”, for example. And others are nice, refined and respectable, such as Vladimir Vysotskiy, Viktor Tsoy, Mikhail Bulgakov, and also the movie “The Irony of Fate, or I Hope You Enjoyed Your Bath” and... the holiday of March 8... They are tools of reminding about a single cultural space. Namely, culture is the foundation on which each imperialism builds the temple of its glory...”¹

¹ There is no need to touch us — the Institute of Ukrainian National Memory denounces the Russian World // RIA Novosti. 28.01.2018.

Thus, vulgar and primitive attempts are made to squeeze out of the consciousness of today's Ukrainians, primarily the young people, those spiritual bonds that make up not only our common values, but also the golden fund of modern world culture.

What was happening in Kiev could not but cause alarm and protests in the South-East Ukraine. Protest movement in Crimea became the strongest, where the radical statements of the Euromaidan activists led to the mobilization of a significant part of the Crimeans against the new leadership of Ukraine. On 23 February 2014, a mass rally of the People's Will Against Fascism in Ukraine took place at Nakhimov Square in Sevastopol, in which more than 50,000 people took part. At the rally, the "people's mayor" Alexey Chalyi was elected, and then the executive authorities of Sevastopol were changed. Russian military men took control of key facilities on the territory of the peninsula and did not allow provocations against the civilian population. On 16 March, a historic referendum was held in Crimea, which, with the support of the overwhelming majority of Crimeans, led to return of Crimea to Russia.

On 18 March an agreement was signed between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on admission of the Republic of Crimea to Russia, according to which new subjects were formed in Russia — the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol.

The Ukrainian government during the presidency of P. Poroshenko and V. Zelenskiy is characterized by the desire to convince the Ukrainian and Western citizens that Crimea was illegally seized from Ukraine by analogy with the Nazi Anschluss. That is why it should be liberated from the Russian occupation and returned to Ukraine. In development of this false version, the authors of the textbook *History of Ukraine for the 11th grade* O. V. Gisem and O. O. Martynyuk came to the following conclusion: "On 11 March 2014, the Supreme Council of Crimea and the Sevastopol City Council adopted the Declaration of Independence. In accordance with it, in the event if the peoples of Crimea will decide to become a part of the Russian Federation as a result of a referendum, Crimea will be declared a sovereign republic and, in this status, it will appeal to the Russian government with a proposal to be admitted to the Russian Federation as a new subject on the basis of an appropriate international treaty. On 16 March 2014, by decision of the Crimean parliament, a referendum was held on the status of Crimea,

which was contrary to the Ukrainian legislation. Despite a decree of the Acting President of Ukraine A. Turchinov to suspend a decision of the Crimean Parliament, as well as contrary to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which recognized the decisions of referendum as inconsistent with the Constitution of Ukraine, despite the disapproving position of the UN Security Council, the referendum was held. In the context of boycott of the referendum by the Crimean Tatar people, the presence of a large number of armed Russian military personnel, as well as massive falsifications, the referendum in Crimea allegedly received more than 1.2 million completed ballots (which is 83.10 % of the total number of voters), of which 96.77 % made a choice “for reunification of Crimea with Russia on the rights of a subject of the Russian Federation”¹.

In reality, a decision on the self-determination of Crimea turned out to be the free will of the Crimean people, expressed on the basis of a legitimate procedure. At the same time, the historical roots of the status of Crimea within Russia should be taken into account.

Protest actions of those who disagreed with the victory of Euromaidan in Kiev took place in all cities of the South-East and were accompanied by clashes with the activists of right-wing radical organizations. The confrontation developed most acutely in Donetsk and Luhansk. The events of November 2013–February 2014 in Kiev caused extreme discontent among the residents of Donbass, but for a long time the popular protest did not take on the character of an armed confrontation. The population counted on the possibility of a political settlement of the current crisis. But the Kiev regime and its supporters decided to ignore an opinion of the residents of Donbass and impose their will on them by force.

In February 2014, mass rallies and demonstrations began, which were called Anti-Maidan. In general, all these processes, including the revival of the Russian movement, mass protests, creation of new authorities, became known as the Russian Spring. They had as their main goal a return to the Russian cultural and historical roots

¹ *Gisem O. V., Martynyuk O. O.* History of Ukraine (profile level): textbook for the 11th grade of general secondary education institutions Kharkiv: Ranok, 2019. P. 209–210.

and reunification with fraternal Russia. The events in Crimea were an important component of the Russian Spring and had a direct connection with the processes taking place in the Donbass.

Ukrainian historiography forms a perception of the criminal occupation of part of the Donbass by Russian regular troops, relying on a handful of local separatist terrorists who proclaimed the illegal Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic. For example, authors of the textbook *History of Ukraine for the 11th grade* O. V. Gisem and O. O. Martyniuk stated: "These actions were staged against the pro-Ukrainian citizens. Clashes occurred. The police was mostly inactive. Events continued until the end of March. The Ukrainian party did everything possible to avoid a direct cause for entering of the regular Russian troops into the Donbass, which were concentrated on the border with Ukraine in full combat readiness. The situation reached its peak in April. Attempts were made to proclaim "the people's republics":

7 April — Donetsk and Kharkov, 28 April — Luhansk. Separatist movement in Kharkov and other cities was suppressed by the Ukrainian human rights lawyers and activists. In the Donbass, on the side of the separatists, who began to create illegal armed units, armed detachments of the Russian mercenaries appeared. Citizens of Russia became the leaders of the so-called DPR and LPR. The idea of creating New Russia from the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine began to unwind¹.

In fact, the movement for equal rights became massive in the North-East and South-East of Ukraine, and its blocking by the new authorities of Ukraine caused a desire for expanded autonomy, which turned into a struggle for independence from Ukraine during military clashes. Separatism in Kharkov, in Odessa (the tragic events of 1 May 2014), in other regions was brutally suppressed not by peaceful human rights activists, but by armed and well-organized detachments of nationalists, who, together with the official units of the Ukrainian army, actually pursued a policy of genocide on the territory of Donbass at the time of armed conflict. No participation in it of the regular armed forces of Russia was confirmed, at the same time, our country regularly

¹ Ibid. P. 213.

provided diplomatic and humanitarian assistance to the struggling population of the DPR and LPR.

On 26 January 2014 in the Donetsk downtown at the square named after V. I. Lenin a large-scale rally was held, which brought together several thousand people. It was aimed at protecting the building of the Donetsk Regional State Administration from an attempted capture by the Ukrainian radicals. Groups of nationalists were specially brought to Donetsk by buses in order to seize the regional state administration and announce their joining the Euromaidan in Kiev. This was contrary to the interests and sentiments of the residents of the region.

In the second half of February, mass rallies and demonstrations began near the monument to Artyom, the leader of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic. It should be noted that the largest rallies were held every weekend, and the number of participants was steadily growing.

On 23 February 2014 the parliamentarians of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine decided to cancel the law “On Fundamentals of the State Language Policy.” Thus, the status of Russian as a regional language was cancelled. This was the beginning of mass protests caused by an indignation of the residents of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkov and other cities. One can say that 23 February 2014 was a beginning of the Russian Spring in the Donbass. Rallies at the central squares of Donetsk and Luhansk served as the basis for the formation of the self-defense units of administrative buildings, as well as important historical monuments from attacks of the Ukrainian radicals.

The regional political elite had to take the side of people because it was their official representative, and also contribute to the resolution of the crisis. However, the governor distanced himself from the protests, and on 24 February, a statement appeared on the official website of the Donetsk Regional State Administration, which spoke of the commitment to “United and indivisible Ukraine.” This step showed that these people, which the people of Donbass counted on, finally betrayed them and it was necessary to form new public organizations to protect the interests of the residents of the South-East.

Cruelty of actions of the radicals at the Maidan in Kiev, seizure of the authorities in various regions of Ukraine, betrayal of the deputies of parliament and leadership of the region finally led the protesters to

the conclusion that it was necessary to create alternative government institutions to protect their interests.

On 25 February 2014, “Pavel Gubarev’s Appeal to the Donbass Militiamen” was published. This document gained great popularity in social networks and played an important role in the formation of the Donetsk People’s Republic.

Rallies began to take place in many cities of the South and East of Ukraine. People’s leaders raised Russian flags on the administrative buildings of Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson, Melitopol, Krivoy Rog, Dnepropetrovsk, Luhansk, Melitopol, Donetsk, Crimea and many other cities.

On 1 March 2014 in the Donetsk downtown at the square named after V. I. Lenin a rally was held with the slogans “Berkut, we are with you”, “I — Donbass — with Russia”, “Bandera will not come.” At the rally, Pavel Gubarev was elected People’s Governor of Donbass, he urged not to implement the decisions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers and regional administration, since they betrayed the people of Donbass and recognized an illegitimate power of Maidan.

After the rally, supporters of Pavel Gubarev went to the building of the regional administration and demanded the resignation of the leader. The flags of Russia and the Donetsk People’s Republic were hoisted on the square near the building. The protest leader announced that he would seek a referendum on the self-determination of Donbass. On the same day, an emergency session of the Regional Council took place in Luhansk, which, in the presence of protesters, decided to condemn the coup in Kiev and ban the activities of Ukrainian radical organizations.

On 6 March 2014, officers of the Security Service of Ukraine arrested Pavel Gubarev in order to suppress protests in Donbass. This resulted in an opposite effect and contributed to the surge of protest moods in the region and growth of members of the People’s Militia of Donbass.

On the same day, representatives of the People’s Militia and more than 40 public organizations created the Coordinating Council of the Donetsk region. The meetings of the Coordinating Council were actively attended by representatives of the Communist Party, the

Progressive Socialist Party, the Russian Block Party, the Rus Party, the People's Militia of Donbass, the People's Liberation Movement, Oplot, the Union of Citizens of Ukraine and many other organizations and movements. The meetings were held in difficult conditions of constant pressure and threats from Kiev; Denis Pushilin, Alexander Zakharchenko and other public figures became leaders. They decided to proclaim the Donetsk People's Republic.

On 5 and 6 April 2014, the Coordinating Council requested that an extraordinary session of the Donetsk Regional Council be convened on 7 April 2014 to consider documents on the status of the Donetsk region. Most deputies were afraid to take political responsibility for fate of the region. Activists occupied the regional state administration, representatives of territorial communities, political parties and public associations of the Donetsk region registered at the session hall. They decided to approve the text of the Declaration of Sovereignty and the Act on Declaration of State Independence of the Donetsk People's Republic. Also, following an example of the Crimea, they adopted an appeal to the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. The meeting participants decided to hold a referendum on self-determination of Donbass no later than 11 May 2014.

In the context of a vacuum of power and inactivity of the deputies of the regional council, this body became the highest representative body of people's power on the territory of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic.

The politicians who came to power in Kiev as a result of a coup immediately switched to a policy of armed suppression of dissent. On 15 March 2014, an order was given to concentrate large units of the armed forces from the central and western regions of the country in the eastern regions. Understanding what the concentration of troops in the Donbass leads to, many people went out onto the highways and formed human cordons, trying with their bare hands to stop an advance of the tanks and heavy equipment.

On 4 April 2014, Acting President of Ukraine Alexander Turchinov officially announced that people who occupied the administrative offices in Luhansk, Donetsk and Kharkov were terrorists, against whom an anti-terrorist operation will be organized.

On 12 April 2014, a group of volunteers from Donbass and Crimea headed by Igor Girkin (Strelkov) arrived to Slavyansk. The city was of strategic importance, since, according to Kiev, it was the key to solving the problem in the Donbass.

On the very first day in Slavyansk, with an assistance of local supporters of the People's Militia, administrative buildings were taken under control. Local residents and heads of the city governments went over to the side of rebels. Heroic defense of Slavyansk began, which lasted more than three months.

On 13 April 2014, the National Security Council of Ukraine published a decision to launch an anti-terrorist operation using the Armed Forces and aviation. The first armed clash between the People's Militia of Donbass and the Armed Forces of Ukraine took place. In the village of Semyonovka on the outskirts of Slavyansk, a reconnaissance unit of militia clashed with the special forces of the SBU Alpha. Three special forces vehicles were moving at high speed and had as their goal, according to a number of sources, physical elimination of the protest leaders. The countermeasures taken by the defenders were very effective, the mobile group stopped the enemy. Subsequently, the Ukrainian command confirmed the death of one and wounding of three officers.

On 14 April 2014, the decree was signed by Alexandr Turchinov and entered into force. The anti-terrorist operation in international practice involves local actions related to the fight against terrorists and a release of hostages. Elimination of dissidents with the large-scale use of aviation and artillery is called a punitive operation. Most of the people who subsequently suffered in the conflict were not combatants.

The Kiev regime, contrary to the UN Charter and international law, began the massive use of aviation and artillery in the residential areas. The purpose of these actions, according to a number of experts, was to intimidate political opponents in the Donbass. To fulfill the tasks set, units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard, the Territorial Defense, the Security Service of Ukraine, special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, hired armed units of Ukrainian oligarchs (battalions Aidar, Dnieper-1, Donbass, Kryvbass, Shakhtar-Tornado), detachments of radical nationalist organizations: Azov, Ukrainian Volunteer Corps, OUN, Right Sector. Separate groups from

the Baltic States, Georgia, Poland, France, Sweden, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy, Croatia, as well as employees of various private military companies, also fought on the side of Kiev. The authorities actively involved representatives of terrorist organizations to suppress resistance. For example, the Chechens formed a separate battalion named after Dzhokhar Dudayev, etc. It can be said that Ukraine has become a refuge for everyone who hated Russia and Russians. At this stage, all prerequisites for unfolding of a real genocide in Ukraine were created. These actions took place simultaneously with the integration of many discriminatory norms into the country's legislation. The Kiev leadership initially wanted to provoke a bloodshed. After completion of the presidential elections, Petr Poroshenko became the new president, and the fighting became widespread.

On 16 April 2014, a unit of the 25th separate airborne brigade was blocked in the Slavyansk region and six airborne combat vehicles and other weapons were captured. This became a significant help in protecting Slavyansk from the Kiev aggression.

Supporters of the republic formed a wide network of roadblocks in the region, which were supposed to delay an advancement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It was necessary to expand the controlled territory and delay the start of hostilities until implementation of a referendum on self-determination of the Donbass republics. At the same time, the most trained detachments formed the mobile groups. They actively operated on the most dangerous sectors of the front, making raids and sabotages. There was a hope that after a referendum, Russia would recognize the Donbass republics in the same way that it recognized the self-determination of Crimea. After that, the activists hoped for Russia's help in protecting them from Kiev's encroachment on sovereignty.

The beginning of large-scale hostilities, according to a number of researchers, was sanctioned by the President of the United States of America — Barack Hussein Obama. In his speech, he called for an establishment of full control over the Donbass a necessary factor in providing the next tranche of loan from the IMF. In the context of the total corruption and complete dependence of the Ukrainian authorities on Washington, this opinion looked like a direct order to start the genocide of Russians in the Donbass. The group of the Armed Forces

of Ukraine in the region of Slavyansk was reinforced by nationalist detachments, tank groups, divisions of self-propelled multiple rocket launcher system, and large caliber artillery mounts.

The Odessa tragedy occurred simultaneously with the beginning of the barbaric shelling of the territory of the city of Slavyansk. No humanitarian corridors were provided for the civilian population, and the start of an anti-terrorist operation was not announced, since all residents were considered terrorists. Several dozens of helicopters and about a hundred armored vehicles were used against a small town with a small military post of the AUU (armed units of Ukraine). Thus, the military operations were initially aimed at intimidating civilians, causing maximum damage to critical infrastructure, destroying hospitals and schools. Barricades were hastily erected on the streets of Slavyansk to delay an advance of the enemy and to allow the residents to retreat to safe areas. With the help of captured weapons, a handful of defenders even shot down two helicopters. All attempts to capture the city on the move failed and led to heavy losses on both sides.

Thus, the armed conflict turned into a phase of hostilities in the South-East of Ukraine, carried out between the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ukrainian irregular paramilitary formations of right-wing radical and nationalist nature, on the one hand, and armed voluntary formations of Donbass residents who opposed the Ukrainian state power, on the other hand. At first, during a confrontation between the parties, clashes were carried out, attacks on roadblocks from two sides, retractable raids using small arms. However, already in the summer, under the guise of the ATO, real hostilities were carried out by the Ukrainian party against the people of Donbass. The ATO officially lasted until 30 April 2018, when Petr Poroshenko announced the start of the joint forces operation, which meant open hostilities by the armed forces of Ukraine.

From the autumn of 2014, the process of incorporating nationalist battalions into the National Guard began, which was a military formation with law enforcement functions and was a part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The nationalist battalion Azov was the first to be included in this structure. For the special cruelty shown in relation to the residents of the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics, by order

of the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Arsen Avakov, it was given the status of a regiment.

On 1 May 2014 a mass demonstration of supporters of the Donetsk People's Republic took place in Donetsk. Participants of the procession went to a building of the regional prosecutor's office and demanded to stop criminal cases against their supporters, to release the activists arrested for political reasons. Employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs used special means against the demonstrators (sting grenades, pepper gas, traumatic weapons), as a result, 26 people were injured, and the prosecutor's office building was taken under control by supporters of the Russian Spring.

The Kiev regime did not stop the attempts to suppress the protests. In many cities, Ukrainian radicals and football fans attacked supporters of the Russian Spring. Some citizens were severely beaten. Local authorities who went over to the side of the rebels contributed to the arrest of many anti-Maidan participants. Mass clashes between radicals and anti-Maidan supporters occurred in Kharkov. In Odessa, on 2 May 2014, Ukrainian radicals attacked anti-Maidan supporters and set on fire the House of Trade Unions, where they were hiding. According only to official data, as a result of fire, 46 people died, 200 received injuries of various severity. Despite their injuries, many of the victims subsequently received prison terms. A large-scale propaganda campaign was launched in the media, where supporters of the Russian Spring were called "Colorado potato beetles" for their adherence to the St. George Ribbon, a symbol of victory in the Great Patriotic War, separatists and terrorists. A significant part of the activists were arrested without legal grounds by the Kiev authorities or even went missing. Having lost their leaders in many cities, the movement was suppressed.

The cynicism of radicals in Odessa and other cities triggered a wave of mass protests in the Donbass. Kiev's refusal to compromise, unwillingness to hear demands of the people, willingness to use radicals and mass terror contributed to the growth of political activity of the residents of Donbass. The registration of volunteers in the People's Militia began to protect against aggression of the Kiev regime.

On 4–8 May 2014 militiamen occupied key facilities in Donetsk. They could be used by the Kiev radicals for provocations against

supporters of the republic. On 9 May 2014 a large-scale rally dedicated to the Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War took place on the central square of Donetsk. At the rally, the leaders appealed to their supporters to mobilize and actively participate in the self-determination referendum.

On 11 May 2014 a referendum was held in the Donetsk People's Republic. 89.07 % of the residents who voted supported independence.

The situation developed in a similar way in the neighboring Luhansk region. 23 February 2014 became a conditional starting point for the events of the Russian Spring in the Luhansk region. On this day, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine voted for abolition of the Law "On Fundamentals of the State Language Policy", thereby canceling the regional status of the Russian language, which caused a surge of popular indignation. In Luhansk, as well as in Donetsk, Kharkov, mass rallies of the citizens took place in order to protect the monuments of V. Lenin, city and regional administrations from invasion, and the capturing by the right-wing radicals and nationalists. Residents of Donbass were waiting for the reaction of the local authorities and support for their civil position. But the leaders of the Party of Regions were in no hurry to evaluate the Maidan events and expressed their readiness to work with the new government. This outraged the people of Donbass and the Party of Regions actually lost the trust of its voters.

Against this background, in Luhansk, on a popular initiative, a rally was held against the new state power, in which about 10 thousand people took part. The state flag of the Russian Federation was hoisted on the building of the Luhansk Regional State Administration for the first time. In response, radical Svoboda party members demanded from the Security Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine to hold the organizers of these actions accountable: "We demand involvement of the organizers of today's anti-Ukrainian sabbath under the flags of a foreign state, involvement of direct participants in raising of the Russian tricolor on the flagpole near the Luhansk Regional State Administration... We demand counteraction to manifestations of separatism not in words, but in deeds." Activists began collecting signatures in support of an idea of holding a referendum on self-determination of the Luhansk region.

On the same day, the deputies of the Donetsk City Council at an extraordinary session proposed to the Donetsk Regional Administration to hold a referendum on the further fate of Donbass and on the status of the region, establish an official status for the Russian language on a par with Ukrainian, introduce a moratorium on price increases and reduce social benefits, and consider Russia as strategic partner of Donbass. At a rally in Donetsk, P. Gubarev was elected the people's governor of Donbass.

The political initiative of the protesters was picked up by the residents of the cities of Alchevsk, Anthracite, Sverdlovsk, Krasnodon, Severodonetsk, Krasnyi Luch, Kirovsk, Popasnaya, Stakhanov. Thousands of citizens went to the streets of these cities with demands: refusal of integration with the European Union, removal of the illegitimate leadership of Ukraine, maintaining allied relations with Russia, granting the Russian language the status of a second state language, holding a referendum on the federalization of Ukraine.

On 2 March 2014 in Luhansk, as a result of decisive actions of the protesters, an extraordinary session of the Luhansk Regional Council announced the following decision: "We do not recognize a legitimacy of the Kiev authorities, we demand an all-Ukrainian referendum, we demand a ban on fascist parties involved in the riots: "Svoboda", "Right Sector", etc." Under pressure from protesters who stormed the building of the Luhansk Regional Council, the deputies adopted a resolution with a number of demands to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: giving the Russian language the status of the second state language, holding a referendum on the federal structure of Ukraine, ending the persecution of former employees of the Berkut special forces, and banning right-wing radical and nationalist organizations. In case of non-fulfillment of these requirements, the deputies reserved the right to seek help from fraternal Russia. The regional council announced that "the central executive bodies formed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in violation of the law" were recognized as illegitimate and demanded from the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "to restore the rule of law."

In the meantime, A. Turchinov dismissed Vladimir Pristyuk, the governor of the Luhansk region, and appointed Mikhail Bolotskiy, who previously held the post of chairman of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, in his place.

On 5 March 2014, another rally of many thousands took place in Luhansk, called Russian Spring — 2 for its participants, initiated by the public organizations Luhansk Guard, Luhansk Self-Defense Detachment, etc. The protesters elected Alexander Kharitonov as the People's Governor of the Luhansk region, who, in turn, proposed to elect his own government — the People's Council of the Luhansk Region.

On 9 March 2014 a 3,000-strong rally under Russian flags gathered on the Luhansk Square of Heroes of the Great Patriotic War in support of the idea of self-determination of the Luhansk region. The activists adopted an appeal to the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin with a request to act as a guarantor of the constitutional rights of Russians and the Russian-speaking population of the Luhansk region. Rally participants occupied the building of the Luhansk Regional State Administration, where the Russian tricolor was raised. During the rally, an initiative was put forward to hold a People's Referendum of the Luhansk region from 16 March to 23 March in order to establish public opinion among the residents of the region on five major issues: "Do you trust the acting President of Ukraine and the persons appointed by him?" "Do you support reduction of social benefits and an abolition of benefits at the request of the IMF (International Monetary Fund)?" "Do you support the status of the Luhansk region as a federal subject within Ukraine?" "Do you support an amnesty for the leaders of the popular resistance in the Luhansk region?" "Do you support joining the Customs Union?"

Governor M. Bolotskikh, appointed by the Kiev authorities, was forced to resign and leave the administration building. And although he later denied the information about his resignation, arguing that he was forced to write an application under pressure, the political situation in the city became even more destabilized. By the evening, a number of protesters reached 10,000. They were able not only to unite and organize, but also to make several important decisions. Thus, Dmitriy Lutsenko was appointed head of the city self-defense.

From 10 to 13 March 2014 employees of the Security Service of Ukraine detained and persecuted public activists. Popular protests began in the city, demands for holding a "People's referendum of the Luhansk region" were put forward more and more insistently, and signatures were actively collected in support of it.

On 15 March 2014 mass rallies took place in Luhansk, Donetsk and other cities covered by the popular resistance movement in support of a referendum in Crimea on the issue of the status and nationality of the peninsula. The referendum in Crimea was scheduled for 16 March, and its results later served as legal grounds for the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation.

The Crimean events inspired residents of the Luhansk region, strengthened their faith in correctness of the chosen path, and gave hope for an opportunity to change the political situation in the region on their own. Rallies of supporters of the Russian Spring were gaining momentum. On 22 March, a mass rally was held under the slogans and posters “Yanukovych is our president!”, “No to chauvinism!”, “We are with Russia!”

On 25 March 2014, by decision of the Kiev Administrative Court, broadcasting of the Russian TV channels RTR, Pervyi Kanal’ Russia 24 and NTV was terminated, which caused mass indignation and protests among residents of the Luhansk region. Luhansk cable television ignored the ban, continuing to broadcast Russian channels. Tension in the society increased. Conflict between the Ukrainian central government and local governments reached a boiling point and threatened to turn into an armed conflict.

On 29 March 2014, at a regular rally held in Luhansk, the results of the “People’s referendum of the Luhansk region” were summed up, in which 173, 284 people took part. 171 thousand ballots were recognized as valid. The results of the referendum showed that 96.15 % of voters refused to trust A. Turchinov; 95.5 % supported the idea of the federalization of the state, more than 95 % opposed an abolition of social payments and benefits; and 96.1 % were in favor of Ukraine joining the Customs Union.

On the night of 29–30 March 2014 unidentified persons attacked the protesters’ tent camp in Luhansk. The camp was destroyed, activists were beaten, several people were hospitalized.

On 30 March 2014 a mass rally was held in the Luhansk downtown, which brought together about 2 thousand people. The participants of the action staged a protest procession with the flags of the Russian Federation, posters “Ukraine is Rus’”, “Russian is the state language”, “Yes — to Referendum, no — to Presidential elections!” Along the

way they shouted: “Luhansk, stand up!”, “Russia! Russia!” The protesters demanded from the deputies of all levels to recognize the new Ukrainian government and the governor of the Luhansk region as illegal, advocated strengthening ties with the Russian Federation, and opposed lowering social standards.

On 2–3 April 2014 a joint Coordinating Council of the Public of the Luhansk Region was created in Luhansk, which included several dozen pro-Russian organizations. As a result of the repressive actions committed the day before against the leaders of the popular protest movement, on 6 April a 5,000-strong rally under the flags of the Russian Federation took place in Luhansk. These days, demonstrations took place in other major cities of the Luhansk region. The number of supporters of the Russian Spring grew, a confrontation between the residents of the region and the bodies and representatives of the Kiev authorities, who were supported by the right-wing radical and nationalist organizations and parties, heated up. Civil confrontation acquired the features of an armed conflict.

On the night of 4–5 April 2014 the authorities arrested activists of the “Russian Spring”, on 6 April 2014 its supporters occupied the building of the Security Service of Ukraine in Luhansk, and on the night of 6–7 April the building of the SBU administration in Donetsk region. During these events, military weapons fell into the hands of the protesters for the first time, so military units capable of resisting Ukrainian aggression began to form — the People’s Militia of Donbass and the Army of the South-East. Valeriy Bolotov and Igor Plotnitskiy became the leaders of the People’s Militia.

On 21 April 2014 a regional “People’s Assembly” was held in Luhansk, at which 217 representatives from 69 cities and districts announced that they had taken power into their own hands and elected Valeriy Bolotov as the people’s governor. And on 27 April, at the congress of representatives of territorial communities, political parties and public organizations, the Coordinating People’s Council adopted the “Act on Declaration of State Independence of the Luhansk People’s Republic.” Thus, on this day, the self-determination and self-proclamation of the Luhansk People’s Republic took place.

On 29 April 2014 supporters of the idea of creation of the Luhansk People’s Republic took control of the buildings of the Luhansk

Regional Administration, the Prosecutor's Office, and the Regional Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Law enforcement officers were provided with a "live corridor" through which they voluntarily left the buildings. Many of them went over to the side of the Republican forces. On this day, Russian flags appeared not only over the buildings of Luhansk, but also of other cities in the region — Pervomaysk, Rovenek, Anratsyt, Bryanka, Alchevsk. By the May First holidays, the popular protest movement swept Severodonetsk, Perevalsk, Krasny Luch.

On 3 May 2014 V. Bolotov announced an introduction of a state of emergency in the Luhansk region and creation of the Zarya people's liberation battalion. Active formation of the people's militia began, an establishment of relations with the military and political leaders of the Donetsk People's Republic. The republic began preparations to protect its state and social interests. It was obvious that the defense would be carried out not only on the diplomatic front, but also with weapons in hands.

An issue of recording legal status of the self-proclaimed republic and holding a referendum for this purpose became crucial. Work on preparation of the referendum was carried out in all districts of the Luhansk region and took place in a short time and in difficult conditions. The Central Electoral Commission was established. A referendum on self-determination of the Luhansk People's Republic was scheduled for 11 May.

Preparations for a referendum were complicated by the actions of Ukraine, which blocked electronic databases of voters in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, as a result of which organizers of voting used somewhat outdated data as of 2012. At that time, 1,830,000 voters were registered in the Luhansk region. In the current situation, activists and volunteers distributed leaflets with an invitation to vote around the clock, and carried out oral campaigning.

On 11 May 2014 at 8:00 am, the polling stations of the Luhansk region welcomed the first voters. The declaration of the will of citizens took place in a tense atmosphere, especially in Svatovskiy, Melovskiy, Belokurakinskiy and Troitskiy districts, controlled by the armed forces of Ukraine. In Luhansk itself, despite widespread fears about possible provocations and sabotage at the polling stations during the

referendum, the voting went smoothly and in an organized manner. Flows of people who wanted to vote flooded the streets of the city. The highest turnout was noted in Krasnodon, Krasnyi Luch and Markovka. In settlements where voting was under threat due to the fault of the Ukrainian authorities, voters voted by list, sending lists to the CEC by e-mail. Many activists and volunteers risked their own safety by trying to deliver ballots to remote areas of the region. In polling stations in some cities, voting for miners and metallurgists working on shift schedules was extended until 23:00–24:00.

Despite the difficulties, the citizens expressed their attitude towards an idea of the creation of a sovereign state in the Luhansk region. According to the CEC, to the question “Do you support the act of state independence of the Luhansk People’s Republic?” 96.2% (1 million 298 thousand 84 people) answered “yes”, 3.8% (51 thousand 276 people) voted “no.” In total, 1,375,295 people participated in the referendum.

This day of mass and free expression of will of the residents of the Luhansk region, who did not want to live in a pro-Western nationalist state, was the culmination of the events of the “Russian Spring.” The political leadership of the Russian Federation declared respect to the will of the people of Donbass. At the same time, neither the Ukrainian authorities nor their political partners — the US, the EU, or the OSCE recognized the legitimacy of the referendum.

On 12 May 2014 a rally was held in Luhansk on the Heroes of the Great Patriotic War Square with the participation of 5,000 Luhansk residents and representatives of the region, at which the “Act on Declaration of State Independence of the Luhansk People’s Republic” was read and the official results of the referendum of 11 May were announced. V. Bolotov addressed the protesters:

“In complete unity, we have chosen our own path, the path of independence from an arbitrariness of the bloody dictate of the Kiev junta, fascism and nationalism. The path of freedom, the path of triumph of law, the path of creation.” Thus the state sovereignty of the Luhansk People’s Republic was proclaimed. 12 May 2014 was declared a public holiday — the Day of the Luhansk People’s Republic.

A few days later, on 17 May 2014 the General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine declared the Luhansk People’s Republic a terrorist organization, and recognized its residents as separatists.

On 18 May 2014, at the first session of the Supreme Council of the Luhansk People's Republic, V. Bolotov was elected Head of the Luhansk People's Republic.

Thus, by the summer of 2014, the Luhansk People's Republic was proclaimed within the territory of the Luhansk region as a unitary republic, its Constitution was proclaimed its fundamental law. The republic began to form the main institutions of statehood.

The events of the Russian Spring were a response to the coup in Kiev and the nationalist course of pro-Western oligarchic development. Mass popular actions and protests in the South-East of Ukraine in 2014, including on the territory of the Luhansk region, under anti-government, pro-Russian slogans, not only became part of the events of the Russian Spring, but also laid the foundation for building their own statehood. As a result, they led to the creation of the Luhansk People's Republic, and allowed the residents of the Luhansk region to make their historic choice in favor of independence and sovereignty. The events of spring 2014 in the Luhansk region were one of the most significant milestones in the recent history of Donbass.

Common historical traditions, as well as the desire of Donetsk and Luhansk to fight together against the aggressive actions of Kiev, contributed to the creation of a single state — New Russia.

On 24 May 2014 the first Congress of People's Representatives of the South-East was held in Donetsk. Representatives of the DPR and LPR adopted a joint declaration on the creation of the Union of People's Republics. It was assumed that it would include representatives of the entire East and South of Ukraine. Participants formed a special governing body — the Council of the Union of People's Republics.

On 24 June 2014 the parliaments of Donetsk and Luhansk approved creation of the Union of People's Republics. Thus, the prerequisites for formation of a new state were created.

On 26 June 2014 a first meeting of the Parliament of the Union of People's Republics took place in Donetsk. Oleg Tsarev, ex-deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, was elected a speaker. One of the first decisions of the Parliament of New Russia was the adoption of the law "On adoption of the Constitutional act on creation of the Union of People's Republics and putting it into effect."

Representatives of public organizations of the DPR, LPR, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Kherson regions became deputies of the Parliament of the SNR. On 13 July 2014 the second meeting took place in Luhansk, at which the new name “New Russia” was officially adopted.

On 21 August 2014 the third and last plenary meeting was held in Donetsk. Later, in May 2015, after a long break in the work of this body, it was officially announced that the project was “frozen”, as it contradicts the Minsk agreements. It should be noted that an attempt to create a confederate state was not implemented. Later, in the fall of 2021, an integration of the DPR and LPR received a new impetus.

Thus, popular demonstrations in the Donbass became a response to a discriminatory policy of the central authorities and the illegal coup in Kiev. The people of Donbass were forced to take up arms to protect their interests and organize themselves in a complete vacuum of power. Public organizations in Donetsk and Luhansk formed the authorities and held a referendum in accordance with the international law. The referendum served as the basis for a formation of the statehood of the DPR and LPR. This was a peak of the development of the Russian Spring in the Donbass. Then there was a long way to form a new management system. But above all, at this moment, it was necessary to protect the sovereignty of the new states from attempts to destroy them by force.

On 3 May 2014 battles began for control over the settlements of Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Krasnyi Liman.

In Mariupol, the hostilities led to large-scale casualties among the civilian population. The militants of the ultra-right nationalist formation Azov, with the financial support of the oligarch Igor Kolomoisky, launched a real terror against any manifestations of dissent. They intimidated and even executed all the unwanted, torturing them in a secret prison code-named “Library” near the airport. On 7 May 2014 armed clashes broke out for the city council building between supporters of the republic and the AUU. On 9 May the building of the city administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was attacked by militants of the national battalions with the support of armored vehicles. Police officers who expressed support for the DPR were shot at the battle scene. The Azov battalion established full control over the city on 13 June 2014.

On 23 May 2014 units of the Donbass battalion tried to break into Donetsk. In the area of the village of Karlovka, they were stopped by the militia of the Vostok battalion. Terrible shelling of the civilian infrastructure of the city of Donetsk began from the territory of the Donetsk International Airport named after Sergey Prokofiev and a nearby military unit. For the first time, AUU used attack aircraft and combat helicopters to make bombing strikes in a densely populated residential area. Every day the list of the killed residents of the city was replenished with new names. Most of them were elderly people, women and children.

On the night of 26 May 2014 the militia tried to take control of the Donetsk airport. This would make it possible to stop shelling and create a safe zone for residents. In response, the Ukrainian Air Force attacked the airport building, the Tochmash plant, and the railway station. The possible death of civilians was one of the goals of the military operation. This was supposed to foment chaos and cast terror into the hearts of the residents of Donetsk and other cities, as well as make them refuse to support the ideas of the Russian Spring.

On 28 May 2014 a rally of residents of Donetsk and Makeevka took place on the central square of Donetsk. The participants, among whom were many employees of coal mining enterprises, supported the initiative to create armed detachments, and the formation of the Mining Division and the Kalmius Battalion began.

An active campaign began with an appeal to join the People's Militia of Donbass. It was carried out through social networks and appealed to all those who consider themselves anti-fascists and want to protect Russians from the genocide in Donbass to join the defenders. The ranks of the armed forces of the DPR began to be actively replenished by residents of Ukraine, Russia and other states.

On 25 May 2014 when the Ukrainian army and national battalions attacked the cities and villages of Donbass, the presidential elections were held in the country. 21 candidates took part in the elections. The election campaign was carried out in conditions of political repression against the opposition and prohibition of any dissent. Opponents of the Euromaidan, primarily representatives of the Party of Regions and communists, were exposed to discrimination and physical violence. On 28 April an attempt was made on the life of the mayor of Kharkov

and a well-known figure of the Party of Regions Gennady Kernes, who was seriously injured. The house of the Communist leader, Petr Symonenko, was captured and set on fire. Presidential candidate Oleg Tsarev was beaten in Nikolaev.

Under these conditions, Petr Poroshenko, one of the leaders of the coup, won in the first round, receiving 54.7% of the vote. The second place was taken by the leader of the Batkivshchyna party Yulia Tymoshenko with the result of 12,8%. Third place was taken by Oleg Lyashko, leader of his Radical Party, who received 8.3% of the votes. All these politicians were active supporters of Euromaidan.

At the same time, a small number of residents of Donbass took part in the elections. In the Donetsk region, the turnout was only 15.37% of the voters. In the Luhansk region it was even less — 8.94%. Less than half of the voters came to the polling stations in Odessa and Kharkov regions, while in the Lvov region 78.2% of voters took part in the elections.

In the summer of 2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine wanted to destroy all centers of resistance and take control of the state border. The people's militia of Donbass planned to form several large units from segmented detachments, ensure the evacuation of residents from dangerous areas, slow down the offensive actions of the enemy, and gain a foothold in the strategic points of the region.

A feature of the civil conflict as the fierceness of the battles, the use of heavy weapons, mass casualties among civilians. In accordance with the concept of network-centric wars, information propaganda was actively carried out in the media.

The Ukrainian command was planning an attack on the rebellious regions with several large units along the state border. At the same time, a strike was delivered from the northwest, breaking connection between the republics in the Debaltsevo area. Thus, large urban agglomerations would be isolated, and volunteers who actively arrived from different regions would not be able to help the rebels. Control over the Donetsk and Luhansk airports, the capturing of road junctions, isolation of small centers of resistance and their consistent destruction should have ensured success.

On 26 May 2014 front-line aviation launched the first airstrikes on major metropolitan areas in the region. First, the city of Donetsk was

shelled, and on 2 June 2014 the Luhansk Regional State Administration. All the dead and wounded were civilians, there were no military units and accumulations of equipment in these areas. Thus the anti-terrorist operation finally became punitive.

In accordance with their tactics, the Armed Forces of Ukraine used superiority in aviation and artillery, split individual centers of resistance and suppressed them one by one. Assault groups of the militiamen inflicted significant damage on them in certain areas, but at this stage the preponderance of forces was not on their side. By 5 June 2014 the Armed Forces of Ukraine took control of the city of Krasny Lyman. On 19 June 2014 Yampol was captured, and on 4 July Nikolaevka. A critical situation developed in the northern section near Slavyansk. The militia units were blocked, and complete encirclement was only a matter of time. The next step was to be complete destruction of the Slavyansk group. At the same time, large units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine approached Donetsk from the west. In this situation, it was decided on the night of 5 July 2014 to break through the encirclement and retreat in the direction of the city of Donetsk. This made it possible to preserve the battle-hardened units and strengthen the military post of the capital city of the DPR.

At the beginning of the summer the Armed Forces of Ukraine occupied a significant part of the territory of the Donetsk People's Republic, capturing Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkovka, Konstantinovka.

Encouraged by the first success, Ukrainian generals sent large forces to take control of the state border. The main hostilities in the south unfolded in the area of the dominant height of Saur-Mogila and the village of Izvarino. The armed forces of the DPR took advantage of the tactical miscalculations of the enemy and blocked the Ukrainian troops with unexpected strikes. Having gained a foothold on the achieved lines, they began their consistent destruction. On 12 July 2014 the assault units of the Slavic brigade defeated the group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine near the city of Torez and completed the encirclement. Thus, the Southern (Izvarinskiy) cauldron was formed. In the so-called "Southern Cauldron" were parts of the following units: 79th Separate Airmobile Brigade, 24th Separate Mechanized Brigade, 28th Guards Mechanized Brigade, 51st Mechanized Brigade,

72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade, 3rd Special Regiment, combined unit of border guards, the territorial battalion Shakhtersk, part of the nationalist battalion Azov. The size of the encircled group, according to various sources, ranged from 4,500 to 8,000 people.

Having seized the strategic initiative, the militia forced the Kiev command to use units that were withdrawn from other sectors of the front. This made it possible to weaken the large-scale pressure of the enemy and prepare conditions for grinding its reserves.

On 27 July 2014 the Armed Forces of Ukraine began an operation to unblock the Izvarinskiy cauldron. The key battles of this stage took place in the Saur-Mogila area. It was very dangerous to go around the height and leave it in the rear. Forces many times superior in number were thrown into battle against the defenders in a narrow area. Heroic defense of the militiamen who fought for their homeland did not allow the Ukrainian troops to achieve success. On 6 August 2014, as a result of elimination of the encircled group, the militia gained control over an important area and eliminated several thousand enemy soldiers. 438 soldiers were interned on the territory of the Russian Federation, and 240 people went over to the side of the Armed Forces of the Donetsk People's Republic. On 10 August 2014 the nationalist battalions Donbass and Azov launched an attack on the city of Ilovaysk. They hoped to gain control of the strategic railway junction and to attack from this bridgehead in the direction of Donetsk and Debaltsevo. The first attempt was unsuccessful, and large reserves of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were brought into battle. Aviation and volley fire systems were actively used. Much of the city's buildings were destroyed. Having stuck down in urban battles, the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine became weak and lost their strategic initiative.

On 26 August, as a result of the offensive of armed units of the DPR, the following battalions were encircled in Ilovaysk: Donbass, Dnieper-1, battalions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Kherson, Svityaz and Mirotvorets, as well as parts of the 93rd and 17th brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

On 28 August 2014 the DPR armed forces finally took control of the city. Similar bold actions of the defenders of Donbass near Amvrosievskaya and Elenovka made it possible to achieve an advantage in the fight against an enemy outnumbered and outgunned.

On 29 August Russian President Vladimir Putin appealed to the militiamen to open a humanitarian corridor for the encircled Ukrainian military to enable them to leave the battlefield. The President also appealed to the government of Ukraine to stop hostilities and enter into negotiations with representatives of the republic. The militiamen accepted this proposal, specifying that the Ukrainian military must leave the “cauldron” without weapons.

However, the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, nationalist battalions and other power structures, in violation of the agreements reached earlier, attempted to force a breakthrough from the encirclement, as a result of which they suffered heavy losses.

Throughout the summer of 2014 the Armed Forces of Ukraine maintained control over the Donetsk and Luhansk airports and continued to carry out artillery strikes on peaceful neighborhoods. On 9 June 2014 LPR units blocked the airport in Luhansk. Main fighting in this area unfolded in the second half of August. On 1 September 2014 the Armed Forces of the Republic finally took control of this strategic “schwerpunkt.” In Donetsk, the Armed Forces of Ukraine strengthened and constantly increased their forces, so they were finally driven out of the airport only on 22 January 2015.

Bold operations of small detachments made it possible to neutralize the numerical and technical superiority of the enemy. During this period, several thousand defenders of Slavyansk were transformed into large military units numbering more than 40 thousand people. They constantly improved their military skills and were ready to resist the enemy.

The most prominent among the militia commanders are Alexey Mozgovoy, Arseniy Pavlov, Mikhail Tolstykh, and Alexander Zakharchenko. All of them tragically died as a result of terrorist attacks by the Ukrainian special services.

Resentful hostilities were happening on the territory of the Luhansk People’s Republic. On 22 May 2014 the Armed Forces of Ukraine carried out an attack near the cities of Rubizhnyi and Lysichansk.

During military confrontation that began, the leadership of the Luhansk People’s Republic tried to avoid casualties. Thus, on 1 June 2014 the LPR authorities turned to the command of the Luhansk border detachment (border detachment), based in the Zarechny quarter, with

a proposal to withdraw it from the territory of the republic. Having received no answer, on the night of 1–2 June the forces of the people's militia blocked the administration building of the Luhansk border detachment.

The nationalist-minded military disarmed and blocked in the bunkers the supporters of a peaceful solution and preferred armed resistance, which was crushed with significant losses on both sides. On 2 June 2014 the forces of the Ukrainian air force launched a missile attack on the Luhansk downtown. Their goal was the regional state administration building, which housed a leadership of the Luhansk People's Republic (the blow was made at the moment when the next meeting of the People's Council was scheduled). During the airstrike, the Regional State Administration building was damaged. Rocket fragments left many craters on the territory of the always crowded square named after Heroes of the Great Patriotic War. As a result of the airstrike, eight civilians died on the spot, three more died from wounds, and 28 people received shrapnel wounds. The height of cynicism of the Ukrainian authorities was an interpretation of this event. Thus, a number of Ukrainian media (for example, the UNIAN agency and the Ukrainian Pravda newspaper), as well as individual political officials, claimed that the tragic event occurred due to a shot from the ground from a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) at the Ukrainian aircraft. Allegedly, a missile fired from a MANPADS reacted to a working air conditioner placed on the wall of the Regional State Administration, and instead of the aircraft engine, it hit the facade of this building. Thus the countdown of the first victims of military aggression of the Kiev authorities in Luhansk began.

By the beginning of June 2014 a large agglomeration of cities and mining settlements in Donbass was under the control of the people's militia. Under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were the northern and part of the southeastern regions of the Luhansk region, as well as the western and southern parts of the Donetsk region.

In early June 2014 battles broke out between Ukrainian armed forces and militiamen for access to the Russian-Ukrainian border. By 5 June the LPR managed to take control of the following settlements bordering with Russia: Krasnodon, Biryukovo, Sverdlovsk, Dyakovo, Chervonopartizansk, Dolzhanskyi, Krasnaya Mogila. However, by

13 June, the military forces of the DPR militia were driven out of Mariupol, and the Ukrainian armed forces began an operation to isolate the people's republics from the Russian border.

On 2 July 2014 Ukrainian military aircrafts launched an airstrike on the village of Luganskaya, as a result of which residential buildings were destroyed, civilians were killed and injured.

At the beginning of the summer of 2014, the Luhansk airport was controlled by Ukrainian troops, who created a bridgehead at its base for transfer of the manpower and equipment by aviation.

On 14 June 2014, over the Luhansk airport, the militia shot down a Ukrainian military transport aircraft IL-76, which transported 49 Ukrainian servicemen. This event was actively covered in the Ukrainian and world media, and serious efforts were made to form a negative image of the residents of the Luhansk People's Republic in the minds of international community.

On 17 June 2014, while performing their professional duties, a Russian film crew of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, consisting of three people, came under mortar fire from the Armed Forces of Ukraine near the village of Metallist near Luhansk. While covering an evacuation of civilians, two journalists, Igor Kornelyuk and Anton Voloshin, were mortally wounded. President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin posthumously awarded the killed journalists with the Order of Courage. The authorities of the Luhansk People's Republic immortalized memory of the feat of journalists with orders "For Merit to the People of the Republic", and on 15 December 2015, the school in the village of Metalist was named after them.

As a result of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the situation on the territory of the Donbass aggravated. One of the first steps towards settlement of the conflict can be considered the beginning of negotiations.

On 8 June 2014 the first formal meeting of the Contact Group on Donbass was held in Kiev with the participation of President of Ukraine Petr Poroshenko, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov and Heidi Tagliavini in the status of OSCE mediator. The subject of discussion was "Poroshenko's peace plan."

On 23 June 2014 the first functional meeting of the Contact Group took place in Donetsk. The meeting was attended by the mediator

from the OSCE — Heidi Tagliavini, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov, the representative of Ukraine — the second President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, from the DPR — Prime Minister of the DPR Alexander Boroday, from the LPR — Chairman of the People’s Council of the LPR Alexey Karyakin. In addition, the following persons participated: Victor Medvedchuk — NGO Ukrainian Choice, Oleg Tsarev — leader of the movement South-East.

On 2 July 2014, the first meeting of the Normandy Four was held in Berlin — an international body that assumed the functions of a control the mechanism on the issue of a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the South-East of Ukraine at the level of the ministers of foreign affairs of Germany, France, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Heads of foreign affairs agencies at this meeting were able to agree on a declaration in accordance with the instructions of the heads of state, where they “urge the Contact Group to resume meetings no later than 5 July in order to ensure an unconditional and mutually agreed sustainable ceasefire.”

After almost three months of hostilities, on the night of 5 July 2014, the Donetsk militia left the city of Slavyansk, one of the most important symbols of resistance in Donbass. The long heroic defense of Slavyansk under the command of Igor Strelkov, who headed the Ministry of Defense of the DPR, aroused ardent support from the people of Donbass, and therefore a decision to retreat and transfer the city under the control of Ukraine was perceived by the residents of the republics with a heavy heart.

On 17 July 2014, near the village of Grabovo near the city of Torez, Donetsk People’s Republic, a *Malaysia Airlines* Boeing aircraft crashed while making a scheduled flight MH-17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. The Ukrainian media hastened to unfoundedly blame the Donbass militia and the Russian Federation for the tragedy. The Ukrainian party did not abandon attempts to seize territories and, taking advantage of the tragedy, on 22 July Ukrainian troops took control of the cities of Rubezhnoye, Dzerzhinsk and Soledar.

In mid-July 2014, militia units went on the offensive on the southern front. Ukrainian units, stretched in a narrow strip from the borders with the Russian Federation to the territory of the Donetsk People’s

Republic, fell into a trap — they ended up in a cauldron. Among the soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, cases of desertion have become more frequent.

While the advanced militia forces of the Donetsk People's Republic were involved on the southern front, the forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine attacked positions of the republics on the northern flank: On 19 July 2014 the road between Luhansk and Donetsk was cut, and checkpoints were set up in the villages of Beloe and Veselaya Tarasovka.

On 22 July the militia retreated from Severodonetsk. The cities of Lisichansk, Kirovsk, Popasnaya and Debaltsevo were abandoned. For two weeks, control over the strategic height of Saur-Mogila was lost.

The positions of the militiamen near Luhansk also worsened. The settlements of Stukalova Balka and Shchastie were abandoned, from where the Armed Forces of Ukraine subsequently conducted regular shelling of Luhansk and Vergunskiy junction, located a few kilometers from the capital city of the Luhansk People's Republic.

Hostilities in the Donbass led to the significant destruction of infrastructure and had a negative impact on the lives of civilians. As a result of the shelling, the housing of tens of thousands of residents was damaged or destroyed and the water supply system, electricity and gas supply, and communications were disrupted. Emergency, rescue and medical services were deprived of the opportunity to provide assistance to the civilian population due to constant shelling, lack of fuel and lubricants, and medicines. Some cities were under blockade for a long time, as a result of which there was a shortage of food, drinking water, essential goods. It can be said without exaggeration that in the summer of 2014 the residents of Donbass, who lived in the zone of active hostilities, were on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe.

Initiative groups in the cities and districts evacuated women and children to the territory of the Russian Federation.

Together with organized groups of buses, private cars also left in columns. The route passed through the territories that were partly controlled by the Ukrainian troops, and in these sections, private cars at times came under fire or were blown up by mines.

At the end of July, the railway communications between Luhansk and other cities of Ukraine were disrupted. Bus service and private transport became the only way to leave the unsafe territory. In

addition to the militia and the authorities of the republic, volunteers helped to evacuate children and women to the territory of Russia in the conditions of constant shelling. Huge assistance in terms of receiving and accommodating refugees was provided by humanitarian organizations of the Russian Federation. A large number of civilians, for various reasons, refused to leave the besieged cities and survived in conditions of a complete blockade.

On 2 August 2014 the power supply was interrupted in the city of Luhansk. Cellular communication stopped working and a day later the centralized water supply was completely stopped. For more than a month, Luhansk was completely blocked by the armed units of Ukraine.

For forty-three days without electricity, water, communication, in complete informational isolation, Luhansk residents survived in the city downtown. The situation on the outskirts was even worse — water supply, electricity and gas appeared there only by the end of autumn 2014.

Due to the constant mortar attacks, it became extremely dangerous to be on the streets of the city. Residents of Luhansk tried not to leave their homes unless absolutely necessary. But it was also unsafe to stay in apartments and private housing construction: when hit by artillery shells, multi-storey panel buildings “folded”, and people died under the rubble and from injuries.

Residents in large numbers moved to the basements of their houses, schools, office buildings and other fortified structures. Due to the lack of water in the city, cessation of municipal services for garbage collection and extremely hot weather (over 30 °C), a dangerous epidemiological situation developed that threatened an emergence and spread of infectious diseases. The city’s hospitals, which admitted the wounded militiamen and civilians injured in the shelling for treatment, were overcrowded.

There was a catastrophic lack of water in the city to extinguish the fires that arose after the shelling, as well as for the domestic needs of the city residents. Residents drew water from private sector pumps, car washes, where generators were still working, pumping water from wells, and artificial and natural reservoirs. Due to the severe drought, the water periodically went deep underground, the springs becoming

scarce for two or three days. Several times a day, trucks with tanks carried water to densely populated neighborhoods, where huge queues of several hundred people gathered.

Separate threats to the residents of the besieged Luhansk were posed by sabotage and reconnaissance groups and spotters, who directed mortar strikes at places where civilians, employees of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the militia were stationed. People were dying in queues for water and bread.

There were only a few shops in the city to which the bread was delivered. In the morning, long queues lined up for it. Closer to noon, life in the city was frozen because of the threat of shelling.

Residents of the apartment buildings were forced to cook on hand-made stoves built from brick in the yards, or boil water using dry fuel. Due to the fact that a significant part of the population had left, a large number of homeless animals appeared in the city and its suburbs, which gathered into the packs and roamed the deserted streets in search of food, thereby creating additional threats to people's lives.

Despite the inhuman living conditions, the residents of Luhansk and other cities that ended up in the blockade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the summer of 2014 did not lose courage. They showed the best qualities of the Donbass character — resilience, bravery and devotion to their motherland. People united in trouble: they helped each other to get water and to cook food on fires, took care of the elderly and infirm, equipped basements to save them from shelling, and shared the last with each other.

During the period of military confrontation, Manolis Pilavov took over the duties of the head of the Luhansk City Administration instead of the escaped mayor Sergey Kravchenko. Under his leadership, many employees of city utilities showed special courage and loyalty to their duty.

The summer of 2014 went down in the history of the region as a time of terrible trials and a period of glory for the people of Donbass.

Humanitarian canteens began to operate on the territory of the city of Luhansk, providing food for all those in need. Provision of canteens with food was carried out at the cost of food leftovers in supermarkets destroyed by Ukrainian shelling. When food was already running out, the Russian Federation decided to ignore all the prohibitions

and conditions imposed by the Ukrainian authorities and deliver humanitarian aid along the shortest route from Izvarino to Luhansk.

A serious help for the residents of the besieged city was humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation, which on 22 August 2014 was delivered for the first time by white KamAZ vehicles through the Izvarino checkpoint. A few days later the organized distribution of food aid to the population began, consisting of 2 kg of cereals, 0.5 kg of sugar, 3 cans of meat, 10 liters of drinking water or tea bags. From the first humanitarian convoy, 220,000 sets were distributed, which made it possible to approximately find out the number of civilians trapped in the blockade.

Only after the militia established control over the Krasnodon-Luhansk highway, was the blockade of Luhansk broken.

On 14–15 August 2014 the Armed Forces of Ukraine went on the offensive in two directions: Lutugino – Aleksandrovsk – Yubileinoe and Georgievka – Novosvetlovka – Khryashchevatoe. Luhansk was practically cut off from the territories controlled by the militia. For some time, the Luhansk-Krasnodon highway was cut, which remained the only “road of life” along which humanitarian aid from Russia could be delivered to the city. At this time, Ukrainian troops occupied the settlements of Komissarovka, Novoannovka, Khryashchevatoe, Novosvetlovka, Lutugino. The battles for Georgievka and Roskoshnoe continued. The territories of Novoannovka, Novosvetlovka and Khryashchevatoe were almost completely destroyed as a result of massive shelling by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The turning point in the course of military confrontation with the Armed Forces of Ukraine was mid-August 2014, when there were simultaneous changes in the political leadership of the two people’s republics. A. Boroday resigned from the post of Prime Minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic, and Alexander Zakharchenko, commander of the Oplot battalion, took his post. The Minister of Defense of the Donetsk People’s Republic I. Strelkov also resigned. On 14 August, the Head of the Luhansk People’s Republic V. Bolotov announced his resignation due to injury. Minister of Defense of the Luhansk People’s Republic I. Plotnitsky was appointed to this post, and on 20 August he headed the Council of Ministers of the LPR.

On 19 August 2014 fighting already resumed on the outskirts of the village of Luganskaya, where the militiamen recaptured a small territory. A day later, a gradual deblocking of the highway leading to Krasnodon began.

On 24 August 2014 the Donetsk militia launched a major counter-offensive in the south of Donbass. Two days later, the flanks of a group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine advancing on Ilovaysk were broken through — the battalions Donbass, Dnieper-1, Kherson, Svityaz, Mirotvorets, as well as units of the regular Ukrainian army, were in the cauldron. A new Ilovaysky cauldron was formed. The Donetsk armed forces made a strike in the south towards the Sea of Azov. On 28 August they took control of Novoazovsk, as well as a number of settlements in the Novoazovskiy, Starobeshevskiy and Amvrosievskiy districts.

At this time, the Luhansk militia captured the Vergunsky junction, the village of Stukalova Balka, the villages of Metallist, Malonikolaevka and Shterovka. By the end of August, during serious battles, the settlements of Georgievka, Lutugino, Novosvetlovka and Khryashchevatoe were liberated. In the area of the village of Belyi, militia forces surrounded a large group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine — the Lutuginskiy cauldron. On 1 September 2014 the LPR militia returned the Luhansk airport to its control, which had been held by the Ukrainian Armed Forces for three months.

The large-scale counter-offensive of the militia of the Donbass republics in August 2014, driving the Armed Forces of Ukraine from a number of strategically important settlements and the creation of the Ilovayskiy and Lutuginskiy cauldrons led to the fact that the Ukrainian leadership was forced to agree with the need for negotiations, which the Normandy Four persistently proposed. As a result, consultations resumed first in the format of a trilateral meeting of delegations of the Security Organization of the Council of Europe, Russia and Ukraine, and later Igor Plotnitskiy and Alexander Zakharchenko, representatives of the LPR and DPR, whose signatures sealed the decisions taken at the Minsk negotiations, were included in the Contact Group.

On 1 September 2014, during the consultations following discussion of the proposals made by the negotiators, a draft Protocol was prepared, and on 5 September 2014, the Protocol was signed in Minsk following the consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on joint steps aimed

at implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and the initiatives of the President of Russia V. Putin”, which provided for a number of steps for political settlement of the conflict.

Article 1 of the Protocol contained the following obligation: “Provide an immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons¹.”

Ukraine’s obligations to adopt two laws were key to resolving the conflict: “On the temporary order of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” (Law on special status) and on prevention of prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.

The Protocol of 5 September 2014 uses the term “Trilateral Contact Group”, although, in fact, this body has a five-party format. The protocol is signed by the OSCE (Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini), Ukraine (the second President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma), the Russian Federation (Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov), and also, without indicating their positions, A. Zakharchenko and I. Plotnitskiy. The preamble specifies three members of the Contact Group, but it is obvious that without signatures of the representatives of the LPR and the DPR, the signing of this Protocol could not have had practical consequences.

The Nature of the conflict is recorded as a bilateral in Clause 1 of the Protocol. This thesis is further developed in the “Memorandum on implementation of provisions of the Protocol following the consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on joint steps aimed at implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and the initiatives of the President of Russia V. Putin”, also signed by the five parties on 19 September 2014.

The draft laws provided by the Protocol were voted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 16 September 2014, which gave reason to perceive the actions of the Ukrainian party as really oriented towards a peaceful settlement, which resulted in the signing of the

¹ Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, Minsk, 5 September 2014 [website]. URL: <https://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258> (access date: 05.11.2021).

mentioned Memorandum. However, within the deadlines established by Ukrainian legislation, none of the voted laws was sent for signing to the President of Ukraine, which directly indicated the fallacy of such conclusions and the lack of real intentions or political will of Ukraine to comply with the provisions of the Protocol of 5 September 2014.

On 19 September 2014, in Minsk, representatives of Ukraine (L. Kuchma) and the people's republics (I. Plotnitskiy, A. Zakharchenko), through a mediation of the representative of Russia M. Zurbabov, signed a Memorandum designed to ensure an implementation of the content of the Minsk Protocol. It provided for withdrawal of heavy weapons with a caliber of more than 100 mm to 15 km from the line of contact between the parties, as well as the creation of a security zone in which flights of military aircrafts and unmanned aerial vehicles and the installation of minefields were prohibited.

During the signing of the Minsk agreements on 5 and 19 September 2014, the issues of ceasefires and prevention of new human casualties aroused the greatest discussions. To ensure their implementation, on 26 September a working group of the joint Center for Control and Coordination of Ceasefire Issues and Gradual Stabilization of the Line of Demarcation in Eastern Ukraine (JCCC) began functioning, which included representatives of the Ukrainian party, the OSCE monitoring group and 76 Russian military personnel headed by Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation. Duties of the working group included an implementation of measures to establish a complete ceasefire regime, the ongoing monitoring of the number of victims and the results of shelling from the Ukrainian party.

The Law on Special Status, as amended by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, provided for early elections in the Donbass on 7 December 2014. It should be understood that, in accordance with Ukrainian legislation, early elections are called by a resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine no later than 60 days before voting day. That is, the law on special status should come into force no later than 6 October.

But only on 14 October 2014, in violation of the deadlines established by the Rules of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the text of the Law on Special Status voted on 16 September 2014 was signed by the speaker and sent to the President of Ukraine for consideration.

On 16 October 2014, at the ASEM summit in Milan, P. Poroshenko defiantly signed the text of the Law on Special Status, demonstrating to the world community a readiness to take political steps to resolve the conflict in Donbass. The law came into force on 18 October 2014 and, obviously, could not be implemented in terms of holding elections scheduled for 7 December.

During this period, the republics did not abandon their attempts to achieve results in terms of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Given the difficulties of participation of the heads of the republics in the negotiations, Vladislav Deynego and Denis Pushilin, deputy chairmen of the People's Councils of the LPR and DPR, were appointed as authorized representatives of the LPR and DPR at the Contact Group talks in Minsk.

Elections of the Head of the LPR and the People's Council of the LPR of the 2nd convocation were scheduled for 2 November 2014, which, given the impossibility of holding elections on the basis of the Ukrainian law on special status, were held according to the laws of the LPR in full accordance with democratic principles and under the control of international observers. This made it possible, in the absence of full international recognition of the LPR, to give greater legitimacy to the state administration bodies of the republic, since the previous composition was elected in extremely difficult conditions at general assemblies of territorial communities, which did not meet the standards of democratic elections, as well as ensuring compliance with one of the key principles of the state — the continuity of power.

From that moment on, the Ukrainian party on international platforms began to explicitly use the fact that elections were held in the LPR and DPR contrary to Ukrainian law as confirmation of the republics' failure to fulfill their obligations under the Minsk agreements. However, at the same time, the fact that Ukraine sabotaged the creation of the legislative conditions necessary under the Minsk agreements for holding elections in Donbass was completely hushed up: decentralization of power in Ukraine was not carried out, and although the law on special status was adopted and formally entered into force, the territory on which it operated, was not determined, and the conditions for holding early elections in the Donbass in the

Ukrainian legislative field had not been formed. It was therefore impossible to hold elections on the date set by the Ukrainian law.

The second key law — on preventing the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine — was never signed by the speaker and did not leave the walls of the Rada.

Despite the signing of the Minsk Memorandum, the representatives of the JCCC stated that most of the measures provided by them had not been implemented. During the autumn, fighting continued for the Donetsk airport and for the territories north of Luhansk. The Ukrainian party carried out daily shelling in the area of Debaltsevo, Gorlovka and Donetsk.

Thus, Ukraine systematically sabotaged fulfillment of key obligations that allow a political basis for resolving the conflict, while accusing the LPR and DPR of violating obligations. However, such actions of Ukraine were not properly assessed either by the world community, which received information mainly through the media broadcasting the official position of Kiev, or by the OSCE, which monitored the situation in Donbass and coordinated the Minsk negotiation process.

As a result, in early November 2014, full-scale hostilities actually resumed in the Donbas, and the representative of the Donetsk People's Republic at the talks in Minsk, Denis Pushilin, announced the need for a new convocation of the Minsk Group with the participation of representatives of the republics of Donbass, the OSCE, Ukraine and Russia. The situation in Donbass escalated again.

On 15 December 2014 a report of the UN Monitoring Mission for Human Rights was published, according to which the death toll in Donbass amounted to 4,634 people.

Violation of the Minsk agreements by Ukraine was manifested in non-observance of the ceasefire. Two-thirds of the clauses of the Minsk Memorandum of 19 September 2014 were fundamentally unfeasible, either because of vague wording (for example, clause No. 7 — “to continue an inclusive national dialogue”), or because of fundamental unacceptability for one of the parties (for example, clause No. 10 — “withdraw illegal armed units, military equipment, as well as militants and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine”).

Clause No. 1 of the Minsk Memorandum was partially implemented — “immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons.” Although the ceasefire was violated almost daily, large-scale hostilities in the Donbass were frozen.

As part of implementation of the Minsk agreements, the parties exchanged prisoners of war. However, the Ukrainian party deliberately ignored clause No. 6 on the adoption of the Law on the Prevention of Prosecution and Punishment of Persons “in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.” The militiamen continued to be “terrorists” for the Ukrainian authorities.

Ukraine tried to create an appearance of fulfilling the Minsk agreements. For example, with great delays, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law “On temporary order of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” (the Law on Special Status), which not only did not comply, but even frankly contradicted provisions of the agreement signed by the parties. This document lacked the most important thing — the list of settlements and territories covered by this law.

The remaining points of the Minsk agreements were either not implemented at all, or there were serious disagreements between the parties of the conflict. For example, instead of implementation of Clause No. 11: “Adopt the Program of economic revival of the Donbass and restoration of the region’s vital activities.” On 1 December 2014 the Ukrainian party began a social and economic blockade of the territories of the republics, stopping social payments and recalling workers responsible for maintaining an infrastructure of Donbass.

Thus, the Ukrainian authorities did not develop the Program for the economic recovery of Donbass. In early December 2014, the Ukrainian authorities restricted transport links with the territories controlled by the people’s republics, leaving only seven corridors for crossing the border with Ukraine.

The status quo of the Minsk agreements was finally violated by the Ukrainian party in January 2015 with the start of intense fighting for the Donetsk airport. The second phase of hostilities in the Donbass began. Only a series of sensitive defeats of the Armed Forces of Ukraine forced Ukraine to return to the negotiating table.

After some stabilization of the situation during the New Year holidays, the Ukrainian party again resumed military activities on 8 January. An attempt was made to blow up the bridge in the village of Luganskaya, the only route in the LPR for a relatively safe crossing of the demarcation line by civilians (subsequently, the bridge was blown up on the third attempt on 18 March 2015).

The city of Donetsk was systematically shelled by Ukrainian armed units from the territory of the Donetsk airport. In order to stop the shelling, the DPR in January 2015 began active hostilities in this direction. As a result, the DPR units, with stiff resistance of the Ukrainian military, managed to take control of both terminals and most of the surrounding territories, and on 22 January, Kiev officially admitted that it had completely lost control over the airport. On the same day, a sabotage group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine fired from a mortar at a public transportation stop Donetskgormash in the Leninskiy district of Donetsk. As a result of the shelling, 15 civilians were killed.

According to various sources, the group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at that time consisted of 3,000 to 7,000 servicemen with armored vehicles, heavy weapons and artillery. At the disposal of the militia of the republics of Donbass there were from 6 to 10 thousand fighters and several dozen armored vehicles.

Tension growth in certain sections of the line of contact provoked an increase in hostilities along the entire line. With particular cruelty, the artillery units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which control the Debaltsevo region, resumed shelling of the surrounding settlements.

During the battles in the summer of 2014, the enemy was able to gain a foothold in the Debaltsevo area. This created a threat of breaking communications between Donetsk and Luhansk. This bridgehead could become a convenient position for rocket and artillery strikes throughout the territory of the DPR and LPR. The Armed Forces of Ukraine, contrary to the Minsk Agreement, which was signed on 5 September 2014, actively concentrated large forces in this area. A large number of armored vehicles and the peculiarities of their location spoke of the beginning of offensive operations in the near future. Realizing the danger of subsequent events, the militia command decided to anticipate the threat.

The city of Debaltsevo, located 74 km from Donetsk, was of great strategic importance, as it was one of the largest railway junctions in the region. Control over it allowed Kiev to quickly transfer reinforcements and develop an offensive both towards the border with Russia and towards the capital of the Donetsk People's Republic from the northeast.

On 22 January 2015 an offensive of the Donbass militia began on the Debaltsevo salient. The following settlements were hit that formed the outer line of defense of the besieged city: Olkhovatka, Redkodub, Popasnaya, Sanzharovka, Troitskoe and Chernukhino.

On 5 February 2015 the forces of the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics occupied Uglegorsk, west of Debaltsevo, and on 9 February they took control of the village of Logvinovo, through which the ATO forces were supplied. The Debaltsevo group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was therefore completely surrounded. A new Debaltsevo cauldron was formed. The militiamen proceeded to methodically suppress the centers of resistance with tanks and artillery, confidently repulsing enemy's counterattacks.

Official Kiev tried to hide the fact of encirclement of its troops. On 11 February 2015 the Minister of Defense of Ukraine Stepan Poltorak stated that the units located in Debaltsevo continue to receive weapons and ammunition, and were communicating and interacting with the command.

Part of the Ukrainian troops was able to get out of the encirclement through the fields and country roads north of Logvinovo, leaving up to 300 pieces of various military equipment in a cauldron. On 17 February 2015 the militia of the republics entered Debaltsevo and took control of the city. Contrary to the assurances of the Ukrainian authorities about a well-planned operation, the human losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Debaltsevo pocket were numerous.

Liberation of Debaltsevo was, in fact, the first large-scale military campaign where serious coordination of the combat units of the people's republics was established at the operational level. Victory in the Debaltsevo-Chernukhinsk operation put an end to the winter military campaign. The Donetsk airport was completely taken under control and the Debaltsevo salient was liquidated.

Development of the events near Debaltsevo contributed to an intensification of efforts on the diplomatic platforms. Since December,

the LPR and DPR, with the support of the Russian Federation and the OSCE, had been taking steps to intensify consultations of the Contact Group. By January, a draft of some “road map for implementation of the Minsk agreements” was prepared, aimed at concretizing the obligations of the parties of the conflict arising from previously signed documents, since it was not possible to achieve their implementation from the Ukrainian party for 4 months.

During the period of maximum aggravation of the military confrontation in the Chernukhino-Debaltsevo region, the Normandy Four was also taking steps to intensify actions of the parties to resolve the conflict. At the level of consultations between advisers to the heads of the Normandy Four countries and heads of diplomatic missions, options for the aforementioned “road map” were considered, which eventually formed a fairly specific, but not detailed, “Set of measures to implement the Minsk agreements.”

During January-early February, the OSCE, with the support of the Normandy Four, made a number of attempts to hold a meeting of the Contact Group in Minsk, which the Ukrainian delegation did not attend until the end of January, despite the preliminary confirmation of its participation. And it was only on 11 February 2015 at 18:00 that the Contact Group began to consider the draft Set of Measures. The non-stop meeting lasted until about 9 a. m. the next day, when the Set of Measures was agreed, with some changes, and signed by all parties of the Minsk negotiations.

At the same time, with the meeting of the Contact Group at 6 pm on 11 February 2015, the Normandy Four summit began in Minsk, which ended at about 10 am on 12 February 2015 with a joint statement by the heads of the Normandy Four countries in support of the “Set of measures for implementation of the Minsk agreements” signed by the Contact Group and submitted for approval of Normandy Four.

On 17 February 2015 the Set of Measures was approved by Resolution 2202 (2015) of the UN Security Council. The text of the Set of Measures and the text of the joint statement of the heads of the Normandy Four countries in support of the Set of Measures were included in the Resolution as annexes.

The Minsk agreements provided for an “Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire from 00:00 a. m. (Kiev time) 15 February

2015” (Article 1) and “Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides at equal distances in order to create a security zone at least 50 km wide apart” (Article 2)¹.

The key thesis of the Set of Measures was a sequence of interrelated steps of the parties of the conflict aimed at its settlement, with the definition of deadlines for their implementation.

The first step — withdrawal of heavy weapons from the line of contact — was implemented practically by the deadline established by the Set of Measures, within two weeks, and was completed and sent to the OSCE and confirmed by the monitoring results, LPR — 2 March, DPR — 3 March, Ukraine — 7 March.

However, the dialogue on conditions for holding elections, which was supposed to begin the day after the withdrawal, was never started. The Ukrainian party systematically avoided discussing this issue, and the OSCE, Germany and France, guarantors of Ukraine’s good faith participation in the negotiations, ignored this fact, like all other counterproductive actions of Ukraine on the Minsk site.

Despite seemingly obvious success in organizing the negotiation process, no serious progress was made towards resolution of the conflict. Basically, some stabilization was achieved on the demarcation line, heavy weapons were withdrawn from the demarcation line of the parties to the distances stipulated by the Minsk agreements, and due to the tactical and technical data of certain types of weapons the withdrawal of tanks, light weapons and mortars of up to 100 mm caliber was carried out under monitoring of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (OSCE SMM, established by Decision No. 1117 of the OSCE Permanent Council dated 21 March 2014. By the end of the summer, the first major ceasefire agreement since the end of August 2015 (the so-called “school truce”) was reached, further reducing the number of casualties. However, in the absence of real steps in the area of political settlement, it was not possible to consolidate success in curbing the armed confrontation. Over time, the withdrawn weapons were returned by Ukraine to the area of the line of demarcation, shelling of the territories of the republics resumed, and they were forced to respond symmetrically.

¹ Set of measures to implement the Minsk agreements [website]. – URL: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/b/140221.pdf> (access date: 05.11.2021).

Throughout the entire period of the Minsk negotiations, representatives of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic made great efforts to prevent casualties and improve the quality of life of the civilian population. To achieve at least a temporary ceasefire, numerous time-limited truces were signed: school, Easter, Christmas and others. The practice of periodic statements by the Contact Group about regular "truces" was eventually reduced by the efforts of the Ukrainian party to nominal declarations not confirmed by real intentions, and on the eve of the date when the declared obligations came into force, the armed units of Ukraine carried out especially cruel shelling of the republics.

Actions were envisaged for a political settlement: constitutional reform in Ukraine and the adoption of permanent legislation on the special status of certain regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The special status of the territories involved provision of the guarantee of the rights to linguistic self-determination, participation of local governments in the appointment of heads of prosecutors and courts, creation of the people's militia units, support for social and economic development, etc. The parties also agreed on an amnesty for participants of the conflict, release and exchange of all hostages, safe access to humanitarian aid, restoration of pensions and other social benefits.

For implementation of the Minsk agreements (Minsk Protocol, Minsk Memorandum, Set of Measures), a Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) was created, including representatives of Ukraine, the Luhansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic, with mediation by the OSCE and the Russian Federation, as well as working subgroups created in accordance with clause No. 13 of the Set of Measures.

Four working subgroups of the TCG were created: on humanitarian issues, on economic and reconstruction issues, on security issues and on political settlement issues.

Representatives of the Luhansk People's Republic were appointed: Vladislav Deinego — in the TCG, Olga Kobtseva — in the subgroup on humanitarian issues, Elena Kostenko — in the subgroup on economic and reconstruction issues, Roman Ivanov — in the subgroup on security issues, Rodion Miroshnik — in the subgroup on political settlement issues.

The work of the TCG and subgroups was carried out on an ongoing basis, usually, with a frequency of once every two weeks. First, meetings of the working subgroups were held, then the results were worked out within the framework of the TCG meeting, which had the authority to make decisions. Prior to start of the pandemic in 2020, the meetings were held in person in the city of Minsk (Republic of Belarus), and subsequently began to be held in the format of online conferences.

Observing an unwillingness of the Ukrainian party to take concrete steps to resolve the conflict in Donbass, representatives of the guarantor countries, the Normandy format, joined the process. The leaders of the four countries expressed their desire to take part in settlement of the conflict in Donbass in the Declaration, declaring their intention to create a control mechanism in the Normandy format, within which regular meetings would be held at the level of senior officials representing the ministries of foreign affairs.

Thus, on 28 November 2015 the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany Frank-Walter Steinmeier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development of the French Republic Laurent Fabius sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavel Klimkin (“The Steinmeier Formula”). The letter proposed an introduction of a special status for certain regions of Donetsk and Luhansk regions on a temporary basis on the day of local elections in these territories, and its permanent implementation after the observers of the OSCE Office for Democratic Initiatives and Human Rights confirmed that the elections were held in accordance with international standards and Ukrainian legislation. The letter stressed that the elections should be held in accordance with the Set of Measures.

In order to encourage Ukraine to implement the Minsk agreements, the document “Jointly Agreed Outcomes of the Normandy Format Paris Summit” of 9 December 2019 was signed, which provided for immediate measures to stabilize the situation in the conflict zone, as well as measures to implement political provisions of the Minsk agreements.

However, having signed the entire set of Minsk agreements, as well as taking part in consultations in the Normandy format, Ukraine

continued to avoid fulfilling any of its obligations. As part of the ongoing consultations of the working subgroups and the TCG, one of the main demands of the Ukrainian party was to change procedure for implementation of the Set of Measures, namely the sequence of steps to implement the Minsk agreements. The Ukrainian party insisted on priority implementation of clause No. 9 (control over the state border), and only then an implementation of the remaining clauses of the document in a free form. This requirement of the Ukrainian party brought the entire negotiation process to a dead end, as the representatives of the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics insisted on maintaining the procedure for implementation of the Set of Measures signed and recorded by the UN, i. e. in a logical sequence from the first to the thirteenth clauses. Although one of the priorities of the Minsk negotiation process was an implementation of clause 1 of the Set of Measures — an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, despite the signed agreements, the Ukrainian party continued to systematically violate the ceasefire.

The guarantors of the Minsk agreements had to make every effort to ensure that Kiev fulfilled its obligations. International European organizations, as well as the leaders of France and Germany, on the contrary, clearly pandered to the Ukrainian authorities. At the same time, they financed a large-scale rearmament and training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The leadership of the Russian Federation drew attention to the systematic violations of the truce and recorded the facts of provocations and military aggression against the republics of Donbass.

Thus, the conflict was not resolved. The political leadership of the United States and Europe, manipulating the Ukrainian authorities, actively contributed to the escalation. The start of full-scale hostilities was only a matter of time.

On 18 January 2018, the Law of Ukraine “On Features of the State Policy for Provision of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine in the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions” was adopted and on 24 February 2018 came into force, which actually meant a refusal to implement the Minsk agreements.

The conflict in Donbass is unique in its duration, active use of heavy weapons, mass casualties among the civilian population. The

Kiev regime initially took a course towards building an authoritarian mono-ethnic state and an uncompromising struggle against all political opponents. Washington and European leaders hoped to create a trouble spot along Russia's borders and also use Ukraine as a source of labor and natural resources. These plans were not destined to come true. In battles, Donbass defended its right to sovereignty. A difficult stage of development of the statehood of the DPR was ahead.

Despite the commitments made, Ukraine did not stop hostilities. Throughout the entire period from the moment the Minsk agreements were signed until 2022, the cities and villages of Donbass were attacked by the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the armed units of Ukrainian nationalists, civilians were killed and injured, including children.

Despite the efforts of the Normandy Four, no serious progress was made on the political settlement track. From 2016, there was a stagnation in almost all areas of the work of the Contact Group, with the exception of certain issues, constructive discussion of which gave the Ukrainian party a direct material benefit. For example, an issue of paying for water supplied under a bilateral contract to the LPR from the territory controlled by Kiev is almost always resolved successfully.

Ukraine blocked all other issues of economic interaction across the contact line and, moreover, put forward demands to ensure full control of Ukraine over the section of the LPR and DPR border with Russia and a ban on the supply of humanitarian goods to the republics from the territory of Russia. By such actions, official Kiev took steps towards an organization of a completely outwardly isolated enclave, doomed to extinction or the flight of the population.

Active military operations on the demarcation line during this period were held back by the parties and were periodically aggravated by the Ukrainian party in certain areas. The armed units of Ukraine (AUU) undertook provocative shelling of the settlements of the republics and critical civilian infrastructure, using sabotage and reconnaissance groups (SRGs) to damage critical facilities such as gas pipelines and bridges. The retaliatory actions of the republics to neutralize the SRGs and suppress the firing positions of the AUU were immediately presented by the Ukrainian party as acts of aggression against Ukraine and, with the support of the Western media, were replicated in support of the status of the "victim" declared by Ukraine.

Against this background, on 21 September 2016 the Contact Group managed to sign the decision on the disengagement of forces and hardware along the entire demarcation line and, in early October, to carry out the disengagement in two of the three agreed pilot areas.

By the end of 2017 and beginning of 2018, the Ukrainian party was changing the tactics of the negotiation process, starting to purposefully “wind up” discussion of any proposals and draft documents submitted by the republics to specify the previously accepted obligations and organize their implementation, without offering any reasonable alternatives, at the same time forming the image of the Russian Federation as the aggressor country, accusing it of hostilities against Ukraine.

Following this tactic, Ukraine:

- renamed the ATO into the Joint Forces Operation (JFO), at the same time transferring control of the JFO from the SBU to the Joint Operational Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, thereby changing the declared format of the conflict and creating prospects for an introduction of martial law or a state of emergency (30 April 2018);
- introduced wordings about the Russian Federation as an aggressor country into the legislative framework of Ukraine (Law on the reintegration of Donbass dated 18 January 2018);
- with the support of countries dependent on the United States, pushed through the PACE vote on recognizing Russia as an aggressor country (25 June 2015).

At the same time with this, the Ukrainian party was trying to change an approach to determining the parties to the conflict in Donbass, stating that negotiations were held between the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE, positioning the representatives of the LPR and DPR as “invited consultants”, which led the negotiations into an even deeper dead end, since without real actions of the LPR and DPR aimed at fulfilling their obligations under the Minsk agreements, no progress in terms of peaceful settlement of the conflict in Donbass was possible.

Immediately after his inauguration (May 2019), the newly elected President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelenskiy put forward slogans to end hostilities and restore social and economic interaction across the demarcation line, which was in line with his campaign promises.

However, when trying to realize these intentions, the representatives of Ukraine at the talks were accused of betraying the interests of the country and came under pressure from radical nationalist elements, which, despite their small numbers, had a fairly significant impact on the domestic Ukrainian agenda. As a result, practical implementation of the declared intentions did not take place.

Gradually, Zelenskiy, who received the support of the Ukrainian voters, opposing himself to Poroshenko and promising peace, began to clearly slide into the rhetoric of his predecessor and more and more clearly show dependence on Western countries, primarily Great Britain and the United States, whose plans did not include settlement of the conflict.

At this stage, with support of the OSCE and the countries of the Normandy Four, the Contact Group managed to achieve an adequate assessment of the degradation and disengagement of forces and hardware in the pilot areas carried out in 2016, where the Armed Forces of Ukraine not only returned to their previous positions, but also occupied part of the territories controlled initially by the republics.

In addition, it was possible to reach an agreement on restoration of the blown-up bridge at the pedestrian crossing point in the village of Luganskaya (restored in a pedestrian version at the end of 2019), agree on two new stages of the exchange of persons held in connection with the conflict (December 2019 and April 2020), could agree on the construction and opening of two new automobile checkpoints on the demarcation line in the LPR (construction was completed on the agreed dates — by 10 November 2020) but an opening was blocked by the Ukrainian party, which put forward unacceptable conditions and refused to agree on the parameters of their safe operation.

In terms of armed confrontation, the OSCE SMM records the development of escalation and proposed to declare another “truce.” Realizing the futility of such empty declarations, the Republics insisted on signing additional obligations to ensure the ceasefire regime, and this was implemented in the form of “Measures to strengthen the ceasefire regime”, signed by the Contact Group on 22 July 2020. Significant aspects of the signed obligations were direct prohibitions on:

- offensive and reconnaissance and sabotage operations;
- use of any types of aircrafts of the parties;

- the use of fire, including sniper fire;
- deployment of heavy weapons in and around populated areas, primarily at civilian infrastructure facilities, including schools, kindergartens, hospitals and premises open to the public.

In order to prevent violations of the ceasefire and effectively apply disciplinary measures for its violation, the parties were required to create and operate a coordination mechanism to respond to all violations, which implied direct contacts for this purpose between command representatives, both personal and through the means of communication, and joint inspections with an assistance of the JCCC in the current composition.

Responsibility for making decisions on the opening of return fire was assigned to the military leadership of the parties. Return fire would be allowed only if there were no results from activation of the coordination mechanism.

In addition, the document provided for a ban on its cancellation, as well as an obligation to immediately publish both measures themselves and information about their entry into force by the relevant orders of the military command of the parties.

However, by signing these obligations, the Ukrainian party dodged in every possible way, publishing excerpts and interpretations that were “convenient” for itself. Only in April 2021, under pressure from the OSCE, were the full text of the measures published, without exceptions, and the statement of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on their entry into force by the relevant order. In practice, Ukraine, less than a month after they were signed, refused to carry out the agreed joint inspection.

In terms of a political settlement, with the support of the Normandy Four and the OSCE, it is possible to get Ukraine to sign in the Contact Group an updated text of the Steinmeier formula and a commitment to implement it in Ukrainian legislation. However, the signed obligations are not fulfilled by Ukraine, the Ukrainian party refuses to discuss this situation in the Contact Group, referring to the lack of a mechanism for the Ukrainian delegation to influence the adoption of laws.

To overcome the alleged “lack of mechanism”, the republics are making a proposal to prepare a detailed Roadmap for resolving the conflict in accordance with the Minsk agreements, which, after signing by the Contact Group, will have to be approved by the Verkhovna

Rada or the President of Ukraine, which will make it mandatory for the Ukrainian authorities. With the support of the Russian Federation, the republics manage to get approval of the Contact Group of an instruction to the subgroup on political settlement issues to urgently prepare a draft of such a Roadmap, but Ukraine categorically refuses to consider the need for its subsequent official approval.

In October 2020 the republics submit for consideration such a draft, which fully complies with the Minsk agreements, but Ukraine ignores it and a month later submits an alternative draft, which consists of three-quarters of the norms that directly contradict the Set of Measures. Further, discussions on this draft come to a dead end, since the OSCE categorically avoids assessments in terms of compliance of the submitted drafts with the Minsk agreements and tries to combine incompatible approaches of the parties in a single document.

In connection with the rigidly non-constructive position of Ukraine, it is possible to initiate a discussion in the Normandy Four of a similar document — the Key Clusters for Implementation of the Minsk Agreements. However, the Ukrainian party approaches this project in a similar way — it blocks constructive work by submitting an alternative project that categorically does not comply with the obligations enshrined in the Minsk agreements, and insisting on considering only its own proposals. The republics sent their comments to the Normandy Four on both drafts, focusing on the aspects of compliance with their previously accepted obligations, but this did not allow them to achieve significant support and overcome blocking of the Ukrainian party.

At the stage of 2021–2022 negotiations in the political part practically “went in circles”, the Ukrainian party in every way “wrapped up” the process of discussing the political aspects of the conflict settlement with the complete forbearance of both the OSCE and the Normandy Four.

Against this background, the military component of the conflict began to grow critically, a frequency of shelling from the Ukrainian party increased, their nature changed towards the use of heavy weapons prohibited by the Minsk agreements, sabotage and provocations became more frequent, and capturing of the “gray zone” by the Ukrainian party began to acquire a systematic character. During the entire period of the

conflict, the areas most subject to shelling by the armed units of Ukraine remained the areas located near the actual demarcation line (front line): the cities of Pervomaisk, Kirovsk, Zolotoe-5 (settlement Mikhailovka), Bryanka, Stakhanov, urban-type settlements Slavyanoserbsk and Donetsk, as well as the villages of Golubovskiy, Frunze, Kalinovo, Kalinovo-Borshchevatoe, Prishib, Molochnyi, Glubokiy, Sokolniki, Veselenkoe, Lower Lozovoe Lozovoye, Raevka, Nikolaevka.

On 13 October 2021, Andrey Kosyak, an observer of the LPR Representation in the JCCC, was abducted from the site of coordinated work for preparation for operation of the Pervomaysk-Zolotoye checkpoint on the LPR-controlled part of the Zolotoe disengagement area No. 2. This was a flagrant violation by Ukraine of its obligations. Representation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the JCCC received full information in advance about the place (the exact coordinates of the area), the time and nature of the work, the quantitative and qualitative composition of the personnel involved and provided additional security guarantees for their implementation. Despite all these circumstances, the Ukrainian party deliberately destroyed the coordination mechanism, which finally undermined trust and crossed out the measures signed in July 2020.

From that moment on, an escalation of the armed confrontation only intensified. The Ukrainian party transferred more and more weapons and personnel to the demarcation line, and frankly discussed in the media the prospects for military seizure of the territories of the republics. At the same time, the intelligence of the People's Militia of the LPR provided real evidence of Ukraine's preparations for active hostilities in the Donbass.

In January-February 2022 Ukraine, feeling the support of the Western countries, further intensified aggression along the demarcation line. Intelligence data confirmed Ukraine's readiness to launch an offensive against the LPR and DPR by the end of February. In this situation, the OSCE tried to hold the next pre-scheduled meeting of the Contact Group, but all its participants were aware of futility of continuing negotiations: Ukraine had actually renounced all obligations, finally crossed out all the agreements reached.

Thus, the so-called "ATO", launched by the Ukrainian government in April 2014, in two months acquired the character of full-scale

hostilities in the form of obvious civil armed conflict, the active phase of which took place from June 2014 to February 2015, and was stopped in the course of successfully implemented military operations in Ilovaysk and Lutugino (Ilovayskiy and Lutuginsky cauldrons), as well as during the Debaltsevo–Chernukhin operation (the Debaltsevo cauldron).

Military success were accompanied by diplomatic efforts, which were implemented during the Minsk negotiation process, which began in September 2014. The Minsk agreements were aimed at cessation of hostilities, a withdrawal of weapons from the demarcation line, an exchange of prisoners of war, and creation of conditions for political and social and economic stabilization in the Donbass. However, Ukraine's systematic disregard for its obligations to implement the Minsk agreements, refusal from direct dialogue with representatives of the republics, as well as an increased aggressive rhetoric, political and hostilities of official Kiev led to a significant escalation of the conflict in November 2021–February 2022 and forced the LPR and DPR to take active efforts to ensure their security and restore control over the constitutionally established territories within the boundaries of the regions.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates that by the end of 2021, “the total number of human losses associated with the conflict in Ukraine amounts to 42,500–44,500.” At the same time, 13.2–13.4 thousand people died, including almost 4 thousand civilians. Another 29.5 to 33.6 thousand people were injured, including 7–9 thousand civilians¹.

Thus, the armed conflict in the South-East of Ukraine is one of the largest humanitarian disasters of our time, taking one of the first places in Europe in terms of the number of victims. Attention is drawn to a significant number of victims among the residents of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In the last four years alone, from 2017 to 2021, according to the UN, about 4 thousand people died².

¹ The UN named the number of victims of the war in Donbass [website]. URL: <https://lenta.ru/news/2021/07/15/donbass/> (access date: 05.11.2021).

² Ibid.; Ukraine leads in human rights violations in Donbass [website]. URL: <https://anna-news.info/ukraina-lidiruet-v-narushenii-pravchelovekana-donbasse/> (access date: 05.11.2021).

According to the UN human rights monitoring mission, in Ukraine only in the period from 14 April 2014 to 30 April 2021, 152 children were killed (of them 102 boys and 50 girls), another 146 children were injured (of them 120 boys and 26 girls). Names of some dead children are imprinted on the most mournful monument of our time — the Alley of Angels. The memorial complex was opened in Donetsk in the park of culture and recreation on 5 May 2015, a year after the start of armed attack of the Ukrainian Nazis on the Donbass.

On 27 July 2014 the central streets of the city of Gorlovka were fired upon by the armed units of Ukraine from Grad units. As a result, 20 civilians, including four children, were killed on the streets of the city. This day became a mournful date and entered the history of the city as “Bloody Sunday.”

During the shelling of Gorlovka, 23-year-old Kristina Zhuk died with her 10-month-old daughter Kira, whom she held in her arms. She ran with her daughter in her arms, trying to escape. The family was about to leave the city. For two days, when the trains did not run, Christina’s mother Natalya called everyone who could take her daughter and granddaughter out by car. Finally, there was a man who agreed to help them. Natalia was delighted. She called her daughter. She stood by the window and saw the carpark where Christina and Kira went for a walk. She joyfully announced that the departure from hell was scheduled for tomorrow, at nine in the morning. She heard how joyfully Cristina shouted: “Hooray! Kiryusha, we are leaving tomorrow!” And at that moment the shelling began.

After her death, Christina Zhuk became known as the Gorlovka Madonna. The Gorlovka Madonna has become a symbol of the war crimes of the Ukrainian Nazis.

We are presenting the stories of some other children of Donbass who became victims of the crimes of the Ukrainian Nazis.

The Bulaev family — Oleg and Tatyana with their children Danya and Sonya — returned to Gorlovka shortly before, in September. They waited out the summer shelling by the sea, but their eldest son, Danya, had to go to school. And they returned.

That evening, Danya’s and Sonya’s grandfather Vladimir Dmitrievich was going to visit them. Oleg, who sometimes liked to push his wife away from the stove, had already prepared dinner, but the

grandfather was late after visiting the country house. He was already leaving the house when the explosion was heard. And he stayed in his apartment because the shelling continued. And when he was finally able to run out into the street, he saw a neighboring house, where his son with his wife and grandchildren moved a year ago. There was only one black hole left from their apartment on the eighth floor.

Danya and Oleg died immediately. Sonya was found much later. The neighbors and the militia, who were clearing the rubble, had time to rejoice for a while, thinking that she had stayed with her grandfather. Then they found her body. One floor below, under the rubble from the apartment.

Tatyana was still alive — with a severe concussion and multiple shrapnel injuries. She was taken to the hospital, where the doctors tried to save her for several days. A few days later she was buried in the same place with her husband and children.

Karina Belonog (9 years old), Gorlovka. The fourth-grader Karina was called a sweet, kind, positive child at school. She went to dances, was friendly with many classmates. On December 19, during the snowless military winter, Yana's mother took her home from school on a bicycle. The shell fell when they were approaching the house.

Karina died in the hospital almost immediately — she did not come out of anesthesia. The wounds were incompatible with life. Her seriously injured mother with a shrapnel in her head was able to survive.

Sonya Martynyuk (4 years old), Kirovskoe. The family had been living in the basement for a long time. It was the summer of 2014, when entire neighborhoods, entire small towns lived in basements and bomb shelters. However, on 24 August Ukraine celebrated Independence Day. And Sonya's mother Oksana, together with her grandmother Lyudmila Nikolaevna, decided that there would be no shelling on this occasion. They went to their house. Oksana cooked lunch, Sonya watched cartoons.

The grandmother will tell that Sonya was very fond of walking in her mother's outfits. She also put on her mother's tunic and secretly slipped out into the yard. The shelling began. Grandmother ran into the room where she thought Sonya was sitting and saw that the child was gone. She ran out into the yard, picked up the girl in her arms. There was a second explosion.

Then several children were taken to the intensive care. Sonya died two days later. She was buried with the doll with which she walked.

Andrey Zaplava (9 years old), Gorlovka. Before the war Andrey loved his cat and collected Lego cars. He really wanted to see the plane that stood on a pedestal in Slavyansk, the city where his mother once studied. He dreamed of becoming a pilot.

On 14 February Gorlovka was shelled again. The house was shaken. Grandma Lyuba said that they had go to the bomb shelter. She collected documents. Mom Svetlana dressed her youngest daughter Masha, Andrey dressed himself. To get to the shelter, one had to go through a small forest. They passed it and were already approaching the entrance of the plant, where the shelter was located. Mother walked in front, holding Masha by the hand, grandmother Lyuba with Andrey followed her. Then Masha said that her hands were frozen, and she asked to put mittens on her. Svetlana squatted down and took out the mittens. There was an explosion. The mother managed to grab the girl and hug her. They were thrown off the road. They regained consciousness on the ground. And they saw that Andrey with grandmother Lyuba were lying nearby, on the pavement. A fragment hit Andrey in the temple, but he was still alive and looked at his mother with wide eyes. She picked him up and dragged him to the shelter. She thought she had to hurry. There was nowhere to hurry. The shelling continued, the ambulance could not come through for a long time due to the incessant bursts of shells. Grandma Lyuba died on the spot. Her head was blown off by the explosion.

Nastya Podlipskaya (11 months old), Gorlovka. 8 August 2014 Due to the shelling of Gorlovka, the Podlipskiy family decided to move to a country house. The family is still not old grandmother, Tatyana Stepanovna, twenty-six-year-old Lera, a young engineer, and her daughter Nastya.

At the country house there was a safe basement, which was equipped as a temporary shelter. They thought there was nothing to be afraid of now. The place was quiet, shells do not reach here. Tatyana Stepanovna went to work, Lera was busy with tomatoes, Nastya played nearby. The missile landed a couple of meters away from them. Both of them died on the spot. Nastya did not live one day before her birthday. She was supposed to turn one year old.

Vanya Nesteruk (4 years old), Telmanovo. It was 4 June 2015. Minsk-2 was going on. It was sunny in Telmanovo and the children were playing in the sandbox. Vanya's mother with her little daughter were sitting very close.

It was a shelling from a Grad unit.sudden. Nobody had time to do anything. It hit somewhere nearby. The children ran away, but four-year-old Vanya fell. A piece of shrapnel pierced his lung and stuck in his spine. "I'll lie down a little more, and then we'll go home," he said to his stepfather, who ran up. He never said anything anymore.

Liza Serbinenko (15 years old), Snezhnoe. On 12 June 2014 Alexey Serbinenko decided to evacuate his daughter Lisa and son Tolik to their grandmother. He thought it would be safer that way. At the Ukrainian checkpoint, he asked in advance whether it would be possible to pass safely. They promised that there would be silence until half past two. That's why Anatoly took his brother with him, put the children in an old car and drove south. At half past one he passed Saur-Mogila. The slaughter has begun.

Lisa was talking on the phone with a classmate. "Do you hear the shots?" — she said into the phone, and the connection went off. A Ukrainian grenade hit the car directly. Everyone died except for Tolik.

A classmate called Liza's mother Natalya back and said with concern that she could not reach her friend. Natalya began to call her daughter, son and husband. Phones were unavailable. Then her son's phone switched on. He asked for one thing: "Mommy, just don't hang yourself. There is no dad, no uncle, an ambulance was called for Lisa. An ambulance was not needed — Lisa died almost immediately. Tolik himself, with shrapnel in his back and under his right rib, was standing at a bus stop¹.

An important evidence of the crimes of the Ukrainian military is the mass graves found on the territory of the unrecognized republics, evidence of executions of residents of Donbass during occupation of part of the territory of the DPR and LPR in 2014. In particular, on 29 October 2021 50 victims of the armed conflict were discovered as a result of search work. According to the adviser to the head of the

¹ Angels. Ten terrible stories about killed children of Donbass [website]. URL: <https://www.5-tv.ru/news/131659/> (access date: 17.04.2022).

LPR, Marina Filippova, “today we are present at the largest burial that exists in the republic ... We know that several hundred of our compatriots are buried (spontaneously buried. — *Ed. note*) here, today we are reburying fifty. This is important for us to understand and the entire world community to understand the scale of the tragedy that took place here in 2014¹.”

The head of the interdepartmental working group on the search for burials in the LPR, Anna Soroka, noted: “The first remains that were raised during the fifth stage of work of the interdepartmental working group finally found peace... Most people died from mine-explosive injuries, from blunt wounds. These are all really victims of the war unleashed by the government of Ukraine against civilians in Donbass².”

Separately, as a crime of the Ukrainian authorities, it is necessary to note terrorist actions — the planned murders of political figures of the unrecognized republics.

On 16 October 2016 the commander of the Sparta militia detachment Arseniy Pavlov (code name Motorola) was killed by a Ukrainian sabotage group in the entrance of his own house³. On 8 February 2017, another commander of the Donetsk militia, Mikhail Tolstykh (code name — Givi) was killed⁴. On 31 August 2018, the leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic Alexander Zakharchenko was killed as a result of an explosion in the Donetsk downtown⁵. All the murders were committed by the Ukrainian special services in the context of the ceasefire and the operation of the Minsk agreements and fall under the category of war crimes.

¹ Remains of 50 victims of the conflict in Donbass were reburied in Luhansk [website]. URL: <https://ria.ru/20211029/donbass-1756953978.html> (access date: 05.11.2021).

² Ibid.

³ Completed murder. Motorola battalion commander was killed in Donetsk [website]. URL: <https://lenta.ru/articles/2016/10/17/molorola/> (access date: 05.11.2021).

⁴ Murder of Givi: how one of the leaders of the DPR died [website]. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/08/02/2017/589ac2229a7947bada2e35d2> (access date: 05.11.2021).

⁵ The head of the DPR Alexander Zakharchenko died in an explosion in Donetsk [website]. URL: <https://rg.ru/2018/08/31/glava-dnr-aleksandr-zakharchenkopogib-pri-vzryve-v-donecke.html> (access date: 05.11.2021).

The conflict in Donbass is accompanied by mass violence against the residents of Donbass. Murder, tortures, kidnappings of civilians, hostage taking, arbitrary arrests and detention, violation of the rights of prisoners — this is not a complete list of crimes against the person committed by Ukrainian officials, security forces, representatives of paramilitary units. One of the released, Vyacheslav Biryukov, recalls:

“They beat me a lot and everywhere. They poked my legs with a knife. They beat me in the face with the butt of a submachine gun. Choked, even hung. They have a special hook on the ceiling for these procedures.” According to him, all this took place in the basement of the SBU building in Mariupol. Together with his comrades Alexander Stelnikovych, Viktor Skripnik and Evgeniy Druzhinin, he spent more than five years in captivity. Kiev suspected them of involvement in the clashes in Mariupol on 9 May 2014. However, over the years, it was not possible to prove their guilt.

Alexander Stelnikovich faced exactly the same attitude, but in an illegal prison at the Mariupol airport:

“Very often they brought people for a week or two — to torture, disable and beat out the testimonies, so that later they could put them to the “legal” jail¹.”

Tortures and humiliations by the security forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and volunteer battalions were in some cases so unbearable that the prisoners wanted only one thing — to be shot. Until now, those who survived the tortures do not believe that this hell has already ended and they are free. To say that the residents of Donbass survived hell is to say nothing.

The story of the torture of the punitive battalion Aidar of a resident of Luhansk Yuriy Lesnyak: “People came in, put a bag over my head, tied my hands with tape and took me outside. They put me on some kind of hook and said: now we will ask you, and shot me in the leg. Then they hit me with a shovel on the same leg. Then another one came up and stabbed me in the arm, then set a dog on me. She bit me twice where the blood flowed. Then they doused me with gasoline and

¹ Participants in the exchange of prisoners spoke about torture in the SBU [website]. URL: <https://rg.ru/2019/12/30/uchastniki-obmena-plennymi-rasskazali-opytkah-v-sbu.html> (access date: 05.11.2021).

set me on fire. When I screamed, they extinguished the fire, and then set me on fire again. They hit me in my head. I begged them to shot me. But I was told that the execution still needs to be earned.”

The story of a young militiaman who was in the Ukrainian captivity: “Literally 5–10 meters away was a tractor with a bucket. They buried a man up to his knees and said that he was from New Russia. They said — let the entire Russia see how you will die. They just lowered the bucket...”

The story of Vitaliy, who suffered as a result of manifestations of Ukrainian Nazism: “They broke my ear with a butt — I lost my hearing. One ear was torn apart, the other a little less. The eye was practically gouged out. Now I can’t see with this eye at all ...” The story of the militiaman Anatoly, how Ukrainian servicemen shot dead one of the female prisoners in a drunken state:

“A friend of mine met me in early September. He says there is a man who wants to meet me in order to join the militia. I met him. He sat down, bought me a beer and said: “I have to move the car closer.” When he left, six riflemen and a policeman entered. When they brought me to the city police department, they started talking to me harshly.

They drove me away, locked me in a freezer, put me in and kept me there. They beat me, beat me in the ribs on both sides by foot. Then they strangled me with a bag, crushed me with handcuffs and lifted me up. When my jaw was knocked out, I could barely chew.

Then they moved me, they said that to Izyum. We were kept in the basement, like a boiler room. Every time they got drunk, they came and made fun of us with blanks. They shot at the ceilings. Then the Right Sector came, also drunk. There was Katya from the city of Kramatorsk. She was shot there on the spot when they got drunk. Three people came, they came in with a Kalashnikov rifle, and one had a PM with live ammunition. They walked around the cells — they shot, then they reached her, as far as we heard, they shot at the ceiling, then we heard a shot and a sound like wheezing, and one of the inmates said that her last words were “Why?” And that’s it. The screaming started, it was noisy. The next day they walked around as if nothing had happened.”

The story of Denis, who was detained by the Ukrainian National Guard on 31 July 2014 at a checkpoint and handed over to the Azov Battalion:

“Every two or three hours there was an interrogation. A lot of everything. I was drowned. Eyes were blindfolded, a towel or rag was placed on the face. I did not see. The hands were chained behind. And, by holding me from behind by the head, putting a rag on my face, they poured water from above. I don’t know from what — from a bottle, from a teapot ... I didn’t see it. State — drowning. Then they brought me to life. Well, and so on. Since my knee had already been broken, they saw a corset on my leg, on my knee, and they broke it again. They broke it on the first day. Then on my feet, where the nail is, they inserted a needle. such a condition, as if the veins are pulled from the neck. Everything pulls, turns to stone through pain.

They threw me into a pit with corpses. Shot me, in short. Throw into a pit, a specific smell — an effect of execution. There was a lot of everything. I know a guy who had four of his front teeth pulled out with pliers. As much as I saw, they made “carousels” on pinch bars to the guys I knew.

There is the story of human rights activist Yaroslav, who was captured at a checkpoint near Bakhmut. In May 2015, Yaroslav drove his friends to the country house on his own car. They were stopped at one of the checkpoints in the Bakhmut area. Both passengers were immediately interrogated, suspecting separatism. The servicemen searched the car, then they put bags over their heads, tied their hands and put them in the back of a truck. They hung Yaroslav by his tied hands and started beating him. He had all his teeth knocked out on one side. One of the servicemen started cutting off his ear. A friend of Yaroslav saw on one of the soldiers who were beating them a chevron of the Right Sector. The beating continued until the truck reached its destination, a stronghold of the military.

“In the cell in which I was kept, it seems that someone was beaten to death. I saw the specific traces of blood and brains. It was scary there... As far as I understood, this was the torture chamber they had.”

At night, servicemen entered the room, beat Yaroslav and forced him to confess that he had corrected the artillery fire of the militiamen. As a result of blow to the back of the head, a base of his skull was broken. According to Yaroslav, the man who beat him wore the chevron of the Aidar battalion on his uniform. When Yaroslav refused to give testimonies, they beat him again, breaking his ribs.

Later, the detainees were taken to a field with bags over their heads and released. A month later, he was detained again — they also tied his hands and put a bag over his head, brought him to the premises of a factory unknown to him. During the interrogation, he was beaten, they simulated execution, shooting near the head and between the legs. And then they forced him to write a statement that he had no claims against the people who detained him.

An elderly man Sergey, together with his son Andrey and grandson Alexey, before the war were the owners of a store in the town of Starobeshevo. Andrey participated in the referendum on the recognition of the DPR, and in May 2014 he joined the armed forces of the DPR. His father and son did not interfere in the politics and continued to run the store.

At the end of July 2014 a car drove up to Sergey's house. Four servicemen in Ukrainian uniforms searched the house and the store. Sergey, together with his grandson, was taken to the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the outskirts of the city. The men were kicked and beaten with rifle butts until they lost consciousness. Sergey was accused of allegedly being a DNR sniper. After the beating, they were put into different cars and taken in the direction of the village of Sedovo. From that moment on, Sergey never saw his grandson. Those who transported him called each other by the code names Doc and Butcher. The man was brought and placed in the basement. During interrogation, his head was forced into a tank with water and held there.

The body of Aleksey with numerous signs of violence was found the day after they were detained on the highway in the vicinity of Starobeshevo. Witnesses claim that representatives of the Azov battalion detained the men. Sergey died shortly after the death of his grandson due to heart problems. Currently, all the materials on the case ... are lost by the investigators.

The overwhelming majority of those captured by the Ukrainian party underwent cruel and systematic beatings.

For example, the victim Andrey tells how he was beaten and hung on a hook in the SBU: "We were detained by the SBU officers dressed in the traffic police uniforms. They took me to a checkpoint, threatened me, put a weapon on me, saying: "We'll shoot you now,

we won't get anything for it." They threatened me with electric shock, and kicked me in the head, it was there, at the post. The handcuffs were constantly tightened so that the hands turned blue. They took me to the SBU, where the same thing continued, only already with the use of plastic bottles filled with water, handcuffs on the back — and on the hook. They took absolutely everything: all personal belongings, phones, money, cards — everything that was there. They didn't return anything, even when we went out for an exchange."

Militiaman Sergey also tells how he was hung on a chain in handcuffs: "We were captured near Luhansk, taken to a helicopter pad, then transferred by helicopter to another site. From there they put us in a pit, my comrade Alexander got more beatings, because during admission they broke his nose, hit him on the head with a butt, smashed his head, broke his jaw. Then we were again reloaded into a helicopter — and taken to Kramatorsk.

In Kramatorsk, of course, they were again placed in pits, handcuffed, hung up with chains and beaten. Then they transported me to the city of Izyum, took me to the basement, with a bag on my head, handcuffed me to the radiator, and stretched me out. The hands became numb as this went on for three days. They took me to the SBU, where they took it all off, bandaged it and treated my hands. Then we were exchanged."

According to the testimonies of the victims, the Ukrainian army, the National Guard, various units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Security Service of Ukraine use an entire arsenal of tortures.

For example, many victims testify that such tortures are used as cauterization of the body with a burner or hot objects, burning various inscriptions on the body of the arrested.

For example, the militiaman Alexander told how the Ukrainian National Guard burned him with a burner and hung him up by his arms: "We were ambushed by the National Guard. For three days they mocked us, without interruption, beaten, burned, hung. They burned me, I understood that with a burner, the bag was on my head.

They hung me up by my hands, the scars had not even healed yet, my right hand is dumb, I don't feel it. Ribs still hurt. They kicked me, fastened my hands behind my back, tied a grenade ring to my fingers, and I had to sit. If I would move, then, of course, I would pull the pin. I had sit all night in order not to move, because I would pull the pin.

I had to sit, although sometimes I even wanted to pull. We asked them to shoot us, but they said that it was an easy death, although they put us against the wall more than once, put a gun to the head, and pulled the trigger. It was just a click, there was no shot. Some even asked to be shot in order not to be tortured. But they said that it was an easy death for us, that we were non-humans, that we had betrayed our country. They are not humans at all, they are animals”.

Volunteer S. Stankevich tells how the National Guard tortured him: they burned the word “sepr” (short for “separatist”) on his chest with a red-hot chain and a German swastika on his buttock with a red-hot bayonet-knife: “On 24 August 2014 we went to accompany a person to the border. On the way, the car was shot. The two of us, me and the driver, were taken to Kramatorsk, where we were tortured, interrogated, beaten by the National Guard. They burned an inscription “sepr” on the chest with a red-heated chain and a German cross on the buttock. After three days of beatings, we were taken to the security service in the city of Kharkov. For a day we lay on the stone floor in the toilet, only then they let us into the common cells. We were treated at our own expense. We were released yesterday with everyone else. The Security Service of Ukraine allocated 1,500 hryvnias for medicines, so that everything would heal. They burned it with a chain. A German cross was burned on my thigh with a red-hot bayonet-knife. They beat me so hard that they damaged my eye. Now it can’t see.”

Mikhail, a militiaman of the DPR, captured in the area of the village of Volnovakhf said: “Then, when we were transferred to the SBU, more people came. They showed the word “separ” burnt on the body, a swastika on the buttock, a star on the back. And all of these were the 3rd degree burns.”

The victim Roman told the following: “I was detained on 5 April 2014 while crossing the border. In the Kharkov pre-trial detention center, he met a man whose heels were set on fire with a red-hot iron. At present, I know nothing about his fate. He was not on the exchange buses with us.”

Such forms of torture are used as crushing of certain parts of the body. For example, a militiaman Alexey, who was taken prisoner on 26 August 2014, tells how Ukrainian army servicemen beat him on his toes and knees with a sledgehammer and a hammer: “When I was

captured, they laid me face down on the ground, I only heard: "Let's take this big one, small one and old one, shoot the rest." Our group consisted of nine people. We were placed in an armored personnel carrier (APC) and taken to an unknown settlement. I understood from the conversations it was some kind of 11th reconnaissance battalion.

There they beat us with a sledgehammer on our toes, with a hammer we were beaten on our knees, respectively, on our legs. They then beat us with shovels... at night they tied us to some kind of fence, stripped us to our underpants and poured cold water over us all night. In the morning the beatings continued, and were taken to some headquarters, where the beatings continued. Then in the SBU of the city of Izyum they already tortured us a little less. We were fed sometimes once a day, sometimes two, sometimes they simply forgot. And then they exchanged us."

Volunteer Oleg also told how he was severely tortured by the Ukrainian servicemen, and they smashed the toes of his comrade with a sledgehammer: "We were detained at the checkpoint. At first they didn't beat us, then people from some kind of punitive battalion arrived, and the beating began immediately. They cut the lip, jumped on the chest, jumped on the back, beat with rifle butts and hit the spine with submachine gun barrels. We were tied up, with bags on our heads we were loaded into an armored personnel carrier. Five comrades were shot at the checkpoint. We were brought to the location, the beating continued and they poured water over us. In the evening they put me in a barn, then they put another comrade with me. The third comrade was tortured on the street. They smashed his toes with a sledgehammer, poured cold water over him at night. In the morning we were loaded into a car with the bags over our heads and our eyes tied with a tape. They brought me to some place where the beating continued, that is, they beat several people at a time. They beat me on the back with a rubber hose. Then they loaded me back into the car and brought me to the headquarters in the city of Kramatorsk, where the beating continued. They beat me in a group of three or four people, beat me with electric shocks, put me on my knees in a sack, shot near my ear. Then their commander came, took us all away and put us in a pit on a chain, handcuffed us. I could not sit, I could not stand, that is, I was hanging on this chain, because my ribs and fingers were broken.

Andrey, who suffered from torture, told how such a method of torture as “tumbler” was applied to him: “They took me on a denunciation simply because I stayed in the city. The National Guard and the SBU officers seized me. They brought me to Kramatorsk and tortured me for three and a half days. They beat me with a maple stick from the elbows to the neck and knees. My entire body was completely purple. There were blows to the stomach, internal bleeding. Then they made a “tumbler” out of me, that is, two people come in, beat me with rifle butts on the head. One in front, the other behind, on the right and on the left, then a blow with a boot in the stomach and one loses consciousness. Then I fell on the ground. When they brought me for a medical examination, the doctors who examined me were shocked by what they saw. It was a continuous hematoma from the neck to the knees and to the elbows.”

The injured Yuriy also became a victim of this method of torture: “On 10 September 2014, I was arrested and brought to the Kramatorsk airport. I was handcuffed to a meter-long chain. After 15–20 minutes, two people approached almost quietly, imperceptibly (since I was blindfolded, I simply determined that there were two of them by the steps), and made me, so to speak, a “tumbler”, that is, they hit me with the flat part of the butt: first on the right on the head, then on the left, rocking me, then one came up, took a step forward, hit me on the head from behind with a butt, and the second hit me on the forehead with a butt, then leaned back, and kicked me in the abdomen. I lost consciousness, fell down, I don’t know how long I laid unconscious. Someone came up and explained that the guys made me a “tumbler.” I was sat on a stool about five meters away, attached to another chain. I sat again and again (I don’t know after what time) two people came up and again did the “tumbler.” I lost consciousness again, fell down, and urinated on myself. The blows were made in the stomach very, very hard in the liver area, professionally.

Igor, who suffered from torture, was detained on 14 September by the officers of the Dnieper battalion, and he spoke about such a technique as the “swing”: “... A long hexagonal pinch bar. Hands under the legs in the handcuffs and put on a pinch bar. And then they circled me with this pinch bar, left me, and I hung on it. My bones almost popped out. Until now, the hands, these parts, do not work.”

The so-called “Bandera’s running knot” is also used as an instrument of intimidation and torture. Nurse Olga, captured on 15 October 2014, said: “When they were interrogated at the SBU, one showed an iron wire like a spiral. He asked me: “Do you know what it’s called? This is a “Bandera’s running knot.” I will choke you with it until you start to talk.”

Evgeniy, a militiaman captured on 10 September 2014, by the SBU officers, spoke: “In the SBU, they put a running knot around my neck, kicked me, hit me with a butt on my head, with a butt on my kidneys, put on a bag, poured water. And then, already in the pre-trial detention center, they beat me on the head with the Criminal Code of Ukraine.”

The standard method of torture of the Ukrainian army and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is the use of electric current.

For example, Igor, who suffered from torture, captured on 14 September 2014, said: “The last time they were kept on a crowbar for 20 minutes, they took it off, they started pouring water and discharged electric shockers on me.” The injured Stanislav, who was detained by representatives of the Azov Battalion, also talks about this technique: “In the process of beating, the ribs were broken, the chest was broken and the lungs were damaged. Then they took me to the court. There I signed the documents under threats. I couldn’t even read them. I was constantly beaten, threatened. They put a wet rag on me and turned on an electric shocker. This happened frequently. They punctured my chest. subsequently, I had a surgery on the lungs. They hit me in my head, my hands. The head was swollen, the hand did not move, almost all of the ribs were broken, the liver was displaced.

Militiaman Alexander tells how he was also tortured with electric current: “They broke into the house, tied my hands with a fixing plastic tape and put me in a minibus, drove for about two hours. They took me out of the minibus, and I heard that someone was escorted next to me and they had a very negative attitude towards this person. They shouted, threatened I heard a shot. And the sound of a falling body. Then I heard: “Why have you dug such a small pit?”

They took me to the basement, seated me on the stairs, handcuffed my hand to the pipe. Fifteen minutes later, I heard that another person was taken out, they were also shouting at him, threatening him in this regard, and again I heard shots. And the sound of a falling body again.

After that, they periodically came to me and beat me with their feet, fists in the area of the head and body. They poured water over me, tied my knees to my arms, took off my shoes, and then put one contact on the arm, the other — on the leg. During all this time, somewhere around 12, I don't remember exactly, until the evening of the next day, approximately until 17–18, and during this entire period there were interrogations, there were tortures. They attached wires from the battery to my arm, poured water over me and hit me with electric current. I lost consciousness. As soon as I regained consciousness, they poured water over me and interrogated me again after a while.

I still remember how they brought me in for interrogation, put a grenade in my hands and squeezed them. As I understand, to leave finger prints on it, after which they took off my hat and began interrogation. Even when the tortures were carried out, they said that they have such a terrarium where people are thrown and nothing remains from them.”

Victims of torture noted that recently the army and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine have begun to systematically use such a method of torture as “drowning.” Previously, this method was used by the American intelligence services.

For example, 18-year-old victim Vlad told: “I came home from Donetsk. In the afternoon, a friend called me and offered to meet. There were three other friends with me. As soon as we got out of the taxi, a minibus drove up and they immediately grabbed us. Bag on the head — and dragged us away. The interrogation began immediately: they laid me on my back, put a rag on top and poured water over it. Handcuffed, I'm upside down Hands behind my back and I lay on my back. I already lost consciousness, then they brought me to life. Three times they did it and each time they brought me to life. Then they filmed me as I testified. They took me to the investigator, they wrote a protocol that I drove in an ambulance and collected the wounded in Donetsk.”

A number of interviewees testified that some of the arrested Ukrainian troops were sent to the minefields.

For example, Vasiliy, a DPR militiaman captured in the area of the Petrovskoe village on 18 August, said: “...Then they dragged me into the pit. Two persons were sent to the minefield. There were seven explosions. They were going to shoot me.” Konstantin, who suffered

from torture and was also captured on 18 August, said: "...Then they sent me to Kramatorsk. There they put me in a pit, periodically beat me, insulted me. Then they brought new ones, and all attention switched to them. A marine approached one of them and took him and another guy away. Then it turned out that they were sent to the minefield." Chairman of the humanitarian fund, Alla, told: "At the airport of Kramatorsk, young guys, for whom I could be a mother, insulted, humiliated me, saying: "We will rape you and send you to the minefield."

Almost everyone says that the Ukrainian army and punitive battalions also shoot prisoners in the limbs and run them over with military equipment. Imitation of executions is also a systematic practice.

Militiaman Michael said: "I was detained during the operation. Two comrades died, two managed to escape, and they took us. They tied our hands and put us in the car. We arrived at an unknown place. At first we sat in a pit, then we were called for interrogation. I didn't feel my hands. I saw how a guy was covered up to his waist with dirt from a tractor bucket, and then they just dropped a bucket on him. Two militiamen were sent to the minefield. One said — it's better to shoot me here. And then they started shooting from the toes up, the distance between the bullets was about five centimeters. When he reached the groin on one leg, he switched to the other leg. He was shooting from a submachine gun."

Vladimir, a militiaman from the Donetsk People's Republic who suffered from torture, talks about threats to relatives and an imitation of the APC hitting him: "I was taken prisoner on 5 July 2014. While they were taking me in the car, they beat me. Upon arrival, they threw me into the pit. During the interrogation, my hands were tied, they beat me, they wanted to shoot me in the knee. Then they put me under the APC and tried to run me over. Thus they scared me. They dragged me out, beat me, I lost consciousness.

They threw me into a waste pit, shot nearby, then dragged me out and continued the interrogation. In the process, I lost consciousness many times. Then we spent the night in the pit, in the rain. We were loaded and taken to the SBU. There we were beaten, threatened with violence against our families. After that, they took me to

a pre-trial detention center, they examined me, after that they didn't touch me."

The standard method of intimidation by the Ukrainian army, punitive battalions and the SBU is threats to relatives of detainees. They also use such methods of pressure as keeping victims in the same cell with criminals.

With such threats, the majority of the victims sign the testimonies offered to them. For example, the victim Pavel says: "On 9 July, they grabbed me and beat me. They grabbed my girlfriend and took her to the base too. They forced her to confess that I was a commander who commanded a detachment that shot down helicopters. They said that your girlfriend would not leave the base, we would rape her before your eyes and kill her in the end. They began to offer me to sign blank sheets of paper. They forced me to confess that I commanded this detachment, and they let her go."

In some cases, threats to relatives are implemented. Igor, the victim, who was detained on 14 September by the Dnieper battalion, said: "It turned out that my wife was tortured. They also took her away and kept her in the next cell. All her toes were broken on her left leg. I signed all the papers."

People detained by the Ukrainian party undergo torture at various stages: directly at the place of capture, during transportation, after being transferred to one or another unit, during preliminary or main interrogations, in isolation wards, in courts, etc.

The victims name the National Guard, various units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the Right Sector, various units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the Security Service of Ukraine as the parties carrying out torture.

For example, the militiaman Alexander says: "I was in captivity. They kept me and my friend in the basement, they demanded an answer from us to the question: "How much did they sell Ukraine for?" I tried to explain them that this is my land, I was born and raised here, I did not sell anything to anyone. Those who kept us in the basement, guys aged 25–28, beat us on the liver, on the kidney. One got tired, the second sat down. The first one had the code name Tema, and the second — the Wind. He liked to stick an awl into the left shoulder blade. All this was happening in the basement near the checkpoint.

I understood that I could not stand it any longer, and I tried to kick out the door, and they said: “If you will try to kick out the door, we’ll hang a grenade.” First they shot me in the leg, then there were other shots.

Then they took me to the city, to the hospital. No case was brought against us, but there was a talk that we would be exchanged. Then they came from another battalion. They wanted to take us away in order to exchange us, but our servicemen did not want to give us back. I won’t go into more detail, it’s very hard for me.”

Sergey, the victim, told how he was severely beaten on the way to the Security Service of Ukraine. His wife was also beaten. It was her whom the staff tortured subsequently, like himself as well: “We were taken from my house. SBU officers arrived in masks, kicked out the door and started beating me in front of my wife and ten-year-old daughter. My wife had a heart attack. They searched the apartment, planted two grenades, after which they loaded me into a minibus and continued beating me along the way. These papers contained nonsense that I was an agent of the Russian Security Service. They said that if I would not sign the papers, they would kill my wife. I signed everything in the SBU. When they beat me on the highway, three of my ribs were broken. It was discovered when I was taken for a fluorography. They changed my picture so that there were no problems with the temporary detention center.”

Another victim told the following: “I was a militiaman. I was captured. They poked me with a knife, beat me with pieces of iron, beat me in the spine, and beat my legs. They demanded I confess that I was a terrorist and so on. They beat me with an electric shocker. Then they tied a wire to the legs and twisted some handle. It hit me hard. Interestingly, one beating took place right in the courtroom, in front of the judge. The judge saw it all. They said that if you did not sign, we would bring children and families.”

Artem, captured on 13 June 2014 in the city of Mariupol, testified: “Immediately they started beating me, brought me to the airport and put me in a refrigerator. They bullied us. Everyone was wearing masks. They kept me there for three days, then they took me to the SBU. We were with broken ribs and without any medical assistance. They used physical violence and put weapons in my hands in order to leave fingerprints., threatened.”

Some interviewees say that SBU officers preferred to use other Ukrainian servicemen for torture, but torture occurred in their presence.

For example, Alexander, captured on 4 August 2014, told how, in the presence of SBU officers, he was strangled, tortured with an electric current and forced to shoot himself with a pistol: “In the evening they beat me and interrogated me. The interrogations were all the same. One of them lasted ten hours. During this time they did not give me a drop of water. They discharged an electric shocker on me, and beat me. Then they changed the tactics of interrogation. They began to choke me. And this is was happening for five days. The interrogations were attended by representatives of the SBU. There was a constant provocation. They staged a shooting. They shot overhead and sent me to a cell. Then they gave a gun in my hands to shoot myself. They beat me until I pulled the trigger, but there were no bullets in it.”

Another victim said: “At the Mariupol airport they kept us in a refrigerator. They came in — they put a gun to the head and shot nearby. Then there were the guys — they were put on the floor and shot near the head. Others used to be cut — the tendons were cut on the leg of one guy, another was smashed in the head with a butt so that his scalp tore off. They said that you are nobody, and you have no name. They didn’t feed us, didn’t give water, didn’t take us to the toilet for two days and didn’t give water. They forced us to confess in terrorism. Medical assistance was not provided. For all diseases they gave us analgin.”

Militiaman Alexander says that those detained in the SBU were also not provided with sufficient medical care: “In early August 2014, we were driving in a car, and we were caught in an ambush. They beat off all my internal organs, broke two ribs, one rib pierced my lung, blood began to flow into the lung then. They beat me hard, tied my hands with a rope, rubbed them on the asphalt, I almost lost my hands. Then they took me to the SBU and then I was taken to the hospital. I was kept in the SBU for a month. There were many wounded with shrapnel and bullets, but many were not taken to the hospital.”

Vladimir told what he saw in the SBU: “In March 2014, I ended up in the Kharkov branch of the Security Service of Ukraine. People were beaten, laid low with broken ribs or a dislocated jaw. One became ill,

his temperature rose and vomiting began. We called the security, and they took him away. In the morning we asked where he was, but we received no answer. There were suspicions that he died. It was terrible. People all came in beaten up.”

Vladimir told how he was beaten by the SBU officers. He recalled: “On 26 July they grabbed me and brought me to the Kramatorsk airfield. The SBU officers themselves did not assault me — they retreated, left me alone, and the 95th brigade beat me. The marines dislocated my jaw and beat my ribs. They took me to the Kharkov SBU. I was taken to a separate room and three operating officers beat me with their hands.”

Sergey said: “In the SBU they beat me, mostly on the kidneys and on the chest. They undressed me, laid me on the floor, stepped on my groin with a foot, put a gun to my hands, to my leg. They said that they would either kill or shoot through my arms and legs during an attempt to escape. They broke my rib.”

They injured Andrey, to whom such a method of torture as “tumbler” was applied — hits on the head with rifle butts. He testifies: “In the pre-trial detention center where I was, no medical assistance was provided.” DPR militiaman Vladimir said: “Medical assistance was not provided.”

In a number of cases, the victims were still sent to the hospital, underwent surgery, but then did not receive the necessary medical care. Torture victim Stanislav, who was tortured with electric current and his lung was pierced, spoke: “My head was swollen, my hand did not move, almost all of my ribs were broken, and my liver was displaced. I was not admitted to the pre-trial detention center. They sent me to the hospital for surgery. After that, I was sent to a pre-trial detention center, where medical assistance was not provided. They put a bag on. It was impossible to breathe.”

The vast majority of those captured told how, using torture and threats, the Ukrainian authorities forced them to sign confessions that they were agents of the Russian special services. Vast majority of civilians captured by Ukrainian troops could not stand the torture and threats and signed all the accusations against them.

A number of respondents named specific places where the National Guard and the Ukrainian army used torture on a massive scale, or gave the code names of those who tortured them.

For example, they mention the training ground of the National Guard “Dnieper-1” near Dnepropetrovsk. Torture victim Andrey also told about this place: “The code names of those who served there are X, Albina and Max. They mocked us as they wanted: they shot over our heads. Almost everyone had broken bones, but they were forced to do push-ups. One person was almost buried in the pit.”

Alexander told how unknown medications were applied to him, how he was tortured and humiliated: “I was accused of committing a terrorist attack and an attempt to kill the border guards. They started beating me with the sticks, kicked me in my head, then opened my mouth and threw two sour cubes into it. I began to choke and lose consciousness. Then, when they brought me to life, they gave me papers to sign, I signed them, and they took me to the freezer. Then they took me to the SBU, and again they gave me papers to sign. I refused to sign them, and four men in black uniforms, masks with guns came to the office and started beating me. Then they again made me sign the papers, and I signed them. They kept us in the SBU and took us to the village to the Dnieper-1 battalion. We were humiliated, thrown into a pit with snakes, shot near the head and near the legs. Then I got out of the pit, and they made me crawl on the asphalt, on the glass, and they also shot near my feet. Then I crawled to the fence, they gave me a shovel and said: “Dig a pit for yourself,” and when I dug a pit, they again started shooting near my feet.”

They also often mention the airport in Mariupol, where the detainees were kept in an industrial refrigerator and underwent tortures, and the airport in Kramatorsk.

Victim Vadim told how he was beaten and threatened with violence against his family: “I was seized on 28 July in the city council of Mariupol. They brought me to the airport and placed me in the refrigerator. There was no air to breathe. They beat me in the kidneys, knees, I lost consciousness, they broke my ribs. The guard was constantly shouting, we were often beaten. They threatened to kill my family and daughter.”

Denis, who was captured by the Ukrainian National Guard on 31 July 2014, also spoke about this place: “I was brought to Mariupol, to the airport, where they placed me in disabled freezers. There is no light, everyone was lying on the tiled floor. Vacuum doors — no air to breathe, stuffiness, suffocation.

Others said that for cooling the refrigerator was turned on, and the temperature in it reached minus four. Alexander, captured on 4 August 2014, said: “I was brought to the airport refrigerator. Some shifts forgot to turn off the refrigerator, and the temperature in it reached minus four.”

Volunteer Alexey told about those who were tortured at the Kramatorsk airfield: “I watched how volley fire systems were launched from the airfield. I was detained by the SBU, who took me to the airfield and tortured me. I was hung up by my hands in a pit and in such an elongated state with a blindfold. They beat me on the ribs, on the liver, on the face. Everyone who passed through the airfield was subject to such torture and abuse. The people who came to the temporary detention center were all blue-violet, all beaten, some of them had a heart failure and died. 90 % of them come from there in such condition. All beaten, all mutilated. The 95th brigade was there, there were foreigners, one with a Georgian, and another with a Polish accent.

Then they were taken to the Kharkov SBU, where upon arrival the operating officers first beat them up in the interrogation chamber. I was all blue-violet after a month and a half there. While I was there, they took my possessions, the keys to the garage, to the car.computers were taken out of the house and for a month and a half no charges were brought.”

The evidence obtained allows us to unequivocally conclude that the majority of victims of torture are not the militiamen of the Donetsk or Luhansk People’s Republics, but belong to the category of civilians.

In a number of cases, in order to participate in the exchange of prisoners, the Ukrainian authorities arrested citizens who obviously did not commit any offenses.

In most cases, civilians of Ukraine were also subject to beatings and threats of violence against their families.

For example, Gennadiy said: “I called my friend, I was going to go to the gym. At the stop, they pulled me out of the car, no one introduced themselves. They put me with my face down on the pavement, hit me in the ribs, broke my glasses, and injured my eye. They put a bag over my head, handcuffed my hands and put me in the car. In the car, I heard the threats against myself and my family. In the

end, I lost consciousness. I regained consciousness only from the smell of ammonia. Upon arrival at the SBU, I saw that my eye was injured. Then they took me for exchange.”

In many cases, seizures are not conducted in accordance with the law and are not registered. For example, militiaman Michael said: “About the end of July, I was detained. They brought me behind some garages, handcuffed me to a tree, hung me up and started beating me with their hands, feet, wooden sticks. I lost consciousness several times from pain shock. They tried to find out about the militiamen. I said that I had nothing to do with them. They took my money and told me to get home on my own. I came back home. I stayed in bed at home. Somewhere in the beginning of August — again they came. They brought me to the regional department, started beating me, put a bag over my head and cut off the oxygen.”

Igor, who was detained on 14 September by the officers of the Dnieper battalion, told in detail how he was tortured: they hung him up on a rack, used a “swing”, beat him with electric current, while his wife was seized and tortured. Besides, he named the code names of those who tortured him at the Dnieper-1 base:

“I was captured by the Dnieper battalion. I went fishing, they seized me, brought me to the linear police station and immediately, from the beginning, they started to beat me up. They beat me with everything they could, with sticks, feet, and with a gun on the head. My head was like a hedgehog. Then they hung me on a rack — with the hands behind my back, hands in handcuffs. All arms were twisted.

They didn’t let me sleep. If I started to fall asleep, such tortures were repeated. What they were trying to find out, I don’t know. Why this had to be done, I don’t know. No matter how much I studied history, the Germans did not use such tortures as they did.

This was going on for four days, and then we were taken to the Kharkov SBU for an exchange.

My ulcer opened there. I was taken by ambulance to Kharkov. At the same time, the doctors performed an endoscopy and all the tests on me — my ulcer was bleeding heavily. The fact is that I was taken under a false name. I was told to call any name, any address.

The doctors wanted to leave me in the hospital. But they did not allow. They brought me back to the SBU, and until the exchange took

place, I had to somehow endure all this unbearable pain. In addition to the fact that the whole body was beaten, well, the ulcer also opened.”

The victim Pavel testified that the reason for his detention and torture was his telephone conversation with a deputy from the Donetsk People’s Republic: “At first they talked to me politely. Then a man came in and started beating me in the ribs. I got sick and they gave me a pill. I had convulsions, my body was numb. They demanded me to confess that I was a spotter. That was not true. They listened to the phones, and I just talked to a deputy from the Donetsk People’s Republic. When they brought me to the Dnieper-1 training ground, they threw a person into a three-meter pit for no reason at all and forced to dig graves.”

The victim Vladimir was seized on 4 September 2014 by people in civilian clothes with balaclavas on their heads and transported him to the Mariupol airport. He said: “After my arrival, they took me into the room and began to beat me with a shocker in the forearm and in the area of my heart. They drowned me. When they lowered a bag over my head I began to lose consciousness. After all this, I was forced to sign some papers. I refused. They took me to a cell. The next day I was taken back. A wet rag was placed on my face, and the water was poured. I began to suffocate, and in order to make suffocation stronger, they beat me with an electric shocker in addition. They hit me in the back very hard. After that, the kidneys hurt for a very long time.

After that, I was taken to the Dnieper-1 near Dnepropetrovsk, to their training ground. There they mocked us, humiliated us, threw people into pits with snakes, forced us to dig graves for ourselves. Abuse was very strong. It cannot be expressed in words.”

The victim Konstantin told how he was arrested for having the phone number of a Russian journalist, and also gave an example of how Ukrainian troops sent captured people to a minefield: “On 18 August 2014 I was arrested at a Ukrainian checkpoint for having the number of a Russian journalist on my phone. During the interrogation, they made me some injection, and I became very ill. I began to lose consciousness, and they demanded testimonies. They began to blackmail me with the fact that if I did not say that I was a separatist, they would not inject me with an antidote. I didn’t care anymore, I signed, if only it would make me feel better. They made me this injection, and I really felt better.

Then the shooting threats followed. Then I was sent to Kramatorsk. There they put me in a pit, periodically beat me, insulted me. Then they brought new ones, and all attention switched to them. A marine approached one of them and took him and another guy away. Then it turned out that they were sent to the minefield. We were already in such a state that every day there was less and less desire to fight for life. Of those whom I saw, two or three did not return. Three days later we were loaded and taken away. There were six of us. When we were driving, I felt freer, we talked. One of them, his last name was Kharitonov, had a complete hematoma on his face. I saw how they brought a guy and began to beat him. They asked whether he helped in holding the referendum. He replied: "Yes." He was accused of being a separatist. The militiamen were beaten, I heard that they were put on a hook. The SBU has such a practice: if one pleads guilty, the prosecutor asks for a minimum sentence for him/her. The nerves of many people could not stand it, and they agreed."

Vasily, a DPR militiaman, captured in the area of the Petrovskoe village on 18 August, testified: "The Ukrainian military convoy saw our car and started shooting at it. We were captured, handcuffed, thrown into the APC. On the way, two cars of civilians drove towards them, they were shot from the APC. One boy survived, he was also captured, tied up and thrown into the vehicle. They brought us and civilians to the base. They beat me with a hammer on my fingers, knees, tailbone. My head was smashed, my fingers were broken. They threatened to put me on a stake, threatened to cut off my leg and arm with a chainsaw. At night, they tied me to a tree, their chief came up with a hammer and began to ask me all kinds of questions. I said I don't know. He hit my legs with a hammer. Then they dragged me into the pit. Two persons were sent to the minefield. There were seven explosions. They were going to shoot me. They told me to pray. I asked to free my hands, that was my last wish. He asked me if I knew what holiday was today. I answered yes, Transfiguration. He said that I was lucky, and this day could be considered my second birthday. I was taken to the pit, where the chains hung. Then I testified on camera.

Dmitriy spoke: "I was taken prisoner at a Ukrainian checkpoint. They brought me somewhere and locked me in a container like a refrigerator, where they kept the fish. We were kept there for two days,

and then transferred to the hangar. And then they started beating me in the kidneys, mostly kicking me. They said that they allegedly found a DNR ID with 5 × 45 caliber cartridges with me. Then, together with another person, they loaded him into the trunk, handcuffed to the spare tire. They brought us to Volnovakha and beat us again there. Then we were brought to Mariupol to the SBU, thrown into the basement. Then they started beating us again. Then I was taken to a temporary detention facility. After that, no one called for interrogations, no one came and asked no questions. Then I was just sentenced.”

Nikolay, captured by the Ukrainian forces on 8 August 2014, said: “We were driving in a car with a friend, we were stopped by armed men with submachine guns, they laid us on the pavement and put bags on our heads, put us in a car and took us away. Most likely, we were in Kramatorsk. They have a military base there, an airfield. Something was constantly buzzing, most likely helicopters. We were periodically taken out, beaten, frightened: “We will shoot you”, “shoot you in the leg”, “we will hand you over to the commander in whose unit many soldiers were killed; they will kill you right there.” There was another case on the way: when we were leaving, there were six of us, one of them had no documents, and they were told that they would not be accepted without documents. Most likely, they were talking about Kharkov. In the middle of the road he was taken out, then a burst of submachine-gun fire was heard, after which the five of us were locked up, the car started up, and we drove away. They broke the arms, beat with their feet, punched in the kidneys, in the liver. One comrade who was traveling with us, after we had already arrived in Kharkov, was immediately taken to the hospital, to the intensive care unit. He had a surgery and then brought back to the SBU.”

Sergey, a militiaman, spoke about a provocation of the SBU officers, who, with his participation, imitated the shelling of a Ukrainian army battalion, calling themselves members of the Russian Federal Security Service. After an organized provocation, they stopped hiding their affiliation with the SBU and began beating the detainee and his son. Threatening to kill his son, they forced the militia to admit all charges in court. The victim Sergey said: “In mid-August, six people from the SBU seized me and my son, blindfolded our eyes and hands, and threw us into a car. Thus tied up, they drove us around the city, then

they took us out of the city, which was heard by the sounds, then they brought us to an abandoned hangar. They introduced themselves as the FSB officers, allegedly they are saving us from the SBU. They said that they allegedly took us to a lieutenant colonel of the Russian army. After that, they again blindfolded us and our hands and took us to some wooded area, where we stayed until late at night. After that, my son and I were again put in the same car of their operating officers, continuing the same game. We drove about a hundred kilometers, and my son and I were untied our eyes and hands, they said that they had an operation in which they wanted to fire at the Ukrainian battalion. One of them took out a grenade launcher from the trunk and sat in the front seat, we drove another 700 meters through some nooks and lanes. Then there was gunfire in the air, the door flung open, my son and I were thrown out and the beating started. A light ramp was already prepared there, as for professional shooting, they took several shots with us. They put bags on their heads, threw us on the concrete, started beating us with their feet, breaking our arms.

Then they all appeared as SBU investigators. Only one question was asked: “Do you want your son to stay alive?” I said, of course, yes. They said: “Then you will sign the detention protocol.” I said: “I will have to.” The protocols were immediately ready. We signed, and we were immediately taken to the SBU. In the morning the investigator came and asked a few questions. In fact, they had made ready everything on the case. They said that the main thing at the trial was that I should be silent and not challenge them. The judge named the measure, and they took us to the pre-trial detention center. Before that, an investigator approached us and said, since we have no conflict situations, we will be loyal to you.”

Volunteer Vitaliy spoke about beatings, which Ukrainian servicemen called “unpacking” and “repacking”:

“On 5 July 2015 I was in my store.suddenly, people in camouflage uniforms burst in with the guns and asking: “Where is Dima?” Without explaining which Dima, they began to say: “Get out from the counter, I’ll shoot now.” They put a gun to my head and said: “Now I’ll shoot you, tell me where the phone is.” They began to seize phones, a tablet, a laptop, registrars, money from the cash register, and top-up cards for phones. Then they asked for documents, the title to the car, and the

car keys were confiscated. They put on a bag, threw me into the trunk, tied my hands with tape and took me away. They just brought me in, and immediately pulled me out of the trunk and the beatings began. They kicked me, beat me in the head. I lost consciousness, regained consciousness when they started to drag me into the trailer. The next day, they took us out of the trailer, put us on our knees, and removed the bags from our heads. There was an entire arsenal of weapons in front of us, that is, they filmed it all on camera and said that we were the DPR militants.

Then they put on the bags again, and took us to the trailers. Whoever wanted to, beat us on the way — in the kidneys, in the legs. In the evening — beating, they called it “unpacking”, and they started dragging us into the pit. We spent the night and day in the rain. Periodically, a soldier descended there, he could hit the kidneys — this was called “repacking”, they pulled us tight with the tape.”

The militiaman Petr, captured by the Ukrainian army near Luhansk, also spoke about beatings and an attempt to bury him alive in a pit:

“We were seized, taken to the airport and began to be interrogated and beaten. Then they took me to another room, put me on a chair and injected something, then I only remember how they asked me for my last name, first name, middle name, and then it was as if my memory was cut off.

Then we were taken to Kramatorsk. There we were beaten, kicked on the heels. Then they dug a pit and began to knock us down with a shovel into the pit. They wanted to bury us alive.”

The victim Dmitriy told how in the Galicia battalion they buried him alive in a pit, simulated execution, set fire to a bag on his head: “On 2 August 2014, wearing only a T-shirt, shorts and slippers, without weapons, the National Guard seized me. Immediately a bag was put on my head, my hands were in handcuffs, my legs were in a collar. They brought me, threw me into the pit, and said: “Pray.” They shot from a submachine gun near my ear, set fire to the bag, and I began to hear badly in my left ear.

Then they came for me, I don't know who they were, but I heard they were from the Right Sector. They introduced themselves as the Galicia battalion. I had my passport with me, they tore my passport, threw it into the pit, threw me into the pit and started burying me. They

buried me right up to the neck, then the elder came up, gave them a command, and they pulled me out. Then they took me to a temporary detention center in Kharkov and for an exchange.”

The militiaman Yuriy testified: “The minibus brought me to the checkpoint of the National Guard. I saw a little black — haired boy under twenty. He was undressed, all blue, beaten, his face was swollen, and his whole body was covered in bruises. He was trembling all over. And they shot him. An officer came up from behind — he commanded them all — and shot him in the temple. And then they beat me, then hung me from behind. And so I stayed there for three days.

And then they brought four more young men, and they began to beat them hard and from time to time they did not forget about me. Somehow they loaded us all into a truck. It was all iron and it was so hot in it that there was no air to breathe. They were driving us for about twenty minutes, I began to lose consciousness, one lung was pierced by a rib. One old man’s diaphragm even burst and the intestines fell out. They didn’t beat me in the SBU anymore. Medical assistance was not provided. Only if the consciousness is lost or they see that this is the condition already. My ribs became ingrown. I didn’t feel the tops of my thumbs at all. The head and the whole body were blue. There, a boy was brought from Luhansk, the Aidar battalion took him. He was blue all over, completely all over, one big bruise. They tortured him — they shot him in the leg and cut his finger. The men said that they would let our boys through the minefield there. Out of ten people, half stayed there.”

Alexey, arrested on 20 June 2014 by the SBU officers, stated: “I was seized by unknown people in police uniform. They twisted my arms, my face on the asphalt, struck several blows on my head, on my body, a bag on my head, put me in the car, brought somewhere. As I understood, that was the SBU base, disguised as a car wash, where for several days they carried out interrogations with prejudice, beatings, moral pressure and humiliation.

Then they put me in a jeep and sent us to the village of Evgenyevka near Slavyansk, where they had their headquarters and at the same time a filtration camp. In this filtration camp there were two boxes, which served as places of temporary detention, these are vehicles with booths of small capacity with an area of about 16–20 square meters.

I spent more than twenty days there, people changed every day, new ones were added, on average people spent five to seven days there.

The beatings were regular. They woke me up at night, took me out of this box and took me to the military for interrogation. You go out in handcuffs, and you have a bag on your head. They put you on a chair, and questions are asked from different sides, and then they start hitting you on the head. The conditions of detention, of course, in the filtration camp are just a nightmare, because absolutely all the time you are sitting with a bag on your head or in a plastic bag that is wrapped around your eyes with tape, in handcuffs. Then there were not enough handcuffs, they began to tie one's hands and fingers with zip ties. Well, of course, they tightened everything very tightly, stiffly. The worst thing is that it happened sometimes that people were stuffed into this box to the limit — on 20 square meters 17–18 people sat. You can't even lie down, and that was for several days. When there were a lot of people, they stopped taking them to the toilet, put a bucket in the corner, everyone urinated into this bucket.

They also put us in the pit. A pit about five meters was dug, and they were taken us there — sometimes, all together, sometimes, one by one. There we used to sit in the pit for several days, in the rain, ankle-deep in water.

Then I was transferred to the detention center of the SBU. These were already cells, much more comfortable, much neater. There we were fed. The SBU operating officers, of course, did a lot of things for which they will have to answer. When I had to go to court, there were traces of blood on my T-shirt after the “conversations”. But, of course, they made me take off my T-shirt and put on a shirt to look as nothing happened. At the trial, they gave me a measure of restraint, and I went to a pre-trial detention center, then for exchange.”

Chairman of the humanitarian fund, Alla, testified:

“We were detained by the National Guard under some list. Perhaps they had something on me only because I helped the residents. They quickly put my hands on the hood, put the bag over my head, tightly rewound it — a vein was severely compressed, for three days I could not move my head. When asked to ease the suffering that my head was about to burst, they told me: “You will die, separatist. You know how many of you are buried around here. Finally we were brought to the

Kramatorsk airport. The things that happened there I could not even imagine in a nightmare in my whole life. Bullied is not the right word. In my presence, my husband was beaten in the liver, because I had to say that Russia sponsored weapons, which was not really the case. What did the National Guard do? They put on a bag and strangled a woman who had diabetes, who asked for water. They said: “We’ll give you urine now.”

It was so terrible there that even, to be honest, it’s scary to remember everything, it’s just scary. Then we were taken to Izyum and chained to some kind of horizontal bar. We slept in handcuffs for three days and they gave us a piece of bread there during whole time. Then we were transferred to the Kharkov SBU, placed in a cell, there was more or less OK.”

Militiaman Pavel told how the National Guard mocked him and tore his wounds: “On 19 July 2014 I was taken prisoner. I was fired upon from an ambush from three sides and taken prisoner in serious condition. In captivity they abused us. They beat me on the head and pressed on the wounds, from which blood flowed. I had six bullet wounds plus shrapnel. They dragged, mocked, insulted, took out to shoot.

From the SBU we were sent to the city of Kramatorsk, where we were in the hospital for a day, then we were transferred to the Kharkov SBU, which did not accept us, and we were again admitted to the hospital.

I lost a lot of blood, they beat me on the wounds, pressed on the fragments, on the bullets, put their fingers into the holes from the bullets, twisted in different directions and laughed. They watched me bleed. They filmed their torture and abuse on a video camera. That was the National Guard. The next day they arrived, they wanted to take us away to shoot us, but the other guards did not let them.

Doctors did not pull out the fragments at all. One bullet got stuck in the arm and split the bone. The doctors didn’t do anything, because they didn’t have to. They simply applied ointment and injected painkillers, tried not to bother me anymore, they said “it will heal like this”, “with time it will come out with pus on its own, it’s okay.” The bullets are still in the body.

Then they took me to the SBU. Not cured yet, I was still with septic wounds. People are brought there beaten, with burnt swastikas,

inscriptions “SS.” Other people came with completely broken bodies and faces beyond recognition just like rotten pears. Everything is beaten off, even flesh gets off the bones¹.”

Vivid evidence of crimes against humanity is the activities of the Tornado battalion. The battalion was created under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in December 2014. It was headed by Ruslan Onishchenko, previously convicted three times for rape, robbery and possession of weapons.

In addition to Onishchenko, about 40 other people with an equally extensive criminal past served in Tornado. For example, Vitaliy Dyakon was considered the gray cardinal of the battalion. Prior to the start of the war, he had five convictions, including for robbery, plundering, and rape.

The battalion distinguished itself by particular cruelty towards the civilian population of Donbass. Among the crimes committed by the militants of the unit there are people’s kidnappings and their illegal detention, tortures, incitement to suicide, extortion, robberies, plundering.

Tornado soldiers (they pointed to specific fighters), under the pretext of establishing their identity, abducted them, kept them in the basement for months, abused, mocked and tortured them — beat them especially cruelly, hung them upside down by their legs, cut them with knives².

The scale and character of the killings and mutilations, their planned nature make it possible to qualify these crimes by the Ukrainian authorities and the Ukrainian military as genocide of the civilian population of Donbass.

In the conditions of hostilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and political repressions against those who disagree, the process of state building is taking place in the self-proclaimed republics. On 14 May 2014, at the first plenary session of the parliament, the deputies of the

¹ Facts of genocide and war crimes [website]. URL: https://antimaydan.info/2019/07/18_fakty_genocida_i_voennyh_prestuplenij_protiv_chelovechnosti_ukrainskih.html (access date: 17.04.2022).

² Tornado effect [website]. URL: <https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/10/16/70207-tornado> (access date: 17.04.2022).

Supreme Council of the DPR adopted the Constitution. On 16 May 2014 composition of the first government of the republic was approved. First Alexander Boroday became the head, and then on 7 August 2014 Alexander Vladimirovich Zakharchenko.

After the signing of the Minsk Protocol and the stabilization of the front line, on 2 November 2014 the first elections of deputies of parliament were held — the People’s Council of the DPR, as well as the Head of the Republic.

On 4 November 2014 Alexander Vladimirovich Zakharchenko became the head of the DPR, receiving 77.51 % of the vote.

Zakharchenko was born on June 26, 1976 in the city of Donetsk. He worked at the mine as a mining electrician and was engaged in entrepreneurship. From December 2013, he headed the Donetsk branch of the Oplot public organization. In 2014 he became one of the leaders of the people’s movement in Donbass. He participated in the assault of the building of the Donetsk Regional State Administration. During a critical period, he became the commandant of the city of Donetsk. He personally took part in battles to defend the republic, was wounded in battle and had state awards. He played a key role the development of the statehood of the DPR, formation of the economy and creation of the Armed Forces. On 31 August 2018 Alexander Vladimirovich Zakharchenko died tragically as a result of a terrorist attack organized by the Ukrainian special services.

Leadership of the state chose the path of evolutionary development of legislation. This meant that a number of legal acts of Ukraine continued to operate on the territory of the republic in order to ensure a gradual transition to a new stage of state construction. This step made it possible to use the existing legal framework for progressive development of the judicial and law enforcement systems. At the same time, steps were taken to ban nationalist organizations.

The party system in the region has been transformed. On the basis of a broad coalition of public organizations, as well as initiative groups, two social movements were formed: the public movement “Donetsk Republic”, and the public movement “Free Donbass.” They took part in the first parliamentary elections and formed two factions in the People’s Council.

At this stage, it was possible to solve personnel problems in a short time and form a stable vertical of power. Under the government leadership, the judicial and law enforcement systems were preserved, and the armed forces were reorganized.

In the spring of 2015, the necessary conditions were formed for development of the economy, education and culture. However, this took place in very difficult social and political conditions.

Ukraine failed to destroy the DPR by force and increased efforts to create a comprehensive blockade of Donbass. On 18 February 2015, gas supplies were cut off. In March 2017, a transport blockade began and direct bus service was prohibited. The constant shelling of the region and even the deliberate interruption of the water supply have put Donbass on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe. The Russian Federation sent thousands of tons of humanitarian aid: medicines and food, equipment and building materials.

At this stage, it was important to achieve recognition of the Donetsk People's Republic, to promote international economic and cultural cooperation. Therefore, the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs played an important role. Within the framework of cooperation with the republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a number of interstate agreements were signed. The Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic in 2014 received political recognition from the Republic of South Ossetia and the Republic of Abkhazia. Meetings with informal delegations of a number of European states were also organized. subsequently, representative offices of the DPR were formed in the Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Belgium, Greece, France and other states.

To support compatriots, on 17 February 2017 Alexander Zakharchenko approved the Humanitarian Program for reunification of the people of Donbass. Denis Vladimirovich Pushilin expanded the program to the entire territory of Ukraine. This provided residents with an opportunity to receive material assistance free of charge, to study at universities, and to undergo treatment on the territory of the republic.

Russia provided unprecedented support to compatriots in the Donbass. On 17 March 2017 the Russia-Donbass Integration Committee was established, in which parliamentarians and public figures contributed to economic, educational and cultural integration.

Many activities have been carried out to implement this strategy. Donetsk and Luhansk actively cooperated with a number of Russian regions. support for the DPR grew in Russia and internationally, despite the information blockade. A logical continuation of this policy was the decision of the Russian leadership to recognize documents issued in the DPR, as well as granting the right to obtain citizenship under a simplified procedure.

In domestic policy, the systematic work of the government of the DPR continued. On 6 February 2015 the parliament of the republic adopted the Memorandum “On the foundations of state building, political and historical continuity of the DPR.” This document determined the key vector of development of the state: Donbass is an integral part of the cultural, economic and political space of Russia.

Ukraine tried to make all residents of Donbass stateless. It was necessary to completely rebuild the entire reporting and document management system. Already on 16 May 2016 the first DPR passports were issued.

Formation of the legislation of the republic continued. Main priority was normalization of legal acts with the laws of the Russian Federation, and later the LPR.

On 11 November 2018 elections were held for the head of the republic, in which Denis Vladimirovich Pushilin received the majority of votes. At the same time, deputies of the People’s Council were elected. The turnout was more than 80 %. International observers from Russia and a number of European countries were present at the polling stations. Public movement “Donetsk Republic” received 72.5 % of the votes.

The economic system of the Donetsk People’s Republic is developing in the most difficult conditions. A number of negative factors should be emphasized: the consequences of hostilities and large-scale destruction, rupture of economic ties and outflow of the labour force, deliberate destruction of the economic system of the region by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and mining of agricultural fields.

Attempts to restore industrial potential were accompanied by constant shelling of large enterprises. Desire to reorient the sale of products ran into fierce resistance from Kiev and European diplomats in the international arena. Under the threat of sanctions, many partners refused to cooperate with the Donbass. russia again became a key economic partner for Donetsk and Luhansk.

An important step in the development of the economy was the formation of the monetary system of the DNR. On 25 March 2015, the multicurrency financial system was officially introduced. That was the first stage of transition from the hryvnia to the Russian ruble. On 1 September 2015 the ruble was approved as the single currency. This decision made it possible to establish strong ties with the Russian Federation and other partners.

The Central Republican Bank of the DPR played a key role in the development of its financial sector. The employees of the CRB promptly created a unique digital payment system. Centralized issuance of all types of salaries and social benefits through regional branches and ATMs began.

The fuel and metallurgical sector of the economy was the flagship of the region's economy. Restoration of these enterprises made it possible not only to establish sales of products, but also to ensure payment of wages to a significant number of residents of the republic. In 2016, according to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, 24 large enterprises of various profiles resumed their activities. The most important was a resumption of the activities of the Yuzovsky Metallurgical Plant, the Donfrost Refrigeration Equipment Plant and other enterprises.

The budget sphere was formed, taking into account the current economic situation. Until 2016, the budget of the DPR was drawn up on a monthly basis. At the end of 2018, it was announced for the first time that the annual budget of the republic was approved for the next year.

Between 1991–2014 the region accumulated a lot of unresolved problems in the area of housing and communal services. In addition to the restoration of enterprises destroyed as a result of shelling, it was necessary to reconstruct many objects.

With the support of the government, the agriculture of the DPR is actively developing. After demining and systematization of the land survey, the area under crops was significantly expanded. The government responds flexibly to changes in the economic situation and raises purchase prices for agricultural products. Preferences were given to the manufacturers of consumer goods. “Miners Poultry Farm”, due to support, has increased production volumes and ensured a stable supply of high quality products in the region.

Culture and education in the Donbass suffered greatly from the actions of the Kiev authorities. In the previous period, many teachers actively resisted Ukrainianization and an imposition of nationalist ideology, and in 2014 supported the DPR.

The Kiev regime planned to withdraw all educational institutions to the territory controlled by the state of Ukraine. Students and teachers were promised salaries and diplomas supposedly recognized in Europe. History has shown that no one needed them. Higher educational institutions were subsequently reorganized and even closed.

A significant part of the teaching staff remained in the Donbass. Despite the shelling and the destruction of schools, they continued to bring the light of knowledge and supported their students, as best they could. A number of teachers died on the job.

Restoration of educational institutions was accompanied by the formation of a new system of state standards, purified from nationalist ideology. Over time, all educational institutions in the region have switched to advanced Russian standards and issue state diplomas of the Russian Federation.

In conditions of military confrontation with Ukraine, the Luhansk People's Republic purposefully carried out the formation of the state authorities — a unified and balanced system of state administration.

The process of state building in the Luhansk People's Republic can be divided into two stages:

- 1) the stage of creating new administrative bodies in the conditions of the active phase of the hostilities (May 2014 — March 2015);
- 2) the stage of formation of a unified political system (April 2015 — February 2022).

The Luhansk People's Republic is a unitary republic of the presidential type, in which the procedure for formation of public authorities is established by the Constitution and legislation. The head of the republic is the Head, who ensures an interaction of all authorities. The highest legislative body is the People's Council; the highest executive body is the government; the highest judicial body is the Supreme Court. A system of law enforcement agencies has been formed and is functioning productively in the republic, as well as the People's Militia of the LPR, which provides protection for the citizens of the republic.

Armed aggression of Ukraine provoked negative phenomena in the social and economic area of the republic. Therefore, after the end of the active phase of hostilities in the republic, a difficult and lengthy process of restoring the national economy took place.

Under the conditions of the economic blockade and incessant shelling from Ukraine, the LPR has gone through a difficult path of forming a social state with a steadily developing economy. This process can be roughly divided into two stages:

1. September 2014 – 2017: the stage of restoration of the destroyed economy, establishment of a normal life of the republic in the conditions of economic (banking, pension, energy, water, transport, food) blockade by Ukraine.

Priorities: restoration of destroyed housing, creation of a financial system (banking, monetary, budgetary, tax), resumption of work of industrial enterprises;

2. 2018 — early 2022: the stage of strategic planning of social and economic development through adoption of the five-year program of social and economic development “Our Choice” (2018) and on its basis — nationwide, territorial and targeted programs.

Hostilities in the Donbass, political terror, persecution of dissidents, economic and social problems, and a gigantic scale of corruption led to a drop in the popularity of President Petr Poroshenko and other Euromaidan figures and an increase of the protest moods. In the 2019 elections, the protest against the current government ensured the victory of the popular Ukrainian actor Vladimir Zelenskiy.

In the first round, on 31 March, Zelenskiy received 30.24% of the votes, while Poroshenko received half as much, 15.95%. In the second round, Zelenskiy scored 73.22%, Poroshenko — 24.45%.

Vladimir Zelenskiy promised an early cessation of hostilities, normalization of relations with Russia and the fight against corruption. However, none of these promises were fulfilled. Moreover, the situation has only worsened. If Petr Poroshenko, at least in words, expressed his readiness to comply with the terms of the Minsk agreements, Vladimir Zelenskiy declared an impossibility of their implementation. On 6 October 2020, he stated that Ukraine would not comply with the terms of the agreements, which state that the transfer of control over the border in Donbass to Kiev is possible

only after implementation of elections under Ukrainian laws in Donbass¹.

The practice of violating freedom of speech, prosecution of journalists and harassing of opposition politicians continued. In February 2021, three leading opposition channels were closed: 112 Ukraine, *NewsOne* and ZIK. Sanctions were imposed against the Verkhovna Rada deputy and member of the Opposition Platform — For Life party, Taras Kozak. Employees of closed channels in a joint statement accused the Ukrainian authorities of wanting to hide the truth from the population: “We believe that the government, which does not have the slightest reason to talk about success, leaves on the air only convenient channels that will lie to the people of Ukraine about “unprecedented” success².”

In May 2021 the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine brought charges of treason against Viktor Medvedchuk, leader of the party Opposition Platform — For Life. The head of the Security Service of Ukraine, Ivan Bakanov, declared that Medvedchuk handed over to Taras Kozak for further transfer to the Russian special services “secret data on the location of a secret military unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine — on its personnel and combat training³.” Additionally, there is a large-scale massacre of opposition politicians and journalists.

Discrimination against the Russian and Russian-speaking population on the basis of language is intensifying. At the same time, Vladimir Zelenskiy continues and develops practices established after the Euromaidan.

Starting from the moment of the coup in February 2014, the radical political forces that came to power in Ukraine pursued a conscious and consistent policy of discrimination against the Russian and Russian-

¹ Zelenskiy openly refused to comply with the terms of the Minsk agreements [website]. URL: <https://ukraina.ru/news/20201006/1029145020.html> (access date: 24.04.2022).

² Sanctions against our own: three TV channels were closed in Ukraine [website]. URL: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2021/02/03_a_13465088.shtml? (access date: 24.04.2022).

³ The Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine decided to achieve the arrest of Medvedchuk [website]. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/12/05/2021/609c159b9a7947335984631b> (access date: 24.04.2022).

speaking population of the country as part of the destruction of the equality of citizens of Ukraine in the political and social and cultural areas.

With its first decision of 23 February 2014, the Verkhovna Rada abolished the Law “On Fundamentals of the State Language Policy”, which provides for granting the Russian language the status of a regional language in those regions in which the Russian-speaking population accounted for at least 10 % of the total number of residents (13 out of 27 territorial units of Ukraine, including the Donetsk and Luhansk regions). The Russian language was deprived of the status of a regional language, and the Russian-speaking population, including residents of Donbass, lost an opportunity to officially use the Russian language¹.

The final blow to the Russian language was made five years later. On 16 July 2019, the Law of Ukraine “On Provision of Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language” came into force. The law regulates the use of the Ukrainian language as the only state language in all areas of public life throughout the country. It has become mandatory for state authorities and local governments, all educational institutions, hospitals and the service sector. Exceptions apply only to private communication and religious rites. It also establishes a circle of persons who are required to be fluent in the Ukrainian language. This rule will affect not only the top leadership in the person of the president, the prime minister, members of the cabinet of ministers and deputies, but also teachers, medical workers, lawyers and notaries.

The law established the mandatory use of the Ukrainian language by officials during meetings, events, negotiations and working communication. Moreover, employees of the public authorities are now required to use versions of computer programs with a Ukrainian-language interface. Internet sites, pages in social networks of state bodies, enterprises and state media will have to be in Ukrainian.

In particular, the use of the Ukrainian language has become mandatory in the judicial process, the army, law enforcement agencies, advertising, during election campaigns and referendums².

¹ The Verkhovna Rada canceled the law on status of the Russian language [website]. URL: <https://ria.ru/20140223/996527008.html> (access date: 06.11.2021).

² Language law came into force in Ukraine [website]. URL: <https://ukraina.ru/news/20190716/1024258882.html> (access date: 06.11.2021).

Thus, Ukraine has legally established the principle of discrimination against citizens of the country on the basis of language. Together with other violations of human rights in the political and social and cultural area, the ban on the Russian language is a gross violation of the norms and principles of humanitarian law.

The problem of discrimination on the basis of language had to be recognized even by the international structures. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission recorded in Ukraine manifestations of hatred against Russian-speaking groups of the population and other national minorities. This is stated in the report of the organization. The document also notes that Kiev must immediately adopt a law on the protection of the linguistic rights of national minorities¹.

Over the years of independence, Ukraine has not only lost the competitive advantages of its economic base, but has become an economic outsider both in Europe and the post-Soviet space.

The volume of Ukraine's GDP in 2020, according to the World Bank, amounted to USD545.1 billion. Ukraine ranks 40th by this indicator. In other words, over 30 years it has dropped 20 positions down. If in 1990 Ukraine was ahead of Poland, now Ukraine's GDP is 2.4 times less than Poland's GDP².

In terms of GDP per capita, there is a steady downward trend. In 2021, for the first time in 30 years, Ukraine ranked last among European countries. In the world, Ukraine ranks 90th by this indicator. If in 1990 Ukraine was ahead of most of the Soviet republics, now it is inferior to almost all countries of the post-Soviet space, except for Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Compared with Russia, Ukraine's GDP per capita is more than two times less³.

¹ "Rhetoric of hatred and threats": how the UN discovered discrimination against national minorities in Ukraine [website]. URL: <https://ru.rt.com/i1be> (access date: 15.04.2022).

² GDP of the countries of the world in 1990–2020 World Bank [website]. URL: <https://svspb.net/danmark/vvp-stran-wb.php> (access date: 19.02.2022).

³ Report for Selected Countries and Subjects: October 2021 [сайт]. — URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/October/weo-report?c=512,914,612,171,614,311,213,911,314,193,122,912,313,419,513,316,913,124,339,638,514,218,963,616,223,516,918,748,618,624,522,622,156,626,628,228,924,233,632,636,634,238,662,960,423,935,128,611,321,243,248,469,253>,

The public debt of the country is constantly growing. If in 1994 it was USD4.8 billion, and the external debt was about USD3.6 billion¹, then in 2020 the external debt alone amounted to USD125.8 billion².

At the same time, it is advisable to divide the fall of the Ukrainian economy into two stages. The first stage covers the 1990s. The period from 1991 to 1999 is the result of radical economic transformations and generally corresponds to similar processes in neighboring countries of the post-Soviet space, including the Russian Federation. The second stage began after the Euromaidan and was caused by a radical break of the economic ties with Russia, the repressive policy of the Maidan authorities against the Russian and Russian-speaking population, the war against their own people in the Donbass, an exorbitant level of corruption, dominance of the oligarchs and an increasing economic dependence on Western capital. Thus, the level of the GDP decline in 2015 amounted to 9.8%, while the GDP of neighboring countries at the same time showed steady growth³.

The infrastructure is in a disastrous state. In fact, Ukraine “eats through” the legacy of the USSR without investing in the development of the infrastructure projects. Thus, the degree of deterioration of the gas transmission system is more than 90%. Thus, according to Boris Martsinkevich, editor-in-chief of the analytical online

642,643,939,734,644,819,172,132,646,648,915,134,652,174,328,258,656,654,336,263,268,532,944,176,534,536,429,433,178,436,136,343,158,439,916,664,826,542,967,443,917,544,941,446,666,668,672,946,137,546,674,676,548,556,678,181,867,682,684,273,868,921,948,943,686,688,518,728,836,558,138,196,278,692,694,962,142,449,564,565,283,853,288,293,566,964,182,359,453,968,922,714,862,135,716,456,722,942,718,724,576,936,961,813,726,199,733,184,524,361,362,364,732,366,144,146,463,528,923,738,578,537,742,866,369,744,186,925,869,746,926,466,112,111,298,927,846,299,582,487,474,754,698,&s=PPPPC,&sy=2020&ey=2021&ssm=0&scsm=1&ssc=0&ssd=1&ssc=0&sic=1&sort=country&ds=,&br=1 (дата обращения: 19.02.2022).

¹ Way Down. What Ukraine was like in 1991 and what it has become in 2018 [website]. URL: <https://ukraina.ru/exclusive/20180824/1020911928.html> (access date: 19.02.2022).

² External debts of the countries [website]. URL: <https://svspb.net/danmark/vneshnij-dolg-stran.php> (access date: 19.02.2022).

³ International Monetary Fund [website]. URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLS/world-economic-outlook-databases#sort=%40imfdate%20descending> (access date: 19.02.2022).

magazine Geoenergetika.ru, “the last technical audit was carried out by German specialists in 2015. At that time, they estimated a degree of depreciation (wear and tear) at 85 %. According to preliminary estimates, about 12 billion euros are required to bring it into line with modern standards. Another six years have passed. From what we know as third party observers from the sources inside Ukraine, that out of 100 % allocated for scheduled preventive maintenance, 30 % are actually received. It is very difficult to say in what state the system is now¹.”

Serious negative changes have occurred in the scientific and technical potential of Ukraine. The number of scientists has decreased by more than three times². Design bureaus and research institutes have closed.

The industry was hit particularly hard. The rupture of industrial chains with Russia, the artificial restriction of economic contacts with Russia have led to the fact that over the past 10 years, industry has declined by more than 20 %³. As a result, Ukraine has become a “graveyard of factories.” Among the factories closed after the Euromaidan are unique enterprises that successfully competed with the European and Russian plant, which have no analogues in the world.

The Kremenchug Steel Plant, which manufactured carriage beams and frames, went bankrupt. More than 90 % of its products were sent to Russia. The Antonov Aircraft Concern, the automobile plants ZAZ, Chasiv Yar, Cherkasy Bus, LAZ, nitrogen plants Rivneazot and Severodonetsk Azot Association, Vesta Battery Plant, Dnepropetrovsk Combine Plant, Dnepropetrovsk Pipe Plant, Plant Dneproshina, Lvovselmash Agricultural Machinery Plant, Zaporizhia Valve Plant, Zaporozhye Steel Rolling Plant, Zaporozhye Ferroalloy Plant,

¹ The GTS of Ukraine resembles patchwork, the expert said [website]. URL: <https://ria.ru/20210904/gaz-1748693901.html> (access date: 19.02.2022).

² Before and After. From Socialism to Complete Independence [website]. URL: <https://rian.com.ua/columnist/20160818/1014892653.html> (access date: 19.02.2022).

³ Significant! Over a decade, the industry of Ukraine has decreased by 22 % [website]. URL: <https://regnum.ru/news/economy/2842206.html> (access date: 19.02.2022).

Kremenchug Automobile Assembly Plant, Azovmash Machine-Building Plant, Kharkov Aviation Plant, Kharkov Tractor Plant¹.

The result was a significant reduction of the key production indicators. Iron ore production is half of the Soviet level (1990). Steel — a little more than a third of the Soviet period. The situation is no better in the agricultural sector. Production of vegetable oil is 32 % of 1990, sugar — 62 %, livestock products — 72 %².

At the same time, the fall of the real economy is accompanied by corruption and a growth of the shadow economy. According to the expert estimates, the volume of the shadow economy in 2019 was a giant 42 % of Ukraine's GDP³.

Important changes have taken place in foreign trade. Since 2006, Ukraine has consistently had a negative foreign trade balance, importing more goods and services than exporting. The structure of exports and imports has differed significantly. Key imports are: cars (6.5 %), oil and oil products (6.3 %), medicines (3.7 %), coal (3.1 %) and gas (2.7 %). Key exports are: sunflower oil (10.8 %), corn (9.9 %), ores and concentrates (8.6 %), wheat (7.3 %)⁴.

The structure of foreign trade allows us to conclude that in 30 years Ukraine has turned from an industrial and agrarian country into an agrarian one, the main product of which is agricultural products, as well as some categories of natural resources.

Ukraine, after the 2014 coup and the illegal coming to power of politicians oriented towards the West and supporting neo-Nazi ideas, is a state hostile to Russia.

The Ukrainian state was ideologically, politically and militarily formed by the United States as an instrument of pressure to weaken and ultimately destroy Russia, even at the expense of the self-destruction and the loss of the Ukrainian statehood.

¹ Ukraine has become a “graveyard of factories.” [website]. URL: <https://newsland.com/community/4765/content/ukraina-prevratilas-v-kladbish-chezavodov/5319323> (access date: 19.02.2022).

² GDP of Ukraine: table by years, dynamics [website]. URL: <https://bbq-cash.com/economics/gdp-of-ukraine> (access date: 19.02.2022).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ukraine. Import and export [website]. URL: <https://trendeconomy.ru/data/h2/Ukraine/TOTAL> (access date: 19.02.2022).

For implementation of this geopolitical super-task, the USA, through controlled military, economic and political structures, developed a plan to strike Russia in the most unfavorable ways (many options were developed — conflicts at the borders of Russia, arrangement of man-made disasters and blaming Russia for them, concentration of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the use of significant superiority in forces during the attack on the DNR and LNR). Preparations were carried out for several years, and at the beginning of 2022, intensive hostilities began, initiated by the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine which required the evacuation of the population from parts of DPR and LPR.

Ukrainian leaders have been saying for eight years that they are at war with Russia. At the same time, they committed war crimes in the Donbass, banned the Russian language and Russian culture.

Ukraine has a significant military potential, which poses a serious danger to Russia and Russian citizens. The Ukrainian army is one of the largest in Europe. If in 2014 it consisted of only 125 thousand military personnel, eight years later its number doubled, amounting to 250 thousand people. Ukraine is armed with almost 3,000 tanks, more than 8,000 armored combat vehicles, and 3,000 pieces of artillery. At the same time, there are another 1 million reservists, and 400 thousand people with combat experience.

For comparison, the British army has 145 thousand people and the number of tanks is 407 units. The quantity of the French army is 202 thousand people and the French army is armed with 423 tanks.

Separately, it is necessary to note the cooperation of Ukraine with the NATO military alliance. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military and political bloc of Western countries created during the Cold War to contain the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it not only did not cease to exist, but, on the contrary, expanded its activities, including the practice of missions “outside the traditional area of responsibility”, claiming status of a global security organization.

The organization currently has 30 members. Since the 1990s it has also launched a network of partnerships with the third world countries. Through military assistance programs, NATO promotes a transition of their armed forces to the Western organizational and technical standards.

Since the 2000s there was a consistent expansion of the military infrastructure of the bloc near the borders of Russia. The first step was air patrol missions in the Baltic countries. In 2016, multinational battalion groups were deployed in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia. In a number of cases, the presence is formally increased outside the framework of NATO. For example, the United States deploys missile defense facilities in Romania and Poland on the basis of bilateral agreements with these countries.

Relations between Ukraine and NATO began to take shape immediately after the declaration of independence of Ukraine. In 1992, Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, a forum created to develop NATO cooperation with the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. In 1994, Ukraine signed an agreement with NATO as part of the Partnership for Peace initiative. In 2002, Ukraine signed the Individual Partnership Plan with NATO. In 2005, after the Orange Revolution, cooperation between Ukraine and NATO acquired the character of “Accelerated Dialogue”, a special format that was the first step towards Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

In 2008, the Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko asked NATO to include Ukraine in the NATO Membership Action Plan. In 2008, at the Bucharest NATO summit, a decision was made on Ukraine’s entry into NATO when Ukraine will meet the requirements for members of the organization.

Expansion of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO occurred after the 2014 coup. In 2017, the NATO membership was proclaimed a foreign policy priority of Ukraine. In 2019, constitutional amendments entered into force, recording Ukraine’s strategic course towards NATO membership at the constitutional and legal level.

On 12 June 2020 the North Atlantic Council granted Ukraine a status of “Partner with Enhanced Opportunities.” At the Brussels NATO Summit in June 2021, NATO leaders confirmed that Ukraine will be provided with a “NATO Membership Action Plan” in the future.

Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO in practical terms, Ukraine’s participation in NATO military and peacekeeping operations, joint military exercises, arms supplies has a 30-year history. For the first time in 1992, Ukraine sent a military contingent

of 1303 people to Yugoslavia to help NATO. In total, Ukraine took part in six NATO and UN peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, helping NATO to finally consolidate the disintegration of the Yugoslav state.

From 2007 to 2021, Ukrainian servicemen took part in the NATO operations in Afghanistan. From 2003 to 2008, the Ukrainian military took part in the military operations in Iraq as part of the peacekeeping forces, which were based on the armies of NATO countries.

The Ukrainian army was systematically preparing for military operations with the most active participation of the NATO countries. In the last three months alone, preceding Russia's special military operation, Ukraine received 1,200 tons of military cargo from NATO countries, including such modern high-precision weapons as the American *FGM-148* Javelin anti-tank systems and British *NLAW* grenade launchers. In August 2021, the Defense Ministers of the United States and Ukraine signed an agreement on foundations of the defense partnership, which implies a significant expansion of military cooperation.

The US defense budget adopted in December 2021 provides for the supply of modern air and missile defense systems to Ukraine. At the same time, a serious NATO infrastructure was created in the form of training centers and training camps. Thus, according to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in December 2021, 10,000 military instructors from the NATO countries were on the territory of Ukraine.

At the end of 2021 thousands of mercenaries representing various Western private military companies arrived in Ukraine to take part in the hostilities in the Donbass. By April 2022, in Ukraine, the Russian army is opposed by 6824 mercenaries, representing mainly Western countries.

A possibility of creation and use of nuclear weapons by Ukraine is of particular danger. On 19 February 2022 President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelenskiy announced Ukraine's readiness to refuse to comply with the terms of the Budapest Memorandum. In other words, start developing nuclear weapons. Zelenskiy, particularly, said the following: "I'm initiating consultations within the framework of the Budapest Memorandum... If they do not take place again or there are

no security guarantees as a result of them... Ukraine will have every right to believe that the memorandum does not work, and all the 1994 Set decisions will be doubted.”

Another serious threat to Russia’s security is the US biological laboratories in Ukraine. 30 military biological laboratories were deployed here, eight of them in Kiev, five in Odessa, three in Lvov, two each in Kharkov and Kherson. According to the Ministry of Defense, samples of human tissue and blood serum, as well as dangerous pathogens and their carriers, were exported from Ukrainian laboratories abroad. According to Igor Kirillov, Chief of the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Forces of the Armed Forces, the American biological laboratories in Ukraine “were engaged in full-scale military biological activities¹.”

In the laboratories of Ukraine, a possibility of spreading cholera, typhoid fever and hepatitis through the waterways was studied, said Igor Kirillov, head of the troops of radiation, chemical and biological protection of the Russian Armed Forces. He stated the following:

“During the work, Ukrainian specialists, under the supervision of American scientists, systematically took water samples in a number of large rivers of Ukraine, including Dnieper, Dunay, Dnestr, as well as in the North Crimean Canal, in order to establish the presence of especially dangerous pathogens, including pathogens of cholera, typhoid fever, hepatitis A and E, and draw conclusions about a possibility of their spread by water”².

Thus, the military threats posed by Ukraine and NATO were complex and included both the militarization of Ukraine, arming and preparation of its NATO-led army for war with Russia, as well as development of weapons of the mass destruction.

On 21 February 2022, Russia recognized the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic, which population

¹ The Ministry of Defense showed a map of biological laboratories in Ukraine [website]. URL: https://lenta.ru/news/2022/03/24/labbb/?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop (access date: 14.04.2022).

² Ministry of Defense: Ukrainian bio-laboratories planned to spread cholera along the rivers of Europe [website]. URL: https://vz.ru/news/2022/4/14/1153757.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop

experienced an armed aggression of the Kiev regime for eight years.

After the Russian Federation recognized the sovereignty of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, an intensity of shelling of the territory of the DPR and LPR by the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the armed units of Ukrainian nationalists increased significantly.

Ombudsman of the Donetsk People's Republic Daria Morozova announced an escalation of aggression by the Kiev authorities:

“After a decision of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to recognize the Republics of Donbass, Ukraine is defiantly increasing its armed aggression in the region.

It is noted that since Monday evening, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been continuously striking along the entire front line, using heavy weapons.

It is obvious that the events of recent days did not bring Ukraine down to earth. Kiev does not abandon attempts to implement a forceful scenario for resolving the conflict in Donbass,” the Ombudsman said in a statement¹.

On 22 February 2022 the Ukrainian military committed sabotage on the Donetsk-Gorlovka highway.

“According to operational information, it became known that this morning on 22 February, Ukrainian saboteurs detonated a mine-explosive device on the Donetsk-Gorlovka highway. As a result of the terrorist attack, three civilians, who were moving along the indicated route in a vehicle, were killed,” Eduard Basurin, a representative of the People's Militia of the Donetsk People's Republic, said in a statement.

The head of the administration of Donetsk, Alexey Kulemzin, said that water supply stopped in the village of Elenovka in the Donetsk People's Republic due to damage of the transformer which occurred during shelling by the armed forces of Ukraine.

“As a result of artillery shelling by the Ukrainian armed forces, a transformer located in the gray area, west of the village of Vasilyevka,

¹ Donbass. Work tape of military events. 22.02.2022 [website]. URL: <https://voicesevas.ru/news/yugo-vostok/63699-donbass-operativnayalenta-voennyh-sobytyi-22022022.html> (access date: 27.04.2022).

Yasinovatskiy district, was damaged. As a result, the 1st ascent of the South Donbass water conduit was stopped,” he wrote¹.

On the morning of 22 February, about fifty artillery shells and mines were fired on the territory of the DPR by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The areas of the settlements of Staromikhaylovka, Dzerzhinskoye, Leninskoye in the Donetsk and Mariupol directions were under the enemy fire. 122 mm cannons and 120 mm mortars were used. Within two hours, from 06:00 to 08:00, 55 missiles were fired across the territory of the Republic. The villages of Aleksandrovka and Staromikhaylovka in the west of Donetsk and the village of Stylya in the south of the DPR were under the fire of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

During the day, the settlements of Petrovskoye, Naberezhnoye, Bezymennoye, Bogdanovka, Pavlopol, Novolaspa, Novaya Maryevka, Belaya Kamenka, Dokuchaevsk, Golmovsky, Ozeryanovka, Zheleznaya Balka, Vasilyevka, Panteleymonovka, Kominternovo, Staromikhaylovka, Sosnovskoye, Zaitsevo and Oktyabr were also shelled. The outskirts of Gorlovka and Yasinovataya were under fire.

In total, more than 312 shells, mines and grenades were fired across the territory of the DPR.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine also shelled a number of settlements in the Luhansk People’s Republic: the urban-type settlements of Donetsk and Kalinovo, the villages of Zolotoe-5, Sokolniki, Nizhne Lozovoe, Sanzharovka, Veselaya Gora and Zheltoe.

According to the representative office of the LPR in the JCCC, Ukrainian armed forces fired 27 times on 16 settlements in the area of responsibility of the LPR.

The shelling was conducted from 120-mm and 82-mm mortars, 122-mm artillery pieces, SPG-9 mounted anti-tank grenade launchers, AGS-17 automatic mounted grenade launchers, RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchers, heavy machine guns and small rifles.

On 22 February, for the first time since 2018, the Armed Forces of Ukraine used the Grad volley fire system during shelling of the Kievskiy

¹ Shelling, killed people and banned equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: what the authorities of the DPR and LPR report [website]. URL: <https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2022/02/22/14564161.shtml?ysclid=12hallh35i> (access date: 27.04.2022).

district of Donetsk. Five BM-21 Grad missiles were fired across the territory of the republican capital city.

An attempt was made on life of the ex-Minister of Defense of the DPR. The explosion roared in the Kalininskiy district of Donetsk. The target of the terrorists was the former head of the Ministry of Defense Vladimir Kononov. There was also an explosion in a four-story building of the editorial building of the Donetsk television center in the Leninskiy district of Donetsk.

On 23 February 2022 shelling of the territory of the DPR and LPR continued.

Over three hundred shells, mines and grenades exploded in different regions of the DPR in a day. Three civilians were killed.

The Luhansk People's Republic was also under fire around the clock. In just a day, the Kiev armed forces violated the "silence regime" 114 times in the area of responsibility of the LPR.

Due to Ukraine's ongoing aggressive actions against the DPR and LPR, the armies of the people's republics began hostilities against the aggressors. On 24 February, Russia, within the framework of allied relations, came to the aid of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic and launched a special military operation. Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined as its goals "protection of people who for eight years have been exposed to bullying, genocide by the Kiev regime." For this, according to him, it is planned to carry out "demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine", to bring to justice all war criminals responsible for "bloody crimes against civilians" in Donbass.

On 23–27 September 2022 referendums were held in the Donetsk People's Republic, the Luhansk People's Republic, and the liberated Zaporozhye and Kherson regions. They demonstrated the unconditional support of the population for an idea of joining Russia. The turnout amounted to 92.6% in the LPR, 97.51% in the DPR, 85.4% in the Zaporozhye region, and 76.86% in the Kherson region. The overwhelming majority of participants of the referendums voted for entry of the republics and regions into Russia. In the LPR this decision was supported by 98.42%, in the DPR — 99.23%. In the Zaporozhye region, 93.11% voted for independence from Ukraine and joining Russia, in the Kherson region — 87.05%.

Russia supported a decision of people of the liberated territories. On 30 September 2022 agreements were signed on admission of the Donetsk People's Republic, the Luhansk People's Republic, the Zaporozhye and the Kherson regions to the Russian Federation. On 3 October the State Duma unanimously adopted federal constitutional laws on the formation of four new subjects of the Federation in the Russian Federation. The next day, the laws were also unanimously approved by the Federation Council and signed by the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin. New subjects became the parts of Russia.

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